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We are nomads 
Travellers of the cosmos 
Pilgrims on a journey to explore the world 
To meet each other, to love, to share 
There is no end to life 
The stars spin and jump in an infinite vortex 
In the whirlwind we climb up and down, dancing and blown 
To discover, meet, love, share 
Dream waves and dreams 
Here is the subplot of post-eternal life 
We remain suspended for a while 
We get to know each other deeply, meet, love each other and share information 
In this eternal life 
Whirling and dancing in circles and swirls of infinity 
Call me sublime 
We've been in step for a while to meet, to love, to share 
Go to war 
Life would be gone 
This is a great value now 
Meet each other, know each other, love each other, share everything with each other 
And things that happen worldwide 
Are part of the destination 
A tiny parenthesis in the nothingness of eternity 
To meet each other, to meet, to love, to share life 
We stand on this earth for a while, 
Little brackets forever, 
A small glance in eternity, 
To get to know each other, meet, love, share 
These travellers are on an endless journey, 
Hovering and dancing in infinity swirls, 
We stopped for a short time, 
Because we met for a short meeting, to love, to share life 
 
Adapted from Paulo Coelho, The Alchemist (1988) by Joëlle Stocker  
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Preface by Chief Fortune Charumbira1 
 
This book is about life and death – there is no other way to put it. 
And now is the right time to be discussing this critical issue, which 
has become a thorn in the side of those who are eager to see a better 
world. It is, therefore, my sincere hope that this book will motivate 
us to come up with a plan that can be used to find solutions for people 
on the move in Libya and the Horn of Africa. 
 
I am currently the Vice President of the Pan African Parliament, 
which is an organ of the African Union. It represents the voices of 
African people. Among other functions, it is the guardian of 
democracy, human rights, good governance, accountability and 
transparency on the African continent. 
 
In this book, you will read about refugees and their shocking stories. 
Their testimonies reveal modern-day slavery in Africa. The heart 
breaking and horrific stories that I have read here involve the 
violation of human rights of the highest order. We need to do all in 
our power to end these practices and stop slavery in Africa. 
 
In Africa, our tradition obliges us as leaders to listen to the troubles 
of our people. I have personally spent time listening to the suffering 
of the refugees who crossed from the Horn to Sudan and Chad, 
surviving the dire situation in Libya and crossing the Mediterranean 
Sea. The devastating testimonies that I heard are reflected in this 
book, which is a courageous attempt to understand these experiences 
based on the voices of refugees – most of whom end up finding a 
place on African soil. 
 
I have been particularly concerned about the dehumanising 
experiences encountered by Eritrean migrants and others who have 
suffered at the hands of human traffickers. These are clearly crimes 
 
1 This preface was adapted from a speech given by the author at the conference 
‘We the People! Peace in the Horn: The Safety and Future of the Eritrean People’ 
held in Brussels, Belgium from 13 to 14 December 2019. 
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against humanity. Millions of Eritreans have been systematically 
displaced from their motherland, with thousands seeking refuge in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Niger, Uganda, Kenya, Israel and Libya, among 
other places. The story of the Afar people, who have been 
marginalised, displaced, dispossessed, and victimised, is equally 
touching and requires urgent attention.  
 
Some refugees find themselves in countries like Libya, where they 
endure cruel treatment at the hands of prisons officials and the Libyan 
Coast Guard, who’s brief is to ensure that no one crosses over to 
Europe. Shockingly, we are told that Europe’s invisible hand is ever 
present in funding the Libyan Coastal Guard, which harasses our 
brothers and sisters. Another shocking revelation is about the 
network of rich and powerful people involved in the human 
trafficking trade in Europe and Africa. 
 
I would like to think that as the European Union preaches respect for 
human rights, as enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, its voice must be the loudest in calling for an end to 
the ill treatment of migrants. Europe, which projects itself as a 
champion and enforcer of human rights, risks losing dignity and 
integrity if it continues to contribute to the inhumane and degrading 
treatment of African migrants. 
 
On behalf of the Pan African Parliament, I can say that we now have 
a full picture of what is going on in Libya and in the Horn. My heart 
bleeds when we talk about the slavery of the people of Africa. I see 
our people following a familiar, but unpleasant, journey; one that our 
forefathers travelled during the slave trade. As Vice President of the 
Pan African Parliament, I can assure you that we will compile all the 
sad stories that I have heard and present them to the parliament. 
 
Also, as President of the Chief Council in my home country, 
Zimbabwe, I am the custodian of our morals and cultural values. 
Hence, I know very well that it is shockingly evil to treat a human 
being as an animal. In African culture, human life is sacrosanct and 
we respect both the living and the dead. It is, therefore, worrying 
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when our colleagues across the oceans in the European Union seem 
to take a lukewarm approach to ending these problems, which are 
affecting innocent people. In order to have a world in which human 
beings are treated as equals, it is high time that we embrace democracy 
in its totality. People, no matter which part of the world they come 
from, deserve to be treated with dignity and respect. 
 
Today, Africans are being seen as a ‘nuisance’ in the West, with many 
of our brothers and sisters perishing as they try to run away from their 
countries. We need to have a deeper understanding of how this whole 
thing started. The problems affecting the Third World, especially the 
African continent, are explicable in terms of history. An attempt to 
understand the continent outside the various historical trajectories it 
went through is an exercise in futility. The continent lacks a distinctive 
historicity, hence, Mbembe (1992) describes the postcolonial 
situation in Africa as “chaotically pluralistic”. 
 
Because of the emotive nature of this subject, allow me to be blunt 
by saying that the problems that we have in Africa, at large, and in the 
Horn, in particular, are the creation of those who sat somewhere in 
Berlin in 1884 and divided up our motherland. What followed only 
worked to brew chaos in Africa. At that time, the Europeans 
themselves were illegal migrants in Africa. But today they are treating 
our brothers and sisters as animals. The historical legacy of slavery, 
colonialism and the perpetual struggle to find authentic self-
expression has only served to produce multifaceted challenges. At the 
heart of these struggles lies the need to achieve distributive justice in 
the face of material lack and political gamesmanship.  
 
The embers of hope ignited by colonial independence are fast dying, 
with mass disillusionment, civil unrest and structural violence 
threatening the very foundations of independence. The use of force, 
coercion and brutality to achieve political goals has remained indelibly 
etched on the people in the Horn of Africa. Such use of violence to 
quell real or perceived threats to national security has left deep scars 
on communities in Africa. There is an apparent lack of open dialogue 
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about the need to correct past and ongoing threats to peace, resulting 
in the sustenance of both open and latent strife among citizens. 
 
Let me thank the editors of this book for their valuable efforts to 
make this important publication a reality. To Professor Mirjam Van 
Reisen, please accept my sincere and deep felt gratitude. To Professor 
Munyaradzi Mawere, who is a prolific writer and an African 
philosopher who makes Africa proud, and to all the editors and 
authors who have put their heart and soul into this book, I thank you 
all. When I was invited to contribute the foreword to this book, I did 
not hesitate because I am aware that this publication has the potential 
to transform the lives of millions of people who are suffering.  
 
There is urgent need for the European Union and African Union to 
find each other and to call for an end to the ill-treatment of migrants. 
We urge the European Union to take a common position and speak 
with one strong voice against the ill-treatment of Eritreans and other 
Africans. I call upon political leaders and other stakeholders to come 
up with a catalogue of issues and a clear plan of action for what needs 
to be done, and I promise that I will present the same to the Pan 
African Parliament and the African Heads of States. The Pan African 
Parliament will also engage the European Parliament on the matter. 
The African Union, under the framework of EU-AU strategy, will be 
seized with the matter. 
 
Hon. Chief Fortune Charumbira 
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What happens at the nexus of the digital divide and human 
trafficking? This book examines the impact of the introduction of 
new digital information and communication technology (ICT) – as 
well as lack of access to digital connectivity – on human trafficking. 
The different studies presented in the chapters show the realities for 
people moving along the Central Mediterranean route from the Horn 
of Africa through Libya to Europe. The authors warn against an over-
optimistic one-sided perspective on innovation as a solution and 
highlight the relationship between technology and the crimes 
committed against vulnerable people in search of protection. In this 
volume, the third in a four-part series Connected and Mobile: Migration 
and Human Trafficking in Africa, relevant new theories are proposed as 
tools to understand the dynamics that appear in mobile Africa. It 
presents research analysing the drivers of human trafficking, identifies 
obstacles to protection and provides recommendations to ensure that 
the use of new technologies contributes to wellbeing. 
 
Part I, ‘Theoretical Perspectives’, opens with four chapters that set 
the theoretical grounding of the studies in this book. In Chapter 1, 
Black Holes in the Global Digital Landscape: The Fuelling of Human 
Trafficking on the African Continent, Van Reisen, Mawere, Stokmans, 
Nakazibwe, Van Stam and Ong’ayo give the reader an orientation to 
the digital divide in Africa. This chapter discusses the digital 
architecture and its historic development, as a social architecture 
through which the extraction of resources and information is 
organised. It focuses on the emergence of ‘black holes’ in the digital 
infrastructure, in which people are disconnected from the global 
digital infrastructure and depend on gatekeepers for information. As 
youth in particular seek to connect to this architecture and take 
advantage of the opportunities it poses, many uproot and move 
towards hubs of connectivity, becoming easy prey for human 
trafficking, who are often in the position of gatekeepers.  
 
The role of gatekeepers in human trafficking in the digital era is 
elaborated on in Chapter 2, Network Gatekeepers in Human Trafficking: 
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Profiting from the Misery of Eritreans in the Digital Era, by Van Reisen, 
Smits, Stokmans and Mawere, which gives a detailed analysis of the 
different manifestations of gatekeeping. This chapter provides a 
different perspective on people vulnerable to human trafficking; it 
argues that rather than making rational choices based on full 
knowledge, potential victims are ill-connected, have little access to 
information and even less ability to send information. Moreover, the 
victims of human trafficking have very limited bargaining power to 
control their situation. This theme is further elaborated on by Mawere 
in Chapter 3, Bound Together in the Digital Era: Poverty, Migration and 
Human Trafficking. In this chapter, Mawere discusses the intrinsic link 
between poverty, vulnerability and human trafficking.  
 
In Chapter 4, Van Esseveld provides an insightful reflection on the 
connection between technological innovations and new modus 
operandi in human trafficking for ransom. Titled Tortured on Camera: 
The Use of ICTs in Trafficking for Ransom, this chapter distinguishes three 
phases of human trafficking that relate to the introduction of smart 
phones in Africa.  
 
Part II, ‘Traumatising Trajectories’, starts with a look at Eritrea. In 
Chapter 5, ‘Sons of Isaias’: Slavery and Indefinite National Service in Eritrea, 
by Van Reisen, Saba and Smits, sets out the background against which 
refugees from Eritrea leave their country. Despite the hope sparked 
by the Peace Agreement with Ethiopia in 2018, indefinite National 
Service and other conditions in the country have not changed and the 
working population continue to be subjected to forced labour, which 
is tantamount to slavery. The exodus of refugees from Eritrea has 
actually increased since the Peace Agreement, and this includes many 
unaccompanied and separated minors. Their understanding of their 
situation, motives and aspirations is the focus of Chapter 6, Journeys of 
Youth in Digital Africa: Pulled by Connectivity, by Schoenmaeckers. While 
only 1% of people in Eritrea are connected to the Internet and sim 
cards are not available to the majority of the people, the youth are 
keen to connect and find creative ways to do so – even in the difficult 




In Chapter 7, Not a People’s Peace: Eritrean Refugees. Fleeing from the Horn 
of African to Kenya, Kuria and Araya discuss the traumatic journeys of 
Eritrean refugees to Kenya. They identify an increasing and worrying 
trend in the extortion and abuse of Eritrean refugees in the country. 
In Chapter 8, Israel’s ‘Voluntary’ Return Policy to Expel Refugees: The 
Illusion of Choice, Orgal, Liberman and Avivi describe serious failures 
in the Israeli policy to expel refugees through mechanisms that put 
them at risk of human trafficking. In their detailed account, they find 
that the Israeli government is complicit in a policy of removal that is 
directly connected to well-known patterns of human trafficking.  
 
In Chapter 9, The Plight of Refugees in Agadez in Niger: From Crossroad to 
Dead End, Wirtz describes how the policy of Niger to stop migration 
and human trafficking has impacted on the situation of refugees and 
migrants, as well as those she refers to as ‘migration professionals’. 
Reserving judgement and merely presenting the situation, she 
describes in detail the societal consequences of the new legislation in 
Niger. In Chapter 10, Lawless Libya: Unprotected Refugees Kept Powerless 
and Silent, Van Reisen, Smits and Wirtz investigate the situation of 
refugees in Libya. Noting that information coming out of Libya is 
scarce, the concern is that refugees are stuck in severely exploitative 
situations, in which they hold little, if any, power and are controlled 
by human trafficking networks. In Chapter 11, The Voices of African 
Migrants in Europe: Isaka’s Resilience, Press demonstrates the 
importance of listening to the voices of refugees and migrants, and 
reflects on the difficulties involved in gaining their trust.  
 
The importance and relevance of addressing post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) among refugees living in highly traumatising 
situations is investigated by Kidane and Stokmans in Chapter 12, 
Desperate Journeys: The Need for Trauma Support for Refugees. These authors 
found that a short intervention to support refugees suffering from 
PTSD had a significant impact on their social-economic resilience. 
They conclude that urgent treatment of PTSD is needed. In Chapter 
13, Rozen examines the obstacles to treating victims of torture and 
slavery in Israel in Identifying Survivors of Torture: “I Never Told What 
Happened to Me in the Sinai”. In great detail, she describes the 
xvi 
 
administrative difficulties as well as the problems victims have in 
disclosing their traumatic experiences. 
 
In Part III, the ‘Psychological Impact of Ongoing Trauma’ is 
explored. How do severely traumatised refugees cope with the 
responsibility of parenting? In Chapter 14, Mouton, Schoenmaeckers 
and Van Reisen examine this question in Refugee Parenting in Ethiopia 
and the Netherlands: Being an Eritrean Parent Outside the Country. They find 
that, although parental self-efficacy is high, this raises questions about 
the emotion regulation skills of refugee parents suffering from PTSD, 
which can impact on the socio-emotional development of their 
children. In Chapter 15, Journeys of Trust and Hope: Unaccompanied Minors 
from Eritrea in Ethiopia and the Netherlands, Schoenmaeckers, Al-Qasim 
and Zanzottera explore the relationship between Eritrean refugee 
minors and caregivers in Ethiopia and the Netherlands. Refugees’ 
hopes of reuniting with their families one day are explored in Chapter 
16, Refugees’ Right to Family Unity in Belgium and the Netherlands: ‘Life is 
Nothing without Family’, by Van Reisen, Berends, Delecolle, 
Hagenberg, Trivellato and Stocker. The discrepancy between the 
procedural requirements and the realities on the ground can be 
overwhelming and result in applications for reunification being 
denied. Requirements can also put family members in danger as they 
try to cross borders or obtain documents illegally. Hence, there is a 
need to rethink family reunification policies, as they are currently 
failing to facilitate family reunfication for many. 
 
Part IV, ‘Problem Framing’, provides a policy lens through which to 
view the problems posed by migration and human trafficking. In 
Chapter 17, Vdovychenko discusses The Representation of Human 
Trafficking in Documentaries: Vulnerable Victims and Shadowy Villains. 
Using documentaries as a source of information, she explores the 
definition of the problem of human trafficking within policy contexts. 
In Chapter 18, Mawere, Van Reisen and Van Stam critically review 
the language in which policy problems are defined in Language 
Dominance in the Framing of Problems and Solutions: The Language of 
Mobility. They point out that the language used not only describes a 
situation, but creates new situations and dictates what solutions are 
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proposed. They present the example of the term ‘illegal migrant’, 
which has direct consequences for people such as refugees, who may 
lose their right to protection and find themselves criminalised as a 
result of such terms. 
 
Part V, ‘Extra-territorialisation of Migration and International 
Responsibilities’, looks at the broader policy context of human 
trafficking. In Chapter 19, The Shaping of the EU’s Migration Policy: The 
Tragedy of Lampedusa as a Turning Point, Smits and Karagianni describe 
the new trends in European Union migration policy that emerged 
after the tragic boat accident at Lampedusa in 2013 in which 360 
refugees perished. Despite the promise of more protection for 
refugees, the collaboration of the European Union with governments 
and militia aimed at stopping refugees from crossing to Europe has 
decreased protection for refugees everywhere. In Chapter 20, 
Crowther and Plaut discuss this in Sudan and the EU: Uneasy Bedfellows, 
arguing that the EU has sacrificed the protection of refugees in order 
to stop them from coming to Europe by collaborating with a 
government accused by the United Nations Commission on South 
Sudan of crimes against humanity in Darfur.  
 
In Chapter 21, Uncomfortable Aid: INGOs in Eritrea, Saba describes the 
situation in Eritrea, where European INGOs could be complicit in 
crimes against humanity committed by the Eritrean authorities. The 
uneasy situation of collaboration with deadly regimes is analysed from 
a legal perspective in Chapter 22, Complicity in Torture: The Accountability 
of the EU for Human Rights Abuses against Refugees and Migrants in Libya, 
by Sereke and Mekonnen, who point to the European Union’s 
involvement and responsibility for human rights abuses against 
refugees and migrants in Libya. In Chapter 23, Playing Cat and Mouse: 
How Europe Evades Responsibility for its Role in Human Rights Abuses 
against Migrants and Refugees, Pijnenburg and Rijken look at the 
European Union’s legal responsibility for the human rights abuses 
against refugees and migrants and calls it to account. The authors 
conclude that there is a grey area in which collaborating partners 
cooperate and that responsibilities are in need of greater clarity to 
avoid impunity and lack of accountability for human rights abuses. 
xviii 
 
The chapters in Part V point to the need for governance aimed at 
protecting people and promoting wellbeing – which requires the 
introduction of ICTs to be flanked by measures to minimise their 
negative use and support good governance. The undermining of the 
rule of law increases the digital divide and the misuse of ICTs, and 
disempowers those in vulnerable situations, putting them at risk of 
exploitation and extortion, including human trafficking. The global 
connectivity enabled by ICTs requires that even more, and not less, 
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The use of spatial imaginaries has provided powerful metaphors 
surrounding Internet 
connectivity. Examples are 
terms like ‘global village' and 
a ‘shrinking world’, which 
depict collapsing 
geographies. These 
metaphors play a powerful 
role in the positioning of 
information and 
communication technologies 
(ICTs) in the international 
discourse (Smart, Donner & 
Graham, 2016). In this 
discourse the ‘digital world’ is 
a common good to help 
innovate the economy and 
solve social problems. 
‘Digital’ in this sense refers to 
digital devices and technology, characterised by computerised 
technology, with particular relevance to the mobility of people and 
global commerce. However, this terminology and the international 
discourse seem to emerge non-locally and are far removed from the 
African context. 
Today’s digital architecture is based on 
the information networks of colonial 
times, which carried information and 
goods – including slaves – to knowledge 
centres in the West. Hence, structures 
like the Internet reflect biases in social 
and political connectivity. Those living in 
‘black holes’ in the digital architecture are 
‘mined’ for information, without enjoying 
any of the benefits of information flows. 
Hence, it is clear that digital technology 
is not impact-neutral. In fact, it seems to 
be fuelling trafficking in human beings, 
particularly trafficking for ransom on the 
African continent.  
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We explore the digital architecture in Africa and its social dimensions 
that generate political, economic and business practices. The 
information society has its roots in the 1500s, at which time it 
supported mobility around the world and the establishment of global 
commerce. This global commerce included the trade in persons – the 
slave trade – which still exists today. Although several researchers 
(including the authors of this chapter) have extensively described the 
link between digitalisation and new forms of the trade in persons (Van 
Reisen, Estefanos & Rijken, 2012; 2014; Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015; 
Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017; Van Reisen et al., 2018; Adugna, 
Deshingkar & Ayalew, 2019), questions still remain: Is the knowledge 
society providing an enabling environment for the trade in people? How can the 
association between digitalisation and new forms of human trafficking be 
explained? 
 
In order to answer such questions, this chapter explores the idea of a 
digital architecture as a social architecture in which information is 
handled and distributed to some, but not to others. Being the product 
of human invention within a social context, the digital architecture 
has social characteristics, which include a historic legacy through 
which social relations are reproduced. As a social structure in which 
information circulates, the question is not only who provides 
information and who receives it, but also who is able to decide which 
information is provided to whom and the conditions of the 
transaction. From this perspective, some people are excluded from 
the Internet and depend on others to receive information and provide 
or send information. These people are living in ‘black holes’ in the 
digital architecture. In this book we illustrate that these black holes in 
the digital architecture are related to the emergence of human 
trafficking for ransom, which depends on digital communication. 
Methodology 
The messy realities on the ground in many parts of Africa and Europe 
are somewhat more nuanced and diverse than dominant and 
essentialising theories describe. There are many forms of 
‘connectivity' to information societies and ways to be included and 
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excluded from access. This leaves much room for developing 
localised theories, furthering understanding of the inherent structures 
of the Internet from the position of the disenfranchised. In this book, 
we use the extended case method, as described by Michael Burawoy 
(2009). Burawoy (2013) argues that ‘living with theory’ takes away the 
separation between the participant and the observer, inspiring critical 
assessment of the conquest of existing theory and allowing for the 
conception of society in alternative understandings. We have 
amended this method to be transdisciplinary and culturally aligned, to 
recognise common threads in African society. We recognise 
embodied knowledge (Mawere & Van Stam, 2017) resulting from our 
engagement with communities and theories.  
 
Furthermore, we recognise that cross-cultural research settings are 
social settings mediated by power, and that strategies to dominate, 
silence, objectivise, and normalise may be part of this setting. This 
can result in epistemic violence, which must be recognised and 
mediated (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016a). We recognise this actively, 
by being reflexive and ensuring interaction with local communities 
about our findings first, before reporting on them in broader fora. 
The authors are engaged in transdisciplinary research, interacting with 
various African communities of practice in both urban and rural areas 
in Eastern and Southern Africa. The book is the result of a 
collaborative, reflexive and retrospective analysis of our experiences, 
positioned from Africa. 
The knowledge society 
Castell (2000) sees the contemporary knowledge society of the 
information age as a comprehensive social reality in an economic, 
political and cultural sense that is historically rooted. Historically, 
these roots are in the 16th Century, when corporations, headquartered 
in Europe, made their way around the globe ‘discovering' new 
continents (Harris, 1998). Information was collected, as were goods 
and slaves. While slaves were treated as products to be transported 
along these networked routes (Ward, 2009), the information collected 
on the voyages was the ‘gold’ that fuelled the trade. From this 
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perspective, some of the most prized items the ships would carry were 
the sacks of letters containing valuable information about the 
colonies. To give an example, during the fourth Anglo-Dutch war 
(1780–1784), the Middelburgse Commercie Compagnie (MCC), a 
company based in the Netherlands, had agents in London 
representing them. Among their tasks was retrieving letters and logs 
from ships captured by the British, as these were considered 
extremely valuable (Zeeuws Archive, n.d.).  
 
Corporate agents were incredibly important gatekeepers of 
information and were able to decide what information would reach 
the European centres, where this information was analysed and where 
it was turned into knowledge that yielded efficiency improvements in 
the handling of their commerce, which, in turn, would generate more 
information. It allowed the headquarters in the centres, located in 
Europe, to ‘act at a distance’ and give instructions to their agents in 
the colonies. As gatekeepers, the corporate agents were located in the 





Figure 1.1. Shipping routes during colonial era 




The original information society facilitated by colonial transport 
routes provided corporate control along trajectories (or networks) 
and over connecting points (or nodes). The nodes were points at 
which there was important representation of the colonial power, 
including legal and financial advisors, and where information was 
collected. The information nodes on the African continent (e.g., Cape 
Town for the Dutch and English) provided essential gateways for 
collecting information, which was transported to Europe where the 
information was analysed. Universities and other knowledge 
institutions were established as the ‘centres of calculation’, as Latour 
(1987, p. 215) coins it, with the aim to turn proceeds from the 
information society into fuel for a ‘knowledge society’. Through this 
process, imported information was used in an actionable way, 
resulting in a European-based analysis and serving as a starting point 
for future economic, commercial, political and military activity in far-
away places. In these European commercial centres of knowledge, 
the idea of a universal knowledge base emerged, as a result of these 
activities. The newly-acquired understanding would inform 
subsequent voyages. The centre of the colonial power would be 
irreversibly ahead in having the acquired knowledge, and so 
strengthen its ability to control and govern. 
 
Latour (1987) advances the idea that during the colonial period a new 
space-time arrangement was developed. Through the space dimension, 
ships with information and goods could go back and forth, but 
African people could not do the same (or only as a ‘commodity’). As 
for the time dimension, elite engineers and scientists appropriating the 
shipped-in information were seeking to turn it into (universal) 
knowledge. Based on this universal knowledge, engineers and 
scientists were able to design projects before local people could be 
involved, provide juridical labels and assign property claims on 
knowledge (Krohn, 2001). Through the idea of ‘universal knowledge’, 
rather than contextualised knowledge, the time-dimension favoured 
those holding the knowledge (Latour, 1987).  
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Architecture of the information network 
The architecture of the early information society built in the 16th 
Century was shaped as a network of routes and nodes supporting 
colonial exploration. The architecture of the Internet follows the 
same pattern. Its heralded progress lies in the acceleration of the 
transfer of information and the generation of universal knowledge, 
the components of which are critical to sustain a globalised economy. 
Digitalisation has further enhanced the restructuring of the space-
time dimension, for instance, in education (Malichi, Van 
Oortmerssen, & Van Stam, 2013). Information – called ‘traffic’ in 
technical environments – even between African nodes, continues to 
travel through European centres (Gueye & Mbaye, 2018). Although 
various organisations have sought to facilitate interconnectivity 
between African Internet service providers, these activities are being 
disempowered by the ‘hunger for information’ from ‘the centre’. As 
a result, the network remains focused on existing directionalities, 
linking externally derived ‘harmonies of interest’, continuing to 
disempower the networks in the colonially defined ‘periphery’ 
(Galtung, 1971). Orientalistic, imperialistic and colonialistic thinking 
and behaviour have consistently heralded the ‘real knowledge 
producers’ in the North – setting the standard for ‘real’ knowledge, 
with the South seen as only delivering information (Mamdani, 2011; 
Mawere & Awuah-Nyamekye, 2015). Manning, Böhme and Stehr 
(1988) discuss the concept of the ‘knowledge society’ in terms of this 
increasing dependency of society on technology. The digitalisation of 
information plays a vital role in providing the means for new forms 
of expropriation in which data is the new gold, moving from the 
African continent to the data centres in the North (Van Reisen et al., 
forthcoming, 2019).  
 
However, the Internet is not the only infrastructure that is supporting 
an imperialistic perspective. The platforms designed to manage the 
information derived from global digital networks follow the same 
pattern. Service behemoths like Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and 
Amazon represent centralised information infrastructures (Van 
Dijck, Poell, & De Waal, 2018) that transport information to be 
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processed in a colonial centre (Van Stam, 2017a). ‘Free’ services or 
products, like Facebook, sweeten the harvesting of information, 
typically targeting areas with limited connectivity and high barriers to 
access information, attracting users to these forms of social media. 
The corporate narrative states that its information informs enhanced 
business approaches; in practice it ensures the continuation and 
growth of intangible and tangible resources from the periphery to the 
centre. This move won Mark Zuckerberg the title of ‘digital 
colonialist’ (Shearlaw, 2016). 
 
The following maps show the old colonial routes for the flow of 
information and today’s information infrastructure, with fibre optic 
submarine cables supporting the Internet, which feeds into the 
knowledge society. The main information routes are overseas and 
connected through nodes; the directionality is to the hegemonic 
centre of the North. A quick comparison of the old colonial shipping 
routes and the current Internet intercontinental network cabling 
shows an incredible similarity. In resembling the architecture of the 
global information society as it was created in the 16th and 17th 
centuries, the direction of the benefits of the Internet is one-sided (as 
is seen in the market capitalisation of the so-called ‘beltway bandits’).  
 
 
Figure 1.2. Fibre optic submarine cables 




As in the past, the contemporary information society supports the 
digital traffic to its centres, thereby supporting the basing of 
economic activity on historic architectures (Heemskerk & Takes, 
2016). This can be seen by comparing the maps of the fibre optic 
submarine cables, social media traffic such as Facebook and the 
location of the global corporate elite structures. 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Facebook nodes; Source: Butler (2010) 
 
 




As illustrated above, the information society facilitates the traffic of 
data to the data centres in Europe, the US and increasingly China to 
support commercial interests (Heemskerk & Takes, 2016). The 
geographic and social realities of African communities have not 
informed the conceptualisation and structuring of the digital 
architecture of the Internet. Moreover, these technologies are not 
designed in ways that work to empower African communities to 
sustain their knowledge societies (Van Stam et al., 2012; Johnson & 
Van Stam, 2016; Van Stam, 2016a; Bidwell, 2016; Van Reisen, 2017), 
as will be discussed in the next section. 
The geographic misrepresentation of Africa and its effect on 
latency 
The dislocation of knowledge from space and time has been 
translated into the representation of the world on abstract maps. 
Maps are tools that affect the perceptions of power and space through 
projection techniques. The earliest world maps that guided ships 
placed Europe both central and dominant on the world map (Wintle, 
1999). The traditional representation using the Mercator projection 
represents Europe’s landmass as proportionally larger than Africa’s 
landmass, although in reality Africa's landmass and geographical 
distances are much larger. A map based on the true geographical size 
of Africa would show that Africa’s landmass could incorporate China, 
India, the United States and Europe (Krause, n.d.). 
 
Matching the architecture of the Internet with a more correct 
geographical representation of Africa in terms of distances clearly 
indicates the fundamental barriers to the implementation of 
communication infrastructure, particularly if information network 
density in Europe is taken as a benchmark. Distances compound the 
universal connectivity problems due to the combined effects of 
latency (distance) and congestion (due to limited bandwidth and 
economic modelling constraints), in combination with the type of 
equipment and software used, due to older machines and 









Figure 1.6. Map of the world, Peters projection 
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Australia, another vast landmass continent physically located far from 
dominant digital centres, experiences similar latency-related 
connectivity dark buffer-float problems, creating delays in gaming 
and affecting time-sensitive communication-related transactions, 
such as financial and trading markets (Armitage, 2003; Brun, Safaei, 
& Boustead, 2006). Only if one accepts the correct size of the African 
continent can it be appreciated how ambitious the idea of connecting 
Africa using this European benchmark for the Internet is. 
 
Since digital networks are constrained by natural limitations, such as 
the speed of light, technical limitations, and the information 
processing capacity of the intermediate technical equipment, the 
geolocation of connectivity predicts its fitness for use, if this is 
conceptualised on the basis of latency. Therefore, geographic location 
is a specific and sensitive factor in the instrumentality of the Internet.  
Black holes in the global digital landscape 
When matching the hegemonic power centres and their sources of 
knowledge with daily realities in many African communities, the 
colonial powers had (and still have) very little information about the 
real geography, social nature, and local values and means of 
knowledge production on the African continent. This lack of 
information translates into gaps in the African information society. 
Burt (2000), in his work The Network Structure of Social Capital, 
represents society in terms of connections and nodes that deliver a 
capacity to share information and knowledge. The weaker 
connections in or between nodes can be represented as ‘structural 
caverns’ or ‘black holes’. Places that are unconnected or weakly 
connected with the network, therefore, cannot play a part in the social 
network underpinning the economy (Burt, 2000). Similarly, Castells 
(2000) argues that digital technology has created a new social 
structure. According to him, information processing is the core 
activity of capitalism within this digital society. Castells refers to the 





The concept of ‘black holes’ not only relates to weak connections in 
the global digital architecture, it also relates to the imperialistic 
perspective on information. Hence, it relates to what geographically-
located people can (or cannot) do when using the digital architecture 
in an agentic way. From an imperialistic perspective, people living in 
‘black holes’ are approached as ‘objects from which to glean 
information’, or ‘subjects of foreign intervention’. So many people in 
Africa may recognise little, if any, instrumentality in digital 
infrastructures. Yet unknown to them, they may be the subject of 
information harvesting, being monitored by digital technologies. As 
in the past, these data trajectories are one-directional from the 
periphery to the centres in the West. Mass surveillance is carried out, 
for instance, by Western-supported military drone-ports in Africa 
(Turse, 2015): “For years, American military expansion in Africa has 
gone largely unnoticed, thanks to a deliberate effort to keep the public 
in the shadows”. The digital information network that routes 
messages through its nodes monopolises narratives by filtering 
communication so it disseminates a dominant story derived from the 
perspective of Eurocentric social norms. Williams (2017) refers to this 
as digital imperialism: extending power and dominion by gaining 
indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas – in 
other words, the extension or imposition of power, authority, or 
influence. Black holes are proof of the inability of the architecture and 
digital infrastructure of the Internet to facilitate African voices on 
their own terms. This practice perpetuates a super-colonial 
dominance over Africa. 
 
The imposition of power in the process of digital imperialism not only 
refers to what technologies are available for use and by whom, but 
also the norms, values and ways of doing that are implicitly 
incorporated in these technologies. From their African base, Mawere 
and other authors (e.g., Mawere, 2014; Nhemachena, 2016; Mawere 
& Van Stam, 2015) call for the respect of local philosophies and 
knowledge, countering practices that they labelled as ‘super-
colonialism’ (Van Stam, 2017b). Buskens and Van Reisen (2016) 
point out that Western epistemology, embedded in contemporary 
ICT, is positioned and imposed as a universal understanding of the 
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world. They call for the recognition of the diverse and sovereign 
epistemologies that ICTs should reflect if they are to be relevant to 
local communities. Williams (2017) calls this digital sovereignty (‘your 
data equals your control’). Mawere and Van Stam (2016a) propose 
that decolonised African engineers must lead the processes of design 
and digital engineering for technologies deployed in Africa in order 
for them to reflect African epistemology and serve African (general) 
interests.  
Stuck with this legacy 
In the foregoing, it was argued that contemporary digital architecture 
is a structure that is historically and geographically informed and 
reproduces biases in social and political connectivity and access. 
Hence, digital technology, including ICTs and, for instance, 
cryptography, is not neutral. It is inherently a set of political tools that 
incorporate social-political and moral dimensions of inclusion, 
exclusion and bias (Rogaway, 2015). Logically, it follows that if digital 
architecture and its application are inherently biased, then they are 
also inherently potentially harmful. The acknowledgement of this is 
the first rule for responsible computing (Zook et al., 2017). 
Concerning Africa, this assertion is especially relevant, given the 
exploitative basis of Africa's insertion in the global economy and the 
ongoing appropriation and direction of the flow of goods, 
information and data from Africa to other continents (Mawere & Van 
Stam, 2016b). 
 
Can Africa change this reality? In answering this question, 
digitalisation could be regarded as a ‘public good’ that is available to 
all members of society to ensure a life in dignity. In the contemporary 
international community, national states are identified as the 
caretakers of public goods in respective societies. In the ideal image, 
it is the role of the state to provide governance that protects its 
citizens from (digital) exclusion from these public goods. In this 
context, digitalisation should be facilitated by the state, as part of its 
responsibility to provide appropriate governance. In reality, African 
states are coerced to remain more reliant on external centres of 
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power, rather than on their internal capacities (Herbst, 1989) and 
needs. Such dependency has weakened the ability of governments to 
govern in the interests of their citizens (Davidson, 1992; Mamdani, 
1996). Governments in Africa have little if any ability to govern 
digitalisation as a public good for African people (Abrahams & 
Mbanaso, 2017), and lack specific decolonisation strategies in 
education (Chukwueren, 2017). This situation is sustained by the lack 
of local research and indigenous policy development (Paterson, 
2017). Exceptions are home-grown innovations, such as South 
Africa's Television White Space (TVWS) regulations, which are based 
on African research (Johnson et al., 2016). African broadband 
operators typically cream off the ‘market’ and “serve 
telecommunication services to limited numbers of wealthier 
(customers) at extremely high prices for bandwidth and voice” (Avila, 
2009, p. 142), and the pricing of satellite connectivity serves crisis 
management in high price-ranges, but de-favours sustainable long-
term connectivity based solutions for end-users (Van Reisen, 2017). 
The increasing divide alienates citizens, which impacts negatively on 
the governance, security, and development prospects of African 
nations (Sommers, 2011). 
 
An additional complicating factor of digitalisation as a public good is 
the definition of the members of a society. In line with Krohn (2001), 
we believe that the global information society depends on two main 
variables: technological innovation (digitalisation) and institutional 
transformation (states in Africa). When the European colonial actors 
met in Berlin to divide Africa among themselves (in the Berlin 
conference in 1884–1885), they were ignorant of the geography and 
life in most parts of Africa. The subsequent transposition of the 
Westphalian state model, which was created as a bordered geography 
in Europe to solve specific contextual problems of governance at that 
time, was alien to the African socio-political reality. Nevertheless, 
national borders in Africa, based on this model, were imposed 
(Mbembe, 2002; Van Binsbergen & Van Dijk, 2004). The aim was to 
distinguish different areas of colonial rule by each of the European 
empires in Africa and, in doing so, local and contextual factors that 
are generally taken into account when borders are established were 
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not considered (Mbembe, 2002). An estimated 30% of the African 
borders were drawn as straight lines (Touval, 1966). Even if there was 
some African participation in some parts in the process of partition, 
the final borders did not reflect local ethnographic or topographic 
realities, and they were drawn in total disregard for local needs or the 
circumstances of the communities (Touval, 1966). Consequently, 
today, historically-connected communities are under the supervision 
of different states, which affects the information society at the 
African level. 
Digitalisation of human trafficking for ransom 
Borders and cross-border dynamics play a critical role in the political 
economy of migration, especially what is now often referred to as 
‘irregular migration’ – migration that is not the result of the prior 
approval of the administrations in the countries of origin or 
destination. These forms of migration depend heavily on (digital) 
information networks facilitated by smugglers and human traffickers. 
 
From 1950 to 2000, Africa's urban population increased from 33 
million to 288 million, and is expected to increase to 1.3 billion people 
by 2050 (UNDESA, 2013). Due to various factors, many youth, in 
particular, have decided to leave their home. These homes are often 
located in black holes in the digital architecture. Access to relevant 
information about where to go to increase (economic) opportunities 
and enhance safety is not available using the Internet, due to lack of 
access, but is only available from middlemen. These middlemen 
bridge the gap in the digital black holes and bring (filtered) 
information to those who want to leave. Therefore, social capital 
moving in different networks can be seen as a function of brokering 
these black holes. This idea is supported by Burt (2000), who claims 
that the nodes of the Internet are connected to a social network of 
real people who share (filtered) information and knowledge with 
those who are living in digital black holes. A two-step flow model of 
communication (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944; McQuail & 
Windahl, 1993) clarifies this. This model states that individuals are 
not social isolates, but act as members of a social group or 
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community. Moreover, it recognises the different roles of individuals 
in the information society: those who are active in receiving and 
passing information from the Internet, and those who rely on 
personal contacts as their information source. Those who are active 
in receiving and passing information can be regarded as ‘gatekeepers’ 
(Shoemaker, 1991; McQuail & Windahl, 1993). These gatekeepers are 
not only selectors of information (what is worth passing and what is 
not), but they occupy bridging roles between networks of those who 
do and do not have access to the Internet. Since these gatekeepers are 
part of the community that is living in the digital black hole (or closely 
associated with it), they are regarded as a reliable source of 
information (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017). Adugna et al. (2019) refer 
to the brokers in migration-routes from Ethiopia to South Africa as 
‘door-openers’. 
 
The intricate connection between migration and social networks has 
been extensively described (e.g., De Haas, 2008; Lazzolino & Hersi, 
2017). Several researchers have also described the link between 
digitalisation and the new realities of refugees (Leung, 2010; Maitland 
& Xu, 2015). Migrants are facilitated or trafficked along the routes on 
trajectories towards and along nodes. Outside the digital black holes, 
in the nodes, information is available, mobile phone payments can be 
received, and travel along routes can be prepared and resourced (Van 
Reisen & Mawere, 2017; Adugna et al., 2019). The networks strongly 
resemble the network of the information society, as observed in a 
Tweet of a map with old slavery routes (retweeted by Cochetel, 2019). 
 
Youth in particular move from the black holes in the information 
society towards nodes, and once they have access to greater 
connectivity they can draw on the support of relatives in diaspora 
communities to try and make their way along the network to “ever 
better-connected places” (Dekker & Engbersen, 2013). The 
directionality is from the South to the West (Nyamnjoh, 2015; Van 
Stam, 2016c). From this perspective, the nodes function as magnets 
attracting people out of black holes into the digital information 
society. At the nodes, smugglers and human traffickers provide those 
who have newly arrived with further information about possible 
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destinations and migration routes. Those who leave their homes 
depend on the information provided by trusted middlemen and 
smugglers. But can we find empirical evidence to substantiate these 
observations? The next section looks at whether empirical data relates 
to the concepts explored in this chapter. 
Some empirical evidence 
During a research visit to Usuku, Katakwi in Northern Uganda by the 
first and fourth authors, a focus group meeting was held in which 
access to phones was discussed. The area is poor in the extreme. 
From the group of around 30 women, only 5 had a phone (a feature 
phone). Asked why others did not invest in a phone, the women 
explained that they would very much like to and that it was a prized 
item that would give them social respectability, but they explained the 
phone was too ‘thirsty’: too difficult to charge and too costly to make 
calls. Those who had phones had received them from someone else; 
a son or a husband living elsewhere, who wanted to be able to 
communicate easily with the family and community in Katakwi and 
who would pay for the phone costs. Those sons or husbands who 
provided the feature phones were critical gatekeepers of information, 
even if with the best intentions, and with the power to provide 
information, take information and remove access to the device 
(Focus group discussion, Usuku, Uganda, 25 February 2019). 
 
The importance of digital access for young people is well illustrated 
in an observation by the first and second authors during a field visit 
to Masvingo, Zimbabwe. During the night all along the fence of the 
Great Zimbabwe University the researchers observed men standing 
near the fence, from where they could pick up a free Internet 
connection available at the campus through a password, which 
apparently, they could access. During a focus group meeting with 
teenagers (boys and girls) in more remote towns near Masvingo, they 
explained that they spend long hours on smart phones. They 
explained that they were spending (almost) all the pocket money they 
received from their parents on buying connectivity and charging their 
phones. The news received through social media on the smart phone 
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was their main source of information (Focus group discussion, 
Masvingo, Zimbabwe, 14 October 2018) and youth were the best 
connected in the community. Here we see that, assuming a 
community has access, the Internet is the main source of information 
about local, national and international affairs for those living in 
remote towns in Africa, but not all community members have access. 
Consequently, those who do have access to the Internet are the 
gatekeepers of information for those who don’t. 
 
In another research on the origin of human trafficking networks in 
Eritrea, the first author found through interviews that people working 
under forced labour conditions in Eritrea on road construction were 
not allowed to have or bring a mobile phone. The researcher also 
learnt from another informant that it is extremely dangerous to 
disobey this rule and that heavy punishments can follow. Give the 
very tightly-controlled digital environment in the country, any digital 
material that proves situations of human rights abuse needs to be 
smuggled out of the country at high risk and with the highest secrecy 
(M., interview, face-to face, with Van Reisen, May 2019; T., personal 
communication, telephone, with Van Reisen, May 2019). 
 
The above case illustrates that connectivity is the first barrier to 
overcome to gain access to information, especially in remote or 
(almost) unconnected places in Africa. The urge to be connected to 
the Internet was also observed in a study among Eritrean youth 
refugees in a camp that lacked digital connectivity in northern 
Ethiopia. The researcher found out that the youth had developed 
ingenuous and creative solutions to overcome the lack of 
connectivity, including, for instance, phoning the European 
emergency number, which would provide them, not with a response, 
but with a short connection to a satellite that would allow them to 
pull in or send messages on Facebook (Schoenmaeckers, 2018). 
Researchers also found that the youth depended heavily on social 
media and on digital networks of family members or friends whose 
information was trusted (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017). Such trusted 
digital social networks are crucial entry points for smuggling and 
human trafficking networks to recruit young people. Moreover, such 
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trusted networks are misused by human trafficking networks for 
extortion (A., interview, face-to-face, with Van Reisen, the 
Netherlands, 5 May 2019), as also illustrated in the following example 
reported by Spratt for the BBC: 
 
I'm here to meet 35-year-old Chandani. Just over a year ago a stranger added her 
on Facebook, she accepted, and soon he slid into her DMs and they began exchanging 
private, direct messages online. The stranger turned out to be an agent for the 
traffickers. [...] “Social media has really helped the agents – nowadays they don't 
have to go to rural villages to find girls,” she tells me. “They can just search for 
potential targets online and send them a message with one click.” “There was a man 
who used to chat with my sister on Facebook,” she explains. “He added me and 
started messaging. [...] When this trafficker messaged her, she was living in a 
temporary shelter. The agent had already been talking to her sister for months, in 
effect grooming them both. Then, in the continuing chaos in the aftermath of disaster 
[the earthquake in 2015], he seized his moment. [...] she was locked in a hotel room 
with 18 other women for several weeks. Chandani looks away when I press her about 
the details. I notice her eyes glisten. [...] She tells me she knew she was “about to be 
sold” because tales of trafficking are everywhere in Nepal. Women grow up being 
warned not to let this happen to them. (Spratt, 2018). 
 
For migrants held in detention centres in human trafficking-related 
situations, access to the phone may present a lifeline to get 
information out on their predicament, and despite heavy sanctions, 
the phone may be their most important possession:  
 
Z: Now he [The Chief of a camp where refugees are held captive in Libya] wants to 
collect the phone, but they refused. The chief beat refugees by gun, like 20 persons  
(Z., interview with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, 23 April 2019) 
 
In battles between different factions in Libya, the Guardian 
newspaper reported on a situation where hundreds of refugees were 
left isolated and locked in a hangar, based on footage smuggled out 
of the place and: 
 
In WhatsApp messages sent to the Guardian on Tuesday, some of the child refugees 
said: “Until now, no anyone came here to help us. Not any organisations. Please, 
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please, please, a lot of blood going out from people. Please, we are in dangerous 
conditions, please world, please, we are in danger”. (Taylor, 2019) 
 
As the situation worsened, guards reportedly attempted to take the 
phones from the refugees, who refused at gunpoint to hand these 
over, reflecting the importance they attach to their phone: 
 
Tranchina took a statement from a man who escaped from the centre after the militia 
started shooting. “We were praying in the hangar. The women joined us for prayer. 
The guards came in and told us to hand over our phones,” he said. “When we 
refused, they started shooting. I saw gunshot wounds to the head and neck, I think 
that without immediate medical treatment, those people would die. “I’m now in a 
corrugated iron shack in Tripoli with a few others who escaped, including three 
women with young children. Many were left behind and we have heard that they have 
been locked in”. (Taylor, 2019) 
 
Lack of information provided by the gatekeepers also leads vulnerable 
people into deceitful situations, with little information on which they 
can base their choices. A refugee secretly sending messages from 
another detention centre in Libya, reported the following 
predicament, during a visit by the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) to arrange repatriations to the country they had fled 
from: 
 
Today the members of IOM came with our chief police of [...the] detention centre2 
and the chief said that for us repeatedly, you must be registered to IOM just like an 
order. His aim is to return us back to our home country. Surprised we are asking 
him: why? He gave a surprising answer. He said that after one or few months, war 
will be started in Libya and the war will affect you. So the only option you have is 
to return to your home country. We are confused. Why he said like that? What I 
mean is, if he said like that maybe after few days, he want to sell us for that reason 
who knows. So, the UNHCR Libya office must take urgent action to evacuate us 
to the other safe detention centres, or to do something for us. (Z., interview with 
Van Reisen, WhatsApp, Libya, 6 March 2019) 
 
 
2 Name withheld to protect the security of the respondent. 
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The refugees, as reported in this case, are entirely dependent upon 
information from the gatekeeper who holds them and who has his 
own interests. It is clear that information is not objective or neutral 
and in such a setting, where there is no access to alternative sources 
of information, the gatekeeper has the power to determine what 
information is provided. If refugees establish their own channels for 
information, this may become a serious power struggle and a matter 
of life and death, as indicated in this interview: 
 
The chief of the camp where refugees are held is very dangerous. They collect phone 
one by one. [...] In Gharyan they remove all clothes from your body then they collect 
money & phone also documents. Now with the new group in Gharyan only one 
phone is there. Only after 10:00 pm it is turned on. (Z., interview with Van 
Reisen, WhatsApp, Libya, 18 March 2019) 
 
Even if a phone is (secretly) available, it may be very hard to send 
information to the outside world to inform others about what is going 
on. In a place where refugees are held and in fear of being sold to 
those extorting ransom (reportedly of around USD 20,000, Z., 
interview with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, Libya, 17 March 2019), it is 
real challenge to send information: 
 
Yesterday I was calling by line but my money is too much few. That's why I cut our 
conversation yesterday. Totally no network prof. Am not okay to inform anything. 
This is problem of network data. But I will try every time at night. I will send 
information until network becomes good. (Z., interview with Van Reisen, 
WhatsApp, Libya, 11 April 2019) 
 
Black holes create a situation in which those living in them are 
dependent upon gatekeepers for information and cannot send 
information, or only with great difficulty. This establishes a social 
reality in which the power relations control the information that goes 
in and out. The digital architecture, with its advanced information 
network, creates opportunities, but also increases dependency on 
gatekeepers (or ‘door-openers’, Adugna et al., 2019) for those who 
have no access. The result is a more pronounced polarisation between 
those with no access and those who can facilitate access. This 
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dependency provides fertile ground for exploitation, extortion and 
the corruption of vulnerable people who seek to move on in order to 
improve their situation. The human trafficking networks depend on 
control information in order to avoid reputational damage (Van 
Reisen et al., 2018). Due to this dependency, gatekeepers can easily 
exploit the situation which can then lead to human trafficking.  
Conclusion 
The Internet and digital infrastructure mirror the architecture of the 
information society established during the colonial era, and they fulfil 
the same function in creating the routes and nodes for a global 
economy driven by corporate expansion in a new time and space 
dimension. This architecture is not geographically bordered, but 
extends around the globe – it is not equally distributed. The result is 
the disempowering of less connected communities (which can 
include technical, financial, social or legal barriers to connectivity), 
referred to as ‘black holes’. 
 
The Internet as a public good relies on international geopolitics and 
on the nation state as the guarantor of the participation and 
protection of citizens. Yet, states in Africa, as structures inherited 
from western colonialism, are relatively weak and ill-equipped to 
counteract the one-directionality of the information society, with 
digital technologies, services and data directed from hegemonic 
centres without social contextual embeddedness. The growing 
inequality emerging from the increasing global digital divide cannot 
be adequately governed through international bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation, as nation states in Africa are unable to resist the 
connected digital corporate economic networks. 
 
The concept of ‘black holes’ in the information society helps to 
explain why many Africans are forced to move, namely, because of de 
facto exclusion from the benefits of the information or knowledge 
societies. Excluded from the digital infrastructure, people in 
marginalised, poorly-connected places depend on gatekeepers, who 
control the information they receive. As they try to move out of those 
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caverns and migrate towards the information nodes, they still depend 
on information provided by gatekeepers, who hold considerable 
power over these people. At the nodes, they find their way into the 
information society and enter into its network of routes and 
trajectories, where new mobility perspectives arise, both in a 
geographic and social sense. Migration to ‘tap into benefits’ has a long 
history in colonised, exploited and excluded Africa, resulting in the 
uprooting of people. In human trafficking for ransom, a modus 
operandi which heavily depends on digital communication, it can be 
shown that the dependency on information to enter these new worlds 
gives the gatekeepers one-sided power, leading to the exploitation and 
extortion of those who are dependent. In the most severe cases of 
dependency people simply become a tradeable commodity, just as it 
was in the days of slavery.  
 
Harris (1998) makes the point that the knowledge society was created 
by doing, by a ‘via activa’, a way of operating from which architectures 
arose. So, what solutions are available to change this situation? Latour 
(1987) proposes that the space-time dimension created by the 
information society can only be challenged if trajectories are created 
in different directions. In the spirit of Achille Mbembe, Lovemore 
Mbiqi, John Mbiti, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Francis Nyamnjoh, 
Cornell du Toit, and many others, the heritage, epistemology and 
knowledge in local communities could be used to direct the 
recognition and handling of information and the production of 
knowledge and technology in a different way. As this chapter has 
shown, however, this may be a struggle, as the digital architecture is 
negatively skewed against such a change and more exploitation may 
result from this. Hence, it is clear to see that the technical 
infrastructure of digital technology is not impact neutral. How 
digitalisation affects societies in differentiated ways is, therefore, a 
relevant and necessary area of academic inquiry.  
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Network Gatekeepers in Human Trafficking: 
Profiting from the Misery of Eritreans 
in the Digital Era3 
 




In 2009, the connectivity of mobile phones was realised at a global 
level (Van Reisen et al., 
2018a). Around the same 
time, a new form of human 
trafficking emerged in the 
Sinai desert of Egypt, which 
came to be known as Sinai 
trafficking (Van Reisen, 
Rijken & Estefanos, 2012). 
Whereas human trafficking 
usually involves the secret 
extortion of people, this 
form of trafficking relied on 
others knowing what was 
going on. Vulnerable people 
who had been displaced 
from their homes, many of whom were Eritrean refugees, were 
kidnapped or transported under false pretences, only to be locked in 
human trafficking warehouses and tortured for ransom. All the 
traffickers needed was a mobile phone number of a family member 
 
3 This chapter is based on a presentation at the 23rd Karlsruhe Dialogues held at 
the Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) Generale in Germany. A different 
article based on the presentation was prepared with the working title: ‘The 
(un)intended role of gatekeepers of information in human trafficking in the Digital 
Era’ (authors: Van Reisen, M., Smits, K., Stokmans, M. & Mawere, M.) for the 
Karlsruhe Institute für Technologie (undated).  
Human trafficking for ransom is a new 
form of trafficking facilitated by digitally-
supported communication, particularly, 
mobile phones. But why do Eritreans 
appear to be among the most vulnerable 
to this form of trafficking? This chapter 
looks at the role of network gatekeepers, 
and the dependence of Eritrean refugees, 
who live in a ‘black hole’ in the digital 
architecture, on these gatekeepers, placing 




or friend of the victim. They would call these numbers and let the 
relatives or friends hear the cries of those being tortured to induce 
them to pay the ransom. This new form of human trafficking for 
ransom depends heavily on digitally-supported communication, 
especially mobile phones and mobile payments, that can be controlled 
by the traffickers. The link between the emergence of this form of 
human trafficking and the simultaneous widespread introduction of 
digital technology has been described by some scholars (Van Reisen 
& Rijken, 2015; Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017; Van Reisen et al., 
2018a), but remains largely unexplored.  
 
Control over the flow of information accessable to victims – a key 
characteristic of ‘network gatekeeping’ (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008) – is a 
necessary condition for the modus operandi used by the human 
traffickers. As has already been noted, digital technology plays a key 
role in the modus operandi of human traffickers for ransom, allowing 
them to exchange information freely, track and target vulnerable 
refugees, and remain anonymous (DSP-Groep & Tilburg University, 
2016; Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). This chapter seeks to elaborate 
on the concept of network gatekeepers and their control of 
information flows in the context of human trafficking, using Eritrea 
as a case study. It looks at network gatekeepers in a new light, in the 
context of today’s uneven digitally-connected world, which is 
exacerbated by the digital architecture in place. As a case-study, this 
chapter explores ‘gatekeeping’ in the lives of Eritreans during the 
trajectories of human trafficking that have emerged in the last decade. 
Eritrea is used as a case study, because it is an extremely closed 
country, at the bottom of the ranking of free access to information 
and open communication (Reporters Without Borders, 2019), while 
at the same time producing a large number of victims of human 
trafficking relative to other countries (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). 
Eritrea also has a monopolised digital architecture, owned by the 
ruling party (the only party), which runs the country.  
 
The main research question is: How is the mediating role of network 
gatekeepers intertwined with the human trafficking of Eritreans and how does the 
digitalisation of communication influence this situation? It is hoped that 
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answering this question will help us to understand the modus 
operandi of the network gatekeepers in an uneven digitally-connected 
world. The study is also expected to provide us with information 
about the new forms of human trafficking that are victimising 
Eritrean refugees so that more effective policies can be put in place 
to stop this tragedy.  
Network gatekeepers  
Open communication or open access to, and distribution of, 
information is related to ‘social capital’. The term social capital defines 
the cohesion of society and its ability to function through shared 
values and connections (Field, 2008). Social capital relies on the flow 
of information between people and is, therefore, related to open 
communication. However, structural holes in communication and 
information flows exist where the connections between groups are 
weak. Information brokers can facilitate the flow of information 
across such structural holes, effectively controlling the information 
flows (Burt, 2000) and regulating the access to open communication 
of the people involved. This control over the flow of information is 
a key characteristic of network gatekeepers (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008).  
 
The concept of network gatekeepers was introduced by Karine 
Barzilai-Nahon, who focused on gatekeeping in digital networks. She 
restricted gatekeepers to social entities such as people and 
organisations and defined ‘gatekeeping’ as “a type of control 
exercised on information as it moves in and out of gates” (Barzilai-
Nahon, 2008, pp. 1496–1497). However, we believe that the 
architecture of digital networks and the software used (such as apps) 
also control the flow of information. Consequently, in this chapter 
we define ‘network gatekeepers’ as social or digital entities (such as 
human traffickers and the architectures of digital networks and 
software) that exercise gatekeeping. This definition is broader than 
former definitions of gatekeeping (see, for example, Shoemaker, 
1991), as it also includes the information that goes out of a gate, i.e., 
the information the gated, such as victims of human trafficking, can 
send to intended receivers of the information, such as relatives or 
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friends. The gated are people subjected to gatekeeping (Barzilai-
Nahon, 2008, p. 1496). The gated can be subjected to gatekeeping by 
his or her own free will (for example, as a strategy to handle 
information overload), or have it forced upon him/her (as in human 
trafficking). A gate refers to an “entrance to or exit from a (social or 
digital) network or its section” (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008, p. 1496). One 
should realise that the existence of a deterministic gate is not realistic 
in social or digital networks, due to the dynamics of such networks, 
as well as developments in digital and information technologies. 
 
Now that the main concepts are clear, we will elaborate on the 
process of gatekeeping. Usually, the process of gatekeeping is 
described by means of ‘gatekeeping mechanisms’, which are defined 
as tools, technologies or methodologies used to carry out the process 
of gatekeeping (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008, p. 1496). These mechanisms 
include different aspects of information handling, such as the 
selection, addition, manipulation, timing, disregarding and deletion, 
of information (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008, p. 1497). These actions are 
performed by the gatekeeper. However, by focusing only on the 
actions overlooks the social process between the gatekeeper and the 
gated, as well as the motives of the gatekeeper and the gated to accept 
or engage in information control. According to symbolic 
interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Hewitt & Shulman, 2011), these 
motives dictate what and how gatekeeping mechanisms are 
performed, as they evolve in the roles of the gated and the gatekeeper, 
as well as the action-reaction involved in the social process of 
information control. By looking at gatekeeping as a social process, the 
relationship between the gated and the gatekeeper becomes the core 
of gatekeeping. We will investigate this relationship in the case of the 
human trafficking of Eritrean refugees for ransom. But first, let’s look 
at the uneven digitally-connected world. 
The uneven digitally-connected world  
In the current digital era, social connections and information 
exchange are governed by the spread of digital technology in 
information exchange. This has created a ‘network society’ (Van Dijk, 
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2006), which, unfortunately for many, is controlled by gatekeepers 
and the digital architecture. Castells (2000) argues, in his three-volume 
work The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, that digital 
technology has created a new social network in which information 
processing has become the core activity of capitalism with little or no 
participation by other actors in society. Within this digital social 
network, structural holes exist in which people are not connected to 
the rest of the world. Castells calls these the ‘black holes’ of 
informational capitalism. In this chapter, the term black holes is also 
used to refer to gated areas in a digital or social network. The term 
describes locations with no, or limited, access to digital networks, 
software that can only handle specific information, and structural 
holes caused by incompatible apps or social networks of different 
groups of people. Information does not flow freely through these 
gates, but can be mediated by a gatekeeper. These gatekeepers 
mediate the ability of individuals to access information that is relevant 
to them and distribute information freely to intended receivers.  
 
So, what is the situation regarding such black holes in Africa? In most 
parts of Africa, people do not have much say over their digital 
infrastructure, because information is disseminated and data mined 
according to Eurocentric norms, which Williams (2017) calls ‘digital 
imperialism’. As Van Reisen, Mawere, Stokmans, Nakazibwe, Van 
Stam and Ong’ayo (Chapter 1, Black Holes in the Global Digital 
Landscape: The Fuelling of Human Trafficking on the African Continent) 
show, the structure of the digital architecture bears close resemblance 
to the architecture of the information society created during the 
colonial era. During the 16th and 17th centuries, specific routes 
(networks) and connection points (nodes) came into existence in 
which information was collected by the European colonisers and 
analysed and transformed into general knowledge, which was used by 
European traders. This knowledge turned into power – the people 
who were colonised and enslaved could not access this knowledge, 
nor use these networks and nodes. Van Reisen et al. (Chapter 1, Black 
Holes in the Global Digital Landscape) show that this 16th and 17th century 
infrastructure provides the foundation for the modern-day digital 
infrastructure. Old colonial shipping routes and modern-day Internet 
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routes (its cable networks and trajectories) and nodes, closely 
resemble each other. In addition, the collecting and handling of digital 
data is Eurocentric, as in colonial times. As a consequence, a lot of 
African people do not have access to digital infrastructure and, if they 
do, the facilities and information provided are predominantly 
Eurocentric. 
 
This brings us back to the critical role of gatekeepers as information 
brokers who play a crucial role in social capital by bridging the black 
holes described above. In the black holes in the digital architecture, 
those who have access to digital networks and specific apps can 
become powerful information brokers – or gatekeepers – who 
control the information flows within and across the black holes. In 
the context of black holes, information gatekeepers are middlemen 
and dictate both the information that people in black holes can access, 
and the information they can produce and disseminate to intended 
receivers. This is clearly visible in the context of human trafficking 
for ransom in Africa, where access to digital technology, as well as 
access to, production of, and distribution of, information is limited, 
so that gatekeeping is forced upon the gated by gatekeepers, such as 
human traffickers. In this chapter we will look at the human 
trafficking of Eritrean refugees for ransom as a case study to 
investigate the relationship between the gated and network 
gatekeepers more closely. But before we do, the following section sets 
out the research methodology. 
Methodology 
In Sinai trafficking, the first form of human trafficking for ransom 
described by researchers, the digital phone played a unique role and 
as many as 95% of the victims were of Eritrean origin (Van Reisen et 
al., 2012; Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). Similarly, in Libya, there is 
currently a large group of refugees of Eritrean origin being held by 
human traffickers, many of whom are being held for ransom. Eritrean 
refugees, therefore, appear to be extremely vulnerable to human 
trafficking for ransom and provide an extreme case to study the 
interaction between gated and network gatekeepers in the digital era.  
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Accordingly, the case study presented in this chapter focuses on 
Eritrean refugees. The study is based on a review of reports and 
communications with resource persons and victims of human 
trafficking. Data was collected in focus group discussions and 
interviews – including through social media. Information was also 
received through frequent contact on social media and in-depth 
written engagement with persons held in human trafficking situations. 
This information was cross checked with experts in the area. In 
addition, pictures and other visual material was collected to verify the 
information obtained. Cross checking was conducted to achieve an 
acceptable level of trustworthiness, proportionate to the extremely 
difficult area of research being conducted (including personal danger 
to the informants). 
 
The data was collected in 2018 and 2019. The respondents and 
informants were of Eritrean origin and were residing either in Europe 
or North Africa, especially Libya, at the time. Detailed information 
was obtained from one of the camps in Libya where the refugees from 
Eritrea were being held. The interviews were carried out by the first 
and second authors of this chapter. For reasons of safety and security 
the names of all respondents are treated with anonymity. The next 
sections present the results of the research 
The relationship between the gated and the gatekeepers  
In order to describe the relationship between the gated and network 
gatekeepers, the theoretical framework proposed by Barzilai-Nahon 
(2008) is adopted. Barzilai-Nahon states that the gatekeeper-gated 
relationship relies on four characteristics: 1) the alternative 
information sources available to the gated; 2) the ability of the gated 
to produce and distribute information freely; 3) the relationship 
between the gated and the network gatekeeper (directness, enduring 
nature); and 4) the political power of the network gatekeeper. In this 
section, we use these four characteristics to present the results of this 
research on the relationship between the gated and the gatekeeper.  
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Alternative information sources  
Benkler suggests that the networked information economy increases 
an individual’s autonomy by enlarging “the range and diversity of 
things that individuals can do for and by themselves” and by giving 
them an unlimited range of alternative sources of information and 
communication opportunities (2006, p. 133). However, this 
autonomy does not result in more freedom or power for ordinary 
people, due to self-regulation (Sunstein, 2001), strong control by 
gatekeepers, and black holes in the digital architecture caused by the 
unavailability of (access to) the Internet or the incompatibility of 
apps. The autonomy of the gated is contingent upon the gatekeepers 
legal and social rules, as well as the technologies provided (Barzilai-
Nahon, 2008). 
 
In Eritrea, strong controls by gatekeepers and black holes in the 
digital architecture limit the alternative sources of information 
available to the general public. The vast majority of information 
comes from the state media (gatekeeper), relatives abroad 
(gatekeeper), although this communication is restricted by the risk of 
surveillance, as will be explained later, satellite radio (gatekeeper) and 
other gatekeepers within the country, including those involved in 
human trafficking networks. Digital information plays only a meagre 
role as an information source, as Eritrea is a black hole in the current 
digital landscape. The World Bank estimates that in 2017, only 1% of 
the Eritrean population had access to the Internet (World Bank, n.d.). 
Internet cafes are available in places such as the capital, Asmara, but 
access to the Internet there is restricted by the knowledge that the 
government might be ‘watching’ – which can be regarded as a 
gatekeeping mechanism – thereby reducing most of the Eritreans to 
the status of citizens in a black hole (Chapter 5, ‘Sons of Isaias’: Slavery 
and Indefinite National Service in Eritrea, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Makeda 
Saba & Klara Smits). 
 
Mobile services are dominated by only one provider, which is Eritel. 
However, access to sim cards is severely restricted. Sim cards are only 
available to those with an ID card, and most of the country’s youth 
are not able to obtain an ID, as it is contingent upon finishing 
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National Service (Chapter 5, ‘Sons of Isaias’, by Van Reisen, et al.). In 
order to obtain a sim card in Eritrea, a customer needs clearance from 
the authorities managing National Service (R., personal 
communication with Van Reisen, email, 24 May 2019). The majority 
of the working population in Eritrea are assigned to National Service, 
which is open-ended in duration and includes conditions of forced 
labour (Kibreab, 2017). As it is compulsory and indefinitely in 
practice, National Service is tantamount to modern day slavery (UN 
Human Rights Council, 2016).  
 
The reality of this is described by a refugee, originally from Eritrea, 
now residing in the Netherlands. In his testimony he says that he was 
forced to work without a salary in construction from 2002 to 2015 
when he fled Eritrea. If he did not obey the orders of the military 
commanders, he was put in prison, which happened twice. Over the 
years, the situation worsened and he decided to escape. He describes 
having hardly any access to communication or information: 
 
We were not able to use a phone. The landlines were controlled and we could not 
speak freely. We could not give any information. We did not say anything. We spoke 
only in code. We were not allowed to have a sim card. It was not possible to 
communicate to explain the severity of our situation. (D., interview with Van 
Reisen, face-to-face, 26 May 2019) 
 
At the time of writing, it is still the case that people working on road 
construction in Eritrea (who are all assigned under National Service) 
are not allowed to have a mobile phone or a sim card.  
 
Due to this situation, the Eritrean population relies on limited sources 
for the information they need. A select few may be able to circumvent 
surveillance and the blocking of social media by using virtual private 
networks (VPNs), but the Internet speed is so slow that a single 
message may take minutes or even longer to send. 
  
Those fleeing Eritrea do so to escape repression, especially the 
indefinite National Service (Melicherová, 2019a), and rely heavily on 
gatekeepers, often smugglers or traffickers, for information (Van 
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Reisen & Mawere, 2017). These gatekeepers offer the only 
opportunity to escape from repression and are, therefore, often hailed 
as ‘saviours’ and parents tell their children to trust and follow what 
they say (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). 
 
Outside Eritrea, most Eritrean refugees own a smart phone, which is 
their most prized possession, as it allows them to keep in touch with 
family and to access information on their destination (Bariagaber, 
2013). A study by Kidane (2016) highlighted the reliance of refugee 
communities on social media for information and found that relatives 
are the most trusted source of information. However, along the 
migration routes, technological barriers restrict the use of mobile 
phones as tools of communication. In research done in one of 
Ethiopia’s refugee camps, it was found that access to digital networks 
is highly restricted (Schoenmaeckers, 2018). The study by 
Schoenmaeckers found that young refugees had to employ all sorts 
of tricks to get even the smallest signal in order to send a message to 
their friends and family members, as connectivity in the camps is very 
poor. Person-to-person contact in the camps was regarded as the 
most common way of sharing information.  
 
With limited access to digital networks to receive and send 
information, refugees easily fall prey to gatekeepers such as human 
traffickers. From the interviews, it emerged that the recruiters for the 
human trafficking organisations are never far away, with easy-to-find 
contacts who can tell you who to turn to. As Eritrean refugees often 
live in black holes and, thus, cannot freely access information, 
attempts to better inform refugees about the risks of migration are 
often ineffective. Internet access is too limited and the refugees rely 
on their close social networks for information (Van Reisen et al., 
2018b). In addition, the camp officials who refugees turn to for 
information or assistance (Schoenmaeckers, 2018) are often unaware 
of official migration procedures (such as resettlement or family 
reunification) or not capable of helping the refugees to access these 
procedures (Chapter 16, Refugees’ Right to Family Unity in Belgium and the 
Netherlands: ‘Life is Nothing without Family’, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Eva 
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Berends, Lucie Delecolle, Jakob Hagenberg, Marco Paron Trivellato 
& Naomi Stocker).  
Ability to produce and distribute information 
Many technologies facilitate multiple applications that provide ready 
and easy-to-use apps that produce content that can be freely sent to 
intended receivers, giving the gated greater autonomy and reducing 
the control of gatekeepers (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008). However, these 
apps and the digital networks that make their use possible are not as 
open and democratic as it appears. Besides technological barriers, 
there are political, economic, and social impediments that prevent the 
gated from reaching others with their intended message (Barzilai-
Nahon, 2008). In many cases, gatekeepers have created platforms 
with a specific architecture and specific policies set by the gatekeeper, 
that restrict what and how information can be posted by the gated. 
Moreover, by using these platforms, the gated are restricted in terms 
of the audience they can reach. 
 
In Eritrea, the gatekeepers heavily restrict the opportunities of the 
gated to produce and distribute information freely. First of all, it is 
not only very difficult to obtain a sim card and to obtain access to a 
mobile phone, there is also no free press and limited access to social 
media, which is further restricted if there is any risk of protest (Africa 
News, 2019). Even if people do have access to a mobile phone or 
social media, it is not safe to send information (M., interview with 
Van Reisen, face-to-face, 26 May 2019; A., interview with Van Reisen, 
WhatsApp, 12 May 2019). All outgoing phone and Internet traffic is 
heavily monitored. In 2015, the United Nations Commission of 
Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea found the following: 
 
The Commission collected a body of testimony that indicates the existence of a 
complex and multi-layered system to conduct surveillance of and spying on the 
Eritrean population, both within and outside the country, with the ultimate purpose 
of controlling it. Information collected through this system is then used to take actions 
aimed at instilling fear in people and maintaining a state of control leading to 
arbitrariness that paralyses them: arbitrary arrests, unjustified detentions, torture, 
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enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, etc. […]. (UN Human Rights 
Council, 2015, p. 91) 
 
Thus, Eritreans in Eritrea (the gated) have a very limited ability to 
produce and distribute information freely. This was also indicated by 
respondents who are forced to work in national service on road 
construction in Eritrea. When asked whether or not they could send 
information, pictures or videos to explain their situation, these 
informants responded that this was not allowed and could put them 
in great danger (M., interview with Van Reisen, face-to-face, 26 May 
2019; A., interview with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, 12 May 2019). 
 
Those fleeing Eritrea are also restricted in their ability to receive, 
produce and distribute information, as they are often situated in 
digital black holes with limited or no connectivity. In limited ways, 
refugees trapped in situations of human trafficking and detention in 
Libya, attempt to contact many people, including journalists and 
international organisations, using their mobile phones to call for help 
(Sunderland, 2019). Using phones in these circumstances can carry 
great risk, if it is not done according to the conditions set by the 
human traffickers (Z., interview with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, April–
May 2019). Refugees may face severe consequences, such as beatings 
and torture, over the secret use of their phones and many have their 
phones taken away from them by force (Smits, 2019). Even in Libya’s 
official detention centres, where horrific abuses also take place, 
demonstrations are rare and few pictures make it out (France24, 
2018). The limited ability of Eritrean refugees to produce and 
distribute information has meant that they are unable to access 
protection or be evacuated, such as would be expected under 
international standards, and the situation remains largely unknown to 
the public at large (Z., interview with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, Libya, 
May 2019). 
 
Often, at the start of their journey, refugees are asked for a crucial 
piece of information by the smugglers or traffickers, people who they 
think are helping them. This is a phone number of a friend or relative 
and often a name and address as well (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). 
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Friends or relatives are then contacted by the smugglers/traffickers 
to arrange payment for their trip. Some refugees enter into ‘no-fee’ 
migration deals (they are told they can pay later on arrival at their 
destination), which turns out to be trafficking for ransom. Even if the 
refugee has access to sufficient funds to pay (usually obtained from 
relatives), this is not carried in cash and family in Eritrea or friends in 
refugee camps or cities are required to arrange the payment on their 
behalf after they have arrived at their intended destination (Van 
Reisen et al., 2018b). This illustrates how the different parts of the 
human trafficking network cooperate and that the refugees are passed 
from one group within the network to another, perhaps all belonging 
to the same overarching organisation. Within these umbrella 
organisations, there are those who play the role of coordinators, for 
example, the notorious General Teklai Manjus, who played a critical 
role in coordinating cross-border smuggling from Eritrea during the 
Sinai trafficking (Van Reisen and Mawere, 2017). Other names 
repeatedly come up in conversations with victims of human 
trafficking (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). 
 
Much of the information that the refugees produce during their 
migration is closely controlled and disseminated by the human 
traffickers to specific audiences. This mainly includes phone calls to 
relatives or friends who are forced to listen to the torture of their 
loved ones in order to induce them to pay large sums of money in 
ransom (Van Reisen et al., 2012). New methods used to extract 
ransom include digital methods that keep up with the progress of 
technology, such as embarrassing pictures spread on Facebook 
(Hayden, 2019) and heart-breaking videos sent to family (CNN, 2018) 
via Facebook Messenger, Imo or WhatsApp. Whereas in Sinai 
trafficking, family and friends of victims were forced to listen to 
voices and sounds, trafficking for ransom has now progressed to 
videos that are published on social media (CNN, 2018). Digital 
technology is clearly providing opportunities for human traffickers to 
hone their modus operandi regarding the distribution of information 
about victims. In addition, desperate family members often turn to 
social media and fundraising platforms to collect money. They use 
the horrific images of torture to crowdfund ransoms (Hayden, 2019). 
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Although the use of social media may lead to the freedom of 
individual refugees, when their ransom has been paid – often multiple 
times – it also leads to ever higher ransoms and increasing numbers 
of victims.  
 
The sounds and images of torture invoke feelings of shame for the 
victims. The shaming of victims appears part of a deliberate strategy 
to disempower the victims of human trafficking for ransom (Z., 
interview with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, March–May 2019). Images 
sent by the refugees, as well as those disseminated by the human 
traffickers, are distributed within the Eritrean community across 
social media networks. Through the deliberate and involuntary spread 
of this disempowering information, not only are the victims 
traumatised, but their friends, families and the wider community as 
well. This, in combination with the crippling amounts of ransom that 
members of the Eritrean community have been forced to pay, has led 
to a situation where the Eritrean community is experiencing collective 
trauma (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017). This collective trauma results 
in ever-increasing profits for the human traffickers. It can also 
discourage survivors and their families from exposing the practices of 
human traffickers beyond the Eritrean community. 
Relationship between the gated and the gatekeepers 
Putnam, Phillips and Chapman (1996) describe relationships as 
linkages or ties between nodes, which in our case are the gated and 
the network gatekeepers. Such linkages have different characteristics, 
such as reciprocity, directness, and strength due to endurance and 
frequency of contact between the two nodes (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008; 
Plickert, Cote, & Wellman, 2007, Putnam, et al., 1996). Reciprocal, 
direct, and strong relations can produce a platform of negotiation 
between the gated and the gatekeeper.  
 
First of all, victims of human trafficking do not have a reciprocal 
relationship with the human trafficker, as the human trafficker 
dominates the relationship. Smugglers and traffickers work together, 
keeping in touch using digital technology, to exchange information 
on refugees’ movements and to understand which refugees may be 
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particularly vulnerable. This exchange is kept secret from the 
refugees, and when a group guided by a smuggler is intercepted by 
human traffickers, the smugglers often maintain their innocence in 
order to protect their reputation, whereas, in reality, they may have 
orchestrated the interception and profited from it (Van Reisen et al., 
2018a). The refugees will remember the smugglers as trusted 
gatekeepers of information and services. They may communicate the 
name of a trusted smuggler to family members and friends and may 
be more reluctant to give information about this part of the human 
trafficking infrastructure to legal agents. 
 
Secondly, victims of human trafficking rarely have direct, face-to-face 
contact with the persons at the top of the human trafficking 
organisation – those organising the business, who decide what the 
next move will be. The crossing from Eritrea to Sudan or Ethiopia 
may have been facilitated by someone the refugee knows, or who is 
introduced by a trusted person, but those in charge of transport, 
accommodation, and food or those who execute the extortion of 
ransom and perform torture are different people from different 
places and of different nationalities. The collection of payments and 
ransoms is done anonymously, to avoid the tracing of the payments. 
Digital technology facilitates this anonymity.  
 
Gatekeepers with no bad intentions – handlers or mediators 
communicating with the traffickers – often use code names and 
multiple sim cards from providers such as Lebara or Lycamobile, that 
do not require the users to be registered (Van Reisen et al., 2018a). If 
friends or relatives are making the ransom payment – which can be 
from anywhere in the world – they are simply told where to leave the 
money. A refugee held in Libya explained how the money is paid: 
 
A: When you enter Libya, the smugglers tell you to pay the chief. 
MvR: And how do you pay the chief? In Dubai or in Sudan? 
A: USD 7,500 is all paid in Dubai. 
A: USD 3,500 is paid in Sudan. 
MvR: The USD 7,500 that is paid in Dubai – do you pay it to a bank? 
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A: They give only a telephone number in Dubai. Someone in Dubai has to call it, 
and then pay. (A., personal communication with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, 
16 February 2019) 
 
After the money has been paid through several channels, usually by 
relatives, a number (code) is communicated to those holding the 
refugees captive to initiate their release or next transport, although 
refugees may also be released and sold on to new traffickers who may 
again extort them for ransom. 
 
A veil of anonymity regarding those in charge of trafficking and 
regarding payments is used to avoid a direct and enduring relationship 
that could produce a platform of negotiation between the gated and 
the gatekeeper. This creates a further power difference and dynamics 
in the relationship between the traffickers and the refugees. Many 
victims of trafficking only hear the name of the top-level trafficker in 
passing, usually only the first name or a nickname. They are not 
offered a platform for negotiation and are, therefore, completely 
dependent on what the trafficker wants from them. In addition, the 
relationship between the gated and gatekeeper is rarely strong. The 
gated are frequently handed over to other gatekeepers along their 
journey. The victims are treated as commodities, and often sold from 
one trafficker to the other.  
Political power 
Barzilai-Nahon (2008) argues that this construct is important, as the 
main objective of a gatekeeper is to control information. The ability 
to do so can be framed in a power struggle between stakeholders who 
all have their own objectives or political interests. In the case of 
network gatekeeping and human trafficking, (political) power can be 
defined as the ability to get others to do what you want them to do, 
even if it is against their will (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008; Weber, Gerth & 
Mills, 1947). 
 
Looking at the political power of the Eritrean refugees in relation to 
their Eritrean traffickers reveals a fairly straightforward first 
difference. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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(UNHCR) eligibility guidelines from 2011, which are still in place 
today, clearly identify Eritrean refugees as in need of international 
protection (UNHCR, 2011). UNHCR specifies that it is not safe for 
Eritrean refugees to return to their country, whether through forced 
or voluntary returns, as repression structures are still firmly intact in 
Eritrea. The political power in Eritrea is centralised in the hands of 
President Isaias Afwerki, there is no constitution, parliament or 
independent judiciary, and are no opposition parties (Plaut, 2017).  
 
Without a free press, people within the country cannot express 
themselves publicly. Outside the country, even as far as Europe, 
Eritrean refugees cannot count on the support of Eritrean embassies, 
which have even been implicated in human trafficking (Van Reisen & 
Mawere, 2017). Eritrean embassies have also been accused of threats 
and violence against, and the extortion of, Eritreans in the diaspora, 
to obtain a 2% diaspora tax, among other things (Buysse, Van Reisen 
& Van Soomeren, 2017). From this it is clear that within and outside 
the country, Eritrean refugees cannot count on the support of their 
government. What is more, within the international political arena, 
refugees exist in what Peter Nyers calls a “depoliticized humanitarian 
space” (2006, p. xiii). In the international arena, which is based largely 
on the concept of sovereignty, the refugee does not fit in. 
 
The human traffickers, on the other hand, enjoy a position of power 
due to their wealth and connections. Research has shown that 
trafficking organisations facilitating the smuggling and trafficking of 
Eritreans have their roots in Eritrea (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). 
The people in control of the human trafficking of Eritreans are 
Eritrean themselves, those at the top of the regime benefit from it 
and do nothing to stop it (Focus group discussion, Van Reisen, 28 
March 2019). Outside of Eritrea, the human traffickers have been 
seen as closely cooperating with state actors, such as officials in the 
Sudanese police, security and intelligence branches and Libyan 
military and non-state militia. This network gives the traffickers solid 




Hegdef PFDJ, the only political party in Eritrea collaborates with all the regimes 
in the region. I was threatened in one country then moved on to the next country. 
There Hegdef approached me to work with them as informer and they offered USD 
50,000. I refused. They sent people who beat me up badly but I still refused. They 
then attacked my family. They have put several of us in prison in this country. They 
pay their protection and they have all the power here. I am very scared now. I need 
to get out. But I don’t have any options now. (B., interview with Van Reisen, 
face-to-face meeting, Egypt, 6 August 2019). 
 
The political power of the human traffickers and smugglers in the 
region is confirmed by their use digital technology to gather 
intelligence, facilitate negotiations and transactions, and coordinate 
with local authorities. They also exchange information on what routes 
are safe and whether any law enforcement agents pose a threat to their 
operations, and they use global positioning system (GPS) to 
determine what routes to take (Van Reisen et al., 2018a). The 
traffickers can freely travel in and out of Eritrea, apparently without 
fear of persecution by the government, as opposed to the refugees 
they victimise (Sahan Foundation & IGAD Security Sector Program, 
2016). Although they operate in an illegal space, the prosecution of 
human traffickers has been very limited in the context of human 
trafficking for ransom in Africa and has even ended up in the 
victimisation of the refugees, as well as humanitarian organisations 
seeking to assist them (Tondo, 2019; Bulman, 2019). Indeed, 
government officials up to the highest level are heavily involved in 
and profiting from smuggling people out of the country and are 
involved in international organisations for human trafficking for 
ransom (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). 
 
Due to this political power, human trafficking organisations can 
induce refugees to do things that they might not otherwise do, 
through information control. Promoting themselves as the only way 
to safety, the smugglers and human traffickers take advantage of 
people’s desperation and draw people into their networks. This 
includes taking the dangerous route over the Mediterranean Sea, 
despite its high risks, as well as accepting being pushed back to Eritrea 
in ‘voluntary’ returns, equally knowing the risks of this. Although 
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refugees are often aware of the risks, they experience high levels of 
trauma putting them in a hyper-vigilant state (Stokmans & Kidane, 
2018). The decision to go along with the human traffickers appears 
to be instigated by a combination of fear, desperation and 
manipulation of information (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017; Z., 
interview with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, April–May 2019).  
 
The power of human traffickers to induce fear in the refugee is very 
real, as is apparent from this message received from Libya by a 
refugee held in captivity in Libya since 2017: “Please remove me first 
from Libya, because when they know this information they can kill 
me” (A., personal communication with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, 14 
February 2019). Constantly changing sim cards and phone numbers, 
this refugee is still finding ways of sending information out, but the 
fear is always with him, making him request that all information 
received from him is immediately deleted: “Please take this message 
to your phone, because every time I will make delete after you put in 
your phone, because I am afraid always (A., personal communication 
with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, 15 February 2019). 
 
Some refugees held in captivity in Libya operate with a foreign sim 
card. Z. explains how he set up a French social media number, from 
captivity in Libya, and why this was necessary: 
 
My best friend stays in France. [...] I asked him to help me with WhatsApp and 
Imo through his number, so he download it for me. Because here in Libya any sim 
card you have you need to buy first, but then you have to come with an ID card. Me, 
I don’t have an ID card, so the only question is how to solve it. How to open a way 
of sending/receiving information? A sim card in Libya you can buy from these 
Arabs, but after a short time the man who sold it to you can close it. (A., personal 
communication with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, 15 February 2019) 
 
The experiences described show the level of fear induced in refugees 
in the process of trying to open communication channels and provide 
information about their situation, but also the difficulties experienced 
in trying to overcome the gatekeepers who stop them from 
communicating freely about their situation. This has enormous 
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consequences. Most refugees do not exist in the digital world and, 
therefore, there is little, if any, understanding of their situation. They 
live in black holes in the digital architecture and entirely depend on 
gatekeepers to help them get information out. This creates extremely 
skewed power relations and dependency. The dependency of Eritrean 
refugees on human traffickers can further be illustrated by looking at 
the alternatives they have open to them, which is the topic of the next 
section. 
The dependence of Eritrean refugees on human traffickers 
The results suggest that Eritrean refugees have no choice but to go 
along with human traffickers to migrate to Europe. This dependency 
will be illustrated by paying attention to the alternatives open to 
Eritreans and understanding their autonomy in choosing which 
alternative to take. This will be discussed by looking at: 1) the 
alternatives to migration to Europe; 2) the alternative migration 
routes or options; and 3) the autonomy to choose human smugglers 
and traffickers. Examining the alternatives open to Eritreans is 
important as it shows the range of alternatives available to them and 
the power that smugglers and traffickers have to make them victims 
of human trafficking. 
Alternatives to migration to Europe 
Starting with alternatives to migration to Europe, these include 
settling in the region or staying in refugee camps. It should be 
emphasised that most in fact do take this option. For example, as of 
August 2018, UNHCR reported that over 170,000 refugees are 
hosted in Ethiopian refugee camps (UNHCR, n.d.). This count does 
not include those who have settled directly in cities and other places. 
Ethiopia’s new refugee proclamation (No. 1110/2019), adopted in 
February 2019 makes it possible for refugees to work and move 
outside of the refugee camps, facilitating better integration (Ethiopia, 
2019). Other countries which host Eritreans include Sudan, Uganda, 
Israel and Kenya. Uganda, in particular, was named in a resolution of 
the Pan-African parliament as an example of refugee hospitality, for 
integrating refugees into host communities as much as possible (Daily 
Monitor, 2019).  
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However, the option of ‘not migrating’ is hindered by barriers to 
settling, which include lack of safety, inadequate provision of basic 
needs in refugee camps, and lack of livelihood opportunities (Van 
Reisen et al., 2018b). Officials from Uganda, which hosts nearly 1.4 
million refugees, note that, especially as the number of refugees 
increases, it is a challenge to meet basic needs and provide security 
and integration opportunities (Malole, 2018). Similarly, officials from 
Ethiopia have expressed concern about the inadequate conditions in 
refugee camps in the northern region (Gebreyesus & 
Schoenmaeckers, 2019; Melicherová, 2019b). An official explained 
the inadequacy of the services available to deal with the large number 
of refugees arriving from Eritrea: 
 
The border situation hasn't produced any change in the number of Eritrean asylum 
seekers per day, which is 250 individuals. From this total, 25% are unaccompanied 
and separated minors. The Eritrean government start to kidnap the children to go 
to SAWA military training. That is why they are coming. Regarding the registration 
situation, more than 1,000 individuals are staying every day. The services in all 
camps are inadequate. (T., personal communication with Van Reisen, 1 
May 2019) 
 
Regularly refugees have no free choice, as they are kidnapped and 
abducted and end up in the hands of human traffickers (Van Reisen 
& Mawere, 2017; Van Reisen et al., 2012). This particularly, but not 
exclusively, relates to vulnerable groups, such as unaccompanied 
minors and young women and men. 
Alternative migration routes or options 
Although limited, migration routes to other places exist. Eritrean 
refugees migrate and are trafficked along Southern (towards South 
Africa) and Eastern (towards the Middle East) migration routes. 
Although deaths along these routes have been less publicised, the 
routes carry equally high risks (Gebre-Egziabher, 2018). Legal, or so-
called ‘regular’, migration pathways are also available to some. 
Eritrean refugees with family members already in Europe may qualify 
for family reunification. However, there are two main barriers to this: 
firstly, someone needs to reach Europe and, secondly, regular 
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migration requires documentation, and refugees often face 
insurmountable bureaucratic hurdles to obtaining documentation, 
including having to go to an Eritrean embassy to obtain the necessary 
documentation, which many refuse to do due to fear (DSP-Groep & 
Tilburg University, 2016). Other legal pathways are basically non-
existent. The European Parliament recently asked for humanitarian 
visas to be made available to Eritreans through the new EU visa code, 
but this was rejected by the European Council and Commission 
(European Parliament, 2018). 
Autonomy to choose human smugglers and traffickers 
The final point of analysis is the consideration of alternatives available 
to refugees to pick and choose human traffickers and smugglers. 
Operating under the veil of anonymity, refugees do not have options, 
or what appears to be a choice may only be a pretence. Refugees 
usually have control over their own mobility only up to a certain 
point, for example, by withholding payment until their safe arrival at 
the agreed point. Smuggling often becomes trafficking when the 
refugees arrive in a situation of lawlessness, such as in Libya. The 
decision-making ability of refugees is negated by captivity (which 
involves no access to open communication), lack of food and other 
basic necessities, lack of access to health care, and subjection to 
torture, violence and sexual violence. They are no longer in control 
of their lives. In the worst cases, their family is not able to raise the 
ransom and they are left without any leverage to negotiate with those 
holding them. In such cases, the only option may be to follow 
instructions to carry out tasks to support the human trafficking 
operation, including by contacting people who are willing to migrate, 
translating, arranging transportation, and even implementing torture, 
(sexual) violence, and extortion.  
Conclusion 
Today’s digital architecture produces ‘black holes’ – places that are 
unconnected or barely connected. The emergence of black holes in 
the digital architecture has a strong resemblance to the colonial 
information society, with the direction of information flows being 
from unconnected places (e.g., in Africa) to super-connected places 
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in Europe. The digital architecture and the advances made in digital 
communication tools and connected information have increased the 
divide between those who are connected to the digital world – and 
can make full use of it – and those who are not. This creates a new 
role for those who facilitate information between connected places 
and those in the black holes, namely, the gatekeepers of information 
and the gated. Gatekeepers bridge the inflows and outflows of 
information from the gated communities and, therewith, have the 
power to control the information streams. This chapter set out to 
investigate how the mediating role of network gatekeepers intertwines 
with the human trafficking of Eritreans and how the digitalisation of 
communication has influenced this situation. 
 
Previous research has indicated that a lot of Eritrean refugees are 
victims of a new form of human trafficking, which makes use of all 
kinds of digital tools, particularly information and financial flows and 
GPS. As the modus operandi of human traffickers is evolving with 
the introduction of new technologies, it appears that digitalisation is 
creating new opportunities in the human trafficking business. These 
digital innovations, however, are not available to Eritrean refugees, 
due to stark differences in connectivity, as well as access to digital 
services. When an Eritrean refugee is a victim of human trafficking, 
the traffickers control the information stream between the refugee 
and his/her social network. They are the gatekeepers of information 
and have total control over information flows. However, a lot is still 
unclear about the relationship between the gatekeepers of 
information and the Eritrean refugees (the gated). Which gatekeepers 
introduce Eritrean refugees into the network of human traffickers, 
and how does the relationship between the gatekeepers and the gated 
evolve into a situation of total control by the gatekeeper over the 
gated?  
 
This reality is investigated by studying the situation of Eritrean 
refugees through the theoretical framework of network gatekeeping 
proposed by Barzilai-Nahon (2008). This paper assessed four factors 
to determine the extent to which Eritrean refugees were dependent 
on gatekeepers for information. The first factor regards the 
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alternatives available to the refugees to get information about 
migration options. This research found that Eritrean refugees are 
trapped in black holes within the digital infrastructure. Moreover, the 
Eritrean government controls all the media, as well as the information 
flows. This considerably restricts Eritrean’s free access to information 
about migration options. The information about opportunities to 
migrate to, for example, Europe is provided by trusted middlemen 
who are connected to smugglers. This research indicates that the 
trafficking of Eritrean refugees is facilitated through social networks 
controlled by Eritreans, which have their roots in Eritrea. When 
human rights abuses in Eritrea prompt someone to flee, they rely on 
information provided by these middlemen and smugglers who have 
ties to human traffickers. 
 
The second factor is the ability of the gated to produce and distribute 
information. This research indicated that in Eritrea, information 
streams are under the full control of the government. It is very 
difficult to obtain a sim card and citizens face severe consequences 
for the unauthorised use of mobile phones. Consequently, the ability 
of Eritreans to produce and distribute any information about 
migration to Europe to family or friends is severely restricted. If 
refugees are on the move, they are probably under the control of 
human traffickers, who have full control over the information 
produced and distributed by the refugees. Although most victims 
have a mobile phone and are able to obtain access to services, such 
as social media, despite low connectivity, the tool they use for 
communication (the mobile phone) becomes a tool of extortion (to 
collect ransom). This paper argues that Eritrean refugees are forced 
into the role of passive gated, whereas human traffickers assume 
complete control of information and act as the gatekeepers. The images 
and communications that do come out, and are shared freely across 
social media, are facilitated by the human traffickers. They are horrific 
images and sounds of torture that are produced to extort ransom 
from the refugees. This traumatises the victims, as well as members 
of Eritrean society, who resort to loans and crowdfunding to collect 




The modus operandi of the human traffickers is such that no 
enduring relationship between the gatekeeper and the gated evolves 
(the third factor). Such an enduring relationship could give refugees 
an opportunity to negotiate. However, victims of human trafficking 
are handled as commodities who are passed on to different people 
along the trajectory who remain anonymous. Consequently, the 
relationship between the human traffickers and the refugees is 
indirect and veiled in anonymity, ensuring that no platform for 
negotiation is possible. The top-level traffickers remain safely hidden. 
This sets up a distorted relationship between anonymous, but 
powerful, human traffickers and their victims, ranging from Eritrea 
to Europe.  
 
The research found that the Eritrean refugees have limited if any 
political power, either before or after they flee Eritrea. The human 
traffickers hold political power through their wealth and ability to 
operate in lawless areas, as well as cooperation with state actors 
involved in the human traffic networks. Through the control of 
information, they are able to force the refugees to enter their world. 
The absolute control gatekeepers of information have in new forms 
of human trafficking puts them in an almost untouchable position. 
This facilitates the human trafficking trade and protects the human 
trafficking organisations. Moreover, it misleads policy orientations, as 
gatekeepers control the flow of information, not only to the victims 
of trafficking, but also to those orientated to fight it.  
 
The fact that the gated have very little control over information flows 
in any part of the migration process goes against the push-pull theory 
of migration, which underlies much of the policies implemented by 
the European Union to stop irregular migration. This theory assumes 
that refugees make calculated decisions, weighing the pros and cons 
of migrating to Europe (Van Reisen et al., 2018b). In contrast, this 
study found that information is tightly controlled by the human 
traffickers as gatekeepers and factors that may provide agentic space 




The policy implications of this are that human traffickers should be 
regarded as central actors in the migration decisions of refugees and 
that those decisions are not made freely. The control of information 
by gatekeepers is used to force refugees into lucrative human 
trafficking situations to extort ransom. One approach to changing 
this dynamic is to increase protection by the international community 
and supported by key political actors, such as the African Union (AU) 
and EU, that gives the refugees more agency and political power, by 
increasing their ability to produce and distribute information freely. 
International protection of Eritrean refugees in countries such as 
Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan and providing adequate means to 
communicate, earn a living and integrate should be supported. In this 
way, the business model of human traffickers is challenged, as it is 
based on gated information and the creation of black holes in which 
people become entirely dependent on the information provided by 
gatekeepers who are intertwined with the trafficking networks. 
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Bound Together in the Digital Era: 





Mixed migration is a hot topic of discussion at the moment with talk 
of a ‘migration crisis’, viewed 
mostly from a Western 
perspective. At the same 
time, human trafficking has 
become a global epidemic, 
which occurs in all countries 
of the world, but more often 
from ‘less developed’ to 
‘developed’ countries. 
Although different in scope 
and nature, trafficking is 
often conflated with mixed 
migration. There is a 
relationship between the two 
phenomena – although this 
link is not always clear. 
 
Analysis of the literature on trafficking in persons and mixed 
migration shows that there is a lack of research in Africa on the link 
between poverty, human trafficking and mixed migration. For 
instance, Kashumba (2014, p. 3) observed that “the prevalence of 
human trafficking and mixed migration in Zimbabwe has not been 
empirically and scientifically verified due to challenges which include 
the absence of enabling legislation and limited funding to undertake 
the research at a national level”. The question, therefore, remains: 
What are the root causes of human trafficking and mixed migration?  
Poverty in the digital era has a new face. 
Those living in poverty are often attracted 
by the opportunities offered by migration 
or targeted by traffickers, who lure them 
with false promises of marriage or a high-
paying job. However, rather than lifting 
them out of poverty, many find themselves 
trapped in a cycle, where poverty drives 
migration and trafficking, which results 
in more poverty. The solution? Tackle the 
root cause: enhance livelihoods and the 
resilience of vulnerable people living in 




This chapter looks at the underlying causes of human trafficking and 
mixed migration in the context of mixed migration trajectories, with 
a focus on Africa. In the following sections, I will critically examine 
the intricate relationship between human trafficking and mixed 
migration, and how the two are connected to poverty. I will then look 
at the political-economy sustaining human trafficking and mixed 
migration in an attempt to unravel their underlying causes. Finally, I 
will come to some conclusions and hopefully inform those who seek 
to make policies to protect those vulnerable to human trafficking and 
to enable Africans to find futures at home. 
The relationship between human trafficking and mixed 
migration 
Although a relatively recent phenomenon, mixed migration has come 
to mean different things to different people depending on their 
orientation. The term has become the latest buzzword, assuming 
different definitions and interpretations, both conceptually and 
historically. It has indeed become “the cliché of our times” (Held, 
McGrew, Golblatt & Perratin, 1999, p. 6), with scholars like Castles 
and Miller (1998) pronouncing that “we are living in the age of 
migration”. However, generally speaking, mixed migration can be 
understood as the complex and irregular movement of people to a 
foreign country for a certain length of time and includes refugees, 
asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants (UNHCR, 
2006). It can be broken into four different sub-categories, some of 
which overlap: migration, irregularised migration, smuggling, and 
human trafficking. These categories, captured under the rubric of 
mixed migration, serve as a contra point to the concept of ‘mobility’, 
which is generally understood as a positive thing, practised for 
economic growth, tourism, upward mobility, exposure and 
experience.  
 
Human trafficking can be understood as one element of mixed 
migration. Van Reisen and Rijken (2015) describe how the terms 
smuggling and human trafficking are often used interchangeably, 
depending on the person’s knowledge of the deliberate exploitative 
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nature of the journey. Smuggling can also become trafficking: 
migrants may initially pay smugglers to start their journey, but end up 
in the hands of traffickers. Human trafficking often has multiple 
layers and can be difficult to distinguish from mixed migration, 
particularly migration in irregularised situations, where people 
without documents are assisted to illegally traverse national borders. 
In fact, many migrants in irregularised situations use smugglers to 
facilitate their journey, inadvertently ending up in the hands of 
traffickers. The United Nations Convention on Human Trafficking 
defines human trafficking (or trafficking in persons) as: 
 
…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons either by 
threat or use of abduction, force, fraud, deception or coercion, or by the giving or 
receiving of unlawful payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
the control over another person for the purpose of exploitation. (UNODC, 2004) 
  
Similarly, the US Department of State (United States, 2013) defines 
human trafficking as “the act of recruiting, harboring, transporting, 
providing, or obtaining a person for compelled labour or commercial 
sex acts through the use of force, fraud, or coercion”. It is on this 
basis that the US Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, in her 
introduction to the National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking, 
describes human trafficking as: “a devastating crime that threatens 
society’s most vulnerable members, exploiting them for sex, labour, 
and servitude of all kinds… destroying families, shattering lives, and 
undermines our most fundamental beliefs about the dignity of all 
people” (United States, 2017).  
 
The term mixed migration seems to be associated with poverty, not 
mobility, and has a negative connotation. However, mixed migration 
may include the movement of highly skilled and wealthy people, as 
well as unaccompanied minors, smuggled persons, stateless persons, 
victims of human trafficking, stranded migrants and other vulnerable 
persons in transit. Different forms of migration are highly 
stigmatised. In Zimbabwe, the local Shona vernacular distinguishes 
‘bad’ migration (kujamba bhodha/border jumping) from ‘good’ 
migration (kuenda mhiri/going abroad). In the first form, the people 
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involved usually migrate illegally to another country without proper 
documentation (such as a valid passport), mainly because they cannot 
afford to secure proper documentation. These people are generally 
fleeing poverty in the place of origin. This differ from the good form 
of migration, which refers to people who go abroad and who, because 
of their status (as wealthy or educated), can financially and legally 
afford to travel. This means that migration has different values 
attached to it. While seeking to become part of the ‘good’ high-end 
spectrum of migration, mixed migration trajectories are followed. 
Human traffickers and smugglers prey on people with such 
aspirations. 
 
A close look at human trafficking and mixed migration clearly shows 
that both are complex, multi-layered and diverse social phenomena, 
especially if we realise that the movement of both migrants and 
human trafficking victims can be forced. In addition, both types of 
migrants are increasingly making use of the same routes and means 
of transport to get to their destination (Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015). 
Worse still, where legal entry to the preferred state is impossible, both 
mixed migrants and human trafficking victims often use the services 
of human smugglers, putting their own human rights at risk. Thus, 
more often than not, mixed migrants and the victims of human 
trafficking are both vulnerable groups – the defenceless and people 
in poverty – whose rights end up in the hands of criminals. Their 
situations pose a formidable challenge to humanitarian aid actors in 
terms of accessing and assisting these people.  
 
In addition, there can be a continuum between mixed migration and 
human trafficking as migrants – for example, economic migrants and 
refugees – can become trafficking victims, and vice-versa. Different 
forms of migration may intersect at some point in the migration 
process, for example, in relation to the motivation to move, use of 
the same agents or brokers, and interactions with mixed communities. 
This mixed migration-trafficking nexus makes human trafficking and 
mixed migration a more complex multi-layered problem that needs 
researching beyond the borders of one discipline in order to 
understand and contain it. Thus, although different in nature and 
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scope, efforts to address the problems associated with mixed 
migration and human trafficking go hand-in-hand, making it even 
more difficult to deal with either issue, especially at policy and judicial 
levels:  
 
Trends in global patterns of migrant smuggling are difficult to assess. A range of 
factors such as the lack of regular migration channels, high visa fees, the often lengthy 
bureaucratic procedures and increasingly restrictive entry requirements, coupled with 
a demand for the various contributions migrants make and services they provide, may 
create the conditions and incentives for migrants to engage the services of smugglers. 
(United Nations, n.d.) 
 
Mixed migration, therefore, encompasses those forms of migration 
that are the opposite of regularised and organised migration for work 
in formalised market environments. It is understood in this chapter 
as mobility that can change form during the one journey. Mixed 
migration is generally carried out along migratory pathways in which 
regularised and irregularised migration, as well as smuggling and 
human trafficking, may be present simultaneously or successively in 
one trajectory. Thus, mixed migration can also involve human 
trafficking.  
Poverty, the main driver of mixed migration 
In Africa, poverty remains an issue, not because the continent lacks 
natural and human resources, but due to the continued influence of 
neo-colonialism, which maintains a stranglehold on Africa and its 
resources. While poverty on the continent was previously driven by 
conquest and subjugation by the colonial regime, which, besides 
looting, instituted the privatisation of communally-owned resources, 
today it is perpetuated in more subtle ways, such as direct resource 
externalisation, under-invoicing, tax evasion, capital flight, 
corruption, bribery and debt repayment, all with the complicity of 
African governments (Mtapuri, 2017; Mawere & Nhemachena, 2017). 
One of the most debilitating aspects of the fight against poverty on 
the continent is the political denial of the fact that poverty is 
manmade and the result of the denial of rights. 
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One of the major problems that co-exists with poverty is migration, 
which also promotes (human) capital flight from Africa, thereby, 
depriving the continent of its human resources. Mixed migration is 
acknowledged as having multiple causes (see, for example, Brewer, 
2008; Lehnardt, 2016), which vary from one country (or place) and 
continent to another. However, in many countries of the world, 
especially in Africa, there seems to be one main cause of mixed 
migration: poverty.  
 
This brings us to the topic of development, and the relationship 
between migration and development. De Haas, a leading scholar in 
the area, warns against a deterministic theorising of the relationship 
between migration and development. He claims that development 
may in fact encourage migration, stating: 
 
Rather than absolute poverty, a certain level of socioeconomic development, combined 
with relative deprivation in the form of global inequality of development opportunities, 
seems to be the most important cause of migration. To a large extent this can also 
explain why leading emigration countries (e.g. Mexico, Morocco, Turkey, the 
Philippines) typically do not belong to the group of least developed countries. (De 
Haas, 2005, p. 1271) 
 
Warning against a naive connection between migration and poverty, 
De Haas (2010) proposes an empirical-based approach to explain the 
relationship between migration and development.  
 
While the link between migration and development has been 
extensively studied (for an overview, see De Haas, 2010), the causes 
of new forms of human trafficking and its rapid expansion in the last 
decade have been much less considered. Chuang (2006) warns that 
the socio-economic causes of human trafficking are often overlooked 
and points to the need to address lack of access to economic, social 
and cultural rights as a long-term remedy to effectively combat human 
trafficking. Poverty, which can be understood as the lack of material 
or immaterial ‘necessities’ (see Mawere, 2017; Sen, 1999), creates and 
sustains the economy of mixed migration and human trafficking. 
There is an intricate relationship between poverty and mixed 
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migration/human trafficking, in terms of both their root causes and 
their impact on human society, as will be discussed in the next section. 
The cycle of poverty and human trafficking 
The past few decades have witnessed an uptick in human trafficking 
(Finn, 2016; SIDC, 2003; Russell, 2014). It is widely acknowledged 
that poverty is both a cause and a consequence of human trafficking 
(in as much as it is also a cause and a result of mixed migration) 
(Mawere, 2017). Abundant literature on human trafficking exists. 
Most of it, understandably, emphasises economic hardship, political 
instability, lack of a safe environment for children, early marriages, 
population explosion, discrimination, and lack of birth registration as 
causes of human trafficking (see, for instance, Brewer, 2008; 
Lehnardt, 2016). These are all symptoms of poverty.  
 
Basing his argument on a literature review, Adepoju (2005) identifies 
the root cause of human trafficking as poverty, citing “deepening 
poverty, deteriorating living conditions, persistent unemployment, 
conflicts, human deprivation, and hopelessness” (see also, Salah, 
2004). He states: 
 
Deepening rural poverty forces poor families to give up their children to traffickers, 
under the pretext of providing them the opportunity to secure good jobs and better 
lives (Dottridge, 2002). Poverty, lack of access to education, unemployment, family 
disintegration as a result of death or divorce, and neglected AIDS-orphaned children, 
make young persons vulnerable to traffickers (ILO, 2003; Moore, 1994). 
(Adepoju, 2005) 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, poverty is multi-dimensional 
and generally connotes a state of lack (of necessities, opportunities, 
and freedom) (see Sen, 1999; Mawere, 2017). This resonates with 
Ramlogan’s (2004, p. 140) observation that “poverty, in its most 
extreme form, is the condition that exists when people lack the means 
to fulfil basic human needs, adequate and nutritious food, clothing, 
housing, clean water, and health services”. It also coheres with 
Narayan and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
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Development’s (2000, pp. 4–5) assertion that poverty is a multi-
dimensional deprivation that “includes hunger, illiteracy, illness and 
poor health, powerlessness, voicelessness, insecurity, humiliation, and 
lack of access to basic infrastructure”. Poverty, therefore, undermines 
people’s liberty to make independent decisions over their own lives; 
it robs them of the chance to decide on matters of basic importance 
to them as people and is, therefore, a denial of rights. 
 
Poverty has political, economic, cultural and social implications. It 
renders people powerless: it deprives them of choice, access to 
protection from the violation of their rights, and access to material 
resources. The powerlessness and vulnerability that come with 
poverty render victims worthless and prone to making risky choices 
(Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017). Such choices may “include resorting to 
migrant smugglers, which in turn makes them more vulnerable to 
trafficking in persons (TiP) and associated forms of exploitation and 
abuse” (United Nations, n.d.). 
 
Unfortunately, there is a knowledge gap that exists on the link 
between poverty and the various forms of human trafficking, as well 
as how to combat them. More specifically, poverty is rarely 
considered as the greatest contributor to human trafficking in global 
discussions and national-level policy frameworks, such that the nexus 
between them remains underexplored. The few studies that do link 
poverty to human trafficking focus more on the feminisation of 
poverty, as they seek to link poverty and human trafficking with the 
sex trade (Fayomi, 2009; Bancroft-Hinchey, 2001). This calls for a 
need to constantly interrogate the epistemological, methodological 
and theoretical approaches to the study of human trafficking.  
 
Inserting Africa and its people at the centre of that interrogation, I 
argue the centrality of poverty as a cause of human trafficking (and 
migration), which is supported by the fact that there have been several 
decades of initiatives to curb trafficking in persons that have failed to 
improve the situation of the vulnerable and those in poverty. 
Basically, there is a two-way causality, whereby people (and countries) 
in poverty have a greater disposition to human trafficking, while at 
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the same time poverty itself is an outcome of human trafficking. In 
other words, poverty can put people at risk of human trafficking and 
human trafficking results in poverty.  
 
In many countries in Africa, victims who are living in extreme 
poverty, who have limited economic and social opportunities and are 
largely unprotected in terms of their rights, are often targeted by 
traffickers who lure them to leave their homes with false promises of 
marriage, high-paying jobs, and a good life. Observing the situation 
in Africa, a report by Swedish International Development 
Cooperation revealed that:  
 
People become the victims of human traffickers mainly due to inequitable resource 
allocation and the absence of viable sources of income. Families have no assets and 
incomes are inadequate. In the countryside, agriculture is less profitable than formerly 
and land has become increasingly scarce. Women and children are therefore compelled 
to contribute more towards the family’s subsistence than in the past. Households 
become increasingly vulnerable as margins shrink. Social security schemes are either 
lacking or do not reach the poorest, most disadvantaged sections of the community… 
In many countries in Africa, the spread of HIV/AIDS places ever increasing 
responsibility for support on the surviving family members, themselves often children. 
The principal economic causes on the demand side of the equation include the 
substantial profits to be made in the sex trade and the call for cheap labour. (SIDC, 
2003, pp. 15–16) 
 
In Africa, the vulnerable – particularly women and children – are the 
most targeted when it comes to human trafficking. Women comprise 
at least 56% of the world’s trafficking victims (Kubatana.net, 2010). 
The presence of women and children as victims of human trafficking 
can be explained by the feminisation of poverty, in that women and 
children can access rights to a lesser extent and are, therefore, more 
prone to exploitation and extortion in mixed migration trajectories. 
However, Yuval-Davis (2009) observes, importantly, that human 
trafficking is larger than just a gender problem and she warns that the 
equation of women and children as the sole victims of human 
trafficking creates a bias in the empirical understanding of human 
trafficking. She states that “the idea of a female ‘victim’ of trafficking 
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who is in need of ‘rescue’ and ‘return’ is a pervasive image that is often 
conjured up and negates scholarly attempts to establish a more 
nuanced understanding of the complexities of trafficking” (see also 
Jeanse, 2007; Jobe, 2008; Ihme, 2008; Gregoriou, 2018). 
 
Once entrapped, traffickers manipulate the victim’s lack of means to 
get themselves back home, limited ability to communicate in the 
language spoken in the place where the victim is dislocated, and 
isolation from friends and family to compel them to comply with the 
traffickers’ demands. The label of ‘illegality’ that is increasingly 
accompanying persons in ‘mixed migration’ trajectories, compounds 
the denial of their right to protection and inclusion in the place where 
the migrants find themselves. 
 
Moreover, “while often thought to be largely comprised of sexual 
exploitation, people are also trafficked for the purpose of forced 
labour, i.e., working as domestic servants without pay or similar 
practices” (Finn, 2016, p. 2; see also Reianu, 2012). However, some, 
especially in Africa, are trafficked for ritual purposes. Markets for 
body parts in Africa are on the rise, with the number of missing 
women and girls shooting up, as some people believe that human 
body parts, especially those of women and girls, enhance profits in 
business (The Herald, 2007; United States, 2009; The Australian, 
2004).  
 
Studies on trafficking in the Southern Africa region (IOM, 2003; 
Katerere, 2007) estimate that 1,000 Mozambican women and children 
are trafficked to South Africa every year for slavery and sexual 
exploitation, while in Zimbabwe over 200 women were allegedly 
lured by Kuwait’s former ambassador to Zimbabwe, Ahmed Al-
Jeeran, before being trafficked to Kuwait with the promise of 
lucrative jobs (All Africa, 2016). A report by the Daily News in 
Zimbabwe alleged that, “from February to August 2016, Zimbabwe 
has been affected by trafficking in persons at an unprecedented scale, 
with an estimated 200 victims trafficked to Kuwait, and just over 101 
repatriated by August 2016” (Mananavire, 2016). Survivors of 
trafficking described themselves as socio-economically disadvantaged 
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people, impoverished by the faltering economy in Zimbabwe, who 
were lured by opportunistic predators who promised them lucrative 
jobs. Some of the women trafficked were sexually abused while others 
were subjected to forced labour and other forms of slavery. A report 
released by News Day in May 2016 spoke of 32 women who had 
returned home after escaping from their captors; one was pregnant 
from sexual abuse (News Day, 2016). The US State Department’s 
Trafficking in Persons report states the following:  
 
South Africa is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and 
children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. South Africans constitute the 
largest number of victims within the country. South African children are recruited 
from poor rural areas to urban centers, such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, 
and Bloemfontein, where girls are subjected to sex trafficking and domestic servitude 
and boys are forced to work in street vending, food service, begging, criminal activities, 
and agriculture. Many children, including those with disabilities, are exploited in 
forced begging. (United States, 2016, p. 2)  
 
In 2013, the US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report 
revealed that Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi are 
among the nations that remain source and destination countries for 
men, women and children subjected to forced labour and sex 
trafficking (United States, 2013).  
 
Given the exploitative nature of human trafficking, the worst form is 
equal to slavery. Without control over their body and mind, and in no 
way benefiting from the profits made from their exploitation, the 
victims of human trafficking are held as slaves. The Global Slavery 
Index (Walk Free Foundation, 2014) estimated that 106,000 people 
were enslaved in South Africa, while Nigeria and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo had 762,900 and 834,200 enslaved people, 
respectively.  
Deliberate poverty  
The process of human trafficking can be divided into three main 
phases: recruitment, transfer from the country (or place) of origin, 
74 
 
and exploitation. Of interest here is the third phase, where it becomes 
clear that the victim has been trafficked. Trafficking is made possible 
by the deliberate impoverishment and control of the victim. This is 
explicitly captured by Van Reisen, Estefanos and Reim (2017) in 
relation to human trafficking in Eritrea; these authors argue that, 
through its state officials, Eritrea has been engaging in the trafficking 
of its own people for ransom since the end of 2010 or even earlier. 
As the authors note, “a deliberate policy of impoverishment [in 
Eritrea] is at the basis of the system, which promotes the black-
market economy and creates dependency” (Van Reisen et al., p. 22). 
The authors emphasise the deliberate creation of a poverty-based 
society as prey for the human traffickers, made possible by complicity 
between officials and human trafficking networks. 
 
In Southern Africa, especially Zimbabwe, the black-market economy 
has dominated since the dawn of the new millennium, forcing many 
into unemployment and poverty. A former teacher previously 
employed in the Zimbabwean Ministry of Education, who is now a 
black market money changer in Masvingo City, commented as 
follows: 
 
With the current inflation in Zimbabwe, working in the formal sector has become 
useless. Basic commodities have become scarce in the formal market. You go to the 
black market, everything you want is found in excess, but at an exorbitantly high 
price. What pains most is that the black market is sustained by the government 
bigwigs-cum-business people, who create artificial shortages so that they [can] channel 
the basic commodities to [the] black market where they fetch more. The situation is 
difficult to control because those who should control it are government officials (or 
highly connected people linked to government officials), who happen to own the black 
market. It’s difficult, but who suffers is us the ordinary people. This is why many 
people, especially the young and unemployed, go out of the country, others ending up 
in the hands of human traffickers. (Anon., personal communication, 30 
October 2018) 
 
What the government officials in Zimbabwe and Eritrea have been 
allegedly involved in may be regarded as a deliberate attempt not only 
to impoverish, but to dehumanise and control their people. This, the 
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officials do by making sure that everyone focuses on survival. This is 
a form of manipulation aimed at stifling people’s self-respect and 
limiting their potential to influence events. In this way, the officials 
keep a tight grip on both political and economic power.  
 
Also, important to note is that trafficking does not only occur across 
borders, but also happens inside a country. There are cases of under-
aged forced marriages. In addition, many young girls are brought 
from rural areas and exploited as maids in domestic servitude after 
being promised a good salary; young boys are brought to farms and 
exploited as farm labourers after being promised good working 
conditions. All are forms of internal trafficking. Furthermore, 
indefinite conscription in the military, such as in Eritrea (United 
Nations, 2016), which qualifies as slavery according to the United 
Nations, is another form of deliberate impoverishment and servitude.  
 
Human trafficking is described by many scholars and organisations as 
modern-day slavery (Fayomi, 2009; US Department of State, 2009). 
The suffering involved in human trafficking makes it one of the most 
despicable, degrading and inhumane forms of abuse and exploitation, 
one that fragments communities, distorts victims’ personalities, 
disrupts their family institutions, and leaves them broken and 
impoverished. The cost of human trafficking to its victims is 
incalculable and the ill-treatment suffered ranks among the most 
abusive and damaging atrocities in human history. What also remains 
clear is that there is a cyclical element to trafficking that involves being 
trapped in a cycle of poverty and vulnerability on which human 
trafficking networks prey, rendering communities and people even 
more vulnerable as the cycle goes on (see also, Van Reisen, Estefanos 
& Rijken, 2013).  
Trafficking in a digital age 
With the spread of digital technology, human trafficking and mixed 
migration have become even more common and complex. 
Technology has made trafficking easier. It has made people more 
mobile and opened up new ways of communication, facilitating the 
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transfer of money and information beyond borders. Global 
communities (diasporas, family and friends in the country of origin 
and fellow migrants) support each other, increasing the access of 
migrants to economic and social capital (De Haas, 2010; Ong’ayo, 
2019). However, such technology has also affected the social fabric 
of communities (Van Stam, 2017) and undermined systems of social 
protection in local spaces, resulting in new forms of vulnerability and 
insecurity.  
 
What is even more worrying is that technology continues to 
transform in a manner that outpaces current trends in human security. 
The differentiated access of people to technology is exploited, 
resulting in new and extensive intercontinental human trafficking 
operations supported by digital technologies (Van Reisen & Mawere, 
2017; Van Reisen et al., 2017. In a recent study, Van Reisen and Rijken 
(2015) elaborated a new form of human trafficking – human 
trafficking for ransom – which they say is specifically related to 
digitalisation. The authors point out that trafficking for ransom 
emerged more or less at the same time as mobile connectivity became 
a global phenomenon and is now common at the border between 
Eritrea and Sudan, as well as in countries like Mexico, Malaysia, and 
the United States of America.  
 
Digital technologies have allowed those at the top of the human 
trafficking networks to remain invisible, directing global networks of 
handlers to do the dirty work, while they enjoy the profits, enabling 
them to invest in new routes in order to traffic even more victims. 
Remittances through mobile money transfers facilitate such journeys, 
while further impoverishing communities and relatives in the 
diaspora and enriching the global criminal human trafficking 
networks, which continue to operate largely with impunity. 
Slavery and trafficking for ransom: A profitable industry 
Adepoju (2005) identifies different forms of human trafficking within 
Africa, including the trafficking of women and children from rural 
areas to capital cities for bonded labour, as well as onwards journeys 
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to Europe (Veil, 1998), pointing to the global connectedness and 
organisation of such trade. Worldwide, human trafficking has resulted 
in an estimated 27 million victims, with at least 14,000 people being 
trafficked annually into the United States (ILO, 2012; Gutow, 2010). 
Victims are reduced to commodities and traded on the international 
market. The ‘industry’ brings in annual profits of about USD 32 
billion worldwide to perpetrators and is the third largest illicit 
economy in the world, after drugs and arms smuggling (Chiweshe, 
2017). As Ludwig Fairberg, a convicted trafficker, revealed: “You can 
buy a woman for USD 10,000 and make your money back in a week 
if she is pretty, healthy and young. Then everything else is profit.” 
(Fairberg, cited in Lehnardt, 2016, p. 2) 
 
Lehnardt goes on to say that: 
 
 A human trafficker can earn 20 times what he or she paid for a girl. Provided the 
girl was not physically brutalised to the point of ruining her beauty, the pimp could 
sell her again for a greater price because he had trained her and broken her spirit, 
which saves future buyers the hassle. A 2003 study in the Netherlands found that, 
on average, a single sex slave earned her pimp at least USD 250,000 a year. 
(Lehnardt, 2016., p. 3) 
 
Shifman (2003) shows that human trafficking is increasing each year, 
as its lucrative nature continues to attract more traffickers. While 
human trafficking is historically a recurrent phenomenon, more 
people are currently living in bondage than at any other time in human 
history (Gutow, 2010). Although reportedly concentrated in South 
Asia, Northern Africa, East Asia, and Latin America, human 
trafficking, as with mixed migration, affects every country in the 
world, either as countries of origin, transit or destination.  
 
Regrettably, although there is ample evidence that human trafficking 





practice is carried out. A study by the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation found that:  
 
Although data for other areas in Africa are sparse in the extreme, there is evidence 
that the trafficking in persons does occur. Women and children are transported from 
different parts of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula, Europe and other African 
countries. The victims are usually exploited for sexual purposes, domestic work or as 
cheap labour. For example, South Africa has now become a destination country, 
reflecting the rapidly expanding sex trade there. Crime syndicates from Central and 
Eastern Europe, South Asia and West Africa are thought to be involved in the 
trafficking. (SIDC, 2003, p. 13) 
 
In a study on human trafficking for ransom in the Sinai, Van Reisen 
et al. (2013) estimated that 35,000 persons had been trafficked 
between 2006 and 2012 for a total estimated value of USD 600 
million. These ransom payments are nearly all profit, once the cost of 
transport and protection money to pay off officials and handlers have 
been subtracted. This makes trafficking a profitable business, with the 
possibility of expansion in countries with large informal economies 
and people with a high level of vulnerability and limited protection 
(Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). Trafficking operations are spread 
across continents (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). In fact, human 
trafficking is one of the fastest growing criminal enterprises in the 
world, because it carries relatively low risk and has high profit 
potential. Criminal organisations are increasingly attracted to human 
trafficking because, unlike drugs, humans can be sold repeatedly 
(Lehnardt, 2016). 
 
Kidane and Van Reisen (2017) point to the extractive nature of 
human trafficking, countering the argument that mixed migration can 
be a source of development on the continent. Having extensively 
researched the individual and collective trauma resulting from 
people’s experiences while on mixed migration journeys, they identify 
the state of hopelessness of many migrants as a motivating factor in 
their choice to take risky onward journeys. They identify the 
unscrupulous extraction of resources (including financial resources) 
of entire communities as a factor that helps sustain mixed migration 
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pathways, seriously undermining the resilience of communities at 
home and in the diaspora. This affects the mental health of all those 
involved and generates a cycle of hopelessness, which feeds into their 
engagement with risky migration trajectories. The vicious negative 
spiral of mixed migration, based on increased fear and lack of hope, 
provides fertile ground for human traffickers. 
An African perspective on combatting human trafficking 
through the eradication of poverty 
Human trafficking is a cross-cutting problem: it respects no 
boundaries, whether national or continental. With increased 
globalisation, the problem crosses national borders and, therefore, 
requires cooperation between countries. The political and socio-
economic nature of human trafficking, thus, necessitates a sustained, 
comprehensive continental and global strategy to address it. As 
Karlsson (2003, p. 5) notes, “combating human trafficking as 
combating mixed migration is no simple task”. A wide range of 
collaborative action is needed in several policy areas and sectors 
across the whole of society.  
 
However, research demonstrates that there is reason for hope, despite 
factors that conspire against social protection and those living in 
poverty, the powerless, the dispossessed, and the vulnerable (Mameli, 
2002). There are a number of strategies that Africa (and the world) 
can adopt to successfully combat this deliberate and calculated 
exploitation of the powerless. The need to monitor trends related to 
poverty, particularly in areas vulnerable to disasters, climate change, 
and political instability and that lack rule of law, is one such strategy. 
As Mameli (2002) suggests, transnational police organisations can 
play a significant role with respect to preventing and investigating the 
activities of the global sex industry. This resonates with Naim’s (2003) 
argument that strengthening existing multilateral institutions, revising 
our universal conception of sovereignty when it comes to allowing 
states to pursue traffickers in other countries, and devising new 
mechanisms and institutions with which to enforce laws would go a 
long way to combatting human trafficking. 
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I would like to add that awareness campaigns on human trafficking 
in migrant source areas, especially among local communities and 
governments, can also help prevent human trafficking. This can be 
facilitated by training community leaders, holding community 
meetings, and making drama shows, posters, and video 
documentaries that highlight the dangers of human trafficking. At the 
national and international levels, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) emphasises the following action as vital:  
 
…counter trafficking orientation for police, military and local government officers in 
partnership with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
and the Protection Cluster; and co-organising capacity-building trainings for 
government and non-governmental organisation partners on victim identification, 
referral and assistance with UN partners and other relevant stakeholders. (IOM, 
2016, p. 10)  
 
Another effective way of dealing with human trafficking is by 
ensuring equality, especially gender equality. The United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, explains the predominance of women as victims of 
human trafficking as follows:  
 
The lack of rights afforded to women serves as the primary causative factor at the 
root of both women’s migrations and trafficking in women. The failure of existing 
economic, political and social structures to provide equal and just opportunities for 
women to work has contributed to the feminisation of poverty, which in turn has led 
to the feminisation of migration as women leave their homes in search of viable 
economic options. Further, instability, militarism, civil unrest, internal armed 
conflicts and natural disasters also exacerbate women’s vulnerabilities and may result 
in [an] increase in trafficking. (Fayomi, 2009, pp. 75–76) 
 
This observation by Coomaraswamy is a cause of concern. In view of 
this observation, I argue that progressive strengthening of the role 
and status of women and girls, while promoting gender equality in all 
aspects of development cooperation work, is more urgently needed 
now than ever to put an end to women’s subordination and to 
guarantee them equal opportunities. This is critical if we are to 
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provide women and girls with a life free from violence and 
discrimination, which in itself “reinforces and magnifies poverty, 
powerlessness and vulnerability of women” (Fayomi, 2009, p. 76). 
 
In addition, building the capacity of governmental and non-
governmental institutions to effectively respond to the challenges 
posed by human trafficking can also be of great help. All governments 
of the world, under the terms of the human rights instruments 
currently in force, are responsible for protecting people against 
human trafficking and abuse of their rights. This means that “the 
governments of the countries of origin, all transit countries and final 
destination countries respectively are directly responsible for 
implementing the necessary measures to prevent and fight human 
trafficking, protect the victims and provide adequate support” (SIDC, 
2003, p. 7). Thus, collaboration between countries and with the 
assistance of the international community is critical to combat human 
trafficking. This can be facilitated by ensuring that perpetrators are 
prosecuted and that there are measures for protection, not only for 
prevention, in place at the national level. This means that 
governments should protect, through legislation and policies, those 
who are vulnerable to trafficking. Law and policy, if effectively 
enforced, can constrain the demand for the services of smugglers and 
reliance on trafficking. The first step is to ensure that all countries are 
signatories to important conventions and regulatory frameworks for 
human trafficking.4  
 
Furthermore, monitoring the outflow of vulnerable populations by 
setting up screening desks at strategic exit points such as border posts, 
while linking these populations to preventive, rescue and support 
 
4 These include the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, especially Women and Children; 1979 United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); 1989 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and 1999 
Convention 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, among other instruments. The 
adoption and effective implementation of these legally-binding documents would 
make all countries stakeholders in the global struggle against human trafficking. 
82 
 
programmes and international networks can also help address human 
trafficking. This would help establish a registration database for all 
displaced persons in camps, with camps established according to 
updated guidelines for a secure environment. In addition, such 
monitoring would ensure that information on trafficking in persons 
reaches the grass-roots level, as it connects the victims (and potential 
victims) with organisations involved in the prevention (of human 
trafficking), prosecution (of perpetrators), and protection (of victims 
of human trafficking) and that partner (with victims and potential 
victims) to help them change their lives for the better.5  
 
Lastly, I think addressing poverty at all levels is the most effective way 
of addressing human trafficking. In this chapter I have argued that 
poverty is the main cause of human trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
yet more often than not, efforts are made to address the symptoms, 
without tackling the root causes, of human trafficking. It is always 
better to promote durable solutions to a problem than short-lived 
ones. In fact, for Africa to effectively deal with the human trafficking 
crisis requires both political and economic commitments. While those 
culpable for committing human trafficking can be directly blamed for 
the practice, blame should also be apportioned to national 
governments that are either reluctant to vigorously pursue cases of 
human trafficking or fail to implement an action package that would 
address the transformational needs of vulnerable people. 
Unfortunately, the current politico-economic responses to human 
trafficking in Africa fail to address the socio-economic causes that 
make people vulnerable to traffickers and human smugglers. We 
should remember that the unchanging status of the marginalised – 
the impoverished, the powerless, women and children – in Africa, as 
elsewhere, is reflected the rise of human trafficking in society at large.  
 
 
5 Prominent among such organisations and international networks which rescue 
and support victims of trafficking include Anti-Slavery International; Cooperative 
for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE); End Child Prostitution, Child 
Pornography and Trafficking in Children for Sexual Purposes (ECPAT); Human 
Rights Watch; Plan International; Save the Children Alliance; World Vision; 
Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW); and Global Alliance Against 
Trafficking in Women (GAATW). 
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What Africa needs to do in the face of such an overwhelming reality 
is to ensure that poverty (and its cause, inequality) is eradicated from 
the face of the continent. Such a grass-root remedy would help ensure 
that the basic economic, social, political, and cultural rights of the 
powerless, the stigmatised and the devalued are promoted. This pro-
active approach, however, is often overlooked in research and work 
on human trafficking. Unfortunately, human trafficking will forever 
remain a problem for Africa and the world as long as we live in an 
unequal society marred by poverty. For the eradication of human 
trafficking, those in poverty and the powerless need to have a ‘place 
in the world’ – a place where their status is improved and their rights 
fully recognised and respected by others. There is an urgent need for 
Africa and the world to promote sustainable development and for the 
deeper cooperation of the wealthy with those living in poverty for the 
betterment of all. I am convinced that progress in these areas can 
greatly advance efforts to eliminate human trafficking from the face 
of the Earth. 
Conclusion 
Addressing human trafficking, is both a worthy and honourable 
challenge to our being, our humanity. The academic world can play its 
part in addressing this challenge by answering the question ‘what 
needs to be done’. It is in this light that I have examined the political 
economy of mixed migration and human trafficking, which expose 
millions to abuse, exploitation and servitude. I have underlined the 
lack of systematic research, especially in Africa, on the link between 
poverty and human trafficking. I have also highlighted the little 
understood link with digital technology. I have described human 
trafficking and poverty as bound together, noting that in Africa (as in 
many other parts of the world) poverty is both a cause and a 
consequence of human trafficking. Human trafficking constitutes a 
crime against humanity. Hence, I am calling on all governments, 
institutions, researchers and individuals to do what is necessary to 
ameliorate poverty and prevent the continuation of this demeaning 




I argue that poverty, rooted in inequality and lack of protection of 
rights, is intricately linked to mixed migration and human trafficking. 
Due to poverty, people are motivated to migrate, and it is during their 
migration journeys that they fall victim to human trafficking. Hence, 
to a great extent, poverty motivates migration, while migration forms 
a centre point between poverty and human trafficking. 
 
This chapter, thus, argues that developing countries and people living 
in poverty have a greater disposition to human trafficking. As such, 
human trafficking feeds off poverty, inequality, scarcity of resources 
and external extracting economic forces. Similarly, human trafficking, 
as evidenced in Eritrea, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South 
Africa, result in poverty. I argue that, in Africa (as in many parts of 
the world), poverty is the principal driver of human trafficking. In this 
analysis, human trafficking is seen as a symptom of poverty.  
 
In light of this understanding, I advance that as long as we live in a 
poverty-stricken society where inequality runs deep, human 
trafficking (and mixed migration) will remain a global problem. 
Deliberate poverty traps communities in a vicious cycle of poverty 
and human trafficking, from which human trafficking networks and 
the officials who maintain the state of deliberate poverty are profiting. 
Outside actors may strengthen the policies that advance deliberate 
poverty by rewarding officials who keep their people in a state of 
oppression, sustaining mixed migration and human trafficking.  
 
Human trafficking can only be eliminated if governments and the 
people of Africa, and the world at large, fully commit to eradicating 
poverty. We need to recognise that everyone needs ‘a-place-to-be’ and 
those trapped in the downward spiral of mixed migration and human 
trafficking are most of all in need of a safe place where they can live 
in dignity. Victims of Human Trafficking deserve to be recognised as 
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Tortured on Camera: 
The Use of ICTs in Trafficking for Ransom 
 
Amber Van Esseveld 
 
Introduction 
In recent times, migration and human trafficking have evolved, 
together with the use of 
digital technology, which has 
become an inherent part of 
the modus operandi of 
traffickers. In 2009, a new 
form of human trafficking 
emerged, called ‘Sinai 
trafficking’ (Van Reisen & 
Rijken, 2015). In this new 
form of trafficking, migrants 
and refugees6 were 
kidnapped and kept in 
torture houses in the Sinai, 
where they were forced to 
make calls to their relatives 
while being tortured to 
extract ransom. The sound 
they made when tortured was 
the mechanism of Sinai trafficking, because hearing this sound via the 
phone is what motivated relatives to pay the ransom – they wanted 
the torture to stop (Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015). 
 
 
6 The term ‘refugees’ is understood here as referring to persons who have had to 
flee from their home country (due to war, violence or prosecution, for example) 
and cannot return home safely (UNHCR, n.d.). 
ICTs, such as mobile phones, are being 
used by human traffickers to facilitate a 
new form of human trafficking – 
trafficking for ransom – which is causing 
primary, secondary and collective trauma. 
The use of ICTs in this way is evolving, 
from the sound of torture transmitted 
through a mobile phone to video footage – 
all to motivate family and friends to pay 
the ransom. However, ICTs are also used 
to enhance the wellbeing of refugees and 
migrants, who use phones and social 
media to stay in touch with relatives, 
receive vital information about their 
journey and store photos and memories. 
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Information and communication technology (ICT) – mobile phones, 
mobile money transfers, and computers – are essential to the modus 
operandi of Sinai trafficking. Mobile phones are the traffickers’ way 
of communicating with those who pay the ransom and with each 
other about the routes on which to take hostages. Mobile phones are 
also used by the victims as a lifeline, to contact family members and 
other avenues of support. The role of ICTs in human trafficking has 
continued to develop over the years, as well as in migration 
generally. Although Sinai trafficking reported ended in 2014, it has 
emerged in similar forms in other places as ‘human trafficking for 
ransom’ (Van Reisen et al., 2018). These new forms of migration and 
human trafficking have been documented in various ways, including 
in traditional news reports on television, news websites and social 
media. They have also been recorded in documentaries, which offer 
a deeper and more personal way of presenting the issue than a two-
minute news broadcast.  
 
In this chapter, I analyse three documentaries: Sound of Torture (Shayo, 
Trabelsi & Cahlon, 2013), Under the Skin (Deloget & Allegra, 2015) 
and It Will Be Chaos (Luciana & Piscopo, 2018), focusing on how ICTs 
have influenced the new modus operandi of human trafficking that 
has emerged due to digitalisation, as well as their influence on 
personal processes such as trauma and healing. Usually, we think of 
the positive impact of technology. However, there are also 
unintended negative impacts, such as the facilitation of the activities 
of traffickers, who use ICTs to help them extort ransom (Van Reisen, 
2017b, p. 10). As well as facilitating refugees journeys and supporting 
their wellbeing by helping them remaining in touch with family and 
friends, ICTs can also spread the impact of trauma, which expands 
from primary trauma (among the victims of trafficking and their 
families who hear the torture over the phone) to secondary trauma 
(someone who learns about what happened to his/her friend) and 
collective trauma (the entire community, even generations later) 
(Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017). ICTs can amplify the effects of trauma, 
which can reach much further because of ICTs such as mobile 
phones, which transcend both time and space. This impact is shown 




This chapter sheds light on the overall development of migration and 
human trafficking in the digital era, looking at three distinct periods, 
which are visualised in the documentaries Sound of Torture (2013), 
Under the Skin (2014) and It Will Be Chaos (2018). The main research 
question is: How are refugees and their communities affected by the availability 
and use of ICTs, including in the context of traumatic events, both in terms of 
wellbeing and harm, and how has this evolved over time? I will look at whether 
mobile phones contribute to overall wellbeing (e.g., by helping to 
maintain family connections) or have unintended negative effects. 
Three sub-questions follow the main research question:  
 
• In what ways are ICTs used by refugees to facilitate their journeys and 
enhance their wellbeing? 
• How do ICTs enable the new modus operandi of human trafficking for 
ransom?  
• How do ICTs help inflict and spread trauma (distinguished as primary, 
secondary and collective trauma), among refugees, their families and their 
communities? 
Research method 
To answer these research questions, this chapter looks at three 
documentaries: Sound of Torture, Under the Skin and It Will be Chaos. The 
documentaries are analysed to determine how ICTs are used in 
migration and human trafficking and the development of this use 
over time, as well as the impact that ICTs have on refugees. The 
analysis is based on the visual images used in the documentaries, as 
well as the narratives/protagonists that are followed. In addition to 
these two aspects, the themes of the documentaries are also of 
importance, as these themes represent a particular development (in 
migration and human trafficking and ICTs) in a particular period of 
time.  
 
As well as the analysis of these documentaries, literature is used to 
deepen our understanding of what the documentaries show. In 
addition, new digital communication material, such as videos shared 
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on Facebook by refugees (as explored in lectures at Tilburg 
University), is also used. Interviews with resource persons (Meron 
Estefanos, Selam Kidane, Rick Schoenmaeckers, Ali Fegan and Klara 
Smits), which were conducted in lectures at Tilburg University in 
October and November of 2018, are also used to understand the new 
forms of human trafficking, their modus operandi and how they have 
evolved. However, the interviews themselves are not directly referred 
to in this chapter, but rather form the background information that 
enabled the author to understand the documentaries. In the next 
section, the documentaries are introduced. 
Documentaries 
Sound of Torture 
Following the emergence of Sinai trafficking in 2009, Sound of Torture 
(Shayo et al., 2013) follows three main storylines that all have a 
connection to this practice. First, we meet the main protagonist, 
Meron Estefanos, a journalist-human rights activist from Sweden, 
originally from Eritrea. Meron hosts a radio programme in Sweden, 
Radio Erena, in which she has a weekly segment called Voices of 
Eritrean Refugees. In this segment, she has contact with Sinai trafficking 
hostages and their family members, witnessing their cries for help and 
trying to bring the issue to the attention of the authorities and the 
public.  
 
Through Meron, the connection is made to the second storyline of a 
man called Amaniel from Eritrea. In the documentary, he is living in 
Tel Aviv by himself, as his pregnant wife was kidnapped while fleeing 
from Eritrea. She delivered their baby chained in captivity in the Sinai 
while being tortured. Amaniel is trying to collect the ransom money 
in order to free his family.  
 
The last storyline follows Dessala, who is looking for his sister. After 
having freed her from Sinai traffickers, he lost track of her while she 
was crossing the Egyptian-Israeli border. Meron tries to help Dessala 
find his sister, as she herself also travels to these border areas and 
other places close to where the Sinai trafficking is happening. Meron 
also meets up with some survivors and relatives who she initially 
95 
 
contacted on her radio programme. This leads to many beautiful 
meetings, but also shows the long-lasting trauma of the survivors. 
Under the Skin  
In Under the Skin (Deloget & Allegra, 2015), we are again confronted 
with the phenomenon of Sinai trafficking, but this time the focus lies 
on the aftermath for the survivors. The documentary follows five 
men, Filmon, Daniel and Robel, who are living in Sweden and 
Germay, Halefom and Merih, who are living in Cairo. These men are 
the protagonists of the story. Each is a survivor of Sinai trafficking. 
We also meet Meron again, but this time in a side role.  
 
The documentary shows the personal experiences of the men, as well 
as the effect of the trauma that Sinai trafficking has left behind, not 
only on their skin through the scars they bear, but also ‘under their 
skin’ through the effect of the trauma on their minds. Insomnia, 
depression and reactions to unknown sounds are some examples of 
the impact of the trauma that the victims of Sinai trafficking are left 
to deal with. 
It Will Be Chaos  
In It Will Be Chaos (Luciano & Piscopo, 2018), we follow two main 
storylines. First, we meet Aregai, a refugee from Eritrea who decided 
to flee indefinite military service. He survived the Lampedusa disaster 
in 2013, but lost relatives. The impact of the disaster is still very 
present in his life and we follow him on his journey trying to find a 
place in Italy. The second story is that of the Orfahli family from 
Syria, who were forced to leave their home due to war. We follow 
them on their journey to Germany, the country in which they hope 
to start a new life. During their journeys, both Aregai and the Orfahli 
family are constantly confronted with obstacles, which are difficult to 
overcome. The documentary takes a look at how Italy (the 
government and its inhabitants) reacts to the flow of refugees coming 




In analysing these documentaries and from the interviews with 
resource persons, three different periods emerged in relation to the 
development of migration and human trafficking and the role of 
ICTs. The first period, 2009–2014, is connected to the documentaries 
Sound of Torture and Under the Skin, as they both show Sinai trafficking. 
This first period is very specific, isolated, contained and raw; there is 
a strong focus solely on Sinai trafficking. Ransoms were at their 
highest during this period, and there was little public awareness of 
this horrendous practice. This period is at the very start of the use of 
ICTs in migration and human trafficking.  
 
The second period is 2014–2015, which is defined by the pervasive 
use of digital means to facilitate migration. This period is shown in 
the documentary It Will Be Chaos, which shows how digitalisation 
leads to the broad sharing of everything that is going on, which is not 
always a positive thing. The term ‘collective trauma’ is discussed, with 
a specific connection to the use of ICTs, which make it possible to 
share everything that is going on in real time, including traumatic and 
horrible incidents, which can lead to secondary and collective trauma.  
 
There is also a new, third period, in which the phenomena seen in the 
first and second period are intensified. This period started in 2016 
and is ongoing. The extortion for ransom is still happening, but the 
modus operandi has changed: from only hearing the torture happen, 
to direct visualisation (Elbagir, Razek, Sirgany, & Tawfeeq 2018). 
Relatives receive live videos of their son or daughter, for example, 
being tortured. In addition, there is also the constant development of 
new technology for smartphones, as well as increased access to this 
technology.  
Theoretical framework 
Linking ICTs to the refugees as users leads us to the theoretical 
framework for this chapter, which is provided by Linda Leung (2010) 
and her research on the use of technology by refugees during 
displacement. In her article, Leung describes how: “…technology is 
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key to sustaining emotional wellbeing and precarious connections 
with family members when displaced. In particular, the telephone is 
the most critical technology for refugees in terms of availability and 
familiarity” (Leung, 2010, p. 58.1). She also mentions how the 
participants in her research acknowledged communication as “…a 
driving need as important as basic shelter, food and water”, as well as 
usually the only way to receive financial assistance (Leung, 2010, pp. 
58.5–58.6). ICTs are, thus, extremely important for the wellbeing of 
refugees, as they are a vital lifeline with many purposes. However, 
ICTs can also become an unintended initiator of negative effects, 
such as secondary and collective trauma. 
 
When looking at ICTs and trauma, it appears that traumatic 
information is shared within the community, which is both 
intensifying the push-factors and creating information loops in which 
trauma is intensified (Kidane, S., lecture at Tilburg University, 25 
October 2018). In her lecture, Kidane explained that most of the 
information that refugees receive about the events that happen in, for 
example, Sinai trafficking, is through other refugees. However, the 
refugees who are providing the information are also traumatised and 
have a high level of fear, transferring this to the receivers; sometimes 
very traumatic information is shared. This then causes secondary 
trauma, which can traumatise people who are indirectly exposed to 
the trauma of others, for example, through a video shared by 
refugees. Primary and secondary trauma are explained by Kidane and 
Van Reisen in the following:  
 
Primary victims included those trafficked and their family and friends who witnessed 
their torture by phone. Secondary trauma is trauma that occurs indirectly and is 
defined as: ‘Learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of 
death or injury experienced by a family member or other close associate’. (Kidane 
& Van Reisen, 2017, p. 320)  
 
Thus, ICTs can intensify existing trauma, or create new primary 
trauma. Secondary trauma then emerges when, for example, someone 
learns about what happened to their friend or family member, but 
he/she is not directly exposed to the incident. Directly connected to 
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this theory of primary and secondary trauma, is ‘collective trauma’. 
“Collective trauma emerges when people who have a sense of 
belonging to one another perceive fearful and painful events together, 
which affects their collective consciousness and memory” (Van 
Reisen, 2017a, p. 7). It is further explained by Van Reisen et al.: 
 
Collective trauma is the impact of an experience, which becomes a keystone in a 
group’s narrative, set of beliefs, and identity, both for the current generation and 
across generations. Collective trauma involves a socially constructed process with an 
impact on the past and future identity of the group and its individual members. The 
impact on the narrative and on the identity of the group can be present even when 
individual members do not have (or no longer have) signs of physical or psychological 
damage. Unlike individual trauma, which can be experienced by a small percentage 
of people, with most recovering within a given period of time, collective trauma does 
not refer to symptoms of traumatic stress but is an outcome that includes the response 
to the traumatic event as well as the way it is constructed into the beliefs, decisions, 
behaviours, and narratives of the collective. (Van Reisen et al., 2018) 
 
In addition, collective trauma “impairs rational decision-making” 
(Van Reisen, 2017a, p. 7) and:  
 
…may lead to structural and individual violence. People lose their ability to react to 
patterns of threats and opportunities leading to poor decision making at all levels 
[…] This can lead to cycles of fragmentation in society, exacerbating previous issues 
[…]. (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017, p. 329) 
 
This effect of the trauma on the decision-making of refugees can stay 
around for a long time after the initial trauma. The entire community 
is affected, which reduces the community’s ability to provide support 
to each other. Collective trauma can make everybody anxious, and 
traditional roles are lost or the people playing such roles are less 
effective (e.g., the role of a priest) (Kidane, S., lecture at Tilburg 
University, 25 October 2018) (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017). Trauma 
nests itself in the heart of the community, pushing everybody out in 




Thus, trauma can influence the decision making of refugees. To 
explain this, the theory ‘feelings-as-information’ by Norbert Schwarz 
(2010) is used. Schwarz explains how we treat feelings as information 
in our mind and how this affects our decisions. If, for example, a 
teacher arrives in class after having a very bad night’s sleep and the 
students sit very quietly, the brain may interpret this as the students 
not being interested. In comparison, if the teacher feels good, the 
quietness of the students may be interpreted as the students being 
interested and focused, resulting in positive information.  
 
This example shows how our mind treats feelings as information. The 
traumatic feelings/mindset that some refugees have is, therefore, very 
important in their decision-making process, as these traumatic 
feelings become information in their minds. Emotion has the upper 
hand instead of rationality. A question that drives their decision, as 
mentioned by Kidane (Kidane, S., lecture at Tilburg University, 25 
October 2018), is: ‘What feels scarier’? In the Lampedusa disaster, for 
example, a pregnant woman died together with her baby, who was 
born in the ocean. This seems strange: why would you risk both your 
own and your baby’s life? If we then look at the question ‘what feels 
scarier?’, the mother decided that staying in her home, or any place 
on her journey, was scarier than getting on the boat and risking her 
life to cross the Mediterranean Sea, illustrating the severity of the 
situation in her places of origin and transit. Rational thinking is, thus, 
overshadowed by the information derived from negative feelings and 
fear. The brain then only uses these emotions and feelings, which are 
strongly present as the motivation behind a decision. If these 
emotions and feelings are mainly traumatic ones, the decisions that 
are made by the refugee are driven by this trauma, which can cause 
them to make decisions that are extremely dangerous.  
 
Thus, while ICTs can be vital to the wellbeing of refugees, they can 
also have negative effects, such as through the sharing of traumatic 
information. Trauma affects many aspects of our cognition, including 
decision making. Collective trauma affects the societal bonds that 
govern decision making. This can lead refugees to decide to migrate 
further, even though this may put their lives at risk: the traumatic 
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situation they are in is considered much scarier than boarding a 
crowded, unsafe boat and heading for the high seas, even when 
expecting a baby. Feelings become the information source for the 
brain and emotional decisions take the lead instead of rational ones. 
Results 
This section presents the results of the analysis of the three 
documentaries, for the three defined periods. These documentaries 
represent a visual timeline of the developments in the use of ICTs in 
migration and human trafficking. The importance of ICTs is highly 
visible in the documentaries, which show how they are used in 
practice, first-hand. ICTs are used differently in the three periods 
examined. In the first period, there is the presence of mobile phones 
and radio, with just sound as the means to communicate. The second 
period features phones and more direct contact due to the expansion 
of the journeys of the refugees. As their journeys expand to, for 
example, Europe, it becomes more important to stay in touch with 
vital contacts such as family members. In addition, the digitalisation 
of the world, continues and this makes contact much easier and much 
more direct than in the first period. The third period is connected to 
the smartphone, with much less direct contact. 
Period 1: 2009–2014 
In 2009, a new form of human trafficking for ransom emerged called 
‘Sinai trafficking’ (Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015). This new modus 
operandi of human trafficking is clearly presented in Sound of Torture 
(Shayo et al., 2013). The documentary commences with Meron 
Estefanos, who provides us with general information about this new 
form of human trafficking, but from an outsiders’ perspective. Then 
we follow Amaniel, whose wife has been kidnapped, as he is trying to 
gather the ransom money for her release, and Dessala, who is 
searching for his sister who has been released. These narrations are 
used to show the modus operandi of this form of trafficking in real 
life. During the documentary, the use of ICTs is constantly visible. 
Starting with Meron, who uses Skype to communicate with the 
hostages and with Amaniel and Dessala. Amaniel is also in contact 
with his wife through his mobile phone, both for the ransom calls as 
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well as for ‘normal’ calls from his wife. There are barely any scenes 
where ICTs are not present, which shows how important they are 
both to the modus operandi, as well as to the other actors connected 
to Sinai trafficking.  
 
Under the Skin also deals with Sinai trafficking, but through the stories 
of some of the survivors: Filmon, Daniel, Robel, Germay and 
Halefom. The documentary shows how deep the impact of these 
traumatic experiences is, and how the survivors will carry these 
experiences with them for the rest of their lives. ICTs are not as 
present in this documentary as they were in Sound of Torture, but there 
are still several important moments in which they are present. The 
first example involves Meron and Robel, who are talking to a hostage 
by phone on Meron’s radio programme. This shows how the 
hostages, besides being forced to use their mobile phones to beg for 
ransom, can also use them to their benefit. A second example is when 
Germay is talking about his experience and uses a lighter as a prop to 
demonstrate making a phone call. It is a very quick and short moment 
in the documentary, but very important: it reflects on both the modus 
operandi as well as the use of ICTs in Sinai trafficking. In addition, it 
also shows how the use of a mobile phone has become second nature 
to victims like Germay, as he uses the lighter to illustrate a phone call 
without really thinking about it. Thus, ICTs are inseparable from Sinai 
trafficking, which would not exist without them. But ICTs are not 
only a tool for the torturers, there is a positive side to their use as well, 
as hostages can use them to contact people like Meron or hear 
motivating words from a survivor like Robel.  
 
While both of these documentaries touch upon Sinai trafficking, they 
each show a different side: while it is happening (Sounds of Torture) and 
the aftermath (Under the Skin). However, they are both very specific 
and narrow in their focus, as they only deal with Sinai trafficking. 
Nonetheless, this does not detract from the fact that the 





In this first period, starting in 2009 and ending in 2014 (Van Reisen 
et al., 2018), ICTs are mostly used by the smugglers and traffickers. 
Van Reisen et al. (2018) identify several of the most important reasons 
why smugglers and traffickers use ICTs: 
 
• To coordinate and carry out their work effectively (e.g., 
facilitate intelligence gathering, transportation and other 
logistics, and the collection of ransom) 
• To keep their identity hidden 
• To network with each other (smugglers and traffickers) to 
identify safe routes and secure times for unhindered 
operations, and so forth 
• To coordinate the collection of ransom by victims (including 
to contact relatives of victims to demand payment as well as 
to facilitate the transfer of ransom to the traffickers) 
 
In Sound of Torture, the emphasis is on the extensive use of ICTs by 
smugglers and traffickers, as we see the protagonists use their mobile 
phones and computers to collect the ransom, talk to their captured 
relative or search for news on a missing relative. However, ICTs are 
used by both ‘sides’ in Sinai trafficking: by the refugees and by the 
traffickers/smugglers. As the latter are in a more powerful position, 
they are better able to exploit these new ICTs, exacerbating the power 
imbalance (Van Reisen et al., 2018). The documentaries also show 
how ICTs can contribute to collective trauma in refugee communities 
that have connections to Sinai trafficking. Firstly, not only the 
hostages themselves are traumatised, but also their relatives, as the 
hostages are forced to call a family member while being tortured. 
Entire communities are brought in touch with what is happening in 
the Sinai through these phone calls and, thus, are exposed to trauma. 
For example, Amaniel is calling his captured wife Hiriti. As can be 
seen in the still below, the phone calls with her are very hard for him 






Figure 4.1. Sound of Torture  
Source: Shayo et al. (2013, 14:19) 
 
Thus, the use of ICTs not only results in primary trauma for the 
relatives, but also in secondary and collective trauma, as families, 
friends and whole communities are indirectly exposed to the trauma 
of the hostage. Hence, while ICTs are the perfect means to transcend 
time and space, they can also intensify and spread trauma.  
 
The use of ICTs by traffickers, as well as by desperate families trying to mobilise 
finances, and equally desperate activists trying to raise awareness using radio and 
social media, has exposed communities to traumatic events, which turn into collective 
trauma and which impact negatively on the community. (Van Reisen et al., 2018) 
 
This first period is characterised by the use of first generation mobile 
phones and radio and, therefore, the emphasis lies on sound. This 
emphasis can be found in the modus operandi of human traffickers 
and is reflected in the title of the documentary, ‘Sound of Torture’. 
This title emphasises the importance of sound in this form of human 
trafficking. In addition, the use of the lighter by Germay to represent 
a phone shows how intertwined digital means like the mobile phones 
are in these human trafficking practices, so much so that their use is 
second nature to people. 
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Period 2: 2014–2015 
As established, ICTs play an important role in human trafficking 
practices, such as Sinai trafficking, where mobile phones are used to 
collect ransom by calling relatives while torturing the hostages. 
However, ICTs also play an important role during migration and after 
trauma, both intensifying it and helping victims to heal. In the third 
documentary, It Will be Chaos, the use of ICTs during migration is 
clearly shown when the father Wael is calling a smuggler to get out of 
Turkey. He emphasises the importance of his mobile phone, as the 
lives of his family members depend on it: it is their only way out. The 
documentary shows how his phone acts as a vital lifeline for the 
family (Leung, 2010, p. 58.5). Aregai also uses his phone to contact 
smugglers and another ‘illegal helper’ who is going to help him get a 
fake ID. As the image below shows, this moment in the documentary 
combines both ICTs and social media, as he uses his phone to call 




Figure 4.2. It Will be Chaos 
Source: Luciana & Piscopo (2018, 01:13:59) 
 
A second way in which ICTs play an important role during migrating 
is by providing contact with family members. This aspect is most 
clearly shown through the story of the Orfahli family, as they receive 
phone calls and messages from relatives while they are on their way 
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to Germany. Wael’s brother and sister contact him to give advice 
about travelling on the boat, warning them, and also letting them 
know what will come next. Their family also messages them about 
the importance of the quality of the life vests that they will use on the 
boat, as this is crucial in order to survive at sea, as the image below 
shows. Leung’s theory (2010) is again applicable here, as we see that 
their mobile phone allows them to stay connected with their family 




Figure 4.3. It Will be Chaos  
Source: Luciana & Piscopo (2018, 20:49) 
 
ICTs also function as a ‘digital photo album’ for the refugees, as 
images and videos are all they have left of their past. Throughout the 
documentary, we see how the Orfahli family has mobile-made videos 
of their life before they fled Syria, showing their happiness and the 
apartment where they lived. Eventually, they receive pictures and 
images on their phone of their apartment as it is now, after it has been 
completely destroyed by the war. With Aregai we also see this 
memory-storing function of ICTs, when at the beginning of the 
documentary he shows pictures of his relatives who died in the 
Lampedusa disaster. Phones, thus, help to keep memories alive. They 
provide a way of going back home, e.g., to Syria, by watching photos, 
videos, listening to music, and so on. In the documentary, phones 
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also show the audience how the refugees’ lives have changed, 
emphasising the fact that they are not fleeing with no reason, they are 
escaping life-threatening conflict and political violence.  
 
     
 
Figure 4.4. It Will be Chaos 
Source: Luciana & Piscopo (2018, 04:39 & 25:12) 
 
The speed of secondary and collective trauma through ICTs is also 
represented, as we constantly see the connections that are made by 
the Orfahli family through phone calls and by sharing first-hand video 
footage of their journey with relatives. Going through these 
experiences creates primary trauma for the family, but sharing the 
video footage and phone calls with their relatives can also cause 
secondary trauma for those people. This can eventually lead to 
collective trauma within their community, both in their new country 
as well as in their country of origin. Another example of the different 
forms of trauma presented in the documentary is the fact that Aregai 
is a primary victim of the Lampedusa disaster, but so are the 
fisherman who saw the boat capsizing and helped save the refugees 
from the water. Secondary trauma is strongly visible in the Mayor of 
Lampedusa, as she is confronted with the refugees and their stories, 
becoming aware of the horrific things that have happened to them. 
She is also a primary victim, as she is confronted directly with death 
through the Lampedusa disaster and seeing all the coffins of the 
people who have died there. Besides the Mayor, the fishermen have 
also been confronted with primary trauma as they were rescuing the 
refugees from the sea. One of the fishermen is seen in the 
documentary, looking out to sea with a sad look in his eyes, as he 
mentions (translated from Dutch subtitles): “It was such a shocking 




In this second period, ICTs are about the broad sharing of everything 
that is going on. This is not only done through phone calls, but also 
by video/photo sharing apps and social media. This development 
from the first period, in which awareness of the practice was still very 
isolated, follows the digitalisation of the entire world. Because of this 
fast developing digitalisation, collective trauma keeps growing and 
also changes from only particular communities being traumatised, to 
‘outsiders’ being traumatised as well. You don’t need to be in the place 
where something happens, as news broadcasts also show footage, 
sometimes first-hand video recordings. In addition, there is the 
immense popularity of social media platforms such as Facebook. 
Through these platforms, images and videos are shared and can reach 
millions of people within several hours. If a person happens to 
stumble upon a traumatising video, he/she may become a victim of 
primary trauma. Within the refugee communities, many traumatising 
videos and images are constantly shared and re-shared, creating a loop 
of negative information. Therefore, ICTs are the perfect means to 
keep in contact with relatives while migrating, but also increase the 
spread and impact of traumatic information, intensifying the trauma 
and leading to more secondary and collective trauma.  
Period 3: 2016-ongoing 
Starting from 2016, a new ‘period’ of digitalisation in migration and 
human trafficking practices started, which is still going on today. 
Within this period, there has been an intensification of what was seen 
in periods 1 and 2. As previously mentioned, Sinai trafficking 
reportedly stopped in 2014 (Van Reisen et al., 2018, p. 147). However, 
these practices have been transferred to Libya, where Libyan militants 
have started to use the same techniques to extort ransom. An 
exclusive report by CNN International (Elbagir, Razek, Platt & Jones, 
2017) shows a video of a slave auction in Libya, where several men 
are being sold. There are also stories of the captured refugees being 
beaten and mistreated, as well as the hostages being forced to beg for 
ransom from their family by phone (Elbagir, Razek, Platt & Jones, 
2017), which is similar to human trafficking for ransom in the Sinai.  
However, the modus operandi of this form of human trafficking in 
Libya has one significant difference: instead of calling relatives for 
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ransom money, video footage is now sent to them. The traffickers 
take videos on their phones while they are torturing the hostages and 
of the hostages begging their relative to send the ransom money. On 
the website of CNN International, videos were shared of hostages 
being whipped while begging their family for money (Elbagir, Razek, 
Sirgany & Tawfeeq, 2018). These direct images from their 
smartphones bridge the distance and make everybody part of the 
traumatic experience.  
 
We can see the resemblance with period 1, in which the practice of 
Sinai trafficking was very isolated, as it is now in Libya. The big 
difference here is that even though the practice is still very isolated, 
the images are shared more broadly. This opens up the situation 
slightly more than the phone calls did. The availability of these videos 
can be spread on social media platforms, shared and picked up more 
easily. This third period, thus, shows both the isolation of the practice, 
as well as its development and the use of new technologies, resulting 
in the spreading of trauma. Unfortunately, no documentaries have 
been made yet on this phenomenon in Libya.  
Conclusion 
From the analysis of the documentaries and the literature, a 
distinction can be made between the three periods, in terms of the 
development of migration and human trafficking, as well as the 
development of the ICTs used in these practices. Period 1, from 
2009–2014, was a very isolated and raw period, with Sinai trafficking 
emerging as a new human trafficking phenomenon. The 
documentaries Sound of Torture and Under the Skin give their audience 
two sides of the story, as we see how the relatives of the hostages are 
trying to free them or find them after their release, as well as the 
aftermath of the trauma from the perspective of some of the 
survivors. Sound of Torture gives us a look into the use of ICTs, mainly 
by the smugglers and traffickers, and shows how mobile phones in 
particular are the mechanism of Sinai trafficking. In addition, Sound of 
Torture shows how ICTs can be used to find a relative who has 
disappeared in the Sinai desert. In Under the Skin, the use of ICTs is 
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less present, but the documentary does show several new uses. One 
of the most interesting uses of ICTs shown in this documentary is for 
the support and motivation of hostages. Through the radio 
programme by Meron Estefanos, Radio Erena, survivors show how 
they can be of help to new victims through a phone call, as they give 
them tips, advice and motivation to resist and keep fighting.  
 
The second period (2014–2015) shows how the use of ICTs covers 
other forms of migration, such as the migration of the Orfahli family 
from Syria. ICTs, such as the mobile phone, are extremely important 
in these situations, as they provide a connection not only with family 
members, but also to smugglers who can help them proceed with 
their journey to a safe place to restart their lives. Mobile phone can 
also store photos and videos of family members and their former way 
of life, thus becoming a digital photo album for refugees and the only 
connection to their past. 
 
Periods 1 and 2 show the connection that ICTs have with collective 
trauma, as images, videos, information and many more things can be 
shared through ICTs, which is often traumatising for members of the 
refugee community. In this way, ICTs can become unintended 
initiators of negative effects. The information shared (photos, videos) 
forms a negative loop of information and makes community 
members connected to Sinai trafficking secondary victims, as they 
receive traumatising information. Eventually, an entire community 
can feel this effect, and collective trauma emerges. The theory of 
feelings as information by Schwarz (2010) is applicable here, as 
traumatised refugees tend to let their emotions and feelings be the 
driving force behind their decisions, resulting in dangerous 
endeavours.  
 
The last period (2016–ongoing) has been only briefly discussed, as no 
documentaries have yet been made about the emergence of this new 
form of human trafficking in Libya. Human trafficking in Libya seems 
to follow the same practices as Sinai trafficking, but uses video 
footage of hostages being tortured instead of phone calls to collect 
ransom from relatives of the hostages. This period is a combination 
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of periods 1 and 2, as the practice is isolated, but the use of ICTs has 
developed, deepening and spreading the trauma.  
 
In summary, ICTs, particularly mobile phones, have been used as the 
mechanism for a new form of human trafficking called Sinai 
trafficking or human trafficking for ransom, which emerged in 2009 
(Van Reisen et al., 2018). They continue to be used by the traffickers, 
but also by the hostages and refugees themselves – with both positive 
and negative effects. We can conclude that the support-seeking 
behaviour of refugees leads to new forms of human trafficking with 
an increasingly aggravating impact on family members, as the 
invasiveness of technology increases. Rather than supporting 
refugees, the technology seems to be inflicting a new form of trauma 
through the sharing of photos and video footage through apps and 
on social media. Primary, secondary and collective trauma are 
intensified and spread, deepening the vulnerability of the refugee 
communities, as also described by Kidane and Van Reisen (2017). 
However, besides initiating negative effects, ICTs can also be of 
tremendous importance to the wellbeing of displaced refugees, as 
their mobile phones act as a ‘vital lifeline’ and storehouse of memories 
of their former life (Leung, 2010, p. 58.5). Through their phones, 
connections with their family are made and financial support 
received. Mobile phones are, thus, also used by refugees to enhance 
wellbeing, which supports Leung’s theory (2010), sustaining 
emotional wellbeing and precarious connections with family 
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‘Sons of Isaias’: 
Slavery and Indefinite National Service in Eritrea7 
 
Mirjam Van Reisen, Makeda Saba & Klara Smits 
 
Introduction  
“God surveys the world one day, 
seeing the mountains, valleys, seas and 
all there is. Suddenly God stops and 
exclaims: “Why is Eritrea so green? 
I specifically made that country dry 
and yellow!” The angel Gabriel leans 
over and whispers: ‘My Lord, those 
are army uniforms’.” (Kimball, 
2008)  
 
In an article for Reuters in 
2008, Jack Kimball, picked 
up this black humour on the 
obligatory and indefinite 
National Service in Eritrea 
(Kimball, 2008; also cited in 
Bozzini, 2011). National 
Service, which was 
introduced in 1994, dominates all aspects of life in Eritrea. It is made 
 
7 The term ‘Sons of Isaias’ is used by interviewee 21 to refer to those in National 
Service who are under the direct control of the President. The term was popularised 
by Papa Abdu, an Eritrean elder who used the term in reference to his own son, Ali 
Abdu, who was Minister of Information, but defected. The term compares the 
President to a patriarch who decides the fate of his children and favours some while 
expelling others because they do not tow the ‘family-line’. Others associate the term 
with a mafia-style organisation, in which the patriarch decides who is protected and 
who is punished, and threatens or terminates the life of those who are not 
considered loyal or useful (see also Saba, 2019). 
In Eritrea, anyone over 18 is conscripted 
into indefinite National Service, where 
they are assigned to forced labour 
programmes in construction, teaching, 
health and administration. This is 
tantamount to slavery. Conscripts have 
no freedom to communicate, their 
movement is restricted, and they live in 
inhumane conditions. Under constant 
surveillance, feelings of hopelessness and 
fear propel the mass exodus of refugees 
from Eritrea, despite the shoot-to-kill 
policy at the border. This exodus is 
feeding human trafficking for ransom, as 




up of military training (6 months) as well civil service (12 months). 
National Service conscripts are required to work for little or no pay, 
under conditions that the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on 
Human Rights in Eritrea found to constitute forced labour (UN 
Human Rights Council, 2016). The conscripts also work in non-
military activities, such as agriculture, road construction, house and 
building construction, mining, teaching, health and government 
administration, among other things. In 2002, the Warsay Yikaalo 
National Development Programme was introduced, under which 
education is militarised by requiring that all students complete their 
final year of high school at Sawa Military Camp (Kibreab, 2017b).  
 
Eritrea is a one-party dictatorship ruled by the Peoples Front for 
Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). It is a country without political parties 
or rule of law (Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018); where the 
Constitution, which was ratified in 1997, has never been 
implemented. There have never been any national leadership 
elections. The PFDJ itself has not had a party congress to elect 
officials and decide a strategy since 1994. It is a state where to even 
think about opposing the government is considered a crime by the 
government (UN Human Rights Council, 2015). 
 
Eritrea is also one of the most closed countries in the world, with 
freedom of press the lowest in the world (Reporters Without Borders, 
2019) and access to digital technology very limited (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2018). The World Bank estimates that in 
2017, only 1% of the Eritrean population had access to the Internet 
(World Bank, 2017). Internet cafes are available in places such as the 
capital, Asmara, but access is restricted by the knowledge that the 
government is watching and controlling all communication, as the 
only provider.  
 
Eritrea has long been one of the largest refugees producing countries 
in the world and, based on data and population estimates by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), it is 
estimated that around 15% of the population have fled (Human 
Rights Watch, 2018). Eritrean’s also make up the largest group of 
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refugees and asylum seekers registered in detention in Libya 
(UNHCR, 2019) and are estimated to be one of the largest groups of 
victims of human trafficking in Libya. Despite the end of hostilities 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia with the peace agreement in 2018, the 
number of refugees fleeing Eritrea is still on the rise (Melicherová, 
2019). Among those fleeing, the majority indicate that it is because of 
National Service. This chapter looks at how National Service 
contributes to this exodus from Eritrea.  
Escaping slavery 
‘They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us’: How Indefinite 
Conscription Restricts Young People’s Rights, Access to Education in Eritrea, is 
the heading of report by Human Rights Watch (2019). The 
organisation investigated National Service in Eritrea as the starting 
point for undertaking the dangerous journey to flee Eritrea through 
neighbouring countries, to Libya and Europe. A young 19-year old 
told Human Rights Watch: “They were making us into slaves, not 
educating us”. The conclusion of the researchers is that National 
Service is the root cause of the exodus from Eritrea by youth, despite 
the considerable risks involved in fleeing: “Young Eritreans would 
rather risk death at sea than let their leaders take their freedom” 
(Human Rights Watch, 2019). 
 
It is difficult to imagine what the benefits of fleeing Eritrea are, an 
action that is severely discouraged. First, travel inside the country is 
restricted and it is illegal to cross the border. People require an exit 
visa to leave and those who do so illegally risk falling foul of the 
shoot-to-kill policy at the border. Those who flee are considered 
‘traitors’ and ‘defectors’ by the state, and risk being imprisoned if they 
are caught. Relatives left behind are fined 50,000 Eritrean nakfa 
(ERN) (USD 3,333)8 if they cannot account for members of their 
family. Family members are punished by association and are 
 
8 We have used the official exchange rate for the conversion, which has been 1 USD 
= 15 ERN (nakfa) since 2005. Up to 2015 the parallel market rate was 1 USD = 40 
ERN, but since 2016 and the restriction on the circulation of the nakfa, the parallel 




imprisoned or penalised in other ways. The attitude of the Eritrean 
Government towards the youth who leaving the country is that they 
are lazy and inadequate and ‘good riddance to bad rubbish’. In an 
interview on Eri-TV, President Isaias Afwerki made this sentiment 
clear: “Do not think that this country is missing out because these 
people have left. There is no way that our world will be disrupted 
because of them… [People] like that are just burdens” (Eri-TV, 
2014).  
 
For Eritreans to return, a ‘regret form’ must be signed and payments 
made, including the fine of 50,000 nakfa for leaving and the 2% tax 
(Buysse, Van Reisen, & Van Soomeren, 2017). Opportunities for 
Eritreans in neighbouring countries (i.e., Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya) 
are limited, and Eritrean security operates in these areas as an 
extension of the regime to harass and intimidate Eritreans (Amnesty 
International, 2019; Buysse et al., 2017). The chances of being 
captured by traffickers and detained for ransom are real and the 
situation for Eritrean refugees in Libya is hopeless and dangerous 
(Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017; see also Chapter 10, Lawless Libya: 
Unprotected Refugees Kept Powerless and Silent, by Mirjam Van Reisen, 
Klara Smits & Morgane Wirtz). The crossing to Europe is risky and 
many Eritreans have died at sea on these journeys. The information 
on these dangers is shared among Eritreans on social media leading 
to collective trauma (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017). The question is, 
why do Eritreans continue to flee their country when the 
opportunities elsewhere are so few?  
 
According to the push-pull theory, migration is a result of the rational 
consideration of positive factors in countries of destination and 
negative factors in countries of origin. But is this framework adequate 
to explain the large number of Eritreans fleeing their country? 
According to Van Reisen and Mawere (2017), the deliberate 
impoverishment of the Eritrean people is pushing them out of the 
country. The concept of a ‘black hole’ in digital connectivity is also 
used to explain the attraction of youth from Eritrea to places across 
borders (Chapter 6, Journeys of Youth in Digital Africa: Pulled by 
Connectivity, by Rick Schoenmaeckers), where they can digitally 
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connect with their friends and family members, who are scattered 
around the globe (Berends, 2019; Barzilai-Nahon, 2008; see also 
Chapter 1, Black Holes in the Global Digital Landscape: The Fuelling of 
Human Trafficking on the African Continent, by Mirjam Van Reisen, 
Munyaradzi Mawere, Mia Stokmans, Primrose Nakazibwe, Gertjan 
Van Stam, & Antony Otieno Ong’ayo and Chapter 10, Lawless Libya, 
Van Reisen, et al.). The research question in this study is: Does National 
Service in Eritrea constitute forced labour and does it explain the exodus from 
Eritrea, despite the considerable risks involved. 
Methodology 
This study is based on empirical data collected in an exploratory 
ethnographic field study. It is based on: the field experience of the 
second author (1998–2012), interviews from earlier research (2012), 
two focus group meetings with five and six respondents (2019), and 
interviews by all three authors carried out from 2016–2019. Twenty-
seven individual interviews were conducted in Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, Uganda, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway and Belgium using 
a free interview format. The interviews were in-depth interviews, 
carried out over three to four hours, allowing the respondents to feel 
at ease and speak about experiences that triggered painful memories. 
After the interviews, the interviewees contacted the respondents, to 
check that they were coping with the aftermath of the interviews. 
Notes were taken during the interviews and transcribed into interview 
reports, which were compared. Follow up interviews were carried out 
to further clarify the content provided. For reasons of security, quotes 
from the interviews have been anonymised and depersonalised. The 
respondents are known to the authors. 
National Service in Eritrea 
The National Service Proclamation (No. 82/1995; State of Eritrea, 
1995) obliges all citizens between 18 and 50 years to participate in 
active National Service for a maximum of 18 months and in the 
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Reserve Military Service after they reach the age of 50.9 Hence, the 
working population of Eritrea are all drafted into National Service, 
with few exceptions:  
 
You are not in the National Service, if you are: unfit (due to disability); classified 
as ‘Board’ (based on a decision by the Medical Board of Directors); overaged (for 
those overaged a special militia has been set up); or a housewife, this is why Eritrean 
ladies get married. (Interview 21, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 2 June 
2019) 
 
As young women and girls who have children are exempt, many opt 
for early pregnancy, which is encouraged by their mothers. Women 
and girls in the National Service are particularly vulnerable, as they 
are expected to serve the military hierarchy and are available for sexual 
services and subjected to sexual violence and rape (Kibreab, 2017a). 
 
Although the legislation specifies that National Service is 18 months, 
in practice it is indefinite (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Interviewee 
14 explained that he served in the National Service for 17 years (1998 
to 2015). After the border war with Ethiopia finished, the troops 
expected to be demobilised. However, to their surprise, they were 
ordered to work building roads: 
 
One day in 2002 we were given an order. We were in Massawa. The order was 
given to our division and six other divisions, approximately 500 men. There were 
no women present. At the time I was 28 years. We were given the following order: 
‘From today you will stop using the gun; you will be demobilised and you will be free. 
But before you are demobilised you will start work. (Interview 14, face-to-face, 
the Netherlands, 26 May 2019) 
 
 
9 The legal basis for National Service in Eritrea relies on the National Service 
Proclamation No. 82/1995 (State of Eritrea, 1995); Legal Notice 27/1996 on 
National Service as a Work Force (State of Eritrea, 1996a); Proclamation 89/1996 
to Provide Jobs and Modalities of Re-Engagement Concerning Nationals who have 
properly Participated in the Active National Service (State of Eritrea, 1996b) and 
the Labour Proclamation No. 118/2001 (Eritrea, 2001). 
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The troops opposed the order, which came from the highest level of 
the military apparatus in Eritrea: 
 
We protested against this order. We refused to work in construction, as we were 
military and not civilians. Moreover, we had not been demobilised. The order that 
we received was given by General Haile Samuel. His nickname is ‘China’. He is a 
General in the Eritrean army. (Interview 14, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 
26 May 2019) 
 
He says the protesters explained to their commanders why they felt 
that it was not acceptable for them to be forced to work for a 
construction company: 
 
As military, we immediately agreed that we would not work without pay. […] We 
did not think that we should be forced to work as civilian labourers and without 
salary or payment. We told the commanders that we refused to work as construction 
workers. We told them, we are military and not civilians. We told them that if we 
are a construction company, we cannot work as a normal employee, without payment. 
(Interview 14, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 26 May 2019) 
 
Following their protest, the President spoke on TV (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009). However, the information provided was confusing; the 
President said that the troops would be demobilised and paid. 
 
The General told us that this is an order. You have to stop the protest. We refused 
to give our guns and they stop everything for one month. They were scared of us 
because we still have guns. Because we were commandos. Then they brought us other 
information. They told us, you will be demobilised and we thought that then we could 
go home. I was married and I had my wife and children at home. The President also 
gave a speech on TV. He said that those who were demobilised would be paid. This 
was like an incentive to demobilise. He said, don’t worry, you will go to the 
construction company and you will be paid. (Interview 14, face-to-face, the 





Subsequently, the troops were persuaded to disarm. But, as soon as 
they disarmed, they realised they had been deceived: 
 
We were told this by Colonel Habtu, the Commander of the 13th Division. But he 
said that the General and the President were lying. That they cheated us. That they 
demanded that the military work for free. He said that he would give us the release 
for demobilisation. So, we put down our guns. We thought we were demobilised. 
(Interview 14, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 26 May 2019) 
 
Once the troops no longer had access to weapons, they were forced 
to work for the construction companies: 
 
Then Major Merge Mir replaced Colonel Habtu and he was sent to the Corporation 
where you work with the military. He said: “Whether you like it or not, you will 
have to do it.” He forced all of us to work for free. So, we had no choice. We had no 
more guns. We had to work for free. We worked for the Construction Company 
Musa Ali Corporation. […] After six months, he [Major Merge Mir] was replaced 
by Colonel Debessai. He is also the leader of the Corporation Musa Ali. They are 
all Hegdef [PFDJ]. He tells us: “You are National Service. You are part of the 
military. You are not demobilised. You have to do this work”. (Interview 14, 
face-to-face, the Netherlands, 26 May 2019) 
 
The information the troops received came through military channels. 
It was limited and did not give them any options, moreover, they later 
realised that the information was false. This disinformation prevented 
them from considering any alternatives. The disinformation coerced 
the troops to disarm, after which they had no choice, but to 
participate in the road construction. They were clearly of the belief 
they were forced to carry out the work: 
 
We were wearing military clothes all that time. […] There was no right to do 
anything without approval. I think of myself as military, not as a civilian. We were 
forced to do the work for the Musa Ali Corporation. We built houses for the Military 
commanders. We built other houses and schools. We do road construction. 




Interviewee 9 was a liberation fighter since 1988, before the 
independence of Eritrea in 1991. He was then in National Service 
until 2015, when he fled. He states: 
 
I have been in active military service for all this time. You cannot distinguish between 
military and non-military activities; as everyone is part of the National Service, and 
some are allocated to military action and others to other activities. (Interview 9, 
face-to-face, the Netherlands, 31 July 2019) 
 
Interviewee 16 showed a photograph of himself working in road 
construction as part of National Service. Pointing to the military 
clothes he and his colleagues were wearing in the photo, he 
confirmed: “In the National Service we are part of the military. We 
wear military uniforms. We report to the higher ranks who are our 
military supervisors” (Interview 16, face-to-face, Belgium, 9 
December 2018). 
 
The perception is that National Service is part of the military 
structure, as explained by interviewee 14: 
 
How I see myself? I was in National Service, I was part of the military. I was not 
demobilised. I was forced to work and I had no free decision or free choice in the 
matter. I was forced to work in construction from 2002 until 2015 as part of 
military service. I had to do this until 2015, when I fled the country. […] Everything 
is owned by the military. There are no civilian workers. The military leaders only 
have more money. That is all. (Interview 14, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 
26 May 2019) 
 
National Service creates a community that is tightly controlled by the 
top officials of the PFDJ (referred to as Hegdef10 in Tigrinya), the 
only political party in Eritrea: “They have military clothes in the 
National Service for each Zoba [administrative zone]. They have also 
overalls for government garage people” (Interview 21, face-to-face, 
the Netherlands, 2 June 2019). 
 
 
10 Hezbawi Genbar naDamokrasen Fetehen (HEGDEF)  
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National Service is indefinite, which means that the date of 
completion is arbitrary. Therefore, it is impossible to know when a 
person will be discharged. Without having completed National 
Service, it is not possible to do anything formally or legally.  
 
I worked in the Ministry of Information. I planned my exit for a long time. One-
by-one I collected the signatures of approval from various superiors. Then I went to 
the Minister and he signed. I was never sure if I would succeed! Then I got out! 
Finally, I was free! (Interview 20, face-to-face, Kampala, 20 January 2016)  
 
As the PFDJ has total control, the legal stipulations governing 
National Service (Proclamation on National Service No. 82/1995, see 
State of Eritrea, 1995) are easily disregarded. Interviewee 9 observed: 
“The starting date of National Service is officially 18 years, that is 
what the dictator says, but…. I was 14 when I was recruited for 
National Service, against my will” (Interview 9, face-to-face, the 
Netherlands, 31 July 2019). Interviewee 11 says that he was 16-years 
old when he was recruited into National Service and interviewee 12 
remembers his sister being recruited at age 16 (Interviews 11 and 12, 
face-to-face, the Netherlands, 31 July 2019). Interviewee 13 
explained: “They search home to home, and they take all the young 
people they find” (Interview 13, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 31 July 
2019). Interviewee 9 describes when he was taken by the soldiers: “I 
was goat herding. When I came home the soldiers took me while my 
parents cried and screamed. Actually, they took a lot of youth from 
the village” (Interview 9, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 31 July 2019). 
 
The pay received in National Service is very low: 
 
In the army military you receive 700 nakfa [USD 47]. But for us, there is no 
salary. There is 200 nakfa [USD 13] for the family directly from the government 
in cash, but since 2013 family only gets food (only if you are not in prison then they 
stop it and when you escape, they stop it). They give us 90 nakfa [USD 6], but they 
deduct 45 nakfa [USD 3] for camp and food, which leaves 50 nakfa [USD 3.3] 





Stipends under National Services differ. Except for the salary paid to 
those working close to the highest-ranking officials (such as the 
President), all National Service remuneration is perceived to be 
inadequate to live off and support a family (see also Landinfo, 2016). 
Such payments are not a living wage, which thus limit the autonomy 
of those serving in National Service, who struggle to meet the needs 
of their families: 
 
In 1999 I earnt 1,790 nakfa [USD 221]11 as a teacher. In 2001, the teachers 
were moved into National Service, taken as military government workers. Then the 
salary became 100 nakfa [USD 7]. 12 The rent for a house for a family is 150 
nakfa and you need 250 nakfa for other things. I got 150 nakfa as a teacher, less 
deductions of 5 nakfa for the sons of the martyrs and 4 nakfa for sports contribution. 
So, I got 141 nakfa [USD 10] in the hand, which is a few dollars a month. That 
is why I blocked my brother from becoming a teacher. My (other) brother, who is the 
director of the school and administrator of the subzone receives only 500 nakfa 
[USD 36]. (Interview 18, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 5 May 2019) 
 
Van Reisen, Estefanos & Reim (2017) call this strategy ‘deliberate 
impoverishment’, as it keeps people powerless, in a state of 
suspension:  
 
No one goes voluntarily [to National Service], there is no choice, you are taken away 
violently. This also happened to me, without any choice at all, my fate was also the 
same as [name redacted]. (Interview 10, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 31 
July 2019)  
 
There is no alternative to National Service in Eritrea. 
Warsay Yikaalo 
The PFDJ also controls education in Eritrea, which feeds into 
National Service. In 2002, a comprehensive national development 
policy was announced called the Warsay Yikaalo National 
 
11 In 1999, the official exchange rate was 1 USD = 8.1 ERN (April to October 
1999) and 1 USD = 9.6 ERN (October 1999 to November 2000). 
12 In 2001, the official exchange rate dropped to 1 USD = 7.25 ERN. 
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Development Programme, which merges military and civil labour for 
development. This was supplemented in 2003 by the integration of 
the education system into the programme. Students now do their final 
year of school (grade 12) at Sawa Military Camp, before entering 
indefinite National Service (Bozzini, 2011; Kibreab, 2014). The 
respondents said that in Sawa Military Camp, they spend three 
months doing military training, followed by six months of academic 
work (Interview 1, face-to-face, Kenya, 19 May 2018; Interview 2, 
face-to-face, Kenya, 24 May 2018). Before they can graduate, the 
students are required to undertake a further three months of military 
training. Then, depending on their results, they are deployed to either 
a National Service destination or one of the vocational training or 
higher education colleges.  
 
National Service, Warsay Yikaalo and secondary, tertiary and 
vocational education programmes are all under the umbrella of the 
Ministry of Defence, which is directly controlled by the PFDJ, the 
ruling party in Eritrea. This creates a situation in which the PFDJ 
controls the entire labour market and productive sectors and what 
people can do: “Everyone between 18 and 60 is restricted by law to 
engage in any employment, trade, or other activities, to travel within 
or outside the country” (Hosabay, 2016). 
Control of labour and the economy 
The PFDJ, through the integration of education, National Service and 
the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme, controls the 
labour provided to enterprises operating in Eritrea, which are owned 
by individual PFDJ top officials or by PFDJ-controlled entities such 
as the Ministry of Defence and Red Sea Trading Corporation, which 
are all directly overseen by the President. The owners of such 
enterprises report to Hagos Gebrehiwot (Head of PFDJ Economic 
Affairs, also known as Hagos Kisha) and Yemane Gebreab (Head of 
PFDJ Political Affairs, also known as ‘Monkey’) who are trusted by 
the President. All financial streams and operations are directly 
handled by the party’s top officials under private names and private 
accounts (Buysse et al., 2017). As Schröeder explains: 
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At some stage the EPLF [Eritrean People’s Liberation Front] leadership must 
have taken the decision not to pass legislation to make the economic assets of the 
Front officially state-property but rather to keep ownership and control of most of 
them. […] the starting point seems to have been the transformation of Section 09 of 
the former Department of Economics of the EPLF into the Red Sea Trading Cor-
poration (RSTC) probably already in 1992 or in early 1993. The RSTC rapidly 
became the major importer and exporter of Eritrea as it received many of the lucrative 
government contracts without proper tender procedures. (Schröeder, 2004) 
 
In relation to the control of labour in Eritrea through the National 
Service, the respondents refer to private companies controlled by the 
top officials close to the President:  
 
All the corporations are under Hegdef [PFDJ]. I checked all the names. There are 
no civilian companies. Sometimes they change the name, to ask for funding from 
outside. Segen Corp. Asbeco Corp, Debab Corp, all these are owned by Hegdef, and 
they have branch offices in Juba. They are working under the office of the President, 
everything is controlled. On the road construction, for instance, the Selambesi 
Dekamhare Road, it comes under the President’s office. (Interview 14, face-to-
face, the Netherlands, 26 May 2019) 
 
Economic activities fall under what is referred to as ‘09’, run by high 
officials in the PFDJ, with President Isaias Afwerki at the top. Former 
Deputy Minister of Finance Kubrom Dafla Hosabay states: 
 
The PFDJ has 33 enterprises. These enterprises are working openly. Trade has been 
shifting to 09, which is the Red Sea Corporation. The commercial sector has been 
increasingly taken over by the Red Sea Corporation.13 The PFDJ enterprises operate 
legally with bank accounts in Eritrea. The black market is illegal, and this is 
purposefully ignored. 09 [Red Sea Corporation] comes in to decide who gets the 
revenue from the PFDJ-mafia. The work in the illegal black market is individual, 
it is ‘personal’, but it is available as part of the overall system. It can also end up 
going to members of Isaias’ [President Afwerki’s] family, ambassadors and other 
 
13 The Red Sea Corporation and the Red Sea Trading Corporation are the same 
entity. The term ‘09’ is used to refer to both. 
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individuals. It is unaccounted for. (Kubrom Dafla Hosabay, interview, face-
to-face, 18 December 2016) 
 
The near-complete control over the economy and economic actors 
by the PFDJ, without any accountability, creates deep corruption and 
fungibility: 
 
It looks as if it is legal, you get receipts and all that, but it is used for personal benefit. 
It is not to generate income for the PFDJ at the party level, but it benefits the 
individuals in the PFDJ directly. It is a system of the winner takes all. There is no 
law, it is divide and rule. Because there is no law, two generals will not agree. Without 
the law, there is just corruption. Anybody who can do it, will go and do it. (Kubrom 
Dafla Hosabay, interview, face-to-face, 18 December 2016) 
 
The various companies coming under the Red Sea Trading 
Corporation, governed by the PFDJ, include Segen Construction, 
Asbeco Construction, Rodab Construction, Badme Construction, 
Gedem Construction, Des Sea Construction, Mereb Construction, 
Musa Ali Construction (Shabait.com, 2014) and Sawa Construction 
(Interview 18, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 5 May 2019). All the 
labour used by these companies is provided by National Service 
recruits (see also Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018). Interviewee 
18 shared that: “Workers who worked for these companies in 2000 
would be paid 1,200–1,400 nakfa [USD 125–146].14 In 2005, 
construction workers in the National Service would earn 500 nakfa 
[USD 33]15” (Interview 18, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 5 May 
2019). 
 
Foreign corporations also make use of labour from National Service 
(Interview 19, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 17 October 2016), such 
as the Canadian company Nevsun for Bisha Mine: 
 
By the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008, I was assigned by Segen Construction 
to work in Bisha Mine. This was at the very start of the mining project. [...] To my 
 
14 In 2000, the official exchange rate was 1 USD = 9.6 ERN.  
15 In 2005, the official exchange rate was 1 USD = 15 ERN. 
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knowledge, all work in the site was undertaken and supervised by SENET in 
collaboration with Segen. My understanding is that the main mining work was 
contracted to SENET by the Canadian mining company Nevsun. SENET in 
turn sub-contracted Segen for the provision of manpower. Since there were no other 
privately-owned construction companies in the country, it was a must for SENET 
to sub-contract Segen. There was no other option. As I will explain later, the working 
conditions for Eritreans was extreme and unbearable. (Tesfagorgis, Hagos, Zere 
& Mekonnen, 2018, p. 67) 
 
The total control by those in power not only concerns labour, but 
also assets and companies, which are held as the private property of 
those in charge (Hosabay, 2016). The Red Sea Trading Corporation, 
a PFDJ-owned company and formerly section ‘09’ of the Economic 
Department of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (now the 
PFDJ), has the exclusive right to engage in import and export 
activities in Eritrea. This company is part of the PFDJ-controlled 
informal economy, identified by the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring 
Group (UN Security Council, 2014). This is the entity of the PFDJ 
which holds a monopoly on imports and exports and is involved in 
often illegal trading arrangements in the region (UN Security Council, 
2011; 2012). There is no government budget or public budgeting 
process in Eritrea, and all public or private finances are collected and 
handled by PFDJ individuals through private accounts (Kubrom 
Dafla Hosabay, interview, face-to-face, 18 December 2016; Van 
Reisen & Mawere, 2017; Buysse et al., 2018). 
 
All of the companies privately owned by PFDJ officials make free use 
of labour from National Service. Agriculture, the main economic 
activity in Eritrea, is also controlled by the government:  
 
If you have cows, you have to get the animal feed from the government, and you have 
to get the milk to the municipality controller. So farming is a big topic, for example, 
you can only be in that village where you belong. But who lives there? Everyone is in 
the National Service; so, there is no labour. If you are not in the right place, they 
stop you and take the land. The Crop and Livestock Corporation, they take the 
yield. So, for instance, I have 200 hectares, then they forced me to sell to a group 
from Hegdef [PFDJ]. My friend is in prison in Guliy – they imprisoned 300 because 
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they sold the crops from their own farm. But the Hegdef says that it will sell the 
crops. (Interview 21, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 2 June 2019) 
 
Due to the fact that nearly everyone of working age is part of National 
Service, farmlands and crops are often seized: “The PFDJ sold the 
crops of the farmers. When they protested, they were sent to prison” 
(Interview 18, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 5 May 2019) 
 
In July 2019, the PFDJ-owned Crop and Livestock Corporation 
introduced a new version of control over herders. The head is an 
active member of the Defence Force, Major Kibreab Abraham (who 
is not a pastoralist). The following information was received on price-
fixing by the corporation: 
 
Recently I had received reliable communication from Asmara that the Government 
of Eritrea was attempting to fix prices for livestock. And that, in the process, was 
confiscating animals on the way to market. I have also been told that confiscation of 
livestock has happened at border crossings. (Interview 27, email, 30 July 2019) 
 
In other informal sector jobs, people also depend on goods being 
made available by the PFDJ through the Red Sea Trading 
Corporation, which controls the flows of good (e.g., goods such as 
flour, sugar, or animal feed) and any other issue critical to small 
entrepreneurs (Interview 18, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 5 May 
2019). In 2002, the bakers who used to produce bread and cakes had 
to choose to do one or the other. Many chose to produce cakes, as 
with bread they would be forced to apply prices as per Government 
directives; bread is rationed (personal observation by author). This 
dependency on goods being made available by the PFDJ has also 
resulted in growing levels of systemic corruption, institutionalised 
forced labour, and the mass exodus of Eritreans (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2018): 
 
[By] pursuing a policy of forced labour while simultaneously strangling any private 
sector economic initiative, the Government of Eritrea has not only failed to achieve 
its goal of development but has manoeuvred the country into deep economic and social 
crisis. (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018, p. 28) 
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Hence, in summary, the PFDJ has total control over the production 
and distribution of labour, related to economic activity, both in the 
public and private sector. 
Control of information  
The PFDJ has also total control over the production and distribution 
of information, which is directly overseen by the President and his 
office (Interview 11, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 31 July 2019). 
Access to phones, both landlines and mobile phones, is severely 
restricted in Eritrea. Phone calls are tapped and sim cards difficult to 
obtain; obtaining a sim card requires extensive documentation, 
including an ID card and property ownership papers or a house rental 
contract. One respondent shared how landlines are also controlled: 
“We also cannot phone. All the landlines are controlled by the 
government. They listen so you can’t say anything. You have to talk 
in code” (Interview 14, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 26 May 2019). 
 
Those deployed in National Service are not allowed to have a mobile 
phone: “We are not allowed to have a sim card. No mobile phones” 
(Interview 14, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 26 May 2019). Another 
respondent shared: “He [my brother] has no access to mobile. They 
do not accept anyone to use it in the workplace. Last November we 
had a family emergency and there was no way to reach him” 
(Interview 21, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 2 June 2019).  
Since 1998, communication has been subject to mass surveillance:  
 
At the beginning of the war [Ethiopia/Eritrea border war], the day after the Israeli 
embassy was evacuated from Asmara, many Israelis with suitcases arrived, all 
working in telecommunication. They arrived with suitcases to renew the whole 
telephone network. Since that time, all phone lines are tapped. (Personal 





For National Service members, information exchange with family 
members is difficult, due to the lack of access to phones, as well as 
the limited freedom they have to visit their families:  
 
At one point, I did not see my own parents for five years. Now I can call her [my 
mother], but there is no mobile phone there. There is no family, because everyone 
belongs to the dictator. My brother works in road construction and gets at most three 
or four days every now and then to visit his family. (Interview 12, face-to-face, 
the Netherlands, 31 July 2019)  
 
Family visits are irregular and often depend on arbitrary circumstance. 
Some may be able to go home to visit family every few months for a 
few days, others can only visit for a short time over a period of 
multiple years. This severely restricts the possibility of a family life 
and for fathers to support to their families. 
 
The lack of free media in the country, especially since 2001, was 
mentioned by interviewees as restricting access to alternative 
information. It is also an obstacle to the production and distribution 
of information by people in National Service. Foreign journalists 
occasionally obtain access to a report from inside the country, but the 
information journalists have access to is strictly controlled: 
 
Sometimes journalists came to visit, and we were told to change from our military 
clothes into civilian clothes. They gave us normal clothes for construction workers. 
We were not able to answer any question. Sometimes we thought maybe we could 
talk to them and tell them the truth, but we had no chance. […] One time we wanted 
to tell them we are military, we are not civilians, we have nothing, we are slaves. But 
then the translator in English tells them, we are okay. (Interview 14, face-to-
face, the Netherlands, 26 May 2019) 
 
Foreign media are not able to travel freely and are reliant on 
government-issued translators who, as the previous quote shows, may 
mistranslate what the Eritreans in the National Service say (see, for 




As well as it being difficult for Eritreans to produce and distribute 
information, information is also collected from them without their 
consent through the system of widespread surveillance and spies. 
This was documented in detail by the Commission of Inquiry on 
Eritrea (UN Human Rights Council, 2015). The report of the 
Commission notes that: 
 
The Commission gathered testimony from victims and witnesses as well as former 
spies. They informed the Commission that the Eritrean Government systematically 
recruits individuals to spy and conduct surveillance activities on individuals and 
entities within and outside the country. (UN Human Rights Council, 2015, p. 
91) 
 
A witness speaking to the Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea noted 
that spies are everywhere and can be anyone, not only constituting a 
system of information collection on a mass scale, but also fostering 
widespread mistrust within communities: “In Eritrea everyone is a 
spy – local housewives, farmers, etc. So, they know when you arrive 
and when you leave. Your own neighbours report you to the 
authorities” (UN Human Rights Council, 2015, p. 91). 
 
The main task of the spies is to report on deviant behaviour. This 
includes behaviour by those in National Service or when a person is 
fleeing or avoiding National Service. When people flee Eritrea, this 
system of surveillance continues. One of the main instruments used 
is the 2% diaspora tax, which is used to establish whether or not an 
individual supports the government (Buysse et al., 2017). News and 
images about what is going on in Eritrea have to be secretly smuggled 
out of the country (Brummelman, 2017). However, recently, limited 
information, including photographs of graffiti protesting against 
National Service (Kidane, 2019), have been leaked out of the country 
by groups such Arbi Harnet (which translates as ‘Freedom Friday’, 
referring to a movement to stay home on Fridays as a protest against 
the dictatorship).  
 
Producing misinformation (referred to as ‘03’) is part of the 
government’s strategy to create confusion and to keep citizens 
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paralysed (Buysse et al., 2017). Finally, UN Human Rights bodies, 
such as the Special Rapporteur on Eritrea, have been denied 
permission to enter Eritrea, and UN organisations operating in the 
country are denied freedom of movement. They are not able to 
operate under the umbrella of the United Nations Development 
Framework (UNDAF), but have to operate under a Strategic 
Partnership Cooperation Framework (UNDP, 2017), which is limited 
in scope. 
 
Access to alternative information sources about Eritrea is limited and 
suppressed. One interviewee explained how the government has 
systematically limited access to alternative information: 
 
They first started by closing the University [of Asmara] and taking all the choices 
from people. It is a brainwashing strategy. You get no chance to do something yourself, 
everything is decided by the government. But the government also tries to close off 
social media, even if you have the Internet, there is no Facebook or anything. You 
are obliged to follow government propaganda. There is only one television source. 
(Interview 11, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 31 July 2019) 
 
One way in which alternative information sources have been limited 
in Eritrea is by strict control of the press, which escalated after a 
crackdown in 2001, during which the Eritrean government arrested 
not only political opposition, but also journalists: 
 
I was a writer. There were still private magazines, but the censorship was very strong. 
In 2001, the private media sector was closed down. […] There are journalists who 
have been in prison since September 2001. Now, there is only one FM-radio channel 
and one television channel. (Interview 12, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 31 
July 2019).  
 
The information distributed by the government is perceived by the 
respondents as propaganda to maintain control, but also to cultivate 
mistrust, fear, and confusion among the population (Buysse et al., 
2017). One respondent shared: “If you have a family, there is so much 
propaganda that you are even afraid of your own father. The 
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propaganda scares people” (Interview 13, face-to-face, the 
Netherlands, 31 July 2019). 
 
The possibility of protesting to improve the situation in Eritrea is 
perceived as extremely limited: “Nobody can gather together, there is 
no freedom of opinion and no ability to speak together, everything is 
controlled, there is no private existence in Eritrea” (Interview 12, 
face-to-face, the Netherlands, 31 July 2019).  
 
The Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea found that there were severe 
restrictions on freedom of assembly in Eritrea, including the right to 
protest, and political parties and trade unions are prohibited (UN 
Human Rights Council, 2015). Civil society is also severely restricted, 
including the activities of foreign non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) (Chapter 21, Uncomfortable Aid: INGOs in Eritrea, by Makeda 
Saba). Therefore, it can be concluded that Eritreans have none or very 
limited ways to exert control over their circumstances. Power is firmly 
in the hands of those at the top of the PFDJ and attempts at dialogue 
or protests usually result in imprisonment. In September 2018, the 
former Minister of Finance, Berhane Abrehe, who had written a book 
to open up discussion on the situation, was taken to prison (Solomon, 
2018). 
 
In summary, the PFDJ heavily controls the information flows in and 
out of the country. Through the extensive surveillance system it has 
put in place, it actively collects information from the general public, 
including those serving in National Service, while at the same time 
generating an atmosphere of fear and mistrust.  
Disruption of social relationships 
The PFDJ ensures that Eritreans are not able to form strong 
relationships by destroying trust between people and separating 
families:  
 
Anyone with an education, and anyone without an education, all are always ruled 
together under the system of the dictator. They have destroyed our families and the 
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common trust. We have only built up trust since we left there. (Interview 12, face-
to-face, the Netherlands, 31 July 2019) 
 
Interviewees often refer to the separation of their families as a big 
source of anxiety, which happens because National Service recruits 
are placed far away from their families: 
 
You can even see your own wife only one month per year if you are lucky, else only 
one month per two or three years. My own nephew was married and went on vacation 
to meet his wife after four years of military service – you cannot build a family like 
that. (Interview 12, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 31 July 2019) 
 
In addition, families are separated when people flee due to the 
political situation:  
 
Life isn’t easy for me. I’ve been in Norway for 3 years and I still am not legal. I left 
my country after I couldn’t find my husband, who used to be in the National Service 
and whose whereabouts still isn’t known to me. I don’t know where he is, and they 
[government forces] came and arrested me asking me where he is. I was released on 
bail – and they came again to arrest me, and I had to flee my country [She starts 
sobbing]. I had to leave my country, I left my children with the neighbours […] And 
here, a life of destitution. My little sister is also in Sudan, she’s in a refugee camp. 
She used to be in National Service. The lives of the members of my family have been 
wrecked because of me. (Interview 22, face-to-face, Norway, 12 September 
2012) 
 
The militarily structured control of National Service, its invasion of 
the private sphere, the separation of families through National Service 
and the lack of control over family life are all sources of deep anxiety. 
This anxiety is instilled during training at Sawa Military Camp, where 
the students finish their school and are introduced to National 
Service. Specifically referring to Sawa Military Camp, Amnesty 
International noted the military style of punishment: “Although 
students are purportedly there for education as well as military 
training, the whole ethos of Sawa is militarised. The students are 
subjected to military style discipline, presided over by military 
137 
 
commanders” (Statement made by Simon, a 23-year-old former 
conscript, cited in Amnesty International, 2015, p. 20). 
 
The situation of military command lacks accountability, and no 
independent courts are available. Punishments are often severe and 
arbitrary, as reported by this respondent, who was working in 
National Service: “I was sent to prison, a very bad prison, Adi Abeito. 
I was asking a question, I was disagreeing with the commander, 
Captain Wedi Zemzem [Idris] about his order. Then they put me in 
prison” (Interview 14, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 26 May 2019). 
 
The combination of being unable to form relationships with family 
members and friends, as well as the low payment and high degree of 
control over their lives in National Service, puts pressure on 
Eritreans. As they do not earn enough money to support their 
families; some try to escape from National Service to find work, but 
this is also punished: 
 
Then again, they put me in prison in 2014. It is called Mai Aidaga. This is an 
underground prison. We were there with 70 people. You can hear the road over your 
head, when there are trucks everything is very bad. They put me in prison because I 
tried to escape for my family and my children. I was not able to look after them. 
There was no money. I earnt the same pay as at the beginning and my family had 
no money. I tried to go home so that I could work for myself to support my family. 
But they captured me and put me in this prison. Then when I came out, I escaped 
from Eritrea. (Interview 14, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 26 May 2019) 
 
Going to prison is not unusual for Eritreans. One respondent shared 
that: “Ending up in prison is normal in Eritrea” (Interview 13, face-
to-face, the Netherlands, 31 July 2019). Imprisonment can be the 
result of petty incidents and can depend on the whim of a superior: 
“You can be asked to make a cup of coffee by a higher officer, but if 
you refuse, you can end up in prison” (Interview 10, face-to-face, the 
Netherlands, 31 July 2019). And there is no trial: “They do what they 
want: there is no justice system” (Interview 12, face-to-face, the 




Both imprisonment as well as its duration are arbitrary, and families 
are not informed as to the reason for imprisonment or the location 
of their family member. Just asking about this can lead to family 
members being imprisoned (personal observation by author). When 
people escape from National Service without permission or fail to 
return in time after leave, if captured, they are usually locked up for 
double the time they have been away. If they were absent for two 
months, their prison term will be four months (personal observation 
by author). In National Service and in the prisons, torture is used as 
a punishment: 
 
There are different ways of punishing in National Service. I was punished once; they 
put me in Otto [a torture method where someone is tied at the wrists and ankles and 
hanged] and they put water and sugar all over me and put me in the sun – then flies 
come all over your body. I also heard about the container of water, that the prisoner 
has to move the water from one big container to another by mouthful. They tie you 
for a long time and they beat you with sticks. Those who have been in Adi Abeito, 
near Asmara, Adesom, Mazrab, and Wia can tell you a lot about what happens 
when you are there. (Interview 21, face-to-face, 2 June 2019) 
 
Another torture method that was mentioned is forcing recruits to 
stand in the sun for long periods of time, which is a standard 
procedure: 
 
This kind of tying up of hands twisted back to your back and your legs and laying 
on the ground for 12 or 24 hours as a punishment in the military National Service 
of Eritrea has already been for about 25 years. Although it has been a daily practice 
as punishment in the Eritrean military service, it also applied in other civilian 
punishments just as we see the under-age young people have been tied up the whole 
day in the hot sun. This kind of punishment is just one the severe punishments, which 
has been carried out for years. During the whole hot day and the cold night to stay 
tied up like this is not only painful and intolerable punishment, but also depending 
on a person's body resistance, it can cause paralysis of part of your hand, trauma, 
disillusionment, psychological crisis, anger, instability and so on. That is why unlike 
many countries young refugees in many European countries, it's been said that by far 
and large, the Eritrean refugees have been victims of psychological instability and 
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trauma. (Interview with Herman Aregoi [translated from Tigrinya], from 
AAN Media Network, 2019) 
 
One of the respondents was allocated through the National Service 
to Bisha mine where he ended up being imprisoned, alleged for 
something he had not done: 
 
I was a translator in the Bisha mine in Eritrea. I was payed 2,500 nakfa per 
month. There was a lady who complained, but I had not done anything wrong. I then 
spent one year and six months in an underground prison, six months of which was 
in solitary confinement. I then changed prison; I was four years in prison in total. 
After four years I went back to the office in Bisha mine. I never had a lawyer. I had 
not done anything wrong. (Interview 19, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 17 
October 2019) 
 
The conditions in prison are atrocious: 
 
I was tortured for six months. I spent my time in the Barentu underground prison. 
We were allowed out once a day. We had a shower and washed our clothes once a 
month. I had no information from my family. Then I went to the prison in Karen. 
It was overcrowded. (Interview 19, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 17 
October 2019) 
 
Interviewee 19 describes being tortured: 
 
My family came to see me there. In the underground prisons we were in chains, both 
legs and hands. I was on my own, alone in one prison room. We received one small 
piece of bread in the morning and sometimes food in the evening, but not always. We 
were very hungry. We received one small bottle of water. They beat me during those 
six months. They wanted information I did not have. They beat me, they electrocuted 
me, they gave me electric shocks, they hit me with plastic sticks. I walked to escape 






While escaping Eritrea, Interview 19 was sold to human traffickers 
who extorted him. His wife also attempted to escape. He has not 
heard from her since. 
 
Friends from Israel paid for me to go from Sudan to Libya. I paid EUR 1,600 to 
go from Sudan to Libya and EUR 2,400 to go to Italy and EUR 300 to go from 
Italy to Holland through Paris by train. When I escaped my wife was put in prison. 
She was put in prison for two weeks when I escaped. They came again and they 
asked her where I was. So, she escaped. She said maybe I will escape to Sudan. I 
have not heard from her. I don’t know where she is. (Interview 19, face-to-face, 
the Netherlands, 17 October 2019) 
 
As the Office of the President is fully in control of all ministries 
responsible for the National Service, Eritreans do not have a direct 
platform or way to complain or exchange information about their 
situation. Interviewee 10 remembers how he ended up fleeing the 
country alone and leaving his wife and children behind: 
 
In 2010 my child was ill. I was in Massawa. I asked permission to bring my 
daughter to the hospital, but I did not get it. I went home without permission and 
brought my daughter to the hospital. Two military personnel came to get me, and I 
was put in an underground prison, a hole dug in the ground. We could hear the cars 
driving over our heads. In 2014, I fled with 80 people during a toilet break, we ran 
even though we did not have shoes. (Interview 10, face-to-face, the 
Netherlands, 31 July 2019) 
 
In summary, social relationships and relationships with family are 
actively broken down, destroying the social structure in Eritrea,16 
which maintains the power of the ruling party. The full control that 
the PFDJ have over the Eritrean people involves regular 
 
16 The Catholic Bishops in Eritrea in their Pastoral Letters (Catholic Church Eritrea, 
2001; 2014; 2019) consistently lament the breakdown of social and family 
relationships in the country as a result of the Eritrean government’s policy of 
integrating National Service, the Warsay Yikaalo National Development 
Programme and education. They also lament the government’s lack of consultation 




imprisonment and severe torture to control people and seriously 
undermine their relationship with their families. 
Choosing to flee 
Proclamation 82/1995 (Eritrea, 1995) stipulates that those who have 
not completed National Service are restricted from leaving the 
country. However, as mentioned previously, National Service is 
indefinite. This pushes people to leave the country illegally, resulting 
in situations of human trafficking and severe human rights abuses:  
 
I’m 22, and I’m from Elaberid. I left with someone who was crossing the border in 
Keren. He promised me that he’d take me all the way there for free. His name is 
Yonas, I don’t know his last name, but we met during my National Service. He 
was a soldier with me. (Interview 23, telephone, Egypt, 17 September 2012) 
 
Those who leave the country are often not in control of the journey, 
as illustrated by the story of interviewee 24, who was abducted after 
serving 15 years in National Service: 
 
My name is [redacted], I’m 35, I was in the National Service for 15 years. I was 
kidnapped while I was working in the fields of Ali Gidir. I don’t know, those people 
are heartless. They brought us all here, and we just informed our families and they 
are scared. I have the papers issued for me by the Eritrean Army here. I can’t tell 
you what’s happened to me here, I have three kids back home and I was in the 
National Service for 15 years. [...] My family cried and wailed and couldn’t do 
anything besides collecting 2,000 dollars. [...] 
We took our travel papers when we were going for a break [...]. Me and this friend 
of mine, we went to Aligidir, because it was planting season, they came to us at night 
while we were resting after a busy day at work and they brandished their knives and 
guns and took us. They took us all the way to Sudan, we thought we were being 
taken to the police station in Tesenei, but they said we’re in Sudan and we’ve been 
sold to slavery. They took every paper we had, those pirates. I can’t take this 
anymore; I can’t pay more as my family don’t have a single cent left. I’m praying for 
death. (Interview 24, telephone, Egypt, 17 September 2012) 
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Interviewee 25 explains how, after 18 years of National Service his 
bad health prompted him to leave the country, after which he was 
trafficked on to the Sinai. 
 
I was a soldier in Eritrea, I’m a member of the 1st round of National Service. I’ve 
been a soldier for 18 years, during which time I was afflicted by fistula and was 
operated on. [...] after the surgery, I was told that a slight infection or heavy work 
would bring back the infection, I tried explaining this to my superiors, but they would 
not understand or let me go, as a result, I decided to leave my country. (Interview 
25, telephone, Egypt, 21 November 2012) 
 
While fleeing Eritrea, interviewee 25 was abducted by human 
traffickers who then, through extortion, forced him to beg for USD 
25,000 from his family, who are extremely poor (Interview 24, 
telephone, Egypt, 21 November 2012; see also Van Reisen, Rijken, & 
Estefanos, 2014).  
 
The control by the Eritrean government is still maintained even after 
people have fled Eritrea. This control is exerted through their 
relatives, among other ways. By WhatsApp, interviewee 26 sent the 
following message: 
 
My wife is taken to prison. I need to send money to my children. They are on their 
own. She is taken because of my writing on Facebook. They say it is best she says 
she does not know me; she can divorce me. I need to send EUR 1,500 to bribe 
someone to arrange her release. (Interview 26, WhatsApp, 2 July 2019) 
 
In order to send the money to bribe the official to release his wife, 
interviewee 26 will need to use the hawala system, which is privately-
owned by PFDJ top officials and overseen by Hagos Gebrihiwot 
(Head of Economic Affairs, PFDJ, aka Hagos Kisha) (personal 
observation by author; Buysse et al., 2017; Interview, Kubrom Dafla 
Hosabay, face-to-face, 18 December 2016). 
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Institutionalised forced labour 
The UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea 
documented grave human rights violations, including in National 
Service (UN Human Rights Council, 2015; 2016). It specifically 
highlighted concerns about its “prolonged and indefinite duration”, 
the “abusive conditions” and “use of conscripts as forced labour” 
(UN Human Rights Council, 2016, p. 20). The Commission also 
identified that “Indefinite military/National Service is frequently 
cited by Eritreans as the prime reason for leaving Eritrea” (UN 
Human Rights Council, 2016, p. 20). 
 
The view of the Commission is that National Service per se is not a 
human rights violation, but that the Eritrean programme has three 
major problems under international law: 
 
(a) its open-ended and arbitrary duration, which routinely exceeds the 18 months 
provided for in a decree issued in 1995, frequently by more than a decade; 
(b) the use of conscripts as forced labour in a wide range of economic activities, 
including private enterprises;  
(c) the rape and torture perpetrated in military camps, and other conditions that are 
often inhumane. (UN Human Rights Council, 2016, p. 22) 
 
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women considered Eritrea’s National Service in its 2015 meeting, 
classifying it as forced labour and expressing serious concerns about:  
 
The negative impact of the indefinite period of National Service on women’s rights 
and at the insufficient measures taken by the State party to remedy the situation. It 
is particularly concerned about: 
(a) Women and girls being forcibly recruited into National Service for an indefinite 
period and without formal pay, under conditions amounting to forced labour; 
(b) Reports that women performing National Service are frequently victims of sexual 
violence, including rape, committed by officers and male recruits and that women who 
refuse sexual advances are often severely punished; 
(c) The large and increasing number of Eritrean women and girls, including 
unaccompanied children, who flee the country and become refugees to avoid National 
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Service and who frequently become victims of violence, human trafficking and 
smuggling; 
(d) Reports that many girls drop out of school, become pregnant and/or are forced to 
enter into child marriages to avoid enrolment at the Sawa Military Training Centre 
and National Service; 
(e) The proliferation of small arms and the accessibility of firearms by individuals in 
the framework of National Service and the impact of that situation on the security 
of women. (UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, 2015) 
 
During deliberations by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), concerns were expressed that:  
 
Some of the reasons for the desperate and dangerous decisions taken by Eritrean 
migrants were forced labour, prolonged military conscription, arbitrary arrests, 
torture, appalling detention conditions, disappearances and severe restrictions on 
freedom of movement in the country. (The representative) recalled that many victims 
of the Lampedusa disaster had been Eritreans who had run away from servitude-
like conditions. (ILO, 2015) 
 
In the UN report of the Special Rapporteur, National Service was 
described as: “arbitrary, extended, and involuntary in nature, 
amounting to enslavement” (OHCHR, 2017). 
 
Although the Presidential Adviser to the Government of Eritrea, 
Yemane Gebreab, had publicly announced in 2015 that: “Eritrea 
would limit its military and National Service programmes to the 18 
months provided for in the 1995 decree” (Bruno Kreisky Forum, 8 
April 2015, cited in UN Human Rights Council, 2016, pp. 20–21), in 
February 2016, Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel said that 
there were no plans to limit military/National Service programmes. 
He said: “demobilization is predicated on removal of the main 
threat… You are talking about prolongation of National Service in 
response to...continued belligerence by Ethiopia” (Reuters, 2016, 




The Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea states that it observed that the 
Eritrean President’s Office was framing the discussion in a way that 
did not match the reality on the ground:  
 
… [We have] received reliable information indicating that the Office of the President 
has instructed Eritrean officials meeting with foreign delegations to make the 
following assertions regarding Eritrea’s military/National Service programmes 
should the issue arise: i) the programme is a National Service programme, and 
conscripts are only required to work in civil service positions; ii) there are no military 
courts or prisons; and iii) there is an amnesty for draft evaders. The Commission has 
received no evidence supporting these Government assertions. (UN Human Rights 
Council, 2016, p. 21) 
 
After the 2018 Ethiopia-Eritrea peace agreement, there was an 
expectation that the period of National Service would be limited, but 
public statements by Minister Luul Gebreab (Minister of Labour and 
Human Welfare) and Minister Woldemichael Abraha (Minister of 
Local Government) indicate that the government intends to continue 
with the current policy of an integrated National Service system 
through the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme and 
the deployment of National Service recruits in it. During an interview 
with Bloomberg in September 2018, Minister Luul Gebreab appears 
to say that most of the army will be demobilised, but, in reality, she 
actually confirms the use of youth in the Warsay Yikaalo National 
Development Programme: “Definitely a small army will remain, and 
the others will concentrate on the developmental work as planned…” 
(Manek, 2018, emphasis added). Despite the lack of reform of 
National Service, pressure remains, including from the United 
Kingdom Minister of State for Africa, Harriet Baldwin, who stated 
that: 
 
[…] we are clear that the general human rights situation in Eritrea, including the 
terms of National Service, remains a substantial concern. [...] Sustainable reform of 
the National Service needs to happen in tandem with an improved economic situation 





Instead, peace is expected to translate into increased large-scale 
projects and the Minister of Local Government, Woldemichael 
Abraha, confirmed the government’s plan to implement large 
national development projects. Analysing the announcement, it also 
appears that there are no plans to change the coercive nature of 
National Service or its inhumane conditions and practices. In fact, 
ILO made the following observations about the institutionalisation 
of forced labour:  
 
The institutionalization of forced labour was evidenced by the serious penalties 
incurred by Eritreans who sought to avoid the obligation, including prison sentences, 
suspension of rights, reprisals against family members, and non-renewal of trading 
licences. Forced or compulsory labour was defined in Article 2(1) of the Convention 
as all work or service which was exacted from any person under the menace of any 
penalty and for which the said person had not offered himself voluntarily. The 
Worker members reiterated their concern with regard to the impact of the Warsay 
Yikaalo National Development Programme on women and children. Although the 
law stated that National Service was to be performed from the age of 18, various 
reports indicated that almost one third of new conscripts in military training centres 
were below that age. (ILO, 2018) 
 
In response to this report, a representative of the Eritrean 
Government stated that he: “…hardly agreed with the conclusions as 
they were mainly the result of unrealistic information that did not 
reflect reality” (ILO, 2018). As the Eritrean authorities do not accept 
that National Service corresponds to forced labour, this weakens the 
likelihood of its reform. 
No change with peace: The exodus continues 
Presently, Eritreans are lamenting the lack of inclusiveness in the 
Ethiopia/Eritrea peace process as well as the failure of the Eritrean 
Government to implement any internal reforms. To the contrary, a 
wide range of sources in the country are reporting that the authorities 
have intensified round-ups (called ‘giffas’) for National Service all over 




Independent sources with contacts in Eritrea confirm that giffas to round up children 
for National Service have greatly increased – in these raids, people whose papers are 
not in order are also arrested. Another source in the Netherlands explained that the 
Eritrean government has started to kidnap children from their neighbourhoods in 
these giffas in order to draft them into military training at the SAWA Defence 
Training Centre. (Melicherová, 2019) 
 
In July 2019, Eritrea Hub reported (based on BBC Tigrinya) that giffas 
were increasing: 
 
A new wave of round-ups of youth, so called ‘Giffas’, is under way in Eritrea. The 
round-ups are organised to take young Eritreans to Sawa for National Service 
training. [...] the round-ups [...] are particularly focused on the Western Lowlands 
area. The round-ups in Hagaz – South of Keren – were reported to be particularly 
intense. Reports of Giffas are also coming from Asmara and the Debub-region. 
(Plaut, 2019) 
 
Referring to rare protests inside Eritrea against the latest round of 
recruitment to Sawa, the article observes that giffas are a preparation 
for the next wave of National Service recruitments: 
 
September is usually the month that Eritrean youth are required to report for 
National Service training and completion of high school in Sawa, but, despite 
warnings by local administrations of consequences to their families as a result of 
failure to report for National Service, the youth is increasingly unwilling to do so. 
(Plaut, 2019) 
 
The article observes that the intensified round-ups are contributing 
to the increased exodus from Eritrea to Ethiopia: “Recently, 
Ethiopian authorities confirmed that 250–300 Eritreans continue to 
register in Ethiopian refugee camps every day” (Plaut, 2019) 
 
According to the BBC, the places where the Eritrean defence forces 
are focusing giffas on are Akurdet, Keren, Hgaz, and Asmara. During 
giffas they take youth from their homes or from the streets. In Hgaz, 
hundreds of military were engaged in the giffas. In Keren and Akurdet, 
many posters had been secretly put up saying ‘Yiakl’, which means 
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‘Enough’ (photograph held by authors). This suggests the giffas have 
been implemented in response to these protests. In various places, 
students are refusing to go to Sawa and have also put up placards to 
protest (photograph held by authors). Local administrations have 
started to instruct parents that they will be fined if their children do 
not turn up for recruitment to Sawa (BBC Tigrinya Service, 2019).  
 
The most recent information from the Eritrean-Ethiopian border 
area is that: 
 
…25 percent of the new arrivals are unaccompanied and separated children. The 
reason given for them fleeing the country is that the Eritrean Government has started 
to “kidnap the children to go to SAWA military training,” said one source. 
SAWA is a military academy in the Gash-Barka region of Eritrea. 
(Melicherová, 2019) 
 
Melicherová (2019) reports an increased number of refugees are 
crossing the border as a result of the giffas: 
 
A senior official from the Ethiopian refugee agency has reported that Eritrean 
refugees continue to arrive in Ethiopia in large numbers, 250 to 300 persons a day. 
[…] ‘We have challenges of shelter, Core Relief Items (CRI), water and energy 
alternatives,’ states the senior official. Earlier reports indicate that many young 
Eritreans currently flee due to the increase of raids, Giffas, to force them into the 
indefinite National Service. (Melicherová, 2019) 
 
Meanwhile, various international partners have started to provide aid, 
in the hope that the peace agreement will lead to a change. For the 
first time, the European Union (EU) has decided to provide 
assistance directly to those in power, including the PFDJ-owned 
enterprises. Yet, despite the EU’s good intentions, the number of 
refugees has increased. Interviewee 11 explains how he sees the 
situation: 
 
The European Union has given a grant of 20 million euro to the Eritrean 
government, but you have to understand that this money shows to our people that we 
have no choice but to flee. I was in Ethiopia in December last year, where I was met 
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by an 80-year old father who had come there from Eritrea. He told me that he had 
been recruited for the road construction without any payment. The road construction 
had already started, and my village is just next to the road, and they recruited the 
elderly because all the young people have fled. (Interview 11, face-to-face, the 
Netherlands, 31 July 2019) 
 
Interviewee 12 explains that he does not think that the EU aid for 
road construction will help the people in his country; he refers to an 
Eritrean national TV documentary of the road construction: “They 
create work with that money, and so more people are recruited under 
National Service. The documentary showed the foreman on the 
building sites. We know them, they are all military with high 
positions” (Interview 11, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 31 July 2019). 
 
According to interviewee 10, it is not possible to reform the system: 
“The military we get to see can’t do anything either, they are scared 
to talk. The apparatus and its security is the problem” (Interview 10, 
face-to-face, the Netherlands, 31 July 2019).  
 
Without fundamental reform, the focus group predicted, that there 
will not be a decrease in the number of refugees fleeing Eritrea.  
Conclusion 
Although the Government of Eritrea presents National Service as a 
duty that is necessary to protect the country, international experts 
have concluded that it constitutes forced labour and is coercive in 
nature, because it is indefinite, and because of the harsh and arbitrary 
punishments that are meted out to recruits and the inhumane 
conditions they forced to live and work in. National Service is 
controlled by the military-based hierarchy, in a context in which there 
is no rule of law. National Service severely undermines family life and 
its indefinite nature, forced those serving to be away from the family 
home. In addition, the insufficient pay received by recruits for 




National Service starts with the last year of school, when education is 
combined with military training in Sawa Military Camp. After their 
year in Sawa is completed, students are assigned to vocational schools 
or higher education under military command under the Ministry of 
Defence, or to military service. These assignments include work as 
teachers, in health care, administration, or for the companies that 
come under ‘09’, the Red Sea (Trading) Corporation. The public and 
private sector are overseen by top-ranking officials in the PFDJ and 
the President, as private persons and through private accounts. There 
is no public budgeting process in Eritrea. Those in National Service 
experience their situation as slavery in which the labour they are 
forced to carry out benefits those who are in control of their situation 
and who can amass private wealth based on this power structure.  
 
There are serious restrictions on the flow of information (both in and 
out of Eritrea) and communication. Those in National Service do not 
have access to a phone or sim cards and they are unable to 
communicate with others about their situation. Very little information 
can be sent from Eritrea, given the strict controls by the government 
and the supervision of all communication. Independent monitoring 
visits are complicated by restrictions imposed by the government on 
where monitors may go and who they may talk to. Those in National 
Service are afraid to speak freely for fear of punishment. Very little 
information and communication enters Eritrea, and there is no 
freedom of press, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly or 
independent media. The Eritrean leadership controls ingoing and 
outgoing information through what is called ‘03’. 
 
National Service creates desperate situations, which are a fertile 
ground for smugglers and human traffickers, who offer their services 
under the protection of those in leadership in Eritrea. Those in 
National Service have no bargaining power and usually have little 
possibility to negotiate their situation. Imprisonment for the smallest 
infraction or for what is considered disobedience happens frequently; 
the punishments are arbitrary, severe and inhumane. There are 
frequent reports of torture and there is no independent justice system. 
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Those in National Service are entirely dependent on the military 
commanders and high-ranking PFDJ officials. 
 
National Service has become the main reason for Eritreans to flee the 
country, seeking ways to escape and willing to pay to cross the border, 
despite the shoot-to-kill policy at the border and the dangerous 
onward journeys to Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya and beyond. An estimated 
15% of Eritreans have fled the country (Human Rights Watch, 2018), 
and the number of refugees fleeing has increased since the signing of 
the peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia in July 2018. 
Unfortunately, many Eritreans have end up in human trafficking 
camps in Egypt, Sudan and Libya. 
 
Eritrean officials have not indicated any plan to reform National 
Service. To the contrary, National Service round-ups, giffas, have 
intensified of late. The fact that the peace agreement has not resulted 
in any meaningful changes in Eritrea, and specifically for National 
Service, has created a sense of despair among the people. Despite the 
considerable risks, hundreds continue to leave the country daily. With 
the limited information available, those who flee run the risk of being 
abducted by human trafficking networks. However, by leaving the 
country, they feel that there is a chance to taste a little freedom, the 
hope of reconnecting with family and community, and the possibility 
of making some decisions about their life. Therefore, based on the 
empirical evidence presented in this chapter, it is concluded that 
National Service in Eritrea can be considered forced labour and is 
directly contributing to the exodus of Eritreans, making them 
vulnerable to being trafficked. Unfortunately, it is likely that this 
situation will continue while President Afwerki continues his tight 
grip on power and control over the ‘sons of Isaias’. 
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Journeys of Youth in Digital Africa: 





Why, and how, do refugee children and youth leave Eritrea on their 
own and arrive in a refugee 
camp? This chapter presents 
the results of research 
conducted among 
unaccompanied children and 
youth in a refugee camp in 
northern Ethiopia. The data 
is based on a three-month 
period of fieldwork in 
Hitsats Eritrean Refugee 
Camp in Tigray province. 
During this period, the 
researcher lived in the 
refugee camp and followed 
the daily routines and habits 
of the residents. The data 
collected was analysed in the 
context of a world that is becoming more and more digitalised. The 
research zoomed in on the use of mobile phones by unaccompanied 
refugee children and youth in their migratory trajectories.  
 
Nowadays, the possession of a mobile phone is no longer a luxury. 
In many places, it is essential equipment, even for the poorest. 
Technological devices such as mobile phones are important tools for 
refugees during their migratory trajectory. Mobile phones and the 
Internet are important means of staying connected with others and 
With limited access to the Internet and 
mobile phones, young people in Eritrea 
are living in a ‘black hole’ of digital 
connectivity. This, together with other 
factors (fear of recruitment into National 
Service, lack of educational opportunities 
and social fragmentation), explains why 
youth are drawn to migration, despite the 
serious risks involved. As they flee the 
country, they prioritise getting connected. 
Adapting to the low connectivity context 
in refugee camps, their interest in digital 




staying informed about developments that might have an effect on 
people and their movement. Leung (2010) describes technology as 
key to the emotional wellbeing of refugees, as it allows them to 
maintain contact with family members in situations of conflict, 
displacement, or resettlement. During migration trajectories, 
technology enables migrants to develop and consolidate social 
relationships and gives them a sense of security (Harney, 2013). The 
possession of a mobile phone is also becoming a common and 
important tool for Eritrean refugee children and youth 
(Schoenmaeckers, 2018; see also Chapter 4, Tortured on Camera: The 
Use of ICTs in Trafficking for Ransom, by Amber Van Esseveld). These 
findings seem incompatible with the fact that although the availability 
of connectivity and Internet connections is increasing across the 
continent, only a limited part of Africa is fully connected (Porter, 
2012). 
 
Children and youth arrive every day in Hitsats, without the 
accompaniment of parents or guardians. They cross the Eritrean 
border into Ethiopia, where they arrive into a new world full of 
challenges and difficulties. The province in northern Ethiopia that 
borders Eritrea is called Tigray. In 2018, the population of Eritrean 
under-aged refugee children in Tigray was 10,533, out of a total of 
72,772 Eritrean refugees in the province. The majority of Eritreans 
who leave their country and arrive in Tigray are young men. In 2018, 
a total of 29,373 were men under the age of 24 (UNHCR, 2018). 
These refugees are mainly fleeing Eritrea to avoid indefinite National 
Service, in which all adult men and women have to serve. While 
women who have children are exempt from National Service, this is 
not the case for men. Children grow up in families in which their 
father is often missing, as the military camps or places where National 
Service is executed are often in faraway places. National service 
creates fragmented families, which drives young children out of the 
country, causing a dramatic exodus of unaccompanied minors from 
Eritrea (Van Reisen & Al-Qasim, 2017; see also Chapter 5, Sons of 
Isaias’: Slavery and Indefinite National Service in Eritrea, by Mirjam Van 
Reisen, Makeda Saba & Klara Smits). Additionally, the Eritrean 
authorities have specifically targeted youth to encourage or force 
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them to leave the country since 2001, when a crackdown took place 
including student arrests and mass detentions (Van Reisen & 
Estefanos, 2017).  
 
Most children and youth in this research come from towns and 
villages near the Eritrean-Ethiopian border. Here, as in most of 
Eritrea, information and communication technology (ICT) is largely 
absent and the use of technological devices limited (Centre for 
Human Rights & University for Peace, 2015). These areas form so-
called ‘black holes’ in digital Africa, where technological limitations 
mean that people are partly unconnected to the rest of the world. 
Bigger towns and cities are better connected and attract people from 
places that are less connected. Technological hubs and economic 
centres can be found in important and big cities. Such cities attract 
people from everywhere and are densely populated. In order to 
negotiate a way out of a black hole, facilitators are required, to find 
out what the situation is outside and to communicate. If you are from 
a black hole, usually the only way to connect with a connected place 
is face-to-face (Chapter 1, Black Holes in the Global Digital Landscape: 
The Fuelling of Human Trafficking on the African Continent, by Mirjam Van 
Reisen, Munyaradzi Mawere, Mia Stokmans, Primrose Nakazibwe, 
Gertjan Van Stam & Antony Otieno Ong’ayo). 
 
This chapter looks at the extent to which children and youth are 
sensitive to technological developments in ICTs and attracted to 
technological (better equipped) hubs.  
Black holes  
Interactions in Western knowledge societies contribute to 
explanations of digital exclusion on the African continent. According 
to Van Reisen et al. (Chapter 1, Black Holes in the Global Digital 
Landscape), “the architecture of the digital knowledge society is 
constructed on, and a reiteration of, the network of sea-routes and 
nodes that supported information gathering and examination as a 
basis of which colonial exploitation and imperial economies were 
constructed”. From this perspective, the authors state that the 
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direction of the knowledge society is in favour of former colonial 
powers – and not directed to, or benefiting, excluded areas. 
Contemporary worldwide digital networks are informed by and 
constructed using these networks, which ensures the imbalanced 
distribution of data and information in, and about, the African 
continent, to the benefit of knowledge produced in Western centres, 
largely ignoring African cultures and habits – and certainly 
diminishing African voices in the production of knowledge.  
 
In the contemporary Western world, knowledge societies are seen as 
societies that have a strong link to the accumulation and expansion 
of ICT, technological development and knowledge. A feature of 
imperialistic, colonial and Orientalist thinking is the belief that the 
Western world is the producer of real knowledge (Chapter 1, Black 
Holes in the Global Digital Landscape, by Van Reisen et al.), although, if 
you analyse knowledge from a broader perspective, it encompasses 
much more than that. Mawere and Van Stam (2017) claim that in the 
African context, knowledge can also exist in the embodied form, as 
knowledge that communities interact with and talk about. Buskens 
and Van Reisen (2017) argue that understanding epistemological 
sovereignty is required to study the social processes that ICTs 
generate in a specific place. Epistemological sovereignty means that 
all human beings have their own agentic ability to interpret their world 
within their own context and act upon that understanding. 
 
In Chapter 1, Van Reisen et al. identify spaces in Africa where 
communities reside that are unconnected, or connected in a limited 
way, to digital information networks. Such spaces are called ‘black 
holes’. Black hole communities are communities that are 
unconnected to the global digital architecture because of their 
geographic location. People who live in such areas can be seen as 
subjects from which information can only be extracted (not shared) 
and which are subject to foreign interventions and specific social 
interactions in which facilitators or gatekeepers have power over the 
information that flows between the connected and unconnected 
places. Essentially, these spaces are vulnerable areas, due to lack of 
163 
 
unfiltered information within the overpowering digital world. In these 
spaces, access to (digital) information enhances power and prestige.  
 
Many Eritrean journalist have been driven into exile. They have set 
up networks in which news and information from and about Eritrea 
is widely spread. This has resulted in suppression by the Eritrean 
government and led to the blocking of several diaspora radio stations 
from airing in Eritrea. The Government of Eritrea carefully analyses 
diaspora information and news in general, and filters everything it 
deems inappropriate (Centre for Human Rights & University for 
Peace, 2015). Nevertheless, modern technological devices make it 
easy to stay in contact with each other – but only outside Eritrea. 
Inside Eritrea technology and connections are weak and ICT is 
limited, which makes interacting by mobile phone or over the 
Internet more complicated. 
 
Nodes and connecting points where information and technology is 
available attract youth from black hole communities seeking to 
increase their ability to access information from the digital world 
directly (as opposed to indirectly through facilitators or gatekeepers). 
It is also the case that many people on the African continent (and 
elsewhere in the world) are forced out of their homes for political, 
environmental or economic reasons. Information nodes appear to be 
destinations for people, as they can benefit from the information and 
technology that is available in these places. This includes important 
information about routes for further migratory trajectories, as well as 
the possibility of contacting relatives elsewhere (Chapter 1, Black 
Holes in the Global Digital Landscape, by Van Reisen et al.). Certain 
tendencies can also be recognised in, for example, worldwide 
urbanisation patterns from rural areas to cities. Although urban mass-
migration has been evident throughout history and mainly motivated 
by economic reasons (Bahns, 2005), the appearance of, and migration 
to, technological nodes and hubs is relative and not fixed. Moreover, 
the magnitude of such nodes and hubs can differ widely; for some it 





Due to enhanced technology, information about the world is more 
easily spread and accessible than ever before. Even in small, 
unconnected villages, knowledge about possibilities elsewhere are 
communicated. When youngsters arrive in Ethiopia or elsewhere 
outside Eritrea, it becomes easier for them to access such (digital) 
information, which might be a trigger for them to move on, as they 
hear stories of better opportunities elsewhere. However, attraction to 
technology is not the only reason for people to leave black holes. 
People are also sensitive to others’ behaviour. Hence, the attraction 
to information nodes should be analysed in the context of social 
conformation and what is known as ‘nudging’. 
Nudging 
People are social animals and highly sensitive to the behaviour of 
others. Conforming to others makes people feel confident and 
accepted by a community or reference group. This is explained and 
analysed by Sunstein and Thaler (2008), who talk about ‘nudging’ and 
how it creates herd behaviour and can bring people to make certain 
decisions. The word ‘nudging’ refers to poking or pushing someone 
gently in a certain direction. People are strongly influenced by the 
deeds and statements of others. This is an automatic reaction to avoid 
the things that you do being received as socially unaccepted. This 
reaction is strongly linked to social learning. Learning from others is 
the basis for individual and social development. Even small social 
‘nudges’ can lead to massive social changes in societies. Two basic 
categories of social influence are information and peer pressure. 
Other people’s actions and thoughts convey information about what 
might be best for us – and we conform to other people’s behaviour, 
values and attitudes in order to avoid disapproval.  
 
Nudging, herd behaviour and peer pressure in the situation of 
Eritrean children and youth was brought forward by the journalist 
Westerhoff (2019). She interviewed two boys who left Eritrea at the 
age of 12. One boy said: “All our friends have left, there is no one 
there anymore. Who are we going to play with or spend time with? 
So we decided to leave too”. The other boy added: “Every day, I had 
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friends calling me and asking me: what the hell are you doing? When 
do you come to Ethiopia? So we came” (translation by author). Every 
day children are leaving Eritrea alone or with friends. Some leave for 
the first time and others had already left and returned before, arriving 
in Ethiopia for the second or third time. They arrive in Ethiopia 
hoping for a better life and better opportunities (Schoenmaeckers, 
2018; Westerhoff, 2019; Gebreyesus & Schoenmaeckers, 2019). 
Methodology 
The overarching question in this research is: To what extent can the 
concept of a black hole explain why children and youth leave their hometowns in 
Eritrea without the company of their parents or caregivers, with a focus on 
‘nudging’? This question is answered by a literature review on black 
hole theory and on the situation in Eritrea. The empirical data 
gathered during this research is used to respond to this question. By 
examining the following sub questions, the theoretical lacuna is 
narrowed: 
 
• What forces unaccompanied children and youth to leave their hometowns? 
• What role do mobile phones play in the trajectories of unaccompanied 
children and youth? 
• How do communication and (digital) information influence 
unaccompanied minors and youths’ decisions to leaving their hometowns? 
 
The research includes a literature review and qualitative ethnographic 
research. The data includes transcripts of in-depth interviews, 
observations, surveys, focus group discussions and workshops. The 
respondents in this research (12–23 years old) were approached with 
the support of the Ethiopian Administration for Refugee and 
Returnee Affairs (ARRA) and the Norwegian Refugee Council 
(NRC). Access to the refugee camp was granted after ARRA gave 
clearance for the research. The NRC takes care of the unaccompanied 
minors in refugee camps in Ethiopia and is responsible for the 
implementation of several education and livelihood programmes, 
which were visited and studied during the fieldwork. Therefore, 
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clearance was also needed from the NRC and the details of the study 
were thoroughly discussed.  
 
In consideration of the ethical issues, all methods and techniques 
were discussed with the respondents themselves and the legal 
guardians of the (youngest) respondents to ensure informed consent. 
By doing so, the autonomy and safety of all children and youth who 
participated in the research was ensured and fully respected (Bryman, 
2012; Ellis, Kia-Keating, Yusuf, Lincoln & Nur, 2007). The term 
‘children’ in this research is used for all respondents younger than 18-
years (UNICEF, 1989). The term ‘youth’ is used for all people 
between 18 and 23 years (adapted from State Adolescent Health 
Resource Center, 2013). 
 
The first respondents were introduced by the case-manager of the 
NRC. After this first interview, children and youth were randomly 
approached and introduced by other respondents creating a snowball 
effect. In order to obtain a clear overview of the situation, 32 semi-
structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with children and 
youth between 12 and 23 years old. Half of the respondents were 
female and half male. The focus group discussions and workshops 
were held with the same respondents as the interviews, because of the 
relationship of trust and confidence established during the interview 
sessions. All in-depth interviews started with questions on 
demographic issues and the possession and use of mobile phones. 
The interviews and focus group discussions were held in the shelters 
of the respondents or in the children-areas of the refugee camp. The 
research was conducted with the help of interpreters who were 
residents of the camp themselves. This created a more equal situation 
and engendered trust among the participants. In further consideration 
of ethical issues, the interpreters received training and were informed 
in detail about the purpose and practices of the study.  
 
The data was collected between June 2017 and August 2017. During 
the time inside the refugee camp, crucial observations were made 
about the programmes of United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs. Such programmes included ration 
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days, in which food is distributed among the refugees, and education 
and professional skill-training programmes, which are offered by the 
different NGOs. Beside these formal activities, many informal 
activities were attended with the residents of Hitsats, ranging from 
birthday and graduation parties to football games or food and coffee 
ceremonies. At the end of the data-collection period, all respondents 
were invited to attend a certificate-of-participation celebration.  
Eritrea: Understanding children and youth 
The Eritrean government started a systematic campaign against its 
own people after the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which ended 
in 2000. After this war, the government implemented a policy of 
mandatory National Service. Although National Service is 
theoretically 18 months, in practice it is indefinite (Van Reisen & 
Estefanos, 2017; Kibreab, 2014). According to Kibreab, the Eritrean 
government introduced National Service “as a means of transmitting 
the social capital produced during the war, and maintaining the high 
level of vigilance and sense of insecurity – the siege mentality – that 
characterised the war” (2009, p. 42). This tactic was used by the 
government to create a national identity and to avert perceived 
threats. Before entering National Service, Eritrean citizens attend one 
year at Sawa Military Training Camp. This training was introduced in 
2003 and is mandatory for all grade 12 students before they are 
redirected to National Service or one of the nine colleges. These 
colleges appeared after the closure of Asmara University in 2007 and 
only the very best students can attend. As soon as students finish one 
of the nine colleges, they can only officially graduate upon completion 
of National Service. The result is that students practically never 
graduate (European Asylum Support Office, 2015).  
 
Mekonnen and Van Reisen (2012) have outlined that under-aged 
children are forcefully recruited to National Service as well. They 
based their findings on a leaked report from Eritrea’s Office of the 
State President in February 2009. According to this report, a total of 
3,510 under-aged children had enlisted for military training in Eritrea 
(Chapter 5, ‘Sons of Isaias’, by Van Reisen, et al.). Van Reisen and Al-
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Qasim (2017) point out that conscription to National Service and the 
dire human rights situation in Eritrea make even the youngest 
children want to leave.  
 
Oppression, the violation of human rights and fear has pushed many 
out of the country. The Eritrean diaspora is vast and widespread 
around the world. Eritreans maintain strong and interconnected ties 
with each other through which information, money, values and tastes 
are exchanged. These are powerful networks through which hopes, 
aspirations, expectations and goals are shared (Kibreab, 2007; 
Hepner, 2015). 
Technology and connectivity in Eritrea 
Eritrea has one state-owned telecom provider, called EriTel. This 
network covers 85% of the country, but has low mobile and Internet 
penetration. The average mobile penetration rate of African countries 
is 46%, but in Eritrea it is only 7%. Furthermore, Eritrea has only 1% 
Internet penetration. This low Internet penetration rate is mainly 
attributed to the lack of 3G and 4G mobile broadband networks 
(Mutafungwa et al., 2017). This low rate means that the flow of 
information that goes via the Internet is not perceived as a serious 
threat to the government’s monopoly on information, resulting in no 
laws that address Internet use in Eritrea (Centre for Human Rights& 
University for Peace, 2015). 
 
As such, mobile services in Eritrea are basic and in most parts of the 
country rely on phone calls and text messages. Additionally, it is 
complicated to obtain a sim-card, as clearance from the local 
authorities is needed. Technically, one must complete National 
Service in order to obtain a sim-card; however, most youth obtain 
mobile phone access through friends and relatives. The Internet is 
mainly available in the urban centres, in, for example, Internet cafes. 
WiFi can be accessed from cyber cafes where people usually go to 
169 
 
access Facebook and other social media in order to contact friends 
and family (Saba17, personal communication, email, 4 March 2019). 
 
Most children and youth from remote areas in Eritrea do not have a 
mobile phone. If children and youth have a phone, they use it mainly 
to share photographs with each other and to listen to music or the 
radio. For a small amount of money, they can buy songs in shops in 
the small villages. The way people share photos or songs with each 
other is via share applications – such as Share.It, C-Share, All Share 
and Xender – which convert the phones in mobile hotspots so that 
they can connect with other phones. When connected to other 
phoned, as well as images and music, applications and other files can 
also be shared freely without the use of the Internet. This method of 
sharing applications or documents through phones is also used in 
Hitsats camp (Schoenmaeckers, 2018). 
Upon arrival in Ethiopia: Hitsats camp 
The conditions in camp 
This researcher found the situation in Hitsats refugee camp to be 
alarming; there is a lack of almost all basic resources and the 
environmental circumstances are making life in the camp difficult. In 
2018, Hitsats had 20,526 Eritrean refugees (UNHCR, 2018). The 
camp is located near the city of Shire in a region where temperatures 
can reach up to 50 degrees Celsius in the dry season. The main issues 
in Hitsats are shortages of drinking water, food, electricity, and 
firewood; lack of hygiene facilities; and malaria epidemics, which hits 
people on a regular base. Additionally, there is a lack of secondary 
education, which impacts on the large proportion of the children in 
the camp. Once a day, people can fill jerry cans with water; this is 
organised per community at fixed times. Furthermore, there is a 
monthly food distribution programme. One week a month, people 
can pick up their rations at the World Food Programme distribution 
point. The rations per person include 10 kg of wheat and 60 
 
17 Saba is an active member of the Horn of Africa Civil Society Forum who has 
lived in Eritrea for years.  
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Ethiopian birr, which is about EUR 2.50 (Schoenmaeckers, 2018; 
Gebreyesus & Schoenmaeckers, 2019).  
Connectivity and mobile phone use 
In Ethiopia, only 15.3% of the population use the Internet and the 
country has a penetration of only 4.2%. There is one telecom 
provider: Ethio Telecom. The country has a restrictive telecom 
architecture that relies on excessive government control. The sale or 
resale of telecommunication services on a private basis is forbidden 
and telecommunication technology that bypasses the local network is 
also illegal. Although the government announced that it will liberalise 
the sector, civil society and the private sector are not allowed to be 
involved in the telecommunication sector. Various international 
calling applications are forbidden and the government blocks and 
filters the media and social media platforms to prevent the 
mobilisation of people. Internet shutdowns have become the norm 
in recent years. These blocks are accompanied by the violation of 
human rights, including freedom of information (Zeleke, 2019). 
 
As such, connectivity in Hitsats camp is weak. Mobile phone and 
Internet connections do not reach the refugee camp and ARRA is 
hesitant about the Internet and social media services. During a visit 
by the researchers’ team to the camp, a conversation with the camp 
coordinator about the possibility of a Facebook page for camp 
residents was rejected immediately. The coordinator replied with 
suspicion in an intimidating voice that if such a Facebook page were 
introduced by one of the researchers, access to the camp would be 
denied immediately. 
 
Most of the youngest children in Hitsats did not have a mobile phone, 
the older ones (15 years and older) did have a phone. People mainly 
obtained mobile phones from others who had left the camp and gave 
their phone to them. Occasionally, people bought a phone with 
money that was sent to them by relatives. The most common brands 
of phones where Tecno and Huawei. Brands like Samsung or Apple 
where rare and never seen among children and youth. Even if they 
had a phone, in many cases they could not afford to put credit on 
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their phone to communicate or make use of the Internet. Children in 
the camp used their phones mainly for games, reading the Bible (a 
free app) and listening to music. The amount of money that was put 
on the phones was usually small, Ethiopian birr 5–15 (EUR 0.15–
0.45). With these small amounts, people could make a local phone 
call or send a couple of messages via Viber, IMO or Messenger, which 
were the platforms mainly used by people to communicate. Another 
difficulty the residents of Hitsats had to deal with was the limited 
power supply. Electricity was available for only a few hours a day via 
generators. This resulted in continuously uncharged phone batteries. 
The small stores and restaurants owned by the Hitsats residents 
offered the opportunity to charge mobile phones during the hours 
that electricity was allowed in the camp. If the owners of the stores 
had generators, they charged people a small amount of money to 
charge their phones in large multiple sockets (Schoenmaeckers, 2018). 
 
Connectivity and mobile signal strength are low, which makes it 
difficult to reach online platforms or to communicate through mobile 
devices. If someone wants to make a phone call, the phones are 
switched to the 2G network. On this network, phone calls can be 
made more easily than on the other networks. If someone wants to 
reach an Internet page, the phones are switched to the 3G network 
for better connectivity. Text messages are sent and received relatively 
well on both networks. Only at night, between midnight and 7 am, 
the signal on the phones could be qualified as good. In order to grasp 
a weak signal during the day, the people in Hitsats use several tricks. 
The most common trick used to grasp the signal was by dialling 112 
– the emergency number. By dialling this number continuously up to 
15 times, a weak signal was established for a short period of time. 
Another option to get a weak Internet connection was to use the 
application Psiphon. This application is designed for people in 
oppressive regimes and ensures a free space to surf the Internet. In 
Hitsats the application was used because it reinforces the Internet 
connection and maintains the signal for a short time. Besides these 
tricks to get a signal, there were certain places in the camp where the 
connection was stronger. On top of a hill the connection improved, 
as well as in Hitsats town, which is the town of the host community 
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that is directly connected to the camp. In order to communicate with 
family back in Eritrea, the applications Tango and Nymgo were used. 
These applications establish a phone connection via the United 
States, which makes phone calls possible. These applications are 
necessary, as all regular lines between Ethiopia and Eritrea are 
blocked by the governments of both countries. However, these 
options were not used often because the US dollar needs to be 
uploaded on the application, which is not possible for most 
youngsters (Schoenmaeckers, 2018). 
Children and youth in Hitsats and mobile phones 
For many of the children and youth in Hitsats, it was the first time 
that they had had a mobile phone. In Hitsats the options on the 
phone expanded, compared to the options in Eritrea, and children 
and youth started to use more and different programmes on their cell 
phones. They used the phones mainly to communicate with friends 
and family inside and outside the camp. If one had Facebook, they 
could open their Facebook page and scroll through the posts. In the 
interview with M (16-year-old female) the different ways in which the 
phone was used emerged: 
 
RS: Do you have a smartphone? 
M: Yes. 
RS: How important is your phone? 
M: Very important. 
RS: What do you use your phone for? 
M: My mother’s sister is in Holland, I am communicating with her. 
RS: So, you stay in touch with your family in Holland. Do you also use your 
phone to access news or other information? 
M: Yes. 
RS: And for entertainment? 
M: Yes. 
RS: What kind of entertainment? 
M: I like to read the Bible on my phone. 
RS: Do you learn any new skills with your phone? Reading other books or 




RS: Do you make calls via normal phone calls, or do you use other 
applications like Viber, IMO etcetera? 
M: I am planning to use Facebook soon. 
RS: And do you make normal phone calls? 
M: Mainly with my friends here in the community. 
RS: And normal text messages? 
M: Yes, I also do that.  
(M., interview with Schoenmaeckers, face-to-face, Hitsats, 6 
July 2017) 
 
The way M uses her phone is common among youngsters. Stories 
about phone use in Hitsats varied from using them for entertainment, 
like games or applications that tell jokes, through to contacting 
relatives who live in different parts of the world. The importance of 
having a mobile phone was further highlighted during the interview 
with S (21-year-old male). When asked why he would like to have a 
smart phone, he answered: “For the applications that I can put on the 
phone, for example, Messenger or Facebook. With such applications 
I can try to find my family” (S., interview with Schoenmaeckers, face-
to-face, Hitsats, 12 July 2017). In this quote, the importance of the 
phone in the search for missing family members is brought to the 
fore. As a modern way of finding family members, mobile phones are 
valuable. Additionally, mobile phones and connecting with people 
outside Eritrea are important, because relatives elsewhere can send 
remittances to people in Hitsats. When money is sent, people are 
notified through their phone and have to bring their phone with them 
to the bank in order to receive their remittances. 
 
The interviews with M and S highlight the interconnectedness of the 
diaspora, as all people communicate directly or indirectly with 
relatives somewhere in the world. The direct communication by 
mobile phone is mainly between Eritrean people who are outside 
Eritrea or Eritrean people who are inside Eritrea. When Eritreans 
residing in Ethiopia want to contact relatives in Eritrea, different 
indirect communication links are used. Informing relatives in Eritrea 
about children arriving in Hitsats is done via relatives elsewhere. 
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Another way in which information streams flows between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea is between people leaving and returning to Eritrea.  
 
Especially with the youngest children, it was noticed that to inform 
their families about their arrival in Hitsats, the information went via 
other children who were returning to Eritrea. F (12-year-old male) 
explained how his family knew where he was: 
 
RS: Does your family know that you are here? 
F: Yes, they know because of the other children that came with me. We left Eritrea 
together, but they went back to Eritrea already. These children told my family that 
I am here. 
RS: Why didn’t you go back with them? 
F: I didn’t want to go back to Eritrea. 
RS: Why did your friends want to go back? 
F: Because they wanted to see their parents again.  
(F., interview with Schoenmaeckers, face-to-face, Hitsats, 5 July 2017) 
 
The other common method of informing relatives was through 
relatives elsewhere in the world, which was brought out during the 
interview with E (14-year-old female) whose father lived in Israel: 
 
RS: Where is your mother? Is she still in Eritrea? 
E: Yes, she is in Eritrea. 
RS: Did she agree with the fact that you left? 
E: She didn’t know anything about that. 
RS: When did your father leave? 
E: Ten years ago. 
RS: How did you stay in contact with your father? 
E: By his mobile phone. He contacted me with his mobile phone. 
RS: Did he ask you to go to Israel or did you decided yourself to go to there? 
E: We never discussed it. 
RS: Does your mother know that you are here now? 
E: Yes. 
RS: How does she know? 
E: My father called her. But this is very common in my village; if a child is lost for 
one day, and the other day he is still not coming home, the people already know: 
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‘Oh ok, he is going to Ethiopia’. This is the case because it is just one hour walk. 
But in my case, also my father called my mom.  
(E., interview with Schoenmaeckers, face-to-face, Hitsats, 7 July 2017) 
 
The above indicates that the black hole of connectivity is bridged by 
personal communication between several individuals who feel 
bonded with the community in Eritrea, as also found by Van Reisen 
et al. (Chapter 1, Black Holes in the Global Digital Landscape). As 
highlighted in the stories above, the information about the children 
reaches their parents back in Eritrea and in the diaspora one way or 
another. It is alarming that E states that it is normal in her village for 
people to automatically assume that when children are missing they 
have left for Ethiopia.  
Social media and secondary movement 
The expansion of social media also has undesirable consequences. As 
there is a lack of awareness raising about the content of platforms like 
Facebook, as well as ignorance and unfamiliarity, the content on these 
platforms is perceived as reality. During an interview with W (18-year-
old female) the unawareness about the nature of information spread 
by Facebook was underscored:  
 
RS: […] and how do you access news and information? 
W: From Facebook, there I can access any news, and anything else I want to 
know. 
[…] 
RS: Do you use your phone to learn new skills? Language or something else? 
W: Yes. 
RS: What kind of skills? 
W: I see… on Facebook for example… I see new things, and then I can answer 
the questions that people ask. 
RS: Questions? What kind of questions? 
W: Any questions. I can give comments [on Facebook] to everything.  





Social media starts to play a more important role for children and 
youth, because on these platforms they are exposed to images of life 
abroad. This exposure, together with direct and indirect stimulation 
via phone calls or other messaging from relatives in Europe or 
elsewhere, make people want to leave for Europe.  
 
The organisations that are active in the camp (various NGOs, ARRA 
and UNHCR) are familiar with this trend and they have launched 
several campaigns in which the dangers of secondary migration are 
highlighted in an attempt to stop the outflow of young migrants. One 
of these campaigns is the ‘Telling the Real Story’ campaign. Billboards 
and pamphlets promoting the messages of this campaign were found 
in many places in and around the refugee camp. The campaign is a 
community-based platform that disseminates stories about the 
extraordinary journeys made by Eritrean and Somali refugees seeking 




Figure 6.1. Billboard of Telling the Real Story campaign in Tigray 
Photograph: Rick Schoenmaeckers 
 
When children where asked if they knew what the posters and 
pamphlets meant, different stories emerged. Some stories were 
related to the actual meaning of the campaign, others had little to do 
with it, or children simply did not know what the campaign meant. 
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Nevertheless, most children and youth in Hitsats are familiar with the 
dangers of the onward migration trajectories. Many have lost friends 
or family members due to migration. Additionally, a Hitsats Facebook 
page (Facebook, n.d.) on which, originally, news about Eritreans on 
the move and in Europe was published, has evolved into a page where 
people are warned and awareness is created about the dangers abroad 
and the humiliating and violent practices taking place in Libya and 
elsewhere on the migration routes.  
 
These stories about the dangerous journeys resulted in most of the 
youngsters in this research preferring not to travel by themselves or 
with groups to Europe. They stated that they want to go via a legal 
route or via resettlement by the UNHCR. Nevertheless, when the 
decision to leave for Europe is made by children and youth, as well 
as by adults and older residents of Hitsats, there appears to be no risk 
that will stop them from going.  
 
When people continue their journey, it seems that helpful 
applications on mobile phones during their migration trajectories are 
most of the time useless because connectivity is lacking and mobile 
phone functions that might help them are unknown. Web-mapping 
applications such as Google Maps were new to most people when 
these were demonstrated by the researcher. The functionality of such 
applications is also limited by lack of connectivity and the fact that 
demographic applications use lots of data, which is too expensive for 
most people.  
 
Thus, as soon as cities are reached where connectivity and mobile 
phone strength is more functional, contact can be made with relatives 
and mobile functions used again. The downside of these mobile 
devices during migratory trajectories is their abuse by criminal 
organisations that target vulnerable refugees with few or no assets, 
especially along the route taken by most Eritreans. Kidane and Van 
Reisen (2017) have outlined how information about and from 
relatives abroad and extortion through mobile phones severely 
damages Eritrean people back home and in the diaspora. Young 
refugees are captured along their trajectories to Europe and tortured, 
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raped and killed, while their family members are extorted for ransom 
using mobile phones. This modus operandi of the human traffickers 
is not only highly traumatising for the victims of the torture, but also 
for the relatives involved, leading to secondary trauma among 
relatives of the victims, and contributing to collective trauma in 
Eritrean society as a whole. This collective trauma evolves and is 
aggravated by the detailed information about these practices that is 
spread among the diaspora via social media (Kidane & Van Reisen, 
2017; see also Chapter 4, Tortured on Camera, by Amber Van Esseveld).  
Reasons for leaving: Is it only (digital) information? 
During the research it emerged that mobile phones play an important 
role for children and youth from Eritrea. Whereas, for many, the 
phones were useless due to lack of connectivity, data, money and the 
functionality of the phone itself, they all wanted to have one and 
stated that it was important. Clearly, (digital) information is not the 
only reason for children and youth to leave Eritrea. The data in this 
research showed that peer pressure and herd behaviour were 
contributing reasons for children and youth to leave Eritrea.  
 
During the interviews, the respondents highlighted that “all their 
friends had left Eritrea”, or were about to leave, and had persuaded 
them to join and to come with them. Most of the time, leaving was 
unplanned and unorganised. A clear example of this came forward 
during the interview with M (13-year-old female): 
 
RS: […] and why did you leave Eritrea? 
M: I had no plan to come here. I was going to collect fruit […] while I was busy 
collecting them my friend took me by the arm, and together we crossed the border. I 
didn´t have any plan…  
(M., interview with Schoenmaeckers, face-to-face, Hitsats, 6 July 2017) 
 
Such answers were not unique, especially among the younger children 
(under 15-years old). They reported their reason for leaving as mainly 
to do with friends who had left and in order to earn money that they 
could send back home when arriving in Europe. The youth who were 
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older than 18 years had other reasons for leaving Eritrea. Most said 
that they left Eritrea to avoid Sawa military training or National 
Service. The main goal of these youngsters was to travel to Europe in 
order to work and send money back to their families in Eritrea. 
However, there were still older respondents who also left because 
friends persuaded them to leave. During the interview with N (18-
year-old male), for example, this was clearly explained: 
 
RS: […] were you happy in Eritrea? 
N: Yes. 
RS: Why did you leave? 
N: [laughing] … because my friend told me to go to Europe. 
RS: Is there anything you miss in Eritrea? 
N: No. 
RS: Do you like Hitsats more than Eritrea? 
N: No, I like Eritrea more. 
RS: Are you planning to move to another place? 
N: I want to go to Europe.  
(N., interview with Schoenmaeckers, face-to-face, Hitsats, 11 July 
2017) 
 
Other respondents mentioned other reasons for coming to Hitsats. 
Some left because of the educational opportunities that were available 
in the camp. These opportunities include mainly vocational education 
and training (VET) programmes, which are offered by NRC and Zuid 
Oost Azië (ZOA). The courses offered include tailoring, 
carpentering, metal work, electrician, beautician, computer skills, and 
cooking courses. This was the case with S (21-year-old male): 
 
RS: Do you have a plan for any future travels? 
S: I don’t have any plan. 
RS: Did you only plan to come to Ethiopia and from here you will see? 
S: I want to live here, because I want to complete my education. 
RS: So you want to live in Ethiopia? 
S: I want to complete my education here. 
[…] 
S: I am learning at the YEP [Youth Education Pack]. 
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RS: Because there is no 9th grade right? 
S: No, so I am learning tailoring. 
RS: Are you planning to do the 9th grade as well? 
S: I would like to do that, I want to learn, but there is no 9th grade. So, I learn at 
the YEP. When I finish my tailoring course, I will take the other courses at the 
YEP as well.  
(S., interview with Schoenmaeckers, face-to-face, Hitsats, 12 July 
2017) 
 
The Youth Education Pack (YEP) is the name of the vocational 
educational programme offered by the NRC. The programme is very 
popular in the camp. All residents in the camp had positive reactions 
to the different courses and said that certain courses in Eritrea were 
not available or very expensive. Such educational courses, as well as 
formal education are important in emergency situations. In situations 
where people have suffered war, oppression or other traumatising 
events, education can reduce existing inequalities, it can assist with 
psychosocial recovery and the readjustment of values and social skills, 
and restore hope and normalcy (Lopes Cardozo & Shah, 2016). 
Whereas the courses are popular and the intentions of the NGOs 
providing them good, there seemed to be a misunderstanding about 
the purpose of the courses. The courses create the illusion that after 
graduating the students are prepared for a life in Europe or the United 
States of America. In a focus group with youth aged between 18 and 
20 years old, this was emphasised by one of the participants: 
 
Participant: I am graduated here [VET programme] as a cook, so I will work 
as a cook there [in Europe]. 
RS: But what if they don’t need a cook? 
Participant: If there is no work as a cook I will do anything else they have for me; 
like carrying things from one place to another. 
RS: […] how will you get money to learn the language? 
Participant: First I will work with my graduate certificate. 
RS: But how will you work there without knowing the language? 
Participant: First I must learn the language. If not, I need an interpreter who has 
to live together with me. 
RS: Who will pay for an interpreter? 
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Participant: All countries have agreed together that they will pay for an 
interpreter [for refugees].  
(Focus group discussion, Schoenmaeckers with 4 respondents, face-
to-face, Hitsats, 2 August 2017) 
 
During this focus group discussion, it was highlighted that the 
expectations the youth had regarding their certificates were high and 
unrealistic, as the three to six months courses do not provide the 
participants with full theoretical knowledge about the subject, nor 
with a legal certification with which they can apply for a job abroad. 
Additionally, the response of one of the participants to the question 
‘what he will do if they don’t need a cook’ highlights the limited 
knowledge of refugees about employment possibilities abroad. This 
limited knowledge was prevalent among all children. In the interview 
with M (13-year-old female) this was also clear: 
 
RS: […] and what kind of job would you like to have? 
M: I don’t know… do you have a manual? […] what kind of work is there 
available in the United States? 
[job examples are given…] 
M: I would like to be a doctor.  
(M., interview with Schoenmaeckers, face-to-face, Hitsats, 6 July 2017) 
 
The ignorance and innocence of the girl is recognisable in her 
answers. At the same time, it is alarming and highlights the 
unawareness of the young children who are crossing the border on 
their own. Especially the younger children appeared not to be fleeing 
any danger, but had “just left with their friends”. This easiness about 
leaving among the younger children raised questions about their 
family situations back in Eritrea. Whenever asked about thoughts of 
families and relatives regarding their leaving, it emerged that almost 
nobody had told their parents about their intention to travel to 
Ethiopia. All of the children claimed that if they had told an adult, 
they would have never let them go. Additionally, the fathers of most 
children are far from home in the military, which leaves only the 
mother as guardian at the home. Most of the children said that they 
missed their mothers and siblings, but there was no thinking of 
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returning to Eritrea. The focus was on Europe and it seemed that 
there was nothing that could change this mindset.  
Detailed information on how the children would get to Europe was 
missing, but roughly everybody knew the route. F (16-year-old 
female) shared what she knew about getting to Europe: 
 
RS: Do you have any idea about how to go to Europe? 
F: Yes, I know. You have to go to Sudan, then Libya, and then the 
Mediterranean. 
RS: Ok. And is this what you want to do? 
F: No, I only know how I have to go.  
(F., interview with Schoenmaeckers, face-to-face, Hitsats, 6 July 2017) 
 
The route described by F shows her ignorance and unawareness 
about what might happen on the journey. Other children gave similar 
responses, which is concerning.  
Conclusion 
Technology, particularly mobile phones, is important for most 
Eritrean children and youth who have fled their country. They use 
mobile phones to communicate with each other and with relatives 
elsewhere and mobile phones are an important source of information 
and entertainment. It can be said that children and youth are enjoying 
the technological possibilities in the new environment – Hitsats.  
 
Back in Eritrea, the only way for many of the children and youth to 
receive information and to get in contact with places outside Eritrea 
was via direct interaction with others. All children and youth in this 
research had lived in small border villages in Eritrea. They receive 
information from people leaving and returning to the villages who 
bring stories from abroad. Such stories included aspects of the life in 
Ethiopian refugee camps and, for example, the educational 
opportunities that are available in these camps. Other stories and 
information were received from people who have relatives elsewhere 
and got in contact with them via mobile phones. Such stories trigger 
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mobility among the children and youth, encouraging them to leave 
for Ethiopia.  
 
Upon arrival in Ethiopia, most children and youth want to have a 
mobile phone, even if these phones have limited or no functionality, 
partly due to the limited connectivity. Creative tricks are used to make 
use of the limited connectivity in the camp, making it possible to 
contact people outside the camp and to use the Internet. When 
people leave black hole societies in Eritrea, it seems that they become 
more attracted and attached to mobile phones and more eager to 
arrive in Europe or the United States of America.  
 
In relation to their reason for leaving, this research found that 
children and youth are leaving due to fear of recruitment into 
National Service, for educational opportunities outside Eritrea, and 
because of herd behaviour; as many left the country, social 
fragmentation led the children to follow parents, siblings or friends. 
Most of the children and youth in Hitsats said that they left Eritrea 
because their friends had already left or because of stories they had 
heard about life outside Eritrea.  
 
The theory of nudging, by Sunstein and Thaler (2008) sheds light on 
how people are influenced by other people. The concept of a black 
hole partly explains why children and youth are heading to Ethiopia, 
and Hitsats in particular, for digital connectivity. More extensive 
research needs to be conducted in order to elaborate on the concept 
of a black hole and herd behaviour, and how this can lead even young 
children to make drastic and dangerous life decisions. 
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Not a People’s Peace: Eritrean Refugees 
Fleeing from the Horn of African to Kenya 
 
Sophie Kamala Kuria & Merhawi Tesfatsion Araya 
 
Introduction 
The Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship signed by the 
governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2018 resulted in the 
reopening of two border 
points, Zalembessa and 
Burrie, on 11 September 
2018 (Eri-platform, 2018). 
For Eritreans, the peace 
process is an opportunity to 
demobilise and re-engage 
with the democratic process. 
The expectation is for greater 
participation and a move 
away from the current one-
party state. However, as 
comprehensive as the peace 
process appears, there are 
some areas of concern. So 
far, within Eritrea, there has 
been no indication that the 
Eritrean government intends 
to release political and 
religious prisoners, stop indefinite National Service, address the 
human rights situation, implement the Eritrean Constitution, or 
reinstate the National Assembly, which has not sat since 2002 (Irin 
News, 2002). Nor is there any indication that there will be freedom 
of speech and freedom of association any time soon. No steps have 
been taken by either the Eritrean government or the Ethiopian 
The Peace Agreement between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia of July 2018 seems to have 
had no impact on the number of people 
fleeing Eritrea, many of whom end up in 
Kenya. The main reason given by refugees 
for leaving Eritrea is family 
reunification; the lack of documentation 
means that they have to move illegally. In 
Kenya, Eritrean refugees face many 
challenges, including a lack of legal 
protection as refugees, which is aggravated 
by the lack of legal documents. When 
asked what is needed to stop the exodus 
from Eritrea, the majority state that 
changes at home are needed before it will 
be safe to live in Eritrea again. 
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government to reconcile the Eritrean opposition with the Eritrean 
government. This is in stark contrast to events in Ethiopia, where the 
government has released political prisoners and welcomed back home 
the Ethiopian opposition, which is preparing to participate in the 
2020 elections (Crisis Group, 2019). 
 
However, the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea has not 
stopped the flow of Eritrean refugees, who continue to flee the 
country (UNHCR, 2018). The reopening of these borders, and the 
fact that there is presently no border control, together with the 
rumour that the border would only be open for 10 days, resulted in a 
number of new arrivals of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia. According 
to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
the average number of new arrivals increased from 50 people per day 
to approximately 180 between 12 September to 13 October 2018 
(UNHCR, 2018). According to the UNHCR report, women and 
children under the age of 15 years make up 80% of the new arrivals. 
Although Ethiopia is presently the safest route for Eritrean refugees, 
because of the Eritrean government’s history of spying, harassing, 
kidnapping and disappearing its citizens, many no longer feel safe in 
Ethiopia and are moving south to Kenya, according to the interviews 
done by Makeda Saba with Eritrean activists in Ethiopia in August 
2018.18 Kenya currently hosts thousands of Eritrean migrants in 
Nairobi and Mombasa, as well as in the refugee camps of Kakuma, 
Isiolo, and Moyale (Amnesty International, 2017). 
Research question 
After the signing of the Peace Agreement between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia in July 2018, an increase in the number of Eritrean refugees 
seeking asylum in Kenya was noticed. Accordingly, it was decided to 
conduct a rapid assessment of new arrivals of Eritrean refugees in 
Kenya after the Eritrea-Ethiopia peace process to better understand 
 
18 Makeda Saba (author of Chapter 21 and co-author of Chapter 5 in this book) 
conducted these interviews in order to assess the situation in Ethiopia and how 
much it was changing. 
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what was happening with refugees at the time, especially in relation 
to how the peace process has impact on their decision to flee Eritrea.  
 
The main research question in this chapter is: Has the Peace Agreement 
between Eritrean and Ethiopia impacted on the number of Eritreans fleeing their 
country and what are the issues they face as refugees in Kenya? To answer this 
question, this chapter looks at the main reasons given by refugees for 
leaving Eritrea, the challenges they faced during their journey and in 
Kenya, any assistance they have received from the Government of 
Kenya and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and the 
solutions they propose to the problems they face. 
Methodology 
The rapid assessment was conducted as a sample survey of newly-
arrived Eritrean refugees assisted by the Eritrean Diaspora in East 
Africa (EDEA)19, in person and over the phone, from 5 October 2018 
to 13 December 2018. EDEA supports refugees in countries like 
Kenya (first asylum countries). As part of its activities, EDEA 
provides advice to refugees as to their options and rights in countries 
of first asylum like Kenya. 
 
The key objectives of the rapid assessment were to: 
 
• Document the rapidly growing number of Eritrean refugees 
newly arriving in Kenya, since the Eritrea/Ethiopia peace 
process 
• Find out where they are coming from (which locations in 
Ethiopia or directly from Eritrea) 
• Find out why they are moving 
• Identify the challenges they face 
 
19 This research was carried out by researchers from EDEA, a non-profit 
humanitarian organisation, founded in Kenya in 2014, whose mission is to provide 
support to the Eritrean community in East Africa. Its aim is to raise awareness 
about the rights of Eritreans in the diaspora. Its staff are individuals from different 
professional backgrounds who volunteer their time on a need basis. The authors of 
this chapter are employed by EDEA. 
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• Identify what assistance is being received by these refugees, 
and their perceptions of this assistance 
• Identify permanent solutions to the exodus of refugees from 
Eritrea 
 
The sample survey design considered all Eritrean migrants assisted by 
EDEA during the study period who were subsequently registered by 
UNHCR and evacuated to Nairobi, Isiolo, Kakuma or Moyale. The 
sample group for the interviews was selected from a group of over 
640 Eritrean refugees who had been trafficked or smuggled into 
Kenya through various means since the reopening of the 
Ethiopia/Eritrea border. Some respondents were referred by key 
contacts during their rescue; others were randomly selected from 
among people referred by families in Europe, Sudan, or other places 
who informed EDEA of their stranded relatives.  
 
This survey used telephone and face-to-face interviews in Nairobi, 
Isiolo and Moyale and Kakuma. Telephone interviews offer several 
advantages over face-to-face interviews. Firstly, they are perceived as 
providing a greater level of anonymity and privacy than face-to-face 
encounters (Carr & Worth, 2001; Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004). 
Secondly, they allow people to talk freely and openly, so long as the 
interviewer guarantees and promises the interviewee absolute 
anonymity and confidentiality. Thirdly, telephone interviews may also 
encourage an open and honest discussion about intimate, sensitive 
and personal subjects, such as physical and emotional abuse and 
inhumane acts (Opdenakker, 2006; Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004). 
Fourthly, shy personalities may not be comfortable with face-to-face 
interactions; telephone interviews exert decreased social pressure on 
participants and provide them with a shield (Vogl, 2013). The 
personality of the respondents to the survey and their preferred mode 
of interview were considered prior to the administration of the 
survey. Telephone interviews allowed EDEA to include refugees who 
were afraid of participating in a face-to-face interview for fear 




A questionnaire was developed to help guide the interview process. 
Most of the refugees could only speak Tigrinya and some English. 
The questionnaire was, therefore, transcribed into Tigrinya to allow 
for the smooth flow of conversations. The responses to the survey 
questionnaires were first summarised into tabular format (comma 
separate files), encode into factor variables, and subsequently 
analysed. R programming was used for exploratory data analysis and 
visualisation.  
Profile of respondents 
A total of 80 Eritrean refugees took part in the survey: 20 from 
Nairobi (25%), 10 from Isiolo (12.5%), 30 from Kakuma (37.5%), 
and 20 from Moyale 20 (25%). The respondents consisted of 59 
women (56 married; 3 single) and 21 men (3 married; 18 single). There 
are significantly more female refugees from Eritrea than male 
refugees; therefore, more women than men were selected for this 
study to reflect this fact.  
 
The ages of the respondents to the survey are given in Figure 7.1. 
Most of the participants were aged between 18 to 25 years. Age 






Figure 7.1. Age of respondents to survey 
Number of newly-arrived Eritrean refugees in Kenya  
During the study period (5 October to 13 December 2018), a total of 
647 newly-arrived Eritrean refugees were recorded by EDEA (upon 
rescue and assistance from EDEA, the refugees were registered and 
transferred by UNHCR to designated refugee camps or holding areas 
in Nairobi, Isiolo, Kakuma and Moyale). Women represented a 
significant proportion of all refugees on a month-to-month basis 
relative to men and children (Figure 7.2). The gender of the children 
was not considered. On average, the arrival of men and children was 
stable in October and November, with inflows of about 62 and 28 
per month, respectively. Nonetheless, the inflow of these groups in 
December might have been higher, as the study only collected figures 































Figure 7.2. Number of Eritrean refugees arriving in Kenya in October, November and 
December 2018, disaggregated by male, female and children  
Source: Authors’ dataset 
 
Figure 7.3. Arrival date of Eritrean refugees, October to December 2018 


























































































































































































































































Figure 7.3 shows the arrival date of Eritrean refugees assisted by 
EDEA within the study period. The largest number of refugees 
arrived in October (313). The ages of the migrants ranged from 6 
months to 43 years. 
 
There is no clear pattern in the arrival of Eritrean refugees during the 
study period (Figure 7.3). However, the arrivals into Kenya were 
significantly higher in October (313 migrants) compared to 
November (179 migrants) of the same year. The number of migrants 
recorded for the period 1 to 13 December 2018 was 153; it is, 
therefore, plausible that the total for December may exceed that of 
November 2018, if the trend continued.  
Departure locations  
Over 99% of the Eritrean refugees into Kenya used the Moyale 
border point as the main entry point, with the exception of a deportee 
from Israel who was recorded at Malaba/Kampala, Uganda. The 
majority of refugees were originally domiciled in Eritrea. In particular, 
about 50% (319 migrants) explicitly stated that they had come directly 
from Eritrea, while the other 50% said that they came from refugee 
camps in Ethiopia with the key departure points being Hixax and 
Shimelba. 
Reasons for fleeing 
When asked why they came to Kenya, many respondents indicated 
that they knew someone in Nairobi or were joining family members 
or friends. Two main factors emerged from the survey regarding 
reasons for leaving Eritrea: family re-unification; lack of 
documentation in their home-country Eritrea; and the reopening of 




Figure 7.4. Factors motivating migration from Eritrea 
Source: Authors’ dataset 
 
The other reasons that prompted migration included insecurity, lack 
of existence of refugee organisations, poor governance, lack of peace 
in Eritrea, no peace process between Eritrea and her neighbours, or 
fear that the peace initiative between Ethiopia and Eritrea will be 
short-lived. 
 
EDEA has come to learn that most Eritreans use Kenya as a transit 
route to reunite with their families in Europe. However, there are 
some who opt to settle in Uganda, claiming that life in Uganda is 
much cheaper than Kenya. 
Challenges faced by Eritrean refugees transiting to Kenya 
Since the reopening of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border, EDEA has 
received many calls from Eritreans in police stations and holding 
areas. The refugees reported having received contradictory 
information from smugglers, police, and EDEA. For example, 
smugglers often demand money (USD 1,600–4,000) for facilitating 
refugees’ journeys, claiming that this is the only way refugees can 
move on, but EDEA advises them not to pay money and wait for 




























help from UNHCR. The refugees face many challenges. One of the 
main challenges faced by Eritrean refugees is the absence of legal 
protection of their rights as refugees, as provided under the Geneva 
Convention of 1951 and its Protocol of 1956. This matter is 
aggravated by the lack of valid travel documents for refugees, which 
would enable them to move about more freely, earn a living, and 
contribute productively to the host country. 
 
In addition, refugees said that despite completing the family 
reunification process to a third country (i.e., Ethiopia), they are unable 
to leave Eritrea without an exit visa and, therefore, have been forced 
to leave Eritrea illegally. Once in Ethiopia, they are not able to obtain 
passports and other travel documents from the Eritrean Embassy in 
Ethiopia. In fact, EDEA has information that consular services, such 
as obtaining passports, are closed to new arrivals in Sudan 
(Khartoum), Ethiopia (Addis Ababa) and Kenya (Nairobi). 
 
The main reason for the lack of travel and identification documents 
among Eritrean refugees is the complex issuing process for travel 
documents by the Eritrean government. In particular, the 
government does not allow youth and underage children to have 
travel documents. In addition, there is a long waiting period (often 
two to four years) demanded by UN and refugee-hosting countries in 
East Africa prior to issuing refugee/alien identification documents 
(UN Human Rights Council, 2016). 
 
Eritrean refugees in East Africa lack support, knowledge of their 
rights as refugees under international conventions, and access to 
protection and legal advice. As mentioned by Horwood and Hooper 
(2016), such difficulties often mean that they are not able to obtain 
relevant documents for many years, leaving them vulnerable to police 
harassment and hindering their free movement to earn a living, 
support their families, and contribute productively to the host 
country. As a consequence, they remain vulnerable and many opt to 
continue on to Europe, despite the risk of physical abuse, rape, 




Another challenge is the changes to the Kenyan immigration policies 
on refugees, which include the closure of some refugee camps and 
disbandment of the Department of Refugee Affairs and the creation 
of the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (Amnesty International, 2017). 
These changes were made in response to the various terrorist attacks 
in Kenya over the years. With the massive influx of refugees from 
other parts of Africa to Kenya, this has resulted in a long process of 
recognition for refugees. Refugees need to go through a lengthy 
process to get refugees status and be considered legal residents. 
However, having a refugee status card does not guarantee 
employment. Kenya does not have a clear policy on refugee 
employment and other benefits. In comparison, in 2006, Uganda 
passed the Refugees Act, which officially allows refugees to settle in 
Kampala and other urban areas. However, if they are living in urban 
areas, they must forgo humanitarian assistance and, therefore, be able 
to provide for themselves. While some self-settled urban refugees are 
able to access education and employment opportunities, many end up 
living in slums with the Ugandan urban poor (Pavanello, Elhawary & 
Pantuliano, 2010). 
 
The following excerpts are from telephone calls received by EDEA 
from Eritrean refugees in police stations and holding areas, and 
describe the challenges faced by the respondents. 
Respondent 1 
Migrants travel long distances to seek asylum in other countries and 
face many challenges in the course of their journey. Respondent 1 had 
this to say about the challenges faced: 
 
I was among the migrants who paid money to be smuggled from Ethiopia to Moyale-
Kenya to seek asylum. Come the day, we were led by them [the smugglers] and the 
worst part of the journey we trekked. Which to me was not as expected, because I 
thought they were to offer transport. Unfortunately, each journey had its challenges, 
that day I slipped and I fell over a bridge. I survived, but with an injury to my back. 
I have not received any medication. (Respondent 1, interview, face-to-face, 




Asylum seekers often suffer mistreatment from smugglers and others. 
Respondent 2 shared the following: 
 
I am a mother of four children. We were put in a safe house at a village in Moyale 
as we waited for the smugglers to transport us to Nairobi. After a while, one of them 
came and led us to the place where we were to be picked up by a vehicle. Reaching 
there, they started quarrelling that I had children and the road was not good for them. 
So they left us with other migrants. We got robbed and ran to the nearest police 
station to seek help. My children got sick at the station. (Respondent 2, 
interview, face-to-face, Isiolo, 29 November 2018) 
Respondent 3 
We surrendered ourselves to Wajir police station after the smugglers dumped us. At 
that time we were 31 in number including men, women and children. We lived under 
poor conditions in terms of hygiene. This led to a diarrhoea outbreak which affected 
most of us. (Respondent 3, interview, face-to-face, Nairobi, 2 December 
2018) 
Respondent 4 
Despite being under the protection of the Refugee Affairs Secretariat, 
Kenya and UNHCR, the asylum seekers still feel insecure and 
threatened by human traffickers, as this respondent narrated:  
 
Refugee Affairs Secretariat had sent us from Maralal to Nairobi-Shauri Moyo for 
registration as legal asylum seekers. After going through the process we were locked 
in Department of Refugee Affairs until 7:15 pm to be transported to the refugee 
camp. As we waited smugglers came from nowhere and kidnapped 10 people out of 
22. Fortunately, the victims were rescued by the Kenyan Police. (Respondent 4, 
interview, face-to-face, Nairobi, 23 November 2018) 
Respondent 5 
On 23 November 2018, there was a group of 22 Eritrean asylum 
seekers, who, pursuant to a court order, were transferred from Moyale 
to Nairobi to have their documents processed by the Department of 
Refugee Affairs. When it was time to leave, they reported that there 
were two vehicles waiting to transport them with men in military 
uniforms. These men forced the asylum seekers into their vehicles 
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and demanding to be paid USD 4,000, stating that the fee was for the 
court order and transportation. They managed to force 10 people into 
the vehicles and the others escaped: 
 
After the registration at Nairobi-Shauri Moyo, we were taken to Kangemi, which 
is the transit point to Kakuma refugee camp, but we were kidnapped by Eritrean 
human traffickers on our way and taken to a place that we did not know. They 
wanted a ransom of [USD] 1,600 dollars which we did not have. (Respondent 
5, interview, face-to-face, Nairobi, 1 December 2018) 
Respondent 6 
One of the Eritrean freedom fighters, who had been serving the 
regime till recently shared the following experience that he faced in 
Eritrea and on the way to Kenya: 
 
I am a 55-year old Eritrean freedom fighter who actively participated to liberate my 
country from Ethiopia. I suffered a lot of injuries during the period that I fought. 
We were able to liberate our country, but we felt that the government failed us because 
we had hope that we could work freely, our children would receive quality education, 
but that was not the case. Systematically we were subjected again to another border 
conflict with Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000. Because of this we could not be released 
by the government from the military. This war affected the development of the country 
in terms of infrastructure, education, culturally etc.  
 
After the end of this war I had hoped to go back to my normal civilian life, but the 
government refused to release us. This led to my wife fleeing the country to Europe 
and leaving our three children behind. You can imagine the challenges I had to go 
through as a single parent without work. So I decided to run from my country to 
Kenya seeking asylum.  
 
I faced a lot of difficulties in the course of my journey to Kenya in the hands of human 
smugglers. I was also intimidated by the police. Finally, I and my children managed 
to be registered under UNHCR and the Kenyan government. (Respondent 6, 




Life in Eritrea can be described as slavery in the sense that everyone 
who works there is either getting nothing or very little. Here is what 
an Eritrean woman who served in the National Service and as a 
teacher had to say: 
 
I am a teacher by profession and also completed the obligatory National Service where 
I was getting paid peanuts. Surely, how can you be given less than USD 1 a day to 
survive? That is like working for free. After the National Service I got married to 
my husband in a lavish wedding in my country. We did not enjoy our married life 
after the wedding, because my husband fled to the USA to avoid the indefinite 
unlimited obligatory National Service. After he left I went through many problems 
including discrimination from government school administrators and loneliness. So I 
later on decided to flee from Eritrea via Sudan. Unfortunately I was caught by 
government officials. Since then I have been transferring from one detention centre to 
another. 
 
I was fined 50,000 Eritrean nakfa (USD 3,333)20 and posted back to the school 
that I was teaching at. Fortunately the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea was 
officially opened after the peace deal. I took advantage of that free movement and ran 
away via Ethiopia to Kenya. I was robbed by militias in Moyale-Kenya. Then taken 
to a police cell that was uninhabitable. I contracted pneumonia due to cold, but later 
on I was flown to Kakuma refugee camp for registration. (Respondent 7, 
interview, face-to-face, Kakuma, 16 October 2018) 
Respondent 8 
Lack of stability in any country affects everyone regardless of age or 
gender. The elderly and children are the most vulnerable part; here is 
what an unaccompanied child had to say: 
 
I was left alone in Eritrea without anybody to take care of me after my mother fled 
to Uganda. I am only 9 years old and during the border peace deal I was brave 
enough to cross to Ethiopia with the traders. Later we went to Kenya where we got 
arrested. We stayed in a police cell; I got sick from pneumonia. Later I was then 
taken to Kakuma where the UNHCR and the Kenyan government are trying to 
 
20 Official exchange rate 1 USD = 15 ERN (nakfa) 
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provide me with proper documentation to travel to Uganda and meet my mother. 
(Respondent 8, interview, face-to-face, Kakuma, 16 October 2018) 
Respondent 9 
Education is crucial to society to achieve development and prosperity. 
A graduate student in Eritrea was given a scholarship to pursue 
further education in Germany. Unfortunately, the government would 
not issue him with valid documentation to go to abroad. This resulted 
in him leaving Eritrea illegally. Here is what he had to say: 
 
I am a graduate student from Eritrea Halhale Business College and I got a 
scholarship to study in Germany. The government denied me a passport so that I 
could go and study. Luckily enough, the border of Eritrea-Ethiopia was opened and 
I fled my home country. Despite all the assistance from the Kenyan government and 
UNHCR in terms of the provision of proper documentation, I was victimised by the 
human traffickers, robbed by the militias, fell sick in the prison and was delayed to 
attend my studies on time. (Respondent 9, interview, face-to-face, Moyale, 
12 October 2018) 
 
Figure 7.5. Word cloud showing the challenges faced by Eritrean refugees  
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Figure 7.5 provides a graphic illustration of the problems encountered 
by Eritrean refugees in the form of a ‘word cloud’. The size of the 
font indicates the seriousness of the challenges faced. For example, 
the three most significant problems encountered by refugees were 
robbery, sickness and lack of accommodation, in that order. 
Government and non-government assistance  
When asked if they had received any assistance from the Kenyan 
government or NGOs, the respondents reported having received 
accommodation, transportation, clothing, medication and 




Figure 7.6. Assistance provided by the government and NGOs to Eritrean refugees 
Source: Authors’ dataset 
 
Refugees were also asked if they found the assistance relevant to their 
needs; 90% of respondents answered ‘no’. Their suggestions for 
assistance included provision of adequate shelter, health care and 
protection; employment; social and political inclusion; and 































When asked how they would improve the assistance provided by the 
government and NGOs, the main suggestion from respondents was 
to respond faster (Figure 7.7).  
 
 
Figure 7.7. Suggested improvements to the assistance provided by the Kenyan 
government and NGOs 
Source: Authors’ dataset 
Solutions to refugee problems  
The respondents were asked what they believed would be a 
permanent solution to the exodus of refugees from Eritrea. Most 
(86%) said that there needed to be a change of regime in Eritrea for 
refugees to stop fleeing. Other solutions included good governance 
and freedom of movement, an end to the psychological warfare by 
the state against the citizens and democracy, as well as freedom of 










































Figure 7.8. Suggested solutions to the exodus of refugees from Eritrea 
Source: Authors’ dataset 
Conclusion and recommendations 
The results of the study indicate that the peace process between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia has had no impact on the exodus of Eritreans 
from the country. Many Eritrean refugees continue to come to Kenya 
as they consider it a safe place in which to settle. Some come to seek 
resettlement in Western countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia 
and Europe, as most of these embassies are not present in Eritrea to 
help provide visas. In addition, the largest branch of the UNHCR 
office is based in Nairobi. This has resulted in a massive influx of 
Eritrean refugees to Kenya, even after the Eritrea-Ethiopia peace 
process.  
 
This study shows the suffering that asylum seekers go through when 
they arrive in Kenya. They are not certain as to whether the 
information they are given is correct, be it from the smugglers, police 
or EDEA. They do not trust anyone. During the study period (5 
October to 13 December 2018) 647 calls for assistance were received 
by EDEA from newly-arrived Eritrean refugees. Women represented 
the highest number of calls (74%). Most of the refugees reported 
coming directly from Eritrea, via the border crossing at Moyale, 
although some also reported coming from refugee camps in Ethiopia. 









































protection of their rights as refugees. This was aggravated by the lack 
of legal documents from Eritrea (passport, exit visa) and the inability 
to obtain such documents from the Eritrean Embassy in Ethiopia. In 
addition, Kenya does not have a refugee policy, so they were unable 
to obtain legal documents evidencing their refugee status or allowing 
them to work in Kenya, leaving them without a way to earn a living.  
 
In relation to the assistance provided by Kenyan government agencies 
and NGOs, 90% of refugees said that this assistance was not relevant 
to their needs. In addition, they complained of considerable delays in 
the response when seeking help from organisations such as UNHCR 
and the Department of Refugee Affairs. These delays exacerbated the 
poor conditions they found themselves in and increased their chances 
of falling into the hands of smugglers and being taken advantage of 
because of their vulnerable and desperate state. When asked about 
their views on a permanent solution to the exodus of refugees from 
Eritrea, the respondents said that a regime change was necessary.  
 
Based on these findings, EDEA makes the following 
recommendations: 
 
• Funding for refugee service providers (such as government 
agencies, NGOs and UNHCR) should be increased to 
strengthen their services and enable them to provide timely 
support to refugees in all areas so that the refugees are assisted 
when they arrive.  
• Humanitarian programmes should focus on enabling refugees 
to secure job opportunities and training refugees on how to 
generate income by taking advantage of existing skills and 
learning new ones. 
• Refugees should be informed of their rights and enabled to 




Limitations of the study 
The main limitation on this study was the time frame in which it was 
implemented. The study was conducted over a 70-day period from 5 
October to 13 December 2018. It also pertains only to Eritrean 
refugees. Therefore, the findings cannot be generalised to other 
refugees of non-Eritrean origin who may have arrived during the 
study period. A longer time period would be needed to draw any 
conclusions about Eritrean refugees in Kenya in general.  
 
Resources posed another limitation. The transcription of the survey 
responses from Tigrinya to English was time consuming and the 
interview and transcription process was tasked to the same limited 
human resource available at EDEA for receiving, assisting and co-
coordinating incoming calls from refugees in multiple locations in 
Kenya. 
 
Another limitation was the fact that there was no set time for the 
interviews. EDEA receives calls directly from refugees/asylum 
seekers and relatives living abroad seeking help. Based on these calls, 
EDEA took the opportunity to interview the respondents. The calls 
would give EDEA an indication of the location in which the refugee 
arrived, but it is not known how the respondents obtained the contact 
information for EDEA. Sometimes the respondents were not sure 
about disclosing information because of fear of being spied on.  
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Israel’s ‘Voluntary’ Return Policy to Expel Refugees: 
The Illusion of Choice 
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“We have expelled about 20,000 and now the mission is to get the rest out.” 
Prime Minister Netanyahu, 3 January 2018 (Heller, 2018) 
Introduction 
Many African asylum seekers, almost exclusively from Eritrea and 
Sudan, arrived in Israel through the Egypt-Israel border in the Sinai 
Peninsula between 2006 and 
2013. Sudanese refugees 
mainly fled following the 
Mustafa Mahmoud Square 
massacre in December 2005 
(Whitaker, 2005); Eritrean 
refugees arrived later, as the 
refugee and trafficking 
routes consolidated around 
2007/08. The closure of the 
Libyan route and the 
strengthening of the 
kidnapping and trafficking 
networks resulted in the 
arrival of many Eritrean 
refugees. Many of these 
refugees had suffered 
extreme conditions and 
torture on route and in the 
torture camps in the Sinai 
(Aid Organization for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Israel, 2014, 
p. 3). In mid-2012, Israel constructed a fence along its border with 
Under Israel’s Anti-Infiltration Law, 
more than 2,000 people have been 
deported to Eritrea, 4,500 to Sudan, 
and 5,400 to Rwanda and Uganda. 
Although ‘true consent’ is required under 
Israeli law, the voluntary nature of such 
returns is dubious, with deportees being 
given a choice between indefinite detention 
and deportation. The deportees leaving in 
this way risk imprisonment, slavery and 
persecution in their countries of origin or 
third countries. Some flee again, often 
through Sudan, Libya and the 
Mediterranean Sea to Europe, perilous 
journeys that are driven by lack of choice 




Egypt, which dramatically reduced entries by 2013 and stopped them 
completely by the end of 2016. In total, 64,736 asylum seekers have 
crossed to Israel through the Sinai since 2005. As of January 2019, 
there were 33,627 African asylum seekers in Israel, consisting of 
24,007 Eritrean and 6,594 Sudanese (Population, Immigration and 
Border Authority, 2019). Eritreans and Sudanese make up the vast 
majority of the group derogatorily referred to as ‘infiltrators’ under 
Israeli legislation. In a bid to rid itself to what it perceived as a 
problem, the Israeli government set up a scheme for what it called 
‘voluntary’ repatriation. To what extent this policy is indeed 
‘voluntary’ and what its implementation means in the lives of the 
refugees is researched in this study. 
The situation in Israel 
Although Israel has signed and ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
it has not embedded it in its national legislation and, at the time of 
writing this chapter, Israel has no refugee law. In the absence of such 
a law, the government, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior 
Affairs enjoy few legal restrictions on determining who is a refugee, 
how the asylum system is built and functions, the rights and 
obligations of refugees, and the status individuals will hold until their 
application is ruled upon. Since the late 2000s, the same Prime 
Minister has been in office in Israel, with similar governments, and 
their attitude toward asylum seekers has been consistent – to get rid 
of them by different mechanisms of deportation (Heller, 2018). The 
first deportation was as early as 2007 under the so-called ‘Hot 
Returns’ policy, under which asylum seekers were pushed back at the 
Israel-Egypt border into the arms of the Egyptian army and Bedouin 
smugglers (Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 2008, p. 49). After this 
policy was renounced, Israel built its border fence, which effectively 
stopped the entry of new refugees. The focus then shifted to the 
population already in Israel. A double-headed approach was put in 
place: first, to make the daily lives of refugees impossible by imposing 
different sanctions, including incarceration under an amendment to 
the Anti-Infiltration Law, which was introduced in 2011, and, second, 
to pressure them to leave Israel under the Voluntary Return 
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mechanism introduced in 2012. The former (indefinite or prolonged 
detention) was used to encourage the latter (voluntary return).  
 
The sanctions Israel has put in place to push the asylum seekers out 
include geographic restrictions; detention for a long duration; denial 
of access to a functioning asylum system; absence of social care or 
any integration scheme; denial of any permanent or long-term visa; 
requirement to renew ‘conditional release visa’ every 1–3 months 
through a humiliating and time consuming process; denial of a work 
permit; and extreme taxation (Rozen, 2014; Birger, Shoham & 
Bolzman, 2018). These measures have led to the removal of more 
than 30,000 persons since 2013 (Population, Immigration and Border 
Authority, 2019).  
 
Severely traumatised survivors of torture camps in Sinai, who have 
survived torture and human trafficking for ransom, succumb more 
easily to pressure from immigration officials to leave the country. 
These survivors owe money to members of their family or 
community who paid their ransom for release from the torture camps 
and cannot afford to stop working. It is, therefore, reasonable to 
assume that since 2013, there are numerous survivors, who should 
have been protected in Israel under Israeli law and international law, 
are among those who left ‘voluntarily’ to third countries (Drori 
Avraham, Rozen & Avigal, 2015; Rozen, 2015; Rozen & Michaeli, 
2015). 
 
Current and accurate information regarding those removed from 
Israel is scarce. Following a freedom of information request in 2015, 
the Ministry of Interior reported that 4,608 Sudanese were deported 
to Sudan, 1,059 Eritreans to Eritrea, and over 4,200 asylum seekers 
to third countries up until August 2015 (Ziv, 2015). Recent data 
published by the Population, Immigration and Border Authority 
reveals that, between 2015 and 2018, 2,228 Eritreans and Sudanese 
were deported to their home countries, 3,376 were deported to third 
countries (Rwanda and Uganda), and 6,049 left to other, mostly 
western, countries. Among the rest of the uncounted deportees from 
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Israel are also around 1,500 South Sudanese who were deported to 
South Sudan in 2012 (cited in Bras, 2018). 
 
This research focuses on Israel’s Voluntary Return mechanism, which 
has been in place since 2012, and asks questions about its 
‘voluntariness’ from a legal perspective. The research is based on the 
Israeli Supreme Court's criteria for voluntary consent, as set out in 
the case Elmasgad v. Minister of Interior, also known in legal terms as 
‘truthful consent’, namely, that the consent must be ‘free’ and 
‘knowledgeable’ (Supreme Court of Israel, 2017, para 120). Based on 
the testimonies of deportees gathered for this research we argue that 
under the sanctions Israel put in place since 2012, these two criteria 
could not have been met. All of the interviews were conducted by the 
authors,21 while additional information was gathered from 
government resources, the media, non-governmental organisations 
(NGO) reports, academic research and the refugee community in 
Israel and abroad. Accordingly, it answers the following research 
question: Is Israel’s Voluntary Return mechanism truly voluntary in practice, 
or are refugees and migrants being pushed out, and what is the situation of 
deportees after they have been deported to countries of origin and third countries? 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: first, we contest the concept of 
‘free consent’ based on the testimonies of those deportation from 
incarceration, and describe the main mechanism used to push 
refugees out of Israel. Israel’s secret third-country agreements are 
described next, along with the promises made to the refugees before 
deportation to dispute the existence of ‘knowledgeable consent’. This 
is followed by a description of the reality for refugees after 
 
21 More than 20 refugees from Eritrea and Sudan who were deported to Rwanda 
and Uganda were interviewed in person by Sigal Kook Avivi and Yael Agur Orgal 
in Uganda in October 2016 and the interviews documented on film. Further 
interviews were conducted with NGOs and UNHCR officials. Several interviews 
with refugees were carried out in person in the Netherlands by Gilad Liberman in 
July 2017. More than 10 refugees were interviewed in person in Switzerland and 2 
in Germany by Sigal Kook Avivi and Gilad Liberman in October 2017. Several of 
those interviews were documented on film and several written. Further interviews 
were conducted over the phone with refugees in Europe, Uganda and Egypt, and 
notes taken. One refugee sent a recorded audio testimony using an online 
messaging system. All interviews were conducted in either Hebrew or English. 
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deportation in their countries of origin and in third countries, Rwanda 
and Uganda. The consequences of deportation are briefly described, 
before the conclusions are presented.  
Imprisonment – The illusion of choice 
For the time being, I plan to lock them up. This I can do without anyone's 
authorization. I am doing it for the good of the State of Israel... I have asked the 
Treasury for a budget increase to build more detention facilities, and until I can 
deport them I'll lock them up to make their lives miserable.  
(Eli Yishai, Minister of Interior, cited in Efraim, 2012) 
 
Before the fence along Israel’s border with Egypt was constructed in 
the Sinai in 2012, virtually stopping the arrival of African refugees, all 
refugees who entered Israel were held in detention for anything 
ranging from hours to years, under the Law of Entry. The Third 
Amendment to the Anti-Infiltration Law, which came into force in 
2012, enabled the detention of new persons arriving through the Sinai 
border for a minimum of three years. By the end of 2013, the law was 
amended again allowing refugees who were already in Israel to be 
'summoned' to detention (Drori-Avraham, Rozen, & Avigal, 2015).  
 
The incarceration of refugees was coupled with a mechanism for their 
‘voluntary’ return – since the end of 2012 from Saharonim 
Penitentiary and since December 2013 from Holot Facility. This 
mechanism is based an individual ‘agreeing’ to leave Israel, distancing 
the procedure from forceful deportation, according to the 
Government of Israel. However, under Israeli law, in order for there 
to be true consent there must be ‘free consent’, which means: 
“consent that reflects the true and free will of a person. Free consent 
can occur only where a person is sovereign to make a knowledgeable 
and aware decision out of a few choosable options” (Supreme Court 
of Israel, 2017, para. 120).  
 
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that if a person is faced with 
two options – leaving Israel or being imprisoned – there is no element 
of free consent, because imprisonment cannot be considered a 
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‘choosable’ options (Supreme Court of Israel, 2017, para. 121). As 
seen in the testimonies of people deported, many were forced to make 
this exact choice. Under the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 
1991), social pressure in the form of motivation to comply with 
immigration officers, who have broad control over the person’s fate, 
both in prison and outside; motivation to avoid mistreatment and the 
fate of indefinite or prolonged imprisonment; and expected 
opportunity in the form of future safety from persecution in the new 
country, all render the person’s attitude irrelevant – these factors 
negate the element of choice. 
Saharonim 
Agreement to return to Eritrea under a jail ultimatum 
cannot be considered voluntary by any criterion. 
(UNHCR to Haaretz newspaper, cited in  
Schwartz & Hetfield, 2013) 
 
Saharonim Penitentiary is located in the Israeli desert, just a few 
kilometres from the Egypt-Israel border and is equipped with 
immigration personnel. Detainees in Saharonim are locked inside the 
facility 24-hours a day and locked in their cells for a variable number 
of hours, ranging from only at night up to 22 hours a day. They are 
not allowed to have phones and do not receive visits, except from 
close family, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) personnel, lawyers and volunteers from the Hotline for 
Refugees and Migrants (Rozen, 2012, pp. 6–8). The Third 
Amendment to the Anti-Infiltration Law, which enabled their 
detention, was finally abolished on September 2013 after an appeal 
was lodged with the Israeli High Court of Justice in October 2012. As 
an intermediary order was not accepted, until the amendment was 
abolished it was applied to newly-arriving asylum seekers, who were 
imprisoned in Saharonim for up to two years, until being moved to 
Holot (Kovaliyov-Livi & Rozen, 2014). 
 
According to Israel’s Population, Immigration and Border Authority, 
1,687 Sudanese and 268 Eritreans left Israel in 2013 (Population, 
Immigration and Border Authority, 2014, table 4). The vast majority 
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of them are assumed to have been refouled to their country of origin, 
as deportation to a third country only started in 2014 and was not 
systematised at that time. Leaving to other (mostly Western) countries 
was also rare. According to the Hotline for Refugees and Migrants 
Report from November 2013, and based on information provided by 
the Population, Immigration and Border Authority to a Knesset 
committee, more than 800 Sudanese and at least 14 Eritreans have 
been deported to their country of origin from detention in Israel until 
2013 (Human Rights Watch & Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 
2013). 
 
BG,22 a refugee from Darfur, entered Israel in 2012 and was 
immediately incarcerated in Saharonim. There, he witnessed people 
breaking due to the long imprisonment and agreeing to leave Israel. 
He reported that in January 2013, after being imprisoned for a long 
time, the detainees decided to go on a hunger strike. Immigration 
officials tried to convince the detainees to end the strike, and when 
that failed, they called the police: 
[On] 5 May 2013, when the police were entering Saharonim, agaf [wing] 7, I saw 
the violence of the police of Israel. They beat us like dogs. They beat us and put 
handcuffs, some were injured, some vomiting, it was like we were animals in the 
forest, some even got out naked. …They came with dogs, handcuffs, all that… It 
was after this that people left. The government beat us like we are not human beings. 
…It was horrible. …it was the first time I had handcuffs in my life, and a lot of 
people were like me. And you say, oh my God, we have to get back. Everyone has 
his own problems, from my point of view, that made a lot of people go back. …They 
put pressure, pressure, pressure and they went back [to their home countries]. People 
said “no, we waited for so long, we are fed up, we would like to get freedom, we 
cannot stay anymore”. (BG, interview with Gilad Liberman, by phone, 
2018) 
Many months of struggle later, BG decided he could not stand the 
pressure in the Israeli prison anymore and that it was better to risk his 
 
22 All names of interviewers have been anonymised for their safety, as some are still 
in vulnerable situations. 
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life by going back to Sudan. He was promised by the immigration 
authorities that he would be safe, but the reality was different: 
 
When I got out of the plane, there is a connection between the Government of Israel 
to the Government of Sudan. When we just arrived, around 20 persons, they took 
our passports. The National Security took our passport and they put us in a big car, 
like a bus. They took us to the office of the National Congress Party. They asked 
us a lot of questions, like where you are coming from. At first we tried to say Turkey, 
but they knew exactly where we came from, because they have connections with the 
Government of Israel… When we were coming from Ben-Gurion airport, there were 
some people, Israelis, who were joining us until Turkey. I'm sure there was a connect, 
because when we arrived, there were other people, but they knew us, the names. They 
had a list and they knew who came from Israel. You can't deny it. They know every 
single detail. 
 
All of us they took to prison, but I spent one month and when I got out other people 
stayed in prison. They did not release us at one time. I was very lucky. I was one of 
the first ones out. During the first 30 days [in prison] they come to insult you, they 
tell you “you are from Darfur and you join the rebel group, and why you came to 
Israel, and you know in the passport we can't go to Israel”. They put water on you. 
They try to force you to talk. [They ask questions like] what do you know about 
Israel and how did you get there… (BG, interview with Gilad Liberman, by 
phone, 2018) 
 
MH entered Israel in June 2012 and was imprisoned in Saharonim 
under the Third Amendment to the Anti-Infiltration Law. He spent 
a year and a half there, until he was moved to Holot under the Fourth 
Amendment, which was passed in December 2013. He never left 
Israel, but witnessed many of his community members break under 
the pressure to leave: 
 
I personally knew over a 130 people who were deported from Saharonim, all of them 
Sudanese. Almost all of them were deported to Sudan, via Jordan or Turkey. The 
first ones deported that I remember, in December 2012 or January 2013, were a 
group of 30 Sudanese. The authorities in prison put a lot of pressure on them to 
leave – they shouted and cursed. They said you can either spend a life in prison in 
Israel or leave to another place. The pressure was too much for anyone. I am not even 
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sure that Israel told them they will go back to Khartoum. Maybe some of them 
believed they will leave to an Arab country. The second group was in January 2013, 
they were over 100 people. The immigration authority then said that if we won't 
leave they will take us to a worse prison. They said "now you have the chance to leave 
the prison and go back to your country, but later you won't have that option to leave 
and you will be stuck in prison for the rest of your life". They always lied to us. 
Always. 
The way they put pressure on people was: call you every week to the office of the 
immigration official and conduct an interview where they said you have a way to go 
out of the prison, or stay in prison for life. They cursed a lot, making fun of our 
situation, stating that we were ‘not men’ for leaving our country, that we were worth 
nothing because we ran away from our families. They always found the small things 
that really make a person upset and used them. The conditions of imprisonment 
also made us despair. Every three days or week they would change our prison cell 
and move us from one place in prison to another. It was during the winter, and we 
were in tents. Everything always was cold and wet. We tried to put fabric around 
the bed to keep in the heat, but they said it was not allowed. Imagine yourself in 
the winter in the desert, every hour of every day outside in the cold. They changed 
our places so much that we did not even organise our things. Everything was 
packed and we could not have any stability – we were always ready to move again. 
I am sure it was all used to make us suffer and despair and leave Israel. (MH, 
interview with Yael Agur Orgal, face-to-face, Jerusalem, January 2018) 
Holot 
The indefinite detention of asylum seekers in Holot detention centre 
started on 13 December 2013 under the Fourth Amendment to the 
Anti-Infiltration Law, which was enacted three days earlier. This was 
after completion of the fence on the Egypt-Israeli border and the 
number of new arrivals had dropped to virtually none. The Fourth 
Amendment laid the foundation for the indefinite detention of 
asylum seekers already in the country at an ‘open’ detention centre. 
Holot is located in the Negev desert, more than 50 kilometres from 
the nearest Israeli city, Be’er Sheva. It is on the other side of the road 
from Saharonim Penitentiary, where detainees in Holot were 
sometimes transferred as a punitive measure. Detainees in Holot were 
barred from working, they were locked in their wing (28 containers 
of 10 persons each) at night time, from 10 pm to 6 am, and had to 
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sign-in 3 times a day. The rest of the time they were allowed to stroll 
in the nearby desert (Guthmann, 2018). Holot was closed in March 
2018, in conjunction with the launch of the new forced deportation 
policy by the Government of Israeli (Zur, 2018).  
 
Holot had the capacity to hold 3,300 persons in containers with a 
small cell space per detainee. The criteria for being 'summoned' to 
Holot has changed over the years. Initially, it was duration of stay in 
Israel, and those who had been in Israel the longest were the first to 
be detained. This policy mainly targeted the Sudanese population. 
However, that emphasis shifted as the population of Sudanese 
refugees was reduced by deportation (Rozen, 2014, p. 4). From 
December 2013 to September 2014, Holot was the main tool used to 
coerce people to leave Israel. Detention at Holot at this time was 
indefinite, and the population detained and threatened were all (single 
men) Eritrean and Sudanese asylum seekers, not only newcomers. 
 
Confronted with prolonged or indefinite detention many refugees 
accepted deportation. After five years in Israel, TGS was 'summoned' 
to Holot. He described that moment and the fear of the mental effects 
that imprisonment would have on him, as the reason he agreed to 
leave Israel: 
 
I was in Israel for 5 years and several months, I had a ‘conditional release’ visa, 
which I renewed every 3 months. Suddenly one day they wrote there that I have to 
enter Holot within one month [for an indefinite time]. I did not want to enter Holot; 
Holot is a prison, also it made me stressed to be in prison. I was 5 years in Tel-
Aviv, and also to return to prison, it's hard for me. So, it is better, I've decided, to 
leave the country and go to Rwanda… (TGS, interview with Sigal Kook Avivi 
and Gilad Liberman, face-to-face Zurich, October 2017) 
 
MSY was summoned to Holot in October 2015. He did not work the 
few months prior due to a work injury. His friends helped pay his 
expenses, including his medical insurance, and when he was 
summoned to Holot he asked to have his detention cancelled or 
delayed in order to keep receiving treatment. His request was refused 
and MSY never received the medical treatment he needed in Holot. 
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Eventually, out of fear that if he stayed, he would suffer long-term 
damage, he agreed to leave Israel: 
 
It was in winter, which is very terrible for my muscles, because I cannot stay in the 
cold… So when I went there [to Holot]. I asked them, because I gave them all my 
[medical] documents… but they only picked a few papers and refused to take 
everything. They gave me back all the documents… I asked them for medication, 
but they never cared about it… They sent me to Soroka [a hospital], but over there, 
she gave me only three pills, tablets. I shouted and really refused, because she was the 
secretary and she decided to give me this kind of advice. I was very nervous at that 
time, because this is psychological abuse. Because they want us to leave… I 
understood this is bad for my health… So I tried again to go back to Holot and 
asked them for the tablets, and they said “no problem, we will see”. I asked “how 
long?” This is physical damage, but they don't care… they don’t want to give you 
any service, any respect. They just want you to leave soon. I tried to think about my 
future and I thought that there is a great threat to me, so I decided to leave Israel. 
(MSY, interview with Sigal Kook Avivi and Yael Agur Orgal, face-to-
face, Kampala, October 2016) 
 
While MSY was denied medical treatment and agreed to leave Holot, 
many, such as MuSY, left after being summoned to Holot, but before 
entering the facility. MuSY spent his time in Israel trying to get into 
higher education. It was clear to him in January 2014 that Holot was 
now the future and that he could either forsake his dreams and be 
imprisoned for life, or take the risk and be deported back to his 
country of origin: 
 
They decided to send people who had lived in Israel four years, or more than four 
years, to Holot. And, actually I was shocked… but no one is above the law, and of 
course no one is going to stop them if this is their decision [the government, to 
imprisoned people]. We are going to Holot, or another choice, you can leave the 
country. Where will you leave to? You leave to Sudan… In January 2014, my visa 
was over and I went to renew it. They said that now you have to go to Holot. So I 
said okay. I went home and thought about it. And I decided that if I go to Holot I 
don’t know when I will get out of Holot. Four years I was struggling to go to college, 
but Israeli government did not allowed me to go to college… So I had to go back to 
Sudan. I knew 80% if I go back to Sudan they will put me in prison… They 
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[Israeli authorities] promised me that nothing will happened to me. (MuSY, 
interview with Sigal Kook Avivi and Yael Agur Orgal, face-to-face, 
Kampala, October 2016) 
 
MuSY, was indeed put in prison in Khartoum upon his arrival. 
 
The Anti-Infiltration Law under its different amendments was 
challenged in court three times, and abolished twice (Ziegler, 2015). 
The Sixth Amendment was enacted on 11 February 2016 and limited 
detention in Holot to one year (Guthmann, 2018). Holot was finally 
closed in March 2018.  
Deportation  
According to the Israeli Supreme Court, the second criterion needed 
for true consent is ‘informed consent’. “This is a consent given after 
a person was informed about all the relevant details in order to make 
the decision” (Supreme Court of Israel, 2017, para. 120). It is argued 
in this chapter that under the Voluntary Return mechanism ‘informed 
consent’ could not have been given, as evidenced by the lies 
immigration officers told asylum seekers in order to convince them 
to leave (as elaborated in this section) and the actual conditions they 
faced upon arrival in Rwanda and Uganda (described in the next 
section).  
Confidential agreements 
Israel has agreements with Rwanda and Uganda to take refugees as 
'third-countries'. Based on these agreements, Rwanda and Uganda 
have been receiving refugees and asylum seekers since 2013. The first 
publications regarding Israel’s agreement with third countries 
surfaced in March 2013 (Pawle, 2013) and again in August 2013 
(Pfeffer & Lior, 2013). The existence of these agreements was also 
discovered in a process in the Israeli High Court of Justice in July 
2013 (Weiler-Pollack, 2013). However, although deportation to the 
two countries has been underway for more than six years now, there 
is almost no official information available on the agreements between 
these countries. These agreements are subject to a confidentiality 
order dated March 2014 signed by Prime Minister Netanyahu. 
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According to the Prime Minister, revealing information about the 
agreement “may harm the State of Israel's foreign relations” 
(translated from Hebrew, Prime Minister’s Office, 2014). In addition, 
Uganda has continuously denied having any agreement with Israel, 
while Rwanda initially did not fully deny having an agreement, but 
later issued a strong denial (Reuters, 2018; Associated Press & Times 
of Israel Staff, 2018).  
 
However, while these countries are keeping quiet, more and more 
deportees are giving testimonies that show the widespread violation 
of the promises given to them by Israeli officials, including promises 
that the government gave to the High Court regarding the procedures 
(Birger et al., 2018; Green, 2017; International Refugee Rights 
Initiative, 2015). Similarly, promises that cannot be met were given by 
the Population, Immigration and Border Authority to asylum seekers 
regarding deportation to home countries, mainly that they will be safe 
upon arrival.  
 
During an appeal against a deportation order, a request was made to 
the Supreme Court of Israel to see these agreements, resulting in the 
expansion of the confidentiality order in September 2015 to include 
any document relating to the agreements, including the supposed 
reports and other information held by the state regarding the 
execution of the agreements and the fate of deportees in those 
countries (Supreme Court of Israel, 2015). Until the time of writing, 
neither Uganda nor Rwanda have confirmed having any deal with 
Israel, or admitted to receiving deportees from Israel. 
Promises regarding about third countries 
With the launch of the deportation mechanism, asylum seekers in 
Israel were given an ‘information sheet’ with vague statements about 
the unnamed third country, promises regarding the issuance of a 
residence permit in that country, the ability to work, and a local team 
allocated to help in the first few days after arrival (Population, 
Immigration and Border Authority, n.d.). The destination country 
(i.e., Rwanda or Uganda) was usually told to the refugees in person, 
but never written down.  
222 
 
TGS weighed his options: life-long imprisonment or the promise of 
a possible future, status and security in Rwanda. He describes the 
choice as follows:  
 
TGS: They [the immigration authority] also said that in Rwanda you'll have 
everything – you'll be [treated] as a refugee there, they said. So I went, so that I'll 
have some quiet [in my head] and be ok, instead of every day being in prison… 
When I went to Rwanda it was not like they said. 
Interviewer: When did you understand that they had lied to you in Israel about 
having a place and status? 
TGS: I knew that they were lying [before I left], but I didn't have a choice; I had 
no other option, I had to leave the country and go, that is what they wanted. ...Myself, 
I knew that of course they lied ... but I was thinking Rwanda might be ok. (TGS, 
interview with Sigal Kook Avivi and Gilad Liberman, face-to-face, 
Zurich, October 2017) 
 
When taken to the airplane, TGS was given an Israeli travel 
document, which was his sole form of identification. When he landed 
in Kigali, he and all the other deportees from Israel were taken to a 
side room by an official who had a list of their names. As with all of 
the deportees we interviewed, TGS’s travel document was taken from 
him there, he did not go through border control, and he was escorted 
out of the airport without any kind of official registration or 
documentation of his legal presence in the country. Many deportees, 
both to Uganda and Rwanda, described exiting the airport with no 
identification document, at which moment they realised that their 
presence in the new country was illegal. MSY, who was deported to 
Uganda, had the same experience in Entebbe airport: 
 
They told us to collect the travel documents just for registration… then at that time 
I tried to explain to my friends in my mother language, but they were not so aware 
of what will be the consequences at that time. And I told them, from now onwards, 
if we hand them this one [the travel document] we are not legal entered in Uganda. 
So take care now, or try to think what we can do when we reach the hotel… When 
I was not registered in the airport, just from that time, I was not protected by any of 
the governments of Israel or Uganda. From that time I was illegal, because I did not 
come legally. Because, they did not sign me in to enter Uganda. (MSY, interview 
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with Sigal Kook Avivi and Yael Agur Orgal, face-to-face, Kampala, 
October 2016)  
 
In a verdict given by the District Court in November 2015, it was 
stated that, during a one-sided session (due to the confidentiality 
order), the government representative argued that the government 
had made some changes, including “In contrast to the past, the transit 
certificate issued to leave the country will remain in the deportee’s 
hands even after his arrival in the third country and will not be taken 
from him” (translated from Hebrew, Administrative Court of Beer 
Sheva, 2015, p. 19). However, testimonies taken from refugees by the 
authors, as well as a recent report on the testimonies of deportees 
from Israel who arrived in Europe, indicate that no change took place 
in practice, and that the documents continue to be taken from the 
refugees upon entry, leaving them with no identification, protection 
or legal status in Rwanda and Uganda (Birger et al., 2018). The latest 
deportee we interviewed, PY, was deported from Israel to Uganda in 
October 2017. His story is identical to all previous testimonies; he 
reports that his travel document was taken from him upon arrival in 
Entebbe (PY, interview with Yael Agur Orgal, by phone, October 
2017). 
Deportation to Rwanda 
Various reports and press articles have been published about the 
deportations to Rwanda, including interviews with deportees. The 
earliest investigation was conducted in 2015 by Galia Sabar (Lior, 
2015b) and the latest in early 2018 by a ‘fact-finding mission’ from 
the Israeli opposition party Meretz (Ziv, 2018). All evidence shows 
that the (very few) persons who were able to stay in Rwanda were the 
first deportees. They received temporary documents while there was 
a legal case in Israel regarding the forced deportation procedure to 
Rwanda. However, afterwards, these deportees found that they could 
not renew their documents. 
 
SSG is the first deportee to Rwanda we know of. He arrived in Israel 
in December 2007 at the age of 16, where he attended school. He was 
deported to Rwanda in March 2013. According to his testimony, he 
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was the second person to be deported from Israel to Rwanda. At that 
time, it seems that the Israeli immigration was ‘testing’ the 
deportation procedure to Rwanda in a non-systematic way. He 
describes being almost kidnapped and deported to Rwanda:  
 
I worked at the corner of Begin Road and Hashmonaim Street. One day there was 
a brawl there, which had nothing to do with me at all, and I went outside. The police 
came with horses and cars, and checked the identity cards of everyone. I forgot my 
visa at home that day. They took me directly to the police station. They left me there 
for several hours. They put me in an interrogation room. I didn’t sleep all night. My 
phone battery drained. I could not call anybody and they did not let me. The same 
night, at around 10 pm, they told me that either I return to my country or I’d go to 
jail for three years. I told them I can’t. They treated me very harshly. Pressured me.  
They told me to wait all day. Locked me in the room. In the morning they gave me 
coffee and food. At the end three men came and took me in a car. A normal car with 
a beacon light. A green car. They took me to my apartment in Pardes Katz. They 
wanted my identity card and I gave them my visa. It was in effect. They told me to 
take only the important things, and that I will not return there. My flatmates were 
not at home and I couldn’t tell them nothing. Nobody knew what happened to me. 
…They took me to prison [probably Yahalom facility] … They told me there that 
there’s an option to go to Rwanda or Uganda. They told me that Eritreans get a 
visa there… There they made me sign a paper. Everything was in Hebrew. They 
told me sign here. I did not know what I was signing. They forced me to sign. I was 
so full of hate for Israel. From there I did not come back home. (SSG, interview 
with Sigal Kook Avivi and Gilad Liberman, face-to-face, Lausanne, 
October 2017) 
 
Once the mechanism for deportation from Rwanda to Uganda was 
systemised, all testimonies revealed the same process. Upon arrival at 
the airport in Kigali, as the plane lands, a person called ‘John’, a 
Rwandan dressed in what is perceived to be an official uniform, 
receives the deportees from Israel, calls them and separates them 
from the rest of the people arriving. The group of deportees is then 
led by him out of the airport, without passing through any passport 
control, into several private cars, which take the group to a villa in 
Kigali. The documents given to them by the Israeli authorities are 
taken from them, either in the airport or in the villa. Most are 
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confined to the villa and forbidden to step outside. The villa is 
guarded, and some interviewees mentioned that the guard was armed 
and did not speak English or Tigrinya. Then the deportees reported 
being pressured to leave Rwanda. After some time, between a few 
hours to several days, they were told that they have to leave to Uganda 
and that they need to pay USD 100 (the sum varied between 
interviewees, but USD 100 was a common figure) to ‘John’, and were 
taken in the afternoon towards the Rwanda-Uganda border, where 
they arrived at night. There, they had to cross by foot, quietly. Upon 
arrival on the Ugandan side, they reported being taken in private cars, 
by smugglers who were waiting for them, to Kampala. They needed 
to pay an additional USD 150 (in most cases) to the smugglers on the 
Ugandan side. 
 
The testimonies regarding Rwanda are very consistent. All 
respondents reported passing through the same villa. In her 
investigative trip to Rwanda, Sabar found the villa and took a photo 
of it (Lior, 2015b). We showed that photo to the deportees we met 
and they all confirmed that it was the place they stayed in Rwanda. 
TGS gave the following testimony about coming to Rwanda by plane 
and having his documents taken from him: 
 
You don't ask them. You don't even have time to ask them. You give them and 
straight away another person tells you "come, come", and you go directly to the car. 
When everyone is in the car, they tell you, we take you to one place, we take you to 
a hotel now, we don't know what's going on, but meanwhile we take you to a hotel. 
After that no one comes to speak with you, to ask you. We were 2–3 days there in 
the hotel; you have a bed to sleep in and food, that's it. You are not allowed to go 
outside. Then somebody comes and tells you, tomorrow you're going to Uganda, 
prepare USD 250. (TGS, interview with Sigal Kook Avivi and Gilad 
Liberman, face-to-face, Zurich, October 2017) 
 
In this part of the route, the trafficking is state-sponsored, the ransom 
is fixed and it is relatively safe. As the refugees are completely 
vulnerable, without documents, under the supervision of a person 
who is either an officer or acting under the guidance of the Rwandan 
government, the amount of actual brutality needed is minimal. For 
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most of the refugees this was their first time on an airplane and they 
arrived in Kigali after a long flight, tired and afraid. And so, after a 
few questions left unanswered, the refugees are quietly and forcibly 
trafficked to Uganda. 
Deportation to Uganda 
Similarly to the testimonies of those deported to Rwanda, the 
testimonies of those deported to Uganda are also consistent. Upon 
arrival in Entebbe international airport, a Ugandan in official clothes 
separates them from the rest of the arrivals, takes the documents 
given to them by Israel, and leads them out of the airport, bypassing 
passport control. They are then taken to one of several hotels 
(notably, Forest Cottages and Fairway Hotel & Spa). While the 
deportation from Rwanda to Uganda is conducted by Rwandan 
officials, those who are deported directly to Uganda have no further 
contact with Ugandan immigration officials after they leave the 
airport. Instead, they are handed to smugglers through the following 
system: the deportees arrive to a pre-paid hotel in the early morning 
(sometimes as early as 4 am), where the reception clerk tells them 
their rooms will be ready later (usually between 10 am and 12 pm) 
and that they should wait in the lobby. It is during this waiting time 
that the smugglers arrive at the hotel, sometimes within minutes of 
the deportees’ arrival. If the deportees from Israel are Eritrean, a 
Tigrinya-speaking smuggler arrives; if they are Sudanese, an Arabic-
speaking smuggler greets them.  
 
MSY, who left Israel after being denied medical treatment in Holot, 
discovered upon arrival that none of what he had been told in Israel 
was true: 
 
We entered Uganda at 3 am at night... 2 persons came, black people, Ugandans, I 
don’t know… [They said] “Don’t go there!”, where other good people go, with 
passports, having it [stamped], “Don’t go there! Give me your visa! Give me! Give 
me!” What is that? 
 
We entered the hotel; 2–4 minutes [after] people came there… saying “you want to 
go to Juba? You want to go to Sudan? You want that?” What is that? We said, 
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10 persons, we don’t want to go to Sudan, Juba, whatever. “Are you crazy? What 
is there in Uganda? Soon you’ll see you’ll go to Juba”. We said we don’t want to… 
(MSY, interview with Sigal Kook Avivi and Yael Orgal, face-to-face, 
Kampala, October 2016) 
 
For MSY, the connection between the local authorities, the smugglers 
and the hotel was obvious from the moment he arrived at the hotel:  
 
When we reached there, they just put us inside the hotel and they disappeared [the 
people who took them from the airport]. But the most strange thing at that time – 
we were welcomed by smugglers – one from Sudan and three from Eritrea. They 
came at night, they were waiting at the hotel... 
[The smugglers said] “This hotel is very expensive for you, so we can take you to 
other very cheap and smuggle you somewhere you want”… We made a very serious 
disagreement – we told them: “We come here now. Who told you to come before we 
arrive here? Who is behind this mechanism?” 
[The smugglers replied] “No we know, we know this one before. That is why we 
came too early.” We ignored them and kept for registration… when we ask the 
reception they said “now is not the check in time. You will wait until 10 am”. 
[MSY replied to the smugglers] “Why such thing? If you are not free why you just 
demand to have people today? This is another means of action – instead of just to 
stay here you want us to leave? This is what you want?” (MSY, interview with 
Sigal Kook Avivi and Yael Orgal, face-to-face, Kampala, October 2016) 
 
Before finally receiving his room at the hotel, MSY tried to strengthen 
his friends and told them not to listen to the smugglers and not to 
make any rash decisions. He advised them to rest and only afterwards 
think together what they should do. In the afternoon, when he got up 
from his rest, he discovered that five people from his group had left 
with the smugglers. 
 
Much like in Rwanda, no physical pressure was exerted on the 
deportees to leave, but the mental pressure is no less powerful: most 
of the deportees had just taken a flight for the first time in their lives, 
they had been on the road for two days, without any rest or proper 
meal, they had just realised they are illegal in a new country, fearful 
for their safety, forced to wait in the lobby with smugglers who tell 
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them they are illegal and cannot stay in Uganda. The deportees have 
a lot of cash on them at that point (money they received from Israeli 
immigration) and many expressed fear about being easy targets out in 
the streets of Kampala. 
Number of Eritreans and Sudanese deported 
In addition to deportation to countries of origin and third countries 
under the Voluntary Return mechanism, over the years, testimonies 
of not-agreed-upon deportation to countries of origin have surfaced 
(Pawle, 2013; Nesher, 2013; TG, interview with Gilad Liberman, by 
Internet voice messaging, 2016;23 Lior, 2015a; MSY, interview with 
Sigal Kook Avivi and Yael Orgal, face-to-face, Kampala, October 
2016). Figure 8.1 shows the number of Eritrean and Sudanese 
refugees deported from Israeli to the different destinations between 
January 2012 and January 2018. The deportations to countries of 
origin (Eritrea and Sudan) are in black, to Rwanda and Uganda (‘third-
countries’) are in grey and to Western countries (resettlement, 
sponsorship, family reunifications, etc.) are in dotted light grey. The 
numbers are those given by the Israeli Population, Immigration and 
Border Authority, which aggregates Eritrean and Sudanese together, 
and only them (Population, Immigration and Border Authority, 
2018). 
 
As mentioned before, by 2015 over 5,400 Eritreans and Sudanese had 
been deported to their home countries (Ziv, 2015), and over 1,700 
individuals were deported to their home countries between 2016 and 
2018 (Population, Immigration and Border Authority, 2019, table 3). 
While the actual number of clear cases of refoulement from Israel to 
countries of origin or from third countries to countries of origin is 
unknown, what is known is that the Israeli immigration officers told 
lies to the refugees and asylum seekers – from the first deportations 
from Saharonim in 2012 until today, which take place even from 
outside prison – to push them to ‘agree’ to leave. 
 
23 A full transcript of TG's testimony can be found at: 
https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2016/09/29/israels-role-in-the-enforced-






Figure 8.1. Timeline of Israeli legislation allowing refugees to be detained in Saharonim 
and Holot and number of Eritrean and Sudanese refugees removed 




Situation after deportation 
By attributing the notion of volition to the action of leaving, Israel is 
reducing its responsibility for the deportees once they exit the 
country, thereby minimising its responsibility for the consequences of 
the deportation. Those who were deported from Israel to third 
countries were left to a life of persecution and illegality, with no 
means to support themselves. All the 25 people we met in Kampala 
lived in fear, hunger and despair. As they had entered Uganda illegally, 
they had no visa and were unable work legally to provide for 
themselves. But even those who manage to buy fake visas declared 
that there are no jobs in Uganda. And, as their access to the Ugandan 
asylum system is blocked,24 they are not eligible for any kind of 
support from UNHCR. All of the testimonies collected showed that 
upon arrival, deportees from Israel in Rwanda and Uganda are 
confronted with two paths: use the money they have to leave Uganda, 
or remain there and live on their savings. Those who choose the 
second option were soon left with nothing.  
 
PS was deported to Rwanda in early 2014. He arrived in Rwanda in 
the early days of deportation, when the mechanism for second-
deportation to Uganda was still being fine-tuned. He is one of the few 
who managed to remain in Rwanda, but he never succeeded in 
receiving legal status. He is dependent on his relatives in Israel, who 
send him money every month, but since the Deposit Law they are 
unable to send as much.25 PS is now suffering from starvation and 
anxiety, and does not know what his future holds (PS, interview with 
Sigal Kook Avivi, by phone, March 2018). 
 
For those choosing the first option, the journey is not any easier. They 
find themselves in the hands of smugglers, on a dangerous route to 
Libya, on which they are extorted for money, tortured and sold into 
 
24 For more on of the Ugandan asylum system and its inaccessibility to those 
deported from Israel see: International Refugee Rights Initiative, 2015, p. 17–19; 
and Green, 2017.  
25 Under the Deposit Law in Israel, which came into force 1 May 2017, employers 
must deposit 20% of asylum seekers salaries into a security deposit. Asylum seekers 
may receive some of their money back once they leave Israel (Heruti-Sover, 2018). 
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slavery. Some have died from dehydration and fatigue, and many have 
drowned in the Mediterranean Sea trying to cross to Europe. Those 
who survive the journey often suffer from mental distress and anxiety 
(MG, interview with Gilad Liberman, face-to-face, Limburg, July 
2017). Most of those we interviewed in Europe travelled similar 
routes: Israel–Rwanda/Uganda–Kampala (Uganda)–Juba (South 
Sudan)–Khartoum (Sudan)–through the Sahara to Izlabya (Ajdabiya, 
Libya)–Tripoli (Libya)–Mediterranean Sea–Europe.  
 
For those deported to countries of origin, testimonies reveal 
imprisonment, harsh investigations and even torture. MuSY was 
deported to Khartoum, where he was imprisoned upon arrival. In 
Israel, he was promised that no harm would come to him in his home 
country, but the Sudanese authorities knew he had arrived from Israel 
and charged him with treason. While he was imprisoned, he was 
tortured and faced the death penalty. In the end, a family friend 
helped him out of prison (MuSY, interview with Sigal Kook Avivi 
and Yael Agur Orgal, face-to-face, Kampala, October 2016). MuSY 
had enough luck and connections to survive, unlike some of his 
friends who were deported with him and disappeared upon arrival. 
Conclusion 
Israeli authorities have denied Eritrean and Sudanese refugees a 
rational and voluntary choice in relation to deportation from Israel. 
This research studied Israel’s Voluntary Return mechanism and 
concluded that is not voluntary in practice. The research found that 
the decision was influenced by pressure from the Israeli legal system 
and immigration officers, the prolonged and indefinite detention in 
Israel, and the untruthful information provided about what will 
happen to the refugees after they are deported.  
 
It is concluded from this research that there is no free consent or 
knowledgeable consent, and, therefore, the refugees and asylum 
seekers deported from Israel could not have provided true consent 
under the law. Hence, it can be concluded that the refugees did not 
leave voluntarily, but were forcefully deported from Israel. Thus, 
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Israel has been forcefully deporting refugees and asylum seekers since 
2012 from Saharonim, under the Third Amendment to the Anti-
Infiltration Law, and since 2014 from Holot, under the Fourth 
Amendment to the Anti-Infiltration Law. By deporting Eritrean and 
Sudanese refugees to their countries of origin without their consent, 
Israel has broken the fundamental principle of customary 
international law of non-refoulement, as also laid out in the 1951 
Refugee Convention, which Israel is a party to. 
 
Under the Anti-Infiltration Law and its amendments, more than 
2,000 persons have been refouled from Israel to Eritrea. The fate of 
virtually all of them is unknown. It is reasonable to assume that many, 
if not most, of them left Eritrea within months of arriving. For most 
people, their safety in Eritrea is uncertain, and the number of lives 
lost, as well as the number of those incarcerated and disappeared, is, 
at the date of publishing, unknown.  
 
More than 4,500 persons have been refouled from Israel to Sudan. 
Many of them belong to persecuted populations. Merely being in 
Israel is a criminal offence in Sudan. Therefore, a ‘sur place’ refugee 
status is due. Horrendous testimonials of murders, imprisonment, 
torture and persecution by the regime upon arrival have been 
collected by the authors. Many refugees report having to subsequently 
flee again. The number of deaths is unknown. 
 
More than 5,400 individuals have been refouled from Israel to 
Rwanda and Uganda, under the confidential agreements Israel has 
with these countries, in what is nothing less than state-sponsored 
trafficking (Ziv, 2015; Population, Immigration and Border 
Authority, 2019). Although Israel has the economic means to pay the 
two countries for at least a small number of refugees to be absorbed 
with some legal status, all testimonies collected show that this is not 
the case. During their journey, the refugees are stripped of their 
documentation, and they are then nudged or trafficked out of the 
countries where they were deported to. The evidence, thus, suggests 
that the role of Rwanda and Uganda in these makeshift agreements is 
to serve as ‘detachment units’, relieving Israel from its obligations 
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under the Refugee Convention (1951), while keeping the 
consequences unknown and hidden from the judicial system, and 
from the Israeli and international public. 
 
People deported from Israel leave in fear of imprisonment, slavery 
and persecution in their countries of origin or in third countries. 
Being unprotected and unsafe, many continue to flee, usually through 
South-Sudan, Sudan, Libya and the Mediterranean Sea, to Europe. 
Given the difficulties of such journeys, the well documented death 
rate in the Mediterranean Sea, and the murders, deaths and slavery in 
the Sahara, which was a common theme in the testimonials collected 
for this chapter, it must be concluded that many have died following 
their deportation from Israel.  
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The Plight of Refugees in Agadez in Niger: 




Introduction: Migration, a capricious market 
A pile of adobe bricks, winding alleyways and brownish facades 
decorated with Tuareg patterns: that is how you might describe the 
old city centre of Agadez in 
Niger. The city is located at 
2,394 km from Sabha in 
Libya, 869 km from 
Tamanrasset in Algeria, and 
554 km from Kano in 
Nigeria. Since its founding in 
the 12th Century, it has been 
a commercial harbour. 
Everything transits through 
Agadez: 4WD Hilux vehicles 
from Libya, Algerian carpets, 
Burkinabe shea butter, 
tramadol, marijuana, cocaine, 
Kalashnikovs, handguns and, 
of course, migrants and 
refugees. 
 
The city of Agadez was 
always an important leg on 
migratory routes. Until 2011, most of the people travelling through 
Agadez were moving towards Libya, the final stage of their journey. 
At that time, Muammar Gaddafi would hold in his territory the 
migratory waves that now continue their journey all the way to 
Europe. Most Africans would manage to earn a decent income as a 
The European Union’s policy to control 
migration from Africa has led to the 
restriction of the free movement of people 
from Agadez in Niger to Algeria and 
Libya – despite the fact that the 
Economic Community of West African 
States guarantees such movement. This 
has left migrants and refugees in dire 
situations, restricting their options and 
ultimately making their journeys more 
perilous. It has also left ‘migration 
business professionals’ without a source of 
income, stifling a trade that has existed 
for generations. The impact of the EU’s 
policy is that Agadez has been 
transformed from a migratory hub into a 
land of lost migrants and refugees. 
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worker in Libya. But when the United Nations (UN) forces 
commenced bombing on Gaddafi’s forces, the spill over was the 
opening of a new gateway for migrants and refugees to Europe 
through the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
Agadez witnessed the mass arrival of migrants. As soon as they would 
step off the bus, they would be sent to ghettos with hundreds more 
of their kind to wait for Monday to come. When it finally arrived, 
hundreds of vehicles escorted by military would bring them all the 
way to Libya. In the back of the trucks, groups of around 25 migrants 
and refugees wrapped up in hoods and turbans would cling to a piece 
of wood in order to stay inside the vehicle, all of them prepared to 
undergo such conditions during the three to five-day journey through 
the desert. Their goal: to reach Europe. Those were good times for 
professional smugglers like Abdoulaye Sidi, who used to fill a vehicle 
every week: 
 
We used to ask for up to 120,000 West African CFA francs (XOF) (EUR 183) 
or XOF 150,000 (EUR 228) per passenger for the trip from Agadez to Sabha. 
The driver gets XOF 70,000 (EUR 107) and I keep XOF 50,000 (EUR 76) 
[total: XOF 1,250,000 or EUR 1,887 for a full vehicle]. That’s making money! 
There is no better source of income except for cocaine. Because you make easy money. 
You do not have to sell anything. (Abdoulaye Sidi, interview with Wirtz, face-
to-face, Agadez, 20 February 2019) 
 
In October 2013, a drama raises the migration issue in Niger – 92 
persons are found dead of dehydration in the desert. Their destination 
was Algeria. The Government of Niger becomes aware of the dangers 
related to transporting the migrants. Two years later, they decide to 
start penalising the trade: on 26 May 2015, the Parliament of Niger 
adopts Law 2015–36 banning all commercial activities related to 
migration (République du Niger, 2015). Transporting migrants and 
refugees becomes trafficking – on paper. In fact, during the first 
months after it was promulgated, the law was not applied and 




At the same time, the European Union (EU) offered support to the 
Nigerien authorities to fight illegal migration. At the European 
Council, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and Commission Vice-President Federica Mogherini declared: 
 
We have agreed on reinforcing our presence in Niger: 90% of migrants from Western 
Africa travel through Niger. Only by working jointly with countries of origin and 
transit, with the African Union and the UN, we will succeed to tackle the root 
causes of the emergency while disrupting criminal organisations and helping migrants 
to escape from them. (Council of the European Union, 2015) 
 
Following the Summit in Valetta in November 2015, the EU set up a 
fiduciary fund worth EUR 1.8 billon with the aim of helping Niger in 
the fight against clandestine migration. In effect, Agadez became an 
external border of the EU. Niger is a member of the Economic 
Community of West African States, which guarantees the free 
movement of people, goods and services in its territory. Regardless, 
Law 2015–36 was implemented and migration professionals started 
to be heavily sanctioned. Authorities, the judiciary, the police and the 
army were trained to fulfil their new task: to eradicate clandestine 
migration by hunting down and judging all those making profit on 
migrants and refugees passing through Agadez. 
 
One might say they did their job. In July 2018, European Parliament 
President Antonio Tajani reported a 95% drop in the migratory flow 
through Niger to Libya and Europe between 2016 and 2017. That 
success for the EU is due to both the repression campaign carried out 
by Nigerien authorities and the regional conditions. Even though lots 
of migrants and refugees still want to reach Europe, only a few of 
them dare to cross Libya, knowing they will be either kidnapped, 
imprisoned, tortured, raped or even killed. Algeria could be an 
alternative, but the risks are high: if they were to be rejected – as is 
often the case – they will be sent back to the starting point of their 
journey. 
 
Agadez has been transformed from a migratory hub into a land of 
lost migrants and refugees. Migration keeps going, but its form has 
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changed. Some young Africans still stop in the city on their way to 
Libya or Algeria. However, a lot of foreigners end up there after being 
expelled from Algeria or fleeing Libya, roaming around in search of 
money in order to continue their journey. Most migration 
professionals have quit. New smugglers have replaced them, bringing 
with them new kinds of abuse, exploitation and extortion. 
 
The main research question addressed in this chapter is: What is the 
current situation of migrants, refugees and smugglers in Agadez (Niger) in the 
context of implementation of Law 2015–36. In order to answer this 
question, the consequences of repression for all the players is 
investigated. The goal is to inform the reader of the situation currently 
prevailing in this town in the north of Niger and to warn about the 
impact of the EU’s foreign policies. 
Immersion in Agadez 
This chapter presents an explorative ethnographic investigation of 
Agadez after the introduction of law 2015–36. It follows a grounded 
theory approach, allowing the researcher to explore a setting without 
any prior theoretical framework in an extended case method 
(Burawoy, 2009; 2013). This approach is particularly relevant to 
understanding situations that are new, in which the researcher 
immerses him/herself to access hitherto unexplored terrain. This type 
of research respects the natural setting and focuses on the specifics 
of the context of the situation under consideration seeking high 
ecological validity (the validity of findings in context) (Chapter 2, 
Network Gatekeepers in Human Trafficking: Profiting from the Misery of 
Eritreans in the Digital Era, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Klara Smits, Mia 
Stokmans & Munyaradzi Mawere). The situation in Agadez was 
chosen given the focus it received from EU-driven policy on 
migration and human trafficking following the EU’s policy transition 
in 2014 (Chapter 17, The Representation of Human Trafficking in 
Documentaries: Vulnerable Victims and Shadowy Villains, by Nataliia 
Vdovychenko, and Chapter 19, The Shaping of the EU’s Migration Policy: 




All the interviews and observations in this chapter were made in 
Agadez between September 2017 and March 2019. The immersion 
was carried out during 18 months by staying in the city with local 
journalists, while sharing the same living conditions. Every day 
brought something new. Many people were interviewed in such a way 
as to catch the complexity of life in Agadez. The impact of the law 
2015–36 was explored focusing on three groups: migrants, refugees 
and those engaged in their facilitation, referred to as ‘migration 
business professionals’. 
 
The first group of players are the migrants. In this research we shall 
keep the focus on those whose main goal is, or has been, to reach 
Europe. These migrants were met on the street, at the bus station and 
in the ghettos. Those transiting through Agadez all have different 
stories. Some are just stopping there until they can find a car that will 
carry them to Maghreb, others are fleeing from Libya or have been 
rejected from Algeria. Some stay in Agadez while they try to find the 
financial means necessary, or decide whether or not, to continue their 
journey north or south. Finally, some people remain in Agadez and 
settle. 
 
The second group of players consists of refugees and asylum seekers. 
Most of them arrived in Agadez at the end of 2017 and beginning of 
2018. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) or UN Refugee Agency sends most of the refugees to the 
capital Niamey, while most of the asylum seekers are hosted in a camp 
15 km from Agadez. 
 
The last group of players is called the ‘migration business 
professionals’. This group consists of smugglers, coaxers, drivers, car 
owners, ghetto chiefs, ghetto owners, retailers of canisters, sticks or 
hoods, and restaurant owners. Between 2011 and 2015, the people of 
Agadez made a lot of money from migration and, as a result, the 
number professions related thereto diversified. The smugglers 
organise the migrant’s journey. They work as a network linking the 
country of departure to the final destination. Coaxers manage the 
migrant’s life in the city. They fetch them at the bus station and drive 
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them to the ghettos. They also buy them certain products and work 
as currency exchange agents. Drivers transport migrants and refugees 
from point A to point B. Car owners rent their vehicles to drivers. 
Ghetto chiefs – often migrants or refugees working to pay their own 
journey – are responsible for organising daily life inside the ghetto. 
Ghetto owners rent houses to migrants, coaxers or smugglers. Before 
they leave, migrants or refugees acquire the equipment useful for the 
trip: canisters to carry water through the desert, sticks to help them 
hold on to the truck, and hoods and gloves to protect themselves 
from the wind, sand and sun. Migration professionals do not 
necessarily fall into only one category: some of them are involved in 
different aspects of the business. 
 
Interviews were also conducted with local authorities, members of 
civil society, police, representatives of the judiciary, journalists and 
experts. While we could meet with some of the interviewees only 
once, we had the chance to ride along with others over a few days. 
 
All the players spoke of their own free will. They were selected based 
on the relevance of their testimony with regards to the topic under 
inquiry and the assessment of mutual trust. Their words were cross-
referenced with other sources of information. Thanks to the 
encounters and meetings in Agadez during the immersion, the author 
was able to reach a global view on the situation and swiftly grasp the 
background to an interviewee’s testimony. 
 
Within the 18 months that the immersion lasted, the situation in 
Agadez evolved. With each day that passes, fewer people work in the 
network. More and more migrants and refugees are roaming around 
the city not knowing where to go next. Many people who we met at 
the beginning of the immersion had already left the city, going either 
north or south. Some migration professionals whom we had the 
chance to interview are now in jail. Others quit because of the lack of 
‘customers’ or because they were afraid of being arrested. 
 
In order to write this chapter, the author drew on material gathered 
during the past two years so that the reader will have the benefits of 
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the most relevant testimonies. In addition, more recent interviews 
were completed with migrants, smugglers, refugees, and 
representatives of UNHCR so as to update or substantiate 
information. The combination of all this material should provide the 
reader with a comprehensive picture of the current situation on 
migration in Agadez. 
Agadez: A crossroad after repression 
Migrants 
Mohammed Baldé is sitting on a holey plastic mat, gazing at the 
ground. His face is illuminated by the rays coming through a skylight. 
There is no window and no door in this ghetto, only holes in the walls 
covered by messages left by the previous tenants. The curious 
observer can read such things as: ‘He who tries nothing, has nothing. 
We’re going to Europe’, ‘Where there’s life, there’s hope’, ‘A blessed 
child will know suffering, but not shame’, ‘God alone decides’ and 
‘Freedom of movement’. 
 
“Me too, I’ll leave someday. And I’ll leave my mark on the wall”, says 
Mohammed (Mohammed Baldé, interview with Wirtz, face-to-face, 
Agadez, 19 February 2019). Eleven months ago, this 19-year-old boy 
decided to leave the Ivory Coast and travel to Europe. He graduated 
in geology, but he could not find a job in his native country. He tried 
twice to get to Libya. However, twice the driver was arrested and sent 
to jail. 
 
That’s why I’m still here. Because my older sister sent me money. But when the 
authority caught us, they caught the driver. We lost our money because the driver was 
sent to prison. And that’s why you must do what the driver tells you to do. It is for 
the good of us all. (Mohammed Baldé, interview with Wirtz, face-to-face, 
Agadez, 19 February 2019) 
 
Like most of the migrants, Baldé does not trust the smugglers and the 
drivers with whom he gets involved, even though he listens to them. 
He knows that at the first disagreement, his transporter will not 
hesitate to abandon or beat him. “Once, the vehicle broke down and 
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a young one wouldn’t help us push. The driver broke his arm. They’re 
bastards, you see. They use violence” (Mohammed Baldé, interview 
with Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 19 February 2019). 
 
When Mohammed Baldé first arrived in Agadez, he was taken under 
the care of an Ivorian smuggler. Eight months later, the smuggler quit 
and left town. He was afraid that he would be arrested and he had 
understood that smuggling migrants was not as profitable as it used 
to be. Mohammed was then transferred to another ghetto. The house 
is just dilapidated walls, a dirt floor and empty rooms. A few canisters, 
a furnace, old books, a map of Africa and a Red Cross poster are the 
only furniture. “It’s better here,” Mohammed explains. “Earlier, I was 
with two or three hundred other migrants” (Mohammed Baldé, 
interview with Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 19 February 2019). If 
places gathering tens of migrants can still be found on the perimeter 
of Agadez, they have become uncommon and out of reach. After the 
law banned all economic activities related to illegal migration, the 
smugglers became cautious. 
 
During his stay in Agadez, Mohammed saw a lot of migrants passing 
by. But as the months passed, the flow dropped off. “For now, the 
newcomers in the ghetto are the ones who’ve been rejected from 
Algeria and decided to try again,” he explains (Mohammed Baldé, 
interview with Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 19 February 2019). 
Foreign nationals from the coastal lands of West Africa keep arriving 
in town. They are mostly from Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea 
Conakry, Gambia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin, Mali or Liberia. 
They are hoping to find a path to Europe. As Mohammed laid out, a 
lot of them do not come straight from their native land, but are fleeing 
Libya or they were sent back to Niger by the Algerian authorities. 
According to IOM, 25,000 migrants from West Africa, among them 
14,000 Nigeriens, were expelled from Algeria in 2018 (Bachir, Pascual 
& Kane, 2019). They are often left at the border in the middle of the 
desert and they keep going on foot until they reach Assamaka, where 




However, this is not enough to discourage all the survivors from 
Algeria and Libya. Some of them will try again. For example, 
Boubakar arrived in Agadez after spending seven months locked up 
in a container in Libya. We find him curled up deep inside a ghetto. 
 
Every day, they brought me one pack of cigarettes, one litre of water and only biscuits. 
That’s the only thing they were giving me there. The man did not beat me with his 
hand. He used a stick to beat me. All my body swelled up. If you saw me [before], 
I was twice the size. The man beat me. Every time he beat me. Sometimes, the 
passengers […] they cried because of the way I looked. I couldn’t even walk. 
(Boubakar Dibba, interview with Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 22 
October 2017) 
 
After being released, Boubakar was brought to a garden in Brak, in 
the centre of Libya, where he was forced to work for three months 
without getting paid. However, these misadventures have not turned 
him away from his dream of going to Europe. 
 
Europe is a very nice place. It’s different from Africa: too much stress, too much 
thinking. The poverty is too much. But if you are in Europe, you live a simple good 
life. Even if you don’t have anything, you live a good life, simple life, good health, 
you understand. In terms of educations, its standards are different from Africa. 
(Boubakar Dibba, interview with Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 22 
October 2017) 
 
In Gambia, Boubakar studied business and management. He could 
not graduate as he was short of money. Most of the migrants in 
Agadez enjoy basic education. They ran away from their native 
countries hoping to find a better financial situation elsewhere. 
However, now the migrants cannot find a job and still have to provide 
for their families. Yet they are not from the poorest segment of the 
population. These migrants were able to save the money needed to 
undertake such a trip. In January 2019, the trip from Sabha to Agadez 
cost between XOF 200,000 and 300,000 (between EUR 305 and 




Estimating the total cost of a journey all the way from any West 
African country to Italy is no easy task and depends on the itinerary, 
the mishaps and the various bargains that might happen along the 
way. Migrants spend money at each control station. They need to 
bribe security forces something between XOF 2,000 and 20,000 
(between EUR 3 and 30) just to be allowed to keep going. Before 
getting to Agadez or after leaving the city, they face the risk of being 
deported, in which case they will have to pay even more for the same 
trip. Some smugglers make migrants use bypass roads by bike or ‘bush 
taxi’ in order to avoid control points. Of course, this additional 
service comes at a cost. Migrants are also sometimes conned by 
smugglers and end up paying twice for the same trip. Finally, migrants 
can lose a lot of money if they are kidnapped in Libya. Ransoms can 
be thousands of euros. 
 
As it is, some migrants arrive in Agadez empty-handed. The majority 
then turn to their family or friends in their home country or the 
diaspora for money. Others start looking for a job. Yet, finding an 
employer in Agadez is a challenging undertaking. Most of the locals 
themselves are jobless. Some rare migrants manage to find a job in 
construction, hair salons, garages or restaurants. Women can find it 
easier to be hired as waitresses, because Nigeriens women will not 
take the job. Several of them also slip into prostitution to earn quick 
and easy money. Myriam, a 26-year-old from Nigeria, has been 
walking the streets to finance her trip back to Lagos. 
 
I did it to make some money. The first time they paid well. The thing was classic. 
He took me in a way classic. So that was the first time. […] It’s not that I did it 
as soon as I arrived in Agadez. It took me like a month, two months. If you don't 
do it, who is going to help you? So it's because of money. […] You feel bad because 
what you did. They didn’t train you for that. You feel bad in your heart because it's 
not work that you can be proud of. (Myriam, interview with Wirtz, face-to-
face, Agadez, 19 November 2017) 
 
Like a lot of the prostitutes in Agadez, Myriam works freely and of 
her own account. Be that as it may, the trafficking of Nigerian women 
takes place through Agadez as well. Nigerian women are brought 
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from their native land to Agadez or all the way to Europe in order to 
work as sex workers. Most of the time they have been approached by 
some rich man or woman making promises of bringing them to Italy 
for free.  
 
Every migrant in Agadez abandoning their European dream and 
deciding to go back home can apply for the IOM programme. The 
United Nations has three transit centres in the area; 300 people can 
be held in Arlit, 150 in Dirkou and 1,000 in Agadez. IOM also rescues 
migrants who were lost or abandoned in the desert. This includes 
those expelled from Algeria. In 2018, 9,419 people who were in 
trouble in the Sahara were assisted by IOM; 98% of them join the 
Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration programme. Through 
this plan, IOM prepares the necessary administrative documents and 
escorts the migrants back to their home country. In addition, it gives 
support to help them reintegrate in their home community.  
 
A young Senegalese and a Guinean are among the volunteers hosted 
in the Agadez IOM transit centre. They were taken in Assamaka, after 
having been deported by the Algerian authorities. The police have 
confiscated all their possessions, including their cell phone and even 
the money they had sewn into their clothes. They shared: 
 
- I am going home with IOM because I don’t even have one cent to buy water. And 
there are dangers. 
- And how can he go to Algeria, at this point in time?  
- Yes. Because I know it is dangerous. We don’t know if Algeria is going to become 
like Libya. That is the problem. We are scared. You have to start by saving your 
life.  
- We have to go back home, to gain momentum, to think. (Anonymous migrants, 
Agadez, February 2019) 
 
Other migrants in Agadez keep their distance from IOM. Their 
reasons vary: some are not sure about going home, others owe money 
to too many people in their home land, some refuse to go back empty-




A good example is Aboubakar: he has been roaming around Agadez 
for three years. In 2014, he climbed on a boat headed for Italy. The 
boat sank. The 29-year-old Gambian was forced to go back. After 
that he was kidnapped in Libya, escaped and, finally, ended up in 
Agadez. In his mind, making another attempt at crossing to Europe 
is out of the question. “Too much risk. There is no government, no 
law in Libya. It is not safe” (Aboubakar, interview with Wirtz, face-
to-face, Agadez, 19 February 2019). Now that Yahya Jammeh (the 
leader of Gambia from 1994 to 2017) is out of office, Aboubakar feels 
that he is ready to go home and see his son. He will, nevertheless, wait 
until he has gathered enough money to cover the whole journey, 
rather than apply to IOM. “IOM, right now, they take your video and 
your fingerprint”, he explains (Aboubakar, interview with Wirtz, face-
to-face, Agadez, 19 February 2019). 
 
An increasing number of migrants remain in Agadez, wondering 
which way to go and how to finance their ride. Others decide to settle 
in Agadez. Despite the road from Agadez to Italy still being used, 
people are increasingly giving up on that itinerary. In the ghettos, 
migrants will tell you that it is safer to go through Timbuktu in Mali 
and reach Algeria or fly to Morocco and cross the Strait of Gibraltar. 
As of today, Agadez is no longer the gateway to Europe: it has 
become Europe’s border. And that border has been closed. 
Refugees 
In March 2019, 2,619 persons had already been transferred from 
Libya to Niamey through the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM). 
This programme, set up by UNHCR, targets extremely vulnerable 
refugees in Libya. Most of them are Eritrean and Somali. Once in 
Niamey, they apply to be recognised as refugees by the government 
of Niger. If their file is approved, they become candidates for 
resettlement. A delegation from American and European countries 
comes to the Nigerien capital on a regular basis and selects a certain 
number of refugees and offers them asylum in their territory. 
According to UNHCR, between September 2017 and January 2019, 
1,242 evacuees left Niger to be resettled in Europe, the United States 
or Canada (UNHCR, 2019b). 
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In Agadez, UNHCR counted 1,666 registered persons in March 2019 
(UNHCR, 2019a). Almost all of them are from Sudan and are seeking 
asylum in Niger. They came there by the hundreds, surprising 
everyone, between December 2017 and March 2018. The majority 
come from Darfur and, before they tried to reach Libya or Europe, 
they had been living for years in camps for deported people in Sudan. 
After Gaddafi’s fall, they suffered from both racism and the absence 
of the rule of law in Libya. A young Sudanese refugee remembers 
how he was turned into a slave: 
 
Four of us were working without receiving any salary. We would be beaten all the 
time. Sometimes we would spend two days eating only dry bread. I would moisten it 
with water. After three months, three of us ran away. The fourth one was lost. He 
was no longer able to do anything. Then he remained. (Wirtz, 2018) 
 
Be that as it may, Sudanese refugees receive little support after 
reaching Agadez. One year after having submit their applications for 
asylum, only 39 persons, the most vulnerable, have received an 
answer (Davies Kamau, interview with Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 1 
March 2019). Niger, one of the poorest countries in the world, has 
become a safe haven for Malians, Nigerians, and refugees. However, 
the population of Agadez seems rather hostile to these asylum seekers 
who are often seen as connected to Sudanese rebels or mercenaries 
operating in southern Libya. “They are related to countries that are at 
war: Libya, Chad, Sudan. They speak Arabic like most of the 
terrorists. We are afraid that they might set up terrorist bases here”, 
explains Mano Aghali, Deputy at the National Assembly of Niger 
(Wirtz, 2018). Many incidents have occurred between the Sudanese 
and the local communities. Some Sudanese have been accused of 
theft, fights and the harassment of women.  
 
In May 2018, over 140 people were arrested by the Nigerien security 
forces. “Despite the awareness-raising we did, they kept walking every 
night close to the military base”, explain the UNHCR chief of office 
in Agadez (Davies Kamau, interview with Wirtz, face-to-face, 
Agadez, 1 March 2019). After talks with UNHCR, the women and 
fathers were released, but the others were moved from Agadez and 
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left in Madama, at the border with Libya. Only 13 of them came back. 
The others are probably in Libya or Algeria, explained Davies Kamau. 
It is really uncommon for Niger to expel people.  
 
Due to these tensions, most of the Sudanese asylum seekers have 
been installed in a ‘Humanitarian Centre’, 15 km away from the city. 
The atmosphere is there depressing. Interviews end in tears. 
According to the asylum seekers, seven persons have already tried to 
commit suicide and a lot of them are going mad. They have nothing 
else to do but keep reliving how much they suffered in Sudan and 
Libya. Many people complain of insomnia. They are scared in the 
middle of the desert and they keep wondering, “who are we”?  
 
We came here a long time ago and actually we faced several problems. Here in the 
camp, we are afraid during the night. We don’t even dare to go to the bathroom 
alone. I have to wake up my husband to ask him to escort me. Recently, I had a 
miscarriage. I lost my child when he was nine months. A lot of women here have 
miscarriages […] We are scared. (Anonymous asylum seeker, interview with 
Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 27 February 2019) 
 
In June 2018, UNHCR made it clear that no resettlement in European 
or American country would be organised for the Sudanese in Agadez. 
During the following six months, around 500 Sudanese left the city, 
probably disappointed and tired of waiting for a decision from the 
state regarding their application for asylum (Davies Kamau, interview 
with Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 1 March 2019). Now, they might be 
working in gold mines in Niger, in Libya or on the way to Europe. In 
March 2018, one of the Sudanese asylum seekers, Mudatheir, 
affirmed his determination to risk his life once more: 
 
I have to follow my dream. I am not going to feel happy if I am a failure. That 
doesn’t mean I am going to be a failure all my life, but I have to follow my dream. I 
am not going to lose hope. So if one road closes in a state, you have to take another 
road. So it’s going to open. If this road is closed, I am going to open a new one. 




Not long after the interview, Mudatheir left for Libya. At the time this 
chapter was written, he had reached Zawiyah on the coast, after 
enduring long months of work and misadventure in Tripoli in Libya. 
He is getting ready to cross the Mediterranean Sea. He dreams of 
studying law in the United Kingdom. 
Smugglers 
Many migration professionals have quit as a consequence of Law 
2015–36. Some of them because did not want to keep doing 
something that had become illegal, others because of the decrease in 
the number of migrants wanting to reach Libya, which rendered the 
activity much less profitable. Hence, Law 2015–36 has had heavy 
consequences in Agadez. 
 
When the law was implemented, authorities promised some kind of 
compensation to migration professionals willing to quit and register 
a file. In January 2019, 2,345 applications for compensation had been 
submitted and analysed in Agadez; 981 were declared eligible and 371 
have already received help (Bachir Amma, president of the ex-
smugglers’ association, interview with Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 25 
February 2019).  
 
This compensation consists of XOF 1,500,000 XOF (EUR 2,264) 
worth of material aimed at helping applicants to start a new business. 
These materials are being allocated by high up authorities and the 
Nigerien non-governmental organisations (NGO) Karkara, which 
funded by the EU fund to fight clandestine migration. 
 
Bachir’s case is significant. He is the president of the ex-smugglers’ 
association. He received what he needed in order to be able to open 
a restaurant: tables, chairs, an oven, casseroles, plates, cutlery, rice and 
spaghetti. Now he makes between XOF 70,000 and 140,000 (between 
EUR 106 and 216) per week. When he was smuggling, he could make 
XOF 1,250,000 (EUR 1,887), yet he does not complain. 
 
We were doing a legal job. We had papers to do that job. Hence, when the law was 
adopted, we were upset. Later, however, with what happens in Libya and in the 
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desert, we may really say that we are happy with what the EU has given us. Because 
the work has become dangerous. […] I am happy with what I earn. I work legally, 
everything is fine. […] There is no one I can think about who has got troubles or 
who is dead. (Bachir, interview with Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 25 
February 2019) 
 
Bachir’s case is an exception. First, because only a few of the 
beneficiaries of the fund have been able to make a decent living out 
of their new business. Second, because many ex-professionals 
complain about the fact that, about two years after they quit their 
work, their file has not been reviewed and they have not received any 
compensation. Some of them are talking about going back to 
smuggling. The way the files are being handled is also being criticised. 
 
That money, actually, when it came, it is a mess. […] Agadez made it a public 
thing. Everyone came and was interested. There are many people. You do not even 
know who’s for real and who isn’t. You do not know to whom you must or must not 
give. […] And us, very unfortunately, frankly, we did not give our names. Because 
we do not want to be identified, we do not want to be known by the whole world, we 
do not want any trouble with anyone. (Anonymous ex-smuggler, interview 
with Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 1 December 2018) 
 
The promise of financial compensation did not convince everybody. 
Certain smugglers keep organising journeys towards Libya and 
Algeria. According to Abdoulaye, an ex-smuggler, some of them are 
newcomers. 
 
Now the majority are foreigners. You can see Burkinabe people who have settled. 
There are Malians and Ivorians as well. They are here. They have settled. Even 
Togolese people. They do stuff, they say they have a restaurant, but it is made-up. 
Migrants come to them, they host them and then they leave for Libya. That’s how 
they do it now. (Abdoulaye, interview with Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 20 
February 2019) 
 
Today most of the drivers are Libyan nationals. They do not speak 
French. They merely come and collect the cargo in the ghettos to 
transport them to Libya. 
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Smugglers have many ways to avoid being spotted by the police 
forces. Very few migrants still reach Agadez through the bus station. 
And if they do so, they do so alone and not as a group. They are in 
contact with their smuggler before arriving, they have contacts 
numbers and addresses, and they have been told who they should 
speak with and who they should not. Some of them arrive in Agadez 
by ‘bush taxi’ or by smaller secondary buses in order to remain under 
cover. Different hosting strategies have been developed. Legally, 
nothing stops you from hosting a foreigner. Yet, in order to avoid 
being arrested on their departure day, migrants and refugees planning 
on leaving to the north keep quiet even in the city. Several of them 
will not leave the ghetto before dark. Smugglers often harbour 
migrants and refugees in their own home. Sometimes, passengers are 
being hosted out of town, in the fields. There are also greater ghettos 
around the city. 
 
Once the migrants and refugees are ready to go, drivers take them, 
usually by night. Different strategies exist that allow them to leave the 
city. Some of them will go in the direction of Tahoua, in the south of 
Agadez, and then Algeria. Others know the roads to avoid 
checkpoints. Others still cross the border by bribing the police. In 
spite of all the training provided in the fight against clandestine 
migration, the police force remains corruptible. As Nigeriens, not all 
police officers agree with Law 2015–36. Like many fellow Nigeriens, 
they believe that the law was enjoined by the EU and should not be 
applicable within the Economic Community of West African States 
region, where freedom of movements of goods and people is 
guaranteed. In addition, some of them were earning money from 
migration before it was banned. They are, therefore, suffering a 
deficit: 
 
Sometimes, the police see but they do not see. Do you get it? They are already used 
to making a lot of money with smugglers. Now, there are none. When migrants 
would cross checkpoints, the police could stop them and make all the foreigners step 
down. Each person would pay XOF 5,000 (EUR 8), sometimes even 
XOF 10,000 (EUR 15). They would profit from each vehicle. That’s for getting 
to Agadez. But when leaving, each migrant would give XOF 2,000 (EUR 3) to 
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the national police. (Abdoulaye, interview with Wirtz, face-to-face, Agadez, 
20 February 2019) 
 
Once they have left the city, drivers take by-pass roads in order to 
avoid being spotted by security forces. “No one can control the 
Sahara” is a common saying among drivers: 
 
We created a new route. In the past, it was the path used by drug traffickers. That 
route is so far from everything that, if your vehicle breaks down, you’re sure to die. 
It’s only gazelles down there. Sometimes, you might even worry about driving over 
one. It could cause troubles to the car. (Wirtz, 2017) 
 
Taking by-pass roads increases the risks. In the case of a breakdown, 
the chances of finding help are low. That is why, since Law 2015–36 
was implemented, there has been an increase in the casualties in the 
desert. “Four months ago, we had a flat tyre. We couldn’t manage to 
take it off. While we went looking for help, nine people died of 
dehydration” (Wirtz, 2017). 
 
Many migrants and refugees die falling from the truck as well. Drivers 
are so scared of being arrested that they do not stop to pick them up. 
At the smallest sign of movement in the desert, they get scared. As 
soon as they see a vehicle they believe to be from the military, they 
speed up and sometimes this causes accidents. Sometimes they decide 
to get rid of the migrants and refugees and leave them in the middle 
of the desert: 
 
Drivers, who are Libyan nationals, do not know the Nigerien military. As soon as 
they spot a military vehicle, they think it’s a patrol that’s going to take them in and 
send them to jail or kill them. The thing is … they’re afraid. Therefore, they threaten 
migrants with a weapon and command them to step out and run away. They leave 
the migrants there. And perhaps, the patrol they spotted had nothing to do with these 
people. Hence, the military turns on the passengers and the passengers stay there. 
One day, two days. […] That’s how they die. (André, ex-smuggler, interview 




For all those reasons, migrants and refugees tend not to trust the 
smugglers. Most of them deny payment until they arrive at their 
destination. This can generate confusion, as migrants and refugees 
and drivers often do not agree on who has paid how much and to 
whom the payment was made. If a driver does not receive his 
payment from a migrant, he will place him in a ‘credit house’. They 
are places where migrants and refugees are locked up in Libya until 
their debt is paid. Jailers leave phones at their disposal for them to ask 
their family and friends for money. Once they are connected, 
migrants and refugees are tortured in order to generate their family’s 
pity and ensure payment. Libyans in search of manpower can also 
come and buy workers by paying their debt at the ‘credit house’. 
That’s how many migrants and refugees become slaves. 
Conclusion: Roaming migrants, blocked asylum seekers, 
unemployed smugglers 
The combination of the situation in Libya and Law 2015–36 has had 
a large impact on migratory flows through Agadez in the direction of 
Europe. Migration has always been part of life in this town in the 
north of Niger. As its residents say: “it couldn’t be otherwise”. But 
the situation is different now from what it was eight years ago. This 
chapter describes the current situation of migrants, refugees and 
smugglers in Agadez (Niger) in the context of implementation of Law 
2015–36. 
 
From this research it is concluded that the journey has become a lot 
more perilous for the migrants. Many of them live through hell in 
Libya or in the desert before coming back to Agadez. Their stories 
are hard to tell. Listening to them is no easy task either. Some of them 
suffer from psychological trouble. Others come back with physical 
scars. In all cases, their pockets are empty. 
 
Due to the situation in Libya and Law 2015–36, the cost of the 
journey has increased. Prices have gone up as the number of migrants 
and refugees has dropped and as the drivers are taking the risk of 
being arrested and sent to jail. In addition, the relationship between 
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migrants and refugees and migration professionals has deteriorated. 
Passengers have always feared their drivers and drivers have always 
despised their passengers. Yet today, migrants and refugees know 
before leaving that their driver might abandon them in the desert or 
sell them to a ‘credit house’ in Libya. 
 
Lastly, the road has got longer. Migrants and refugees make longer 
stops, trying to earn some money for their onward journey. They are 
often forced to turn back and start again by a different path. One of 
the main consequences of Law 2015–36 is that more migrants and 
refugees are roaming around the Sahel. Some of them are going back 
home with IOM, although they are not necessarily sure that they will 
not try to go to Europe again later. 
 
Regarding refugees, many leave a chaotic Libya and gather in 
neighbouring countries. Niger barely manages to welcome everybody. 
It is following agreements with UNHCR that the Nigerien state will 
serve as a transit land for refugees applying for resettlement. 
Furthermore, UNHCR has had to convince the authorities to house 
asylum seekers in Agadez. And yet the situation of the 1,666 Sudanese 
stuck in Agadez registered with UNHCR has not changed in a year. 
Left alone, some of them feel like going back to Libya and making a 
new attempt at reaching Europe, which is in total contradiction with 
the EU policies currently being applied in that region. 
 
Migration professionals have likewise suffered from the deterioration 
of the situation in Libya and the implementation of Law 2015–36. 
The majority have ended up jobless. The decrease in migration has 
had an impact on the city’s economy, as migrants and refugees used 
to inject money on each level: from the smuggler to the canister 
retailers and the police. 
 
Those migration professionals who actually received the 
compensation that was promised in return for quitting are few at this 
point in time. The migration professionals who have found 
themselves jobless may easily slip into petty crime or become prey for 
terrorist groups operating in the region. Some smugglers who kept 
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working and newcomers to the business have seen their profits 
increase as a result of the rise in the price of crossing the desert. 
However, the risks taken by professionals have also grown. They can 
now be arrested and imprisoned, they can face breakdowns and 
accidents in the desert, and they often end up with blood on their 
hands. By operating illegally, smugglers have become criminals. 
 
This chapter aimed at sketching a general picture of the situation of 
migrants, refugees and smugglers in Agadez. Several topics have been 
mentioned, without development. Many issues need further 
investigation and more thorough study. Despite the contact made 
with the authorities and security forces during the immersion in the 
city, their comments have not been reproduced here. In future 
research it would be compelling to bring our attention to the citizens 
of Agadez who are not directly involved in migration and the decrease 
in migratory flows. 
 
Finally, it is important to underline that the aim of this work is not to 
judge Law 2015–36, but to merely highlight its consequences. 
Prohibiting all economic activities related to migration has had a 
serious impact on Agadez. The chaotic state of affairs in Libya has 
brought about similar effects. In spite of the adverse impact of the 
law, one question remains unanswered: what would migration in 
Agadez look like if the law had never been implemented? 
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Unprotected Refugees Kept Powerless and Silent 
 
Mirjam Van Reisen, Klara Smits & Morgane Wirtz 
 
Introduction 
Libya has long been a destination for migrants and refugees, mainly 
as a place to work, but also a transit country for those seeking to go 
to Europe (Hamood, 2008). 
In 2008, the Italian 
Government and then 
President Gaddafi arranged a 
special deal to push migrants 
and refugees in the 
Mediterranean Sea back to 
Libya. This coincided with a 
new form of human 
trafficking for ransom – Sinai 
trafficking – which emerged 
in 2008 and came into full 
swing in 2009 (Van Reisen & 
Rijken, 2015). In this new 
form of human trafficking, 
migrants and refugees, many 
of whom were Eritrean, were 
locked up in torture 
warehouses in the Sinai. The 
human traffickers extorted 
the victims by calling their family and friends and forcing them to 
listen to the sounds and screams of their loved ones being tortured. 
After 2012, this new form of human trafficking for ransom migrated 
west to Libya and the broader region (including Sudan and Chad), 
after routes through the Sinai were stopped by a high-tech fence 
After the legitimisation of some militias 
as enforcers and coast guards, the 
landscape of human smuggling and 
trafficking in Libya has changed 
drastically. The trafficking networks 
have gone underground and profit-
making has become less about moving 
people across the Mediterranean Sea and 
more about human trafficking for ransom 
and forced labour. Refugees are kept in 
warehouse, abused and commoditised, 
sold and extorted for ransom. The almost 
total control of digital technology by 
‘gatekeepers’ keeps the refugees in a 
‘black hole’, which plays a vital role in 
the repression and human trafficking of 
refugees in Libya. 
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constructed on the border between Israel and the Sinai, as well as anti-
terrorism activity in the Sinai dessert (Van Reisen et al., 2017).  
 
But how are such inhumane practices able to take root and flourish 
in today’s modern world? Surprisingly, this practice emerged at a time 
when digital connectivity, in particular, the use of mobile phones, hit 
a global level (Van Reisen et al., 2018; Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015; Van 
Reisen & Mawere, 2017). Although, often assumed to be positive, 
developments in technology do not benefit everyone equally. While 
information is distributed to some, it fails to reach others, creating 
‘black holes’ in the socio-digital landscape (Castells, 2000). In Africa, 
where inequality is pronounced and access to connectivity and digital 
technology is unequal, the effect of these black holes is distinct. 
Within these black holes, information exchange is limited due low 
connectivity and high levels of control. In this communication 
structure, people in black holes rely on gatekeepers of information, 
who keep a tight hold over the information exchanges that take place 
(Van Reisen, Smits, Stokmans, & Mawere, forthcoming, 2019). 
 
Libya can be described as a black hole in the information landscape, 
especially in places that are under the control of fragmented militia. 
In 2018, Freedom House (2018) analysed Internet freedom in Libya 
and noted that the country suffers from both physical obstacles (such 
as power outages), as well as restrictions on freedom of the press. 
There is limited access to the Internet and access is controlled. This 
is especially the case where migrants and refugees are held in captivity, 
as will emerge later in this chapter. 
 
This chapter looks at the relationship between the gatekeepers and 
‘the gated’ in Libya. These gatekeepers range from human smugglers 
and traffickers, to police, detention centre guards, and workers from 
humanitarian organisations such as the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The chapter explores how 
the evolution and spread of information communication technology 
(ICT) relates to the emergence of human trafficking for ransom and 
its development into a full-blown criminal trade. The focus of the 
research is on Eritrean refugees who are or were held in Libya. It is 
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difficult to give an estimate of the number of refugees in Libya, as 
presence on the ground is challenging. Of the refugees registered by 
UNHCR currently in detention in Libya, Eritreans form the largest 
majority by far – 2,589 individuals as at June 2019, which is 66% of 
the total number of refugees registered with (UNHCR, 2019b). 
However, this does not include unregistered refugees. The closest 
realistic estimate is that over 11,000 Eritrean refugees are held 
involuntarily in camps and detention centres in Libya at the time of 
writing (Melicherová, 2019). This large number of generally young 
Eritrean refugees, many of whom are unaccompanied and separated 
minors, is of great concern. Eritrean refugees have the right to 
protection under international law and the European member states 
regard around 90% of Eritreans as entitled to asylum (Eurostat, 
2018). Many Eritrean refugees have been held in captivity in Libya for 
long periods of time. In addition, since 2009, they have constituted a 
high percentage of the people who have fallen victim to human 
trafficking for ransom (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017), first in the Sinai 
desert of Egypt, and currently in Libya and other countries, such as 
Sudan. This chapter zooms in on how their situation has evolved in 
Libya. The main research question is: What is the role of the gatekeepers 
and the situation of Eritrean refugees as a gated community living in a black hole 
in the digital landscape in Libya?  
Methodology 
This study was conducted as a literature review and an explorative 
ethnographic case study. The case study consisted of interviews with 
refugees and resource person, focus group discussions and 
observations. The document and literature review includes reports, 
news articles and policy documents that have covered the situation of 
human trafficking in Libya in the past years. The research was 
conducted over a period of three years, from 2016 to 2019.  
 
The focus on Eritrean refugees was chosen given that this group 
forms an ‘extreme case’. An extreme case methodology is justified for 
a particular problem to emerge more clearly (Jahnukainen, 2010). The 
group of Eritrean refugees in Libya are distinct because of their 
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reason for moving to Libya, their composition, and their proportional 
presence among victims of human trafficking. What sets Eritrean 
refugees apart is that this group is generally accepted for protection 
under international law – and they are, therefore, clearly refugees, 
even if they are denied such protection – and the group comprises 
many young refugees, unaccompanied and separated children, and 
pregnant girls and young women. It also seems that human trafficking 
for ransom specifically affects Eritrean refugees. 
 
Interviews were conducted with 35 Eritreans between February and 
July 2019. The interviews were in-depth and semi-structured. Two 
Eritreans were interviewed twice, with follow up questions focused 
on details relevant to the research. The interviewees had all been held 
in Libya between 2014 and 2019 and spent anywhere from 40 days to 
3 years there. Most of the interviews were done in Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Ethiopia and Niger. Several interviews were 
conducted via WhatsApp with three refugees in various camps in 
Libya. One refugee was later interviewed face-to-face in Niger. Three 
testimonies presented in public by Eritrean refugees between 
December 2018 and April 2019 were also included. In addition, in-
depth interviews were held with resource persons. Most of the 
interviews were done individually, although three were conducted 
with two people at once, one of which was a family with two children 
(the children were not interviewed). The interviews were extensive 
and carried out over several months while the respondents resided in 
different locations. All interviews were conducted in English, 
Tigrinya (with translation) or Dutch. They were recorded and 
transcribed and analysed through open coding-labelling. In addition 
to the interviews, a focus group discussion was held in the 
Netherlands with six refugees on 27 March 2019. During this 
meeting, experiences were extensively shared. The conversations 
were translated from Tigrinya to English. 
 
Given the researchers’ work on human trafficking among Eritrean 
refugees, they were able to build trust among the community, which 
helped facilitate access. The second and third researchers carried out 
site visits and interviews in Niger. In the setting, the first and third 
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researchers had direct or indirect contact with human smugglers and 
traffickers to help understand the way they saw their work. Research 
on human trafficking is sensitive and it requires trust among 
respondents and researchers, especially given the sensitivity of the 
stories. The researchers took time and prepared for the interviews 
over two years, by conducting document reviews and engaging with 
the community. Being well embedded in the community and present 
in different countries relevant to the research, the researchers were 
able to enter the community through trusted persons. 
 
In order to ensure the safety of the participants in the research, all 
names are withheld (but known to the researchers) and all 
information is provided such that it cannot lead to a particular person. 
In the citations of WhatsApp messages, the language is adapted, 
without changing the meaning, to make the messages accessible to 
the reader. The names of people provided in the interviews in relation 
to smuggling and human trafficking have not been anonymised 
because these names have been published on earlier occasions and 
emerge often, consistently and regularly in the interviews. The 
authors deem it in the public interest that these names are made 
available. Although this is the case, this is an ethnographic study and 
is based on observations, as they have been provided by the 
participants in the study; the chapter does not contain legal analysis 
or make any legal accusations. 
Theory of gatekeeping 
The concept of gatekeepers is used to describe the individuals or 
processes in control over the filtration, cutting down and selecting of 
information (Shoemaker, Vos & Reese, 2009). This filtered 
information then reaches the target audience, the gated (Barzilai-
Nahon, 2008). The concept is most often used to describe the process 
of selection and editing in traditional media such as newspapers, but 
it has also been used more generally to mean people who mediate 
between different isolated groups. The term gatekeeper has been 
widely used in other areas of study as well, for example, to describe 
those who control access to information and relations (Tushman & 
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Katz, 1980). Network gatekeepers are those who perform the role of 
information guardian in any form of network (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008). 
In the case of refugees on the move, many different actors, including 
smugglers and traffickers of people, authorities, refugee 
organisations, friends and relatives, can act as gatekeepers.  
 
The role of gatekeepers is especially powerful in the context of black 
holes in the information architecture. Digital innovations can create 
power imbalances, which are used by those with (full) access to 
technology and information to exploit those who do not have (full) 
access (Castells, 2000). Castells argues that technology creates a new 
social structure from which the elite profit, but others become 
trapped in ‘black holes’ of informational capitalism. Van Reisen, 
Smits, Stokmans and Mawere (Chapter 2, Network Gatekeepers in 
Human Trafficking: Profiting from the Misery of Eritreans in the Digital Era) 
explain how this new digital social structure bears close resemblance 
to the information society created during the colonial era. This 
structure facilitates the flow of data to certain areas, while leaving 
other places disconnected, as ‘black holes’ in the information 
landscape. This is particularly pertinent in Africa, given the vast size 
of the continent, extreme differences in wealth, and low physical 
connectivity to the Internet. 
 
In order to describe the role of gatekeepers and the situation of the 
gated with regard to Eritrean refugees in Libya, the theoretical 
framework on network gatekeeping proposed by Barzilai-Nahon 
(2008) is used. In order to assess the relation between gatekeepers and 
gated, as well as the mechanisms of gatekeeping, Barzilai-Nahon 
looks at the salience of the gated with regard to the gatekeepers. In 
other words, the theory assesses the degree to which the gated are 
controlled by the gatekeepers. Barzilai-Nahon states that the 
gatekeeper-gated relationship relies on four attributes: 1) the 
autonomy and alternative information sources available to the gated; 
2) the ability of the gated to produce and distribute information freely; 
3) the relationship between the gated and the gatekeeper, considering 
that a direct and enduring relationship can produce a platform of 
negotiation between the gated and the gatekeeper; and 4) the political 
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power involved in the gated-gatekeeper relation. The gated can 
possess attributes in any number of those four categories, including 
none at all – the lower the score, the more information control the 
gatekeepers can exert over the gated. Following these distinctions, 
this chapter investigates the human trafficking of Eritreans in Libya 
from the perspective of the relationship between the gated and the 
gatekeeper. 
Situation in Libya 
In 2017, the world was shocked by a CNN video of people being sold 
as slaves in Libyan markets (Elbagir, Razek, Platt & Jones, 2017). 
Other videos emerged showing migrants and refugees being held in 
captivity, tortured and forced to beg for ransom from family 
members (Elbagir, Razek, Platt & Jones, 2018). After the 
legitimisation of some militias in Libya as enforcers and coast guards, 
the landscape of human smuggling and trafficking in Libya has 
changed drastically. Micallef (2019) argues that it is not so much the 
work of the Libyan coast guards, but the change on Libyan soil that 
led to the drastic drop in migrants and refugees crossing the 
Mediterranean Sea to Europe. Starting in the Libyan city of Sabratha, 
militias that were involved in the smuggling and trafficking of people 
changed their tactic overnight and became the security outfits tasked 
with stopping smuggling and trafficking. In response, the trafficking 
networks went underground and profit-making became less about 
moving people through Libya and pushing them out to sea, and more 
about forced labour and human trafficking for ransom.  
 
The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (UNSMIL 
& OHCHR, 2018) remark in their report, Desperate and Dangerous: 
Report on the Human Rights Situation of Migrants and Refugees in Libya, that 
Libyan authorities are either unwilling or unable to tackle the human 
rights abuses in Libya. In addition, UNSMIL states that it: 
 
[...] continues to receive credible information on the complicity of some State actors, 
including local officials, members of armed groups formally integrated into State 
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institutions, and representatives of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence, 
in the smuggling or trafficking of migrants and refugees. (UNSMIL & OHCHR, 
2018, p. 6) 
 
In July 2018, the UN Security Council, in the first resolution of its 
kind, added six individuals to its Libya sanctions list for their 
complicity in human trafficking (UN Security Council, 2018). Four of 
these were Libyan nationals and two were Eritreans, Ermias Ghermay 
and Fitiwi Abdelrazak (Jaura, 2018), who had been earlier identified 
by Van Reisen & Mawere (2017). One of the Libyans named in the 
resolution was the head of a regional arm of the Libyan Coast Guard. 
The report by UNSMIL remarks that despite overwhelming evidence 
of abuse, the Libyan authorities seem unwilling to take action against 
or even acknowledge the violence taking place in trafficking 
warehouses in Libya.  
 
UNSMIL received consistent testimonies from migrants and refugees about horrific 
treatment, degrading conditions, and frequent rapes in captivity […] Despite the 
well documented patterns of abuse against migrants and refugees by smugglers and 
traffickers and the frequent recovery, across Libya, of bodies of unidentified Sub-
Saharan migrants and refugees bearing gunshot wounds, torture and burn marks, 
the Libyan authorities have appeared largely unable and unwilling to address or even 
recognize crimes committed against migrants and refugees. As Libyan law 
criminalizes irregular migration and lacks any measures to protect victims of 
trafficking, migrants and refugees are reluctant to report abuse to Libyan authorities. 
(UNSMIL & OHCHR, 2018, pp. 26–27) 
 
According to the Head of the Presidential Council in Libya, Fayez al-
Sirraj, 800,000 migrants and refugees are residing in Libya, as of 
January 2019 (Assad, 2019). Only a fraction of these are housed in 
official detention centres. The vast majority are stuck in human 
trafficking warehouses or on the streets of Libya. It is estimated by 
human rights activists that there are several thousand Eritreans stuck 
in situations of human trafficking in Libya (Human rights defender 
11, interview, face-to-face, Italy, 18/19 March 2019). The UNHCR 
states that as of July 2019, there are 50,000 registered refugees and 
asylum seekers in Libya (UNHCR, 2019a). 
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Of the refugees and migrants stuck in Libya, the OHCHR and 
UNSMIL have reported that Somali and Eritrean individuals seem 
most likely to be held in captivity for prolonged periods of time 
(UNSMIL & OHCHR, 2018). UNSMIL commented that this 
appears to be the case because smugglers and traffickers think that 
these communities can pay more, due to the likelihood of them being 
granted refugee status in Europe and the disposition of the diaspora 
communities. According to estimates by the International 
Organization for Migration’s (IOM’s), there are some detention 
centres where there are almost exclusively Eritreans, such as 
Abusliem (793 Eritreans out of a total of 838), Al Zintan (700 
Eritreans out of a total of 915) and Alkhums (310 Eritreans out of a 
total of 438) (Human rights defender 11, interview, face-to-face, Italy, 
18/19 March 2019). 
 
UN agencies described the scope of the abuses against migrants and 
refugees in Libya as including death, detention, abuse, sexual violence 
and rape, exploitation and starvation (UNSMIL & OHCHR, 2018). 
Degrading treatment includes the lack of hygiene, adequate food and 
water, and lack of access to health care for (seriously) ill people. 
Tuberculosis is rampant in the centres and the direct cause of death 
for many. In addition, many detention centres have been the scene of 
violence, most prominent among which is the shooting of detainees 
in Qasr bin Ghashir detention centre in April 2019 (Médicins sans 
Frontières, n.d.) and the airstrike on Tajoura detention centre in July 
2019 (Wintour, 2019). Organisations such as IOM and UNHCR, as 
well as the African Union (African Union, 2019), have called for the 
release of all migrants and refugees from detention centres, replacing 
them instead with open facilities. When refugees and migrants are 
trapped in detention, the only options for escape are through IOM’s 
Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programme or 
evacuation through the Emergency Transit Mechanism by UNHCR 
to Niger, from where refugees can be resettled to other countries 
(IOM, 2018). The UNHCR emphasises that more places for 




Gatekeeping in Libya and the situation of refugees as a gated 
community 
In order to look at gatekeeping in Libya, it should first be established 
who are the gatekeepers in relation to the gated, in this case the 
Eritrean refugees in Libya. Whereas gatekeeping theory refers to the 
control of information, every aspect of the lives of Eritrean refugees 
in Libya is controlled by the gatekeepers. From the interviews, three 
main categories of gatekeepers emerged: human traffickers and 
smugglers, who form a single category as the distinction is blurred in 
the context of Libya; Libyan authorities, such as militias working with 
the Government of National Accord, guards and chiefs of detention 
centres; and international organisations and actors such as UNHCR, 
IOM and international delegations. When looking at the four 
attributes of the gated in relation to the gatekeepers, these three 
categories will be included in this order.  
Autonomy and alternative information sources  
The first attribute in the theory of gatekeeping set out by Barzilai-
Nahon (2008) is the autonomy and alternative information sources 
available to the gated. In Libya, access to information is severely 
restricted for Eritrean refugees. Many of them enter Libya via the 
town of Kufra, which lies relatively close to the border with Sudan, 
from where they are transported to warehouses in places such as Bani 
Walid. All of the refugees interviewed were held by human traffickers 
at some point, often multiple times, for weeks to years, while they 
arrangement for the payment of their journey and/or ransom. Many 
Eritrean refugees do not carry a phone with them on the journey, but 
if they do carry a phone, it is both dangerous and difficult to keep 
possession of it. One Eritrean refugee explained the difficulty of 
keeping a phone on the journey from Sudan to Libya: “You hide the 
phone inside your clothes or anything. Because it is so hard to pass 
the telephone. If the smugglers see the phone, they take it” (Refugee 
13, interview, face-to-face, Niger, 4 July 2019). 
 
The unofficial places of detention run by human traffickers are 
described as warehouses with as many as 1,000 or more people 
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crowded under one roof. Locations include Bani Walid, Shwerif, 
Kufra and Sabratha, among others. 
 
We know that the town is Bani Walid, but we don't know the town. We are in the 
side of the town. We are in a big house. People are crowded together there. […] 
Women, children, all nationalities, put together. (Refugee 10, interview, face-
to-face in Niger, 9 July 2019)  
 
The refugees shared that they are not viewed as human beings in these 
places, but only as a marketable source of income. In these 
warehouses, even speaking to each other is strictly forbidden by the 
guards: “There were Libyans with guns. If someone speaks loudly, 
they say, please stop talking. And one was shooting at a guy for 
talking. Only the Libyan people are speaking with the Eritrean 
smugglers (Refugee 1, interview, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 17 
March 2019). 
 
In such situations, the inflow of information is fully controlled by the 
guards and the traffickers, who do not provide information to the 
refugees. One refugee spoke of the fearful experience of being caught 
in the middle of heavy fighting between militias in Sabratha, which 
started around September 2017. Despite the fighting, the refugees 
who were trapped received no information and were often left alone 
by their guards for days as the fighting worsened: “We are locked. We 
see only some holes – we see some soldiers shooting. They come to 
us. The heavy tanks are coming. Our lives are going from bad to 
worse” (Refugee 10, interview, face-to-face, Niger, 9 July 2019). 
Another refugee caught in the same fighting confirmed: “You just 
listen to the arms [gunshots] – they tell you nothing” (Refugee 13, 
interview, face-to-face, Niger, 4 July 2019). 
 
Information exchange starts to be possible only when the refugees 
are captured by the Libyan police or coast guard, or report to 
UNHCR. After that, they are taken to detention centres. The 
conditions in the detention centres varies, with the worst conditions 
reported in the more isolated centres. The autonomy and access to 
information varies based on the detention centre where the refugee is 
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located and relies mostly on the ability of the refugees and migrants 
inside to obtain and hold onto a phone, which they are then able to 
use for sparse communication. In Gharyan detention centre, for 
example, one refugee described only one phone being available and 
hidden carefully: “In Gharyan […] they remove all the clothes from 
your body then they collect money and phones, also documents” 
(Refugee 23, interview, WhatsApp, Libya, 18 March 2019). 
 
Refugees state that, in some instances, obtaining a phone is possible 
by bribing the guards. Other things, such as credit, can also be 
obtained by paying the guards or other workers: “They are entering 
the money in the phone” (Refugee 10, interview, face-to-face, Niger, 
9 July 2019). 
 
The UNHCR faces severe challenges in guaranteeing the rights of 
refugees in detention centres in Libya, by their own admission 
(UNHCR, n.d.). Especially in detention centres that are not easy to 
reach, this leads to a sense of abandonment by the refugees. Many 
also state that UNHCR does not give them sufficient information 
about their situation, refugee status determination or evacuation. 
 
We are dying slowly. Why the world is killing us slowly? Where is UNHCR? 
(Refugee 10, interview, WhatsApp, Libya, 11 January 2019) 
 
Sometimes in the prison they give us clothes, shoes, blanket, soap from UNHCR. 
But the policemen take it. (Refugee 24, interview, face-to-face, Niger, 4 
April 2019) 
 
Through limited access to phones, refugees in Libya are in touch with 
other Eritreans and, in some cases, journalists or activists outside the 
country. Pictures, information and posts on social media are shared 
in this way, which for many is the only alternative source of 
information available. Lack of information also means that the 
Eritrean refugees are often unsure of who to trust in detention 




Therefore, staff of international organisations – especially when also 
Libyan – may arouse suspicion.  
 
[…] when the Red Cross was coming there, some people were afraid. Maybe they 
are dressed like Red Cross, but it is not them. We cannot believe them. The Red 
Cross said: “Me I am working for Red Cross. If you believe me, I will make contact 
with someone from Eritrea”. They called someone from Eritrea. One that someone 
knows. He said: “Yes these people are from Red Cross”. (Refugee 32, interview, 
face-to-face in Niger, 4 April 2019) 
 
This shows that at every stage of their captivity in Libya, Eritrean 
refugees are unable to obtain information; information comes mostly 
from their social network via the few and shared mobile phones 
available (see below). They do not have access to independent 
information and they do not understand the situation in which they 
find themselves and what the future my hold. This results in mental 
health problems such as anxiety, stress and post-traumatic stress, 
depression and mistrust, including of international organisations, 
which are there to protect refugees.  
 
It can be concluded that Eritrean refugees have no significant 
autonomy and alternative information sources in Libya than the three 
categories of gatekeepers. In the hands of smugglers and traffickers, 
the refugees have no access to information sources such as phones – 
the traffickers do not provide them with information on what 
happens outside of the warehouses. Libyan authorities also severely 
repress access to information in detention, although through 
smuggled and hidden phones, very limited contact via social networks 
is possible for some. International actors and organisations face 
mistrust from the refugees and refugees state that they feel 
abandoned and uninformed by international organisations, mainly 
UNHCR. Hence, Eritrean refugees score low on this attribute. 
Information production and distribution  
The second attribute in the theory of gatekeeping is the ability of the 
gated to produce and distribute information freely. The previous 
section remarked on the difficulty for refugees to obtain and keep a 
274 
 
phone, which is one of the few links to the outside that they possess. 
The information that the refugees produce is, in many cases, extracted 
by force. In human trafficking warehouses, refugees are forced to pay 
ransoms – often multiple times. The amounts usually range from 
between USD 3,000 to 7,000 for every trafficker the refugee 
encounters. After paying the amount that was agreed for the journey 
from Sudan to Libya (‘the desert’) and from Libya to Europe (‘the 
sea’), many are told the amount they owe is higher than what was 
agreed. Even after paying, many end up in the hands of other 
traffickers, either because they are sold or as a result of fighting 
between different groups of traffickers over control of territory.  
 
The extortion of ransom happens through mobile phones. Family 
and friends are forced to listen to the cries of their loved ones as they 
are tortured:  
 
Every morning he comes. He puts the people in a line. Every person he gave telephone. 
Family, friends, he asked you to call them to ask them to send money. Me I don’t 
have anybody to pay money. I will hold the line, but who will I call? They beat you 
when you call your family or your friends. They have sticks. Also, in the cold time 
they throw cold water on us. It’s cold. He beats. When you hold the telephone, he 
beats. When he hears your family voice, he will beat you. (Refugee 25, interview, 
face-to-face, Niger, 4 April 2019) 
 
In addition to phone calls, pictures and videos are also circulated 
(Hayden, 2019). Often, refugees reported have access to the same 
pictures and videos, which are circulated on social media, serving 
both as extortion mechanisms and to put fear into other (future) 
victims. This modus operandi of using digital technology is highly 
effective:  
 
They try to give you a phone and beat you, to cry, to shout, so that your family will 
sell things in their house, like gold. Gather money, like in church. That's why they 
can pay. If you can't pay, sometimes they kill you. If they don't kill you, they sell 




Most refugees stated that during their trip, they had sparse or no 
contact with family. For some families, the extortion calls from Libya 
were the first sign that their loved one was still alive: “I am not in 
touch with them, but I call to my family [when I was] in Libya. Even 
now, I'm not in touch. Only in Libya” (Refugee 17, interview, face-
to-face, Niger, 8 July 2019). 
 
This shows that, rather than the classic definition of a gatekeeper, 
who is someone who dictates what information the gated receive, 
human traffickers also decide what information the refugees are able 
to produce and distribute. This creates widespread fear in the Eritrean 
community, which leads to compliance and payments, which in turn 
reinforces the lucrative profits generated by the traffickers.  
 
In the official detention centres, there are severe restrictions on the 
information that refugees are able to send out: “Now in Gharyan only 
one phone is there. Only after 10:00 pm is it turned on” (Refugee 23, 
interview, WhatsApp, Libya, 18 March 2019). Some refugees 
maintain contact with the outside through journalists or human rights 
defenders, but they are highly cautious of the information they send 
out. If they are caught sending out information that could be 
damaging, the guards will arbitrarily punish them. In the example 
below, a refugee wanted to take a picture to communicate about the 
bad meal they received for lunch:  
 
A: There is open war here between my friend and the Libyan police 
MR: Why? 
A: Today our lunch is very bad. 
MR: What happened? 
A: I told you to wait for me to take a picture. 
MR: I want to take a picture to send you. 
A: But the police took my phone, they made me delete the picture and gave me a 
warning. (Refugee 23, interview, WhatsApp, Libya, 28 April 2019). 
 
Visitors to detention centres, in addition to UNHCR, are Médicins 
Sans Frontières, Red Cross, international delegations that visit to 
obtain information, and delegations that visit for the repatriation of 
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individuals locked up there. However, during these visits, several 
methods are used by the Libyan authorities in charge to minimise 
their access to information produced by refugees:  
 
When the UNHCR come, the Libyan policemen will take all Eritreans outside. 
They will say that these people are free. Understand? There are many Europeans 
who will come to see you in that place. When they leave, all the people will enter the 
store [detention holding centre]. When they have finish their work, they start beat 
us. “Go!” “Enter!” When you are praying, they beat you! When you need to sleep, 
they beat you! (Refugee 25, interview, face-to-face, Niger, 4 April 2019) 
 
The conditions repeatedly reported in detention centres include lack 
of food, water, hygiene, and medical treatment; lack of light; 
punishment; isolated detention in harsh conditions; lack of clothing; 
and severe beating. One journalist describes her experiences of 
witnessing a foreign delegation in Libya speaking to a refugee who 
told them frankly about the situation. Afterwards, his friends 
contacted her to explain that he was severely beaten.  
 
[…] right now, this person is beaten, so the information was collected by speaking 
with this fellow’s friends in Tajoura, by hidden phone; they are all extremely scared 
to speak about this, because they are afraid of what could happen to them. They told 
me “he was beaten in front of us, like a snake”. And he could not even stand up 
after they had beaten him, and then he was brought to this separate cell, where he is 
now staying with other guys who either have tried to escape from the centre or so on. 
(Journalist 12, interview, face-to-face, Belgium, 1 April 2019) 
 
A statement by an Eritrean refugee describes a similar situation, 
which happened after talking to representatives of IOM. 
 
One day, IOM came to visit the centre and us and the two Eritrean people explained 
what was happening in the centre, but when IOM left, the police took the two persons 
who spoke and testified about the living conditions, and now we do not know where 
they are. (M., public presentation, Brussels, 13 December 2018) 
Refugees who protest about the conditions also face consequences 
and may even be shot at. One refugee recounted how he was shot 
after 20 refugees were taken from his detention centre and sold. 
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When another 20 were threatened to be sold, the refugees protested 
and the interviewee was shot: 
 
We fight with the police there. They tried to sell us, many times. They take a lot of 
people. After that, we ask "why did you take them?" So, they tried to beat us. After 
that, one police, he shot two people. Me and another... (Refugee 13, interview, 
face-to-face, Niger, 4 July 2019) 
 
General punishments for speaking out serve as a warning to others: 
 
People are beaten, in front of the others, in order to tell “ok, do it again and this will 
be the treatment”. They put them in a different room, or they lock them, or they say 
we won’t give you food or we won’t give you water, or just harassment. So just to 
make people afraid of speaking out. (Journalist 12, interview, face-to-face, 
Belgium, 1 April 2019) 
 
Furthermore, access for civil society organisations and journalists is 
impossible in human trafficking warehouses and very difficult in 
detention centres. This makes information on what is going on in the 
holding places difficult to obtain, as described by a journalist who 
went to Libya: 
 
So as a foreign media person, if you want to report, you have to register at the foreign 
ministry department that is under the Sarraj – the recognised government. There, 
you need to specify why and so on. And then, if they want, they will give you an 
authorisation and you will be followed by someone from the department. So, this 
means that all your work is followed by someone who is telling you what to do and 
what not to do. I mean, you are not really freely able to collect what you want without 
putting people at risk. And, also, let’s not forget that even if you have access and you 
are able to enter those detention centres, the people who have the courage to speak 
with you because they are fed up with the situation, they may face consequences. 
(Journalist 12, interview, face-to-face, Belgium, 1 April 2019)  
 
There was a situation where they were giving food. […] Then he was saying, “film, 
film!”. I don’t want to film, you know. I want to film and I want to ask to the 
people if they are ok to be filmed. So even this treating people as objects or just saying 
“we have the right over them and we decide how you film about them or what you 
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do”. That’s not the kind of work I like to do. I like to sit with someone and discuss 
and then film. (Journalist 12, interview, face-to-face in Belgium, 1 April 
2019) 
 
The tight control over information means that any attempt to raise 
awareness about the situation carries severe risks. Even so, refugees 
in detention centres organise protests where they sit with crossed 
arms – pictures and videos of such protests are shared on Facebook, 
in hope of wide circulation.  
 
UNHCR and IOM, as well as other organisations, have limited access 
to Eritrean refugees and do report on their situation, however, those 
communications are not under the control of the refugees. Therefore, 
the organisations – by necessity – play the role of gatekeeper, when it 
comes to the production and distribution of information. Part of the 
control of information comes from the dependency of the refugees 
on UNHCR and other organisations. Even outside of Libya, Eritrean 
refugees who have been evacuated, but remain under UNHCR 
protection, express fear that any information they give may 
compromise their case with UNHCR. Therefore, respondents are 
difficult to find and those willing to speak often seek repeated 
assurances from the researchers that they are not part of UNHCR 
and that their interviews will remain anonymous.  
 
In conclusion, information production and distribution by refugees is 
affected by all three categories of gatekeepers. The human traffickers 
and smugglers fully control the use of mobile phones and other digital 
media, using it to force Eritrean refugees to ask for ransom from 
family and friends, while their images and sounds of torture are used 
to increase pressure. Libyan authorities in detention centres also 
strictly control information outflows, handing out severe 
punishments for unauthorised phone use or speaking to foreign 
visitors. Journalists face severe restrictions on free reporting, while 
authorities attempt to present a positive image of the detention 
centres. UNHCR and other international actors have limited access 
to collect and distribute information from refugees, beyond their own 
mandate. Hence, Eritrean refugees also, score low on this attribute. 
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Relationship between refugees and the gatekeepers 
The essence of this attribute is whether an exchange is able to take 
place between the gated and the gatekeepers – for this, a relationship 
that can form a platform of negotiation has to exist. Most Eritrean 
refugees who were interviewed knew at least a nickname of the 
person who was overall in charge of their trafficking and/or 
smuggling. However, the relationship and any chance of negotiation 
usually did not go any further than that. The traffickers and smugglers 
are often only known to the Eritreans because of conversations via 
the phone or because they have overheard the name being mentioned 
by people who work for the smuggler or trafficker. For example, 
when payment needs to be made, the people who work for the 
traffickers often specify the trafficker who the payment is destined 
for. However, most do not know prior to arriving in Libya that a 
major trafficker is the one in charge of their travel and payment. 
Smaller actors, posing as smugglers, do not mention this information 
when negotiating over the phone or in person in Sudan. Finding 
people to take you to Libya is not a challenge: 
 
It’s difficult to identify who collects us. “Oh, you want to go to Libya.” “Yes, I am 
not accepting to live in Khartoum, thus I want to go to Libya”. Ok, so someone 
comes and collects everyone in one car. (Refugee 1, interview, face-to-face, the 
Netherlands, 17 March 2019)  
 
In Libya, the passengers are distributed to warehouses belonging to 
different traffickers: “When you enter Libya, the first city after the 
border is called Kufra. There all the connection men are waiting for 
their different passengers. For me, my smuggler was A. He is 
Eritrean” (Refugee 32, interview, face-to-face in Niger, 4 April 2019). 
 
This process leaves the Eritrean refugees mostly in the dark as to the 
identity of their traffickers until they are already locked up. Even then, 
they know few details. In one case, an interviewee stated that the top 
trafficker had visited the place where he was detained: “It was at night 
time. Speakers say “Medhanie, Medhanie”… we heard this. He was 
loudly announced” (Refugee 1, Interview, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 
17 March 2019). However, the Eritrean refugees have no chance to 
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engage in conversation or negotiate with the high-level smugglers and 
traffickers: 
 
I know only the names, I didn’t see them. Only the people who organised us: “Oh, 
this is from Welid and this is from Medhanie”. They separated us – but where is 
Welid, where is Medhanie, I don’t know. No one knows. (Refugee 1, interview, 
face-to-face, the Netherlands, 17 March 2019) 
 
Negotiations over price usually take place in Khartoum, Sudan, with 
middlemen before departure. However, the prices that were originally 
agreed upon before departure to Libya often suddenly increased upon 
arrival: “In Sudan, the connection man said, me, I pay USD 3,800. 
But when I entered in Bani Walid, he asked me for USD 5,500” 
(Refugee 25, interview, face-to-face, Niger, 4 April 2019). 
 
After arriving in Libya, the situation often switches from apparent 
facilitation of transportation to human trafficking, due to the increase 
in price or because people are sold after paying the agreed amount. 
Phones are used to extort ransoms from the Eritreans, but the 
numbers of the smugglers and traffickers often change: But I will 
never call him. I am afraid […]. This is the phone number for 
Abduselam. But they change phone numbers from hour to hour” 
(Refugee 23, interview, WhatsApp, Libya, 4 April 2019). 
 
A platform of negotiation is not present. If a refugee or his/her family 
and friends are unable to pay, torture will follow until the money is 
found. If the money is paid, this is communicated through the 
trafficking network by sending codes, after which the refugees are 
released for the next phase of transport, or sold to other traffickers. 
If the money is not paid, two options remain: either the refugee is 
killed or sold to another trafficker who repeats the process. Some 
traffickers have a bad reputation – this is sometime used by other 
traffickers, who often cooperate, to threaten victims: 
 
They tried to scare us, to take us to Abdella Sini [translator noted the man was 
notorious for violence]. So we stay for a week or two weeks [with Abdella Sini] and 
he beat us. He tried to force us to pay. So, after two weeks or one week, they returned 
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us to our place. And then another time, he did that. But we have no money. 
(Refugee 17, interview, face-to-face, Niger, 8 July 2019) 
 
The traffickers in charge of the network are often not located in 
Libya: 
 
The boss is in Dubai. […] sometimes he calls us. Because if you don't pay 
money, bad things will happen to you. […] He says, "If you don't pay the 
money, I will sell you". If they sell you, the ransom increases. (Refugee 17, 
interview, face-to-face, Niger, 8 July 2019) 
 
Family and friends of the Eritrean refugees who pay the ransoms and 
fees are also unable to form any relationship with the smugglers. 
When they are able to pay, they do not meet with the smugglers. In 
all cases, the family is told to leave the money in a location, mostly in 
either Sudan or Eritrea. 
 
Some of the traffickers are paid in Eritrea, so they have a branch there. Many people 
have paid there. Especially in 2014, 2015 and 2016. Now it happens less.  
In Eritrea, the family paid – they were told to leave the money in the house, in the 
shop… They think it is normal. Some people get told where to leave the money. They 
never see the person who collects the money. They just get told where to leave it and 
go. (Human rights defender 11, interview, face-to-face, Italy, 18/19 
March 2019) 
 
Payments for Eritreans held in Libya are also done in Tel Aviv, in fact 
Eritreans in Tel Aviv pay for the entire trip from Eritrea to Europe 
from Tel Aviv, and they also pay there for ransoms when relatives are 
extorted: 
 
When I was in Tel Aviv, we paid for everyone from there. I paid USD 24,000 for 
three boys, one was my cousin, the other my nephew and then my brother. As we 
were living close to the border, they could cross to Ethiopia, then I paid in Tel Aviv 
for them to go from Hitsats refugee camp to Khartoum (USD 1,700 each), then 
from Khartoum to Libya, that was the same price and then from Tripoli to Italy, in 
2015, that was USD 2,000. I paid for the food and everything else, it was USD 
24,000. Then you get a code, you give that to the person for whom you pay. Then 
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they know you have paid. I paid it in Tel Aviv. I knew them, they are Eritreans, 
some from my own village. They receive the money, then it is sent to Dubai. They try 
to hide they are working with 09 Red Sea Corporation [owned by People’s Front 
for Democracy and Justice, the ruling party in Eritrea]. They give you a 
representative to pay the money to. We all pay it in cash in an open shop, they were 
receiving some USD 20,000 a day. We call them the ‘receiver of money’, in Tigrinya 
it is: ‘tekebali hawala’. (Refugee 39, interview, face-to-face, Ethiopia, 24 
July 2019) 
 
The payment system is secret and inaccessible: 
 
They open a small shop, but on the other side they do the hawala [traditional system 
of transferring money]. So, the shop is to hide the hawala. You can also pay in 
Asmara or Khartoum, or Tel Aviv or any city, and they can receive the money for 
your travel. You can pay anywhere for the ransom of people held in Sudan or Libya. 
They have links with the smugglers and traffickers in Sudan and Libya. Hegdef 
[Tigrinya name for the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice] is collecting the 
people and the money for the trafficking. (Refugee 39, interview, face-to-face, 
Ethiopia, 24 July 2019) 
 
Eritreans comment on the dehumanisation they face during the 
process of trafficking in Libya. They describe being treated like 
commodities that are valued according to their perceived worth in 
terms of ransom or sale. They state that persons of different origin 
are treated differently: 
 
Eritreans and Somali have money. They think like that. Ethiopians, they have no 
money. Sudan… they pay USD 500 for everything, from Sudan to Libya, by plain 
[desert] and sea. But for Eritrean, it is USD 1,200, 1,600. Even Somalis – more 
from us. Even more. So, everybody is not the same. (Refugee 13, interview, face-
to-face, Niger, 4 July 2019)  
 
When they see people from Eritrea, what they see is money. That is why they want 
to have us. (Refugee 24, interview, face-to-face, Niger, 4 April 2019) 
 
Refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are all placed under detention 
when arrested or returned from Mediterranean Sea. The NGO 
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Global Detention Project (2018) considers this detention arbitrary, as 
it is not part of a clear legal framework or process. All are placed in 
the category ‘illegal migrants’ for illegally entering and residing in the 
country. Some guards in the detention centres are available for some 
negotiation, for example, to obtain a phone, phone credit or other 
materials, as described earlier in the chapter. However, the 
interviewees expressed a general mistrust towards the Libyan guards 
and detention centre chiefs and described frequent beatings.  
 
In the detention centres, the gated are again unable to establish 
platforms of negotiation for information or their personal status. 
There is a risk in some detention centres of being sold back to the 
human traffickers. This is often disguised as an opportunity to cross 
the Mediterranean Sea. As the Eritrean refugees lack information on 
who to trust, it becomes a one-sided negotiation: 
 
The Libyan asks us: “If you want to cross the sea, just give us the money, we will 
send you”. But we say no. Because we are afraid that when we pay the money they 
[will] try to sell us. (Refugee 18, interview, face-to-face, Niger, 8 July 2019)  
 
UNHCR and other international organisations are not able to 
establish relationships with the gated beyond what their mandate 
states. Although they can provide some materials, such as clothes or 
medical care, the conditions are set by those in charge of the detention 
centres: “They [the UNHCR] cannot come for us, but we see them 
from afar. Because we are locked up” (Refugee 17, interview, face-to-
face, Niger, 8 July 2019).  
 
In conclusion, Eritrean refugees in Libya have hardly any ability to 
establish a direct relationship with the gatekeepers controlling the 
information flows. As for the human traffickers and smugglers, they 
do not know them directly and have no direct contact with them; 
payments are arranged far away and to extensions of networks that 
they have no knowledge of and no relationship with or control over. 
The gated see their gatekeepers as operating from a long distance 
away, and they lack access to them, which makes it virtually 
impossible to negotiate their situation. Agreements made outside of 
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Libya are often not kept. Eritrean refugees are locked up in detention 
centres arbitrarily and are in no position to negotiate their freedom or 
conditions. In some cases, Libyan authorities cooperate with human 
traffickers and sell the refugees to them. The relationship between 
international actors and the Eritrean refugees is also fully controlled 
by the Libyan authorities. Hence, Eritrean refugees score low on the 
third attribute, as well. 
Political power 
The fourth attribute of gatekeeping theory, political power, is 
expressed in three dimensions: control of actions; control of the 
policy agenda; and control over the shaping of preferences. Especially 
relevant to the political power of the gated, in this case the Eritrean 
refugees, is how much agency they are able to exercise over their 
situation in Libya and to what extent they are able to make choices. 
To a large extent, this relates strongly to the lack of ability to produce, 
distribute and receive the information described above. In Libya, the 
line between authorities and human traffickers is blurred, and with 
the inability of Eritreans to protest their situation, they feel powerless 
over their destination, the amount of money they have to pay and 
who they can turn to. The testimonies of refugees show that Libyan 
authorities are often directly benefiting from, and, therefore, involved 
in, the smuggling and trafficking of human beings. The authorities 
who in other contexts might be the ones protecting them, therefore, 
become the oppressors:  
 
We were arrested by the policemen. They have communication with the connection 
man. They took me to Misrata’s police station. Another connection man knew this 
place. His name is Abduselam. He is Eritrean. He has a good communication with 
the police. He asked the police to catch the people so that he could take them 
afterwards in exchange for money. (Refugee 24, interview, face-to-face, 
Niger, 4 April 2019) 
 
In such situations, the actions of the refugees are fully under the 
control of the gatekeepers. The gatekeepers – authorities and human 
traffickers – have free communication and know who they can trust. 
The relationship between the smugglers and traffickers and the police 
285 
 
enables them to freely travel around in Libya: “Every police is 
working under that [the system of cooperation with the traffickers]. 
If we travel from Shwerif to Tarabulus [Tripoli], there are posts – but 
the posts don't ask anything. Why?” (Refugee 13, interview, face-to-
face, Niger, 4 July 2019). 
 
Although most refugees say that they intended to go to Libya in order 
to cross into Europe, not all of them go willingly. The kidnapping of 
refugees from Sudan to Libya also happens, so refugees are not always 
in control of their arrival in the first place: 
 
Refugee 4: Some of them are smugglers, but some force you and take you to Libya. 
Interviewer: How do they kidnap people? 
Refugee 4: The police stop you and they take you. But the Eritreans 
made an agreement with them before and then they take you. From the 
police station, they bring you to the cars. The traffickers have their own 
police officers that they work with. (Refugee 4, interview, face-to-face, 
Italy, 19 March 2019) 
In the detention centres, the Libyan authorities remain mostly in full 
control of the policy agenda by constricting the outflow and content 
of the information. Even the access of UNHCR to the detention 
centres is restricted. As Libya has not signed the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and does not consider itself a country of asylum, Eritrean 
refugees have limited rights. One interviewee said that UNHCR used 
to have status, but the authorities quickly realised that UNHCR could 
not do anything: 
 
They [the guards] tried to sell us [to human traffickers], but we fought with them. 
At that time, UNHCR took our names, they just register us – so they were afraid 
of us. Because the guards tried for the first time to deal with UNHCR. After 2 
months, 3 months, the guards know everything about UNHCR. Because UNHCR 
is so afraid of the Libyans. (Refugee 14, interview, face-to-face in Niger, 4 
July 2019) 
 
This is exemplified by the fact that UNHCR has long been aware of 
the situation in refugee camps in Libya and advocates for change, but 
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the situation remains unchanged (UNHCR, 2018). Some refugees 
attempt direct communication with UNHCR or others, such as the 
European Union, but are often frustrated by the perceived lack of 
impact their testimonies have: 
 
In this place where I am today, there is no sufficient food or water, no clothes for the 
winter. Where are our human rights? There are many pregnant women and children. 
I contacted the EU and UNHCR on Twitter and by email, they didn't respond to 
my claims. This is a very dangerous place. We are suffering more than anything. 
And nobody takes responsibility. This is a shame on the EU. (Refugee 10, 
interview, WhatsApp, Libya, 11 January 2019) 
 
In other words, their ability to contribute to agenda-setting, the 
second dimension of political power, is limited. On the other hand, 
the European Union and UNHCR work together and are dependent 
on the Libyan authorities, which makes their political power 
significantly larger. Through their ties with authorities, the human 
traffickers and smugglers also enjoy a measure of protection.  
 
The refugees lack the power to determine how, where to and when 
they should exit Libya. The UNHCR evacuates refugees from Libya 
through the Emergency Transit Mechanism; due to the desperate 
situation in Libya, most refugees interviewed in Niger said that they 
are relieved to be outside of the country, but also emphasise that they 
did not expect to stay in Niger for long. Some, however, have 
remained there over a year and a half, since the evacuations started. 
IOM operates in cooperation with the UNHCR on voluntary returns; 
this also includes Eritreans, despite the UNHCR’s classification of 
Eritrea as a country where people cannot safely be returned. 
According to IOM, the returns are voluntary; however, in the AVRR 
guidelines, one condition mentioned is “the absence of physical or 
psychological pressure to enrol in an AVRR programme” (IOM, 
2018, p. 6). The testimonies reveal that the Eritrean refugees are 
under severe physical and psychological pressure due to the 
prolonged and traumatising stay in Libya, and, therefore, the returns 




Examples of the third aspect of power, the shaping of awareness and 
preferences, will not be further elaborated on, as the refugees are 
unable to act on their awareness and preferences. As shown in the 
case of ‘voluntary’ returns, the overall oppression in Libya is such that 
little choice of any kind remains for the refugees. Therefore, it is 
irrelevant to discuss this aspect of power.  
 
In conclusion, the Eritrean refugees have almost no ability to exert 
political power in relation to all three categories of gatekeepers: the 
traffickers, Libyan authorities and international organisations. The 
refugees perceive that they have very little control over their actions 
or over the policy agenda, they also have no control over their choices 
or preferences. The refugees reported feeling that they have no ability 
to exercise any influence on agenda setting. Their complaints, when 
they were able to communicate them, remain unanswered and their 
protests are not seen or registered anywhere. In the perception of the 
refugees, the dependency of the international community on the 
Libyan authorities gives the latter an almost uncontrolled free hand 
and the Libyan authorities are perceived as providing a free place for 
smugglers and human traffickers, who are able to exploit the refugees 
without any restrictions. Hence, Eritrean refugees score low on the 
fourth attribute. 
Conclusion 
This research looked at the role of the gatekeepers and the situation 
of Eritrean refugees as a gated community living in a black hole in the 
digital landscape in Libya. It found that access to information in Libya 
is nearly fully controlled by gatekeepers. The gatekeepers form the 
bridge between the gated, acting as vital sources of information. This 
research investigated at the situation of Eritrean refugees in Libya by 
examining the four attributes of their relationship with gatekeepers, 
as set out by gatekeepers theory (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008): the 
autonomy and alternatives available to the refugees as the gated, 
information production and distribution by the gated, the relationship 
between the gated and the gatekeepers, and the political power of the 
gated. The gatekeepers identified were the human traffickers and 
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smugglers, the Libyan authorities, and the international organisations 
and delegations operating in Libya.  
 
In relation to the first attribute, the analysis revealed that Eritreans 
have very little alternative sources of information, as access to mobile 
phones is severely restricted. All three categories of gatekeepers have 
little need to keep the refugees informed of what is going on. Also, in 
relation to international organisations such as UNHCR, the refugees 
feel there is a lack of information on their cases and expressed a sense 
of abandonment.  
 
Analysis of the second attribute, information production and 
distribution, showed that not only do the human traffickers control 
whether the refugees can produce and distribute information, but 
they also force the refugees to distribute information beneficial to 
them, including threats, ransom requests, and sounds and images of 
torture. The Libyan authorities mainly repress information, but also 
force the refugees to present a positive image to foreign visitors, 
through threats and reprisals. International organisations also decide 
what information they do and do not share about refugees in relation 
to what they see and hear. In both the production and distribution of 
information, as well as the alternative information sources available, 
the refugees rely heavily on mobile phones. However, access to 
mobile phones is controlled by the human traffickers and the guards 
at detention centres, and unauthorised use of phones carries heavy 
penalties.  
 
The third attribute relates to whether or not there is a platform for 
negotiation between the gated and the gatekeepers, which was found 
to be mostly absent in Libya. Human traffickers hide themselves by 
positioning themselves at the top of an extensive network, known 
only by their nicknames, and communicating only through mobile 
phones, thereby, negating any possibility for negotiation. The guards, 
representing the Libyan authority, may facilitate some things for the 
refugees (such as airtime) for bribes or payment, but otherwise do not 
form relationships with the refugees. International organisations face 
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both restricted access and the knowledge that refugees who share 
information with them may face reprisals.  
 
The fourth attribute, political power, was examined by looking at the 
dimensions of control of actions, control of the political agenda, and 
control of awareness and preferences. The gatekeepers in the first two 
categories have been shown to collude with one another, so that the 
refugees’ actions are almost fully controlled by them. In addition, the 
political agenda in Libya is also in control of the first two categories 
of gatekeepers. Although the international organisations and 
delegations that visit Libya do influence the overall political situation 
in Libya, they have no direct control over what happens to the 
refugees. As there is full control of the refugees’ actions and the 
political agenda by gatekeepers, the third category of awareness and 
preferences becomes irrelevant.  
 
International organisations such as UNHCR and IOM perform a role 
as gatekeepers, but can at the same time be seen as gated. Their access 
to refugees and migrants in detention centres is tightly controlled and, 
due to fear of reprisals and as a result of the influence of the human 
traffickers, the information they receive from refugees may also be 
distorted. Therefore, the organisations are trapped in a delicate 
balance, where they are both critical of Libyan authorities, but at the 
same time depend on the relationship with them to operate.  
Through the analysis of the four attributes, it can be seen how control 
over digital technology, through the lack of access to technology and 
use of mobile phones, videos and social media to extort the Eritrean 
refugees, plays a vital role in the repression and human trafficking of 
refugees in Libya. It can be concluded from the analysis that the 
Eritrean refugees do not score on any of the four attributes of 
gatekeeping theory. This means that they can be classified as 
‘traditional gated’ (Barzilai-Nahon, 2008), as they are mere ‘receivers’ 
in gatekeeping theory. However, in the case of Eritrean refugees, 
rather than just passive receivers of information, they are in fact 
forced to distribute information on the conditions specified by the 
gatekeepers. In the case of the human traffickers, the Eritreans are 
forced to send messages to family and friends to beg for ransom. 
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Their videos and pictures are also used and distributed to put pressure 
on the wider Eritrean community to pay ransoms. In the detention 
centres, refugees’ means of communication are tightly controlled, so 
that they do not reveal the extent of the abuse in the centres. Even 
foreign journalists face pressure to record only positive aspects and 
their work is tightly controlled. Refugees who have been evacuated 
from Libya also clearly fear that revealing any information to 
researchers may compromise their case with UNHCR. Therefore, 
they are more than ‘traditional gated’, but can be considered 
‘exploited gated’, as the content and means of their information 
distribution also is controlled by gatekeepers. In addition, due to the 
fact that not only do the gatekeepers have control over information, 
but also over the situation and indeed the very lives of the refugees in 
Libya, the Eritrean refugees can be seen as a particularly repressed 
gated community.  
 
The new slavery in Africa today is located in the black holes in the 
digital landscape, where people are extorted without any control over 
their situation, lacking information about their situation and incapable 
of communicating about their fate. Eritrean refugees in black holes in 
Libya depend entirely on gatekeepers to get information out and to 
receive information. Human traffickers exploit this situation and the 
gatekeeping power they hold. Not only do they restrict what 
information is received, sent and distributed, but they force the 
refugees to send information by mobile phone and social media for 
their own financial benefit. Human trafficking for ransom relies on 
the black holes in the digital infrastructure, in which the 
powerlessness of those in the black holes is increased, while the 
power of those controlling the information streams in and out is 
nearly absolute.  
 
The fight against human trafficking requires recognition of the gated 
and slave-like conditions of those held in captivity, a focus on the 
protection of the victims and a determination to persecute the 
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The Voices of African Migrants in Europe: 
Isaka’s Resilience 
 
Robert M. Press 
 
Introduction 
In the ancient hilltop city of Perugia in central Italy, the locals admit, 
almost with pride, that they are ‘chiuso’, or closed-minded to foreigners 
– which can mean anyone 
from the next city, and 
definitely someone from 
distant Africa. However, a 
chance encounter, a smile, a 
nod, a greeting, can dissolve 
this invisible barrier in an 
instant. Such an encounter 
happened one summer 
evening in 2018 in the main 
plaza of the city when an 
elderly Italian man and a 
young African migrant26 with 
a spiked hairstyle found 
themselves sitting silently 
next to each other on a stone 
bench outside a museum. To capture the contrast between them, I 
asked if they would lean their heads toward each other for a photo. 
They happily obliged then fell into conversation in Italian, which the 
African migrant had learnt. Soon an Italian woman who had been 
sitting on the other side of the migrant, and another Italian man, 
joined in with smiles all around. 
 
26 “Migrants includes people moving across international borders for any reason, 
including economic or educational pursuits, family unification, or flight from 
conflict, which can apply to refugees and asylum seekers” (Connor, 2018a).  
Although migration is a hot topic at the 
moment, refugees and migrants’ voices 
and stories from their own perspective are 
hardly told. This chapter shares the 
stories of refugees and migrants and the 
hardships they have suffered told in 
interviews with the author. This chapter 
makes the point that refugees are not 
numbers. Like Isaka, every refugee has a 
name. Each person has a story: 
experiences, courage, loss, pain, resilience 
and dreams. Their presence among us 
bids us to listen to their voices. 
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In a Europe that needs migrants to fill gaps in the workforce left by 
an aging population, public scepticism and outright racist sentiment 
towards Africans (and other migrants) is being used by nationalist 
politicians to win votes.27 Plaza encounters, such as the one above, 
between Italians and migrants may be unique, but what is not unique, 
according to European polls, is that people who have actually met a 
migrant are much more welcoming than those who have not. 
“Proximity to immigrants correlates with pro-migrant sentiment, 
rather than the opposite” (The Economist, 2018). Getting to know 
more about migrants has the potential to affect public views of them 
– and possibly even the views of policymakers.  
 
In that spirit, this chapter introduces some recent African migrants in 
Europe today. Italy is a prime initial destination, given its geographic 
location and relationship with North Africa, the main departure 
point. Based on personal, private interviews conducted by the author, 
this chapter introduces some African migrants. In their own words, 
they share their hopes and dreams, their fears and uncertainties, and 
their memories of the dangerous journey across the Sahara, through 
Libya, where torture and modern-day slavery are common, and across 
the Mediterranean Sea, where tens of thousands have drowned.  
 
In theoretical terms, there is much to learn about migrants from 
closely examining their journeys, instead of the more traditional 
method of examining the origin and destination of migration. This 
study also places their voices against a backdrop of the failure of 
origin, transit, and receiving states to provide the kind of human 
rights and safety in a post-colonial society that, as Hannah Arendt 
 
27 Despite the political rhetoric about a migrant ‘crisis’, the European Social Survey 
– “one of the most high-quality sources of attitudinal data – asked citizens in 15 
countries in 2014 and 2016 about their attitudes to immigration and found that 
during this period nine countries had become more favourable, four did not change 
and only two – Austria and Poland – became more negative” (Dennison & Geddes, 
2017). Yet by 2018, even some communities originally favourable toward migrants 
as a way to help their economy have felt the political pressure against migration 
(Martins, 2018). The immigration of Africans to Italy and beyond to other 
European countries continues, although it is about 80% less than in 2017 when 
Italy began helping Libya to capture would-be asylum seekers and send them back 
to Libya (Torelli, 2017). 
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(1973) points out, everyone deserves. This chapter is based on more 
than 60 face-to-face interviews with African migrants, mostly in Italy, 
some in France, between 2014 and 2018. The interviews give deeper 
insight into the migrants’ experiences than is available in some studies 
on contemporary African migration to Europe, in which the voices 
of the migrants themselves are lost in theoretical arguments and data 
analysis. By listening properly to migrants, it is possible to better 
understand their pain, their resilience, their losses – and perhaps most 
of all – their hopes and dreams. One of these migrants is Isaka.  
Isaka’s story 
Isaka is from Guinea. His story is an example of the resilience, 
courage, and strategic thinking that helps Africans migrants to survive 
the journey to Europe. In Perugia, Italy, a major reception centre for 
African migrants, Isaka has agreed to tell his story. He wears a polo 
t-shirt and black jeans, holding his cell phone as we talk in private in 
the courtyard of a former church.  
Deciding to leave Guinea 
“There was [political] fighting; they killed some people in my family; 
my father was killed” (Isaka, Guinean, interview, face-to-face, 
Perugia, 24 May 2016).28 Like hundreds of thousands of Africans 
before him, Isaka set out on a long and dangerous journey that 
eventually took him through Libya, the main transit state for African 
migrants to Europe, a lawless land where migrants are frequently sold 
as slaves (CNN, 2017) and sometimes tortured for ransom. Isaka 
crossed the Mediterranean Sea in an overcrowded boat to Italy.  
 
“I came [to Europe] to survive. I came to get protection”, he 
explained. Despite lack of work and still waiting for official 
permission to stay, he said, “Italy is good”, compared to his native 
state and Libya. However, African migrants arriving in Italy since 
2017 have experienced a third state failure: that of Italy. Italy has 
begun a European Union-supported policy of helping Libya return 
 
28 To protect the identity of the migrants interviewed for this study, the author has 
used aliases chosen by the migrants or assigned by the author. 
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would-be-asylum seekers to Libyan prisons and possible torture and 
sale as slaves (BBC News, 2012).  
Prisons in Libya 
“The children could take a stone and throw it (at you). We were in a 
big compound. There was no work.” However, Isaka was hopeful: “I 
was going to find work”. He found it, but only for a week, on a 
construction site: 
 
[Then] they put us in prison in southern Libya. Meals consisted of bread in the 
morning and couscous at midday. One of my ‘brothers’ [fellow countrymen] heard I 
was in prison. If you don’t have any relationship, it’s hard for a black. He put me 
on a bus to a city near Tripoli. I was working there. The place was so nice for me. 
(Isaka, Guinean, interview, face-to-face, Perugia, 24 May 2016) 
  
Isaka worked for three months building houses; then he was caught 
by the military: 
 
They took me to another prison. I was there about two months. I was suffering. 
There was no good food…They beat us with a big stick. They made us run up a hill 
carrying a big stone in each hand. (Isaka, Guinean, interview, face-to-face, 
Perugia, 24 May 2016) 
 
Migrants learn to network along the journey. Once again, his friend 
helped get him out of prison by contacting the same Libyan who had 
helped free him from prison before. Isaka’s account of the 
helpfulness of some Libyans cropped up in numerous interviews, in 
stark contrast to the militia, gangs, and police who imprison Africans, 
often demanding ransom for their release. Motives for helping 
individual Africans may include sympathy, but are almost certainly 
economic as well. Altogether, he was in prison three times in Libya, 
ranging from about a month to more than six months. Conditions 
each time were deplorable: “There was no space. You can never lay 
down straight.” With his hands, he indicated a small area into which 
many people were shoved “like animals. They punch you” (Isaka, 




In Tripoli, all the money he had earnt working was stolen when a gang 
came and started shooting, searching everywhere in the compound. 
One evening around 8 pm, his ‘boss man’ put him on a truck, 
covering him with a blanket to avoid detection, presumably by police 
or Libyan militia, and took him to the seaside. People were boarding 
a boat. “He had a gun and said if you don’t go I will shoot you.” 
Speculation among African migrants is that smugglers do not want 
people to stay in Libya and discourage others from leaving. They 
describe the dangerous overcrowding of boats. Smuggling is a major 
business, and the line between trafficking and smuggling is blurred. 
Across the Mediterranean to Italy 
His rubber raft with some 150 people left the Libyan shore around 9 
pm. It was 29 January 2016. Waves are higher in the winter, making 
such craft even more vulnerable to capsizing. “I was so afraid”, Isaka 
said. Like many of African migrants, Isaka does not know how to 
swim. By eight the next morning, they were spotted by a big ship and 
were rescued and taken to the Italian island of Lampedusa. After three 
days there in a closed camp, he was transferred to an open camp in 
Sicily for a week, then travelled by ferry and bus to Perugia where he 
joined the Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana (Italian 
Cultural Recreational Association, ARCI) migrant reception 
programme, which provides temporary housing for migrants while 
they are waiting for their asylum case to be decided, a stipend for 
food, and Italian lessons two hours a day. Isaka lived with a Malian, 
Gambian and two other migrants from Guinea. “Everybody cooks 
their own rice,” he said. Asked what he eats, he laughs: “couscous”, 
the food of his prison time in Libya. 
Migration 
A problem for senders, receivers and the migrants themselves 
Contemporary African migration to Europe represents a problem for 
the migrants and Europe, as well as for the sending and transit states. 
For the migrants, the problem is obvious: they suffered at home and 
along the routes to Europe. Once in Europe, they continue to suffer 
from isolation – although they often make new friends among 
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migrants and with locals in the ‘host’ country. They also have 
problems integrating in the host country. As the interviews show, 
migrants are often lonely and disoriented, adrift in a new culture 
among people who may not want them there. The position taken in 
this chapter to explain these issues is primarily that of the migrants. 
 
For Europe, the problem is how to receive and effectively use the 
migrants to fill the gap in the labour force left by an aging population 
(in addition to calming the political anti-migrant rhetoric that makes 
reception and integration difficult). For the sending states in Africa, 
the problem is how to slow the exodus of willing workers by curbing 
abuses and corruption. For the key transit state of Libya, the challenge 
is to regain political stability and curb human rights abuses. 
In search of dignity and safety 
In practical terms, African migrants in Europe, or still trying to get to 
Europe, are seeking the safety, freedom and dignity that their origin, 
transit, and even receiving states have failed to provide. Their decision 
to migrate usually amounts to an unarticulated protest against this 
lack of protection of their human rights, as promised in the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights. For example, in Libya, a major 
transit state for those seeking to reach Europe, migrants experience a 
range of abuses by Libyans and Sub-Saharan Africans engaged in 
trafficking and smuggling. Italy and other receiving states in Europe, 
which have both welcomed migrants and tried to deny migrants entry, 
are “complicit” in sending would-be asylum seekers back to Libya, 
where they face possible torture and slavery (Amnesty International, 
2017). As reported in the European Union (EU) Observer, United 
Nations (UN) Human Rights Chief Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein is quoted 
as saying that: “forcing rescued people at sea to return to Libya for 
detention was inhuman. ‘The suffering of migrants detained in Libya 
is an outrage to the conscience of humanity’” (Nielsen, 2017). The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Fillipo Grandi, 





According to a Pew Research poll conducted in 2017, “One-in-five 
or more adults in Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa say they 
plan to move to another country in the next five years if they have 
the means and the opportunity” (Connor, 2018b). Although political 
violence remains the leading cause of migration in Africa, the fact that 
the poll includes Senegal, Ghana and Tanzania, countries without 
major political violence, indicates that migrants move for reasons 
other than national security. As indicated in the interviews, personal 
security may be an issue even in countries that are politically stable. 
State failure 
The scholarly literature on African states and failed states is 
immense.29 Often it includes comparisons with Western states and 
frequently cites Weber’s definition of a state, which focuses on the 
control of territory (Weber, 1919).30 Khadiagala (1995, p. 33), notes 
that: “Since Weber, however, scholars have also conceded the 
inadequacy of mere territorial expansion, hence the importance of 
legitimacy, the normative basis for the exercise of authority”. Herbst 
(2000) points out that geographical differences, including greater 
concentrations of people in Europe after the 14th Century than in 
Africa due to the environment, help explain why Weber’s definition 
cannot be applied automatically to African states. “[T]he European 
experience does not provide a template for state-making in other 
regions of the world” (Herbst, 2000, p. 22). In the West African 
savannah, for example, “Under population was the chief obstacle to 
state formation” (Iliffe, 1995, p. 70). Mamdani wrestled with the 
legacy of colonialism on the African state, arriving at a discouraging 
point:  
 
No nationalist government was content to reproduce the colonial legacy uncritically. 
Each sought to reform the bifurcated state that institutionally crystalized a state-
 
29 Examples include Zartman (1995); Khadiagala (1995); Akokopari (1998); 
Whitman (2000), whose book includes chapters listed separately in the references 
by Du Pisani (2000), Schoeman (2000), and Chokuwenga (2000); Englebert & Tull 
(2008); Castles (2009); and Herbst (1996/1997; 2000). 
30 Weber defines a state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 
1919; 1947, p. 78). 
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enforced separation of the rural from the urban and one of ethnicity from another. 
However, in doing so each reproduced a part of the legacy, thereby creating its own 
variant of despotism. (Mamdani, 1996, p. 8) 
 
If one agrees that the Western model of a state was never the model 
for African states, what then is the model when Western governments 
try to help restore what Zartman (1995) describes as ‘collapsed’ states, 
including post-conflict states?31 Some scholars argue that as Africa 
never had the Western version of a state, when an African state 
collapses or fails, there is no Western model to follow in rebuilding 
it. “Indeed, the evidence is overwhelming that most collapsed states 
at no point in the postcolonial era remotely resembled the ideal type 
of the modern polity” (Englebert & Tull, 2008, p. 111). These authors 
then point out that most Western efforts at reconstruction of ‘failed’ 
states aim at re-establishing the “monopoly over coercion” 
(Englebert & Tull, 2008, p. 112), similar to Weber’s definition of a 
state. So even as debates and comparisons of Western versus African 
states continue, the underbelly of statehood implies a concentration 
of power, whether legitimate or not, which opens the door to human 
rights abuses. 
 
Regarding the delicate balance between state capacity and human 
rights, Englehart (2009, p. 163) notes that: “The more common 
problem is states that cannot effectively protect human rights. We 
must take state failure seriously when thinking about the causes of – 
and remedies for – human rights abuse”. He adds: 
 
The analysis above suggests that states' protective role outweighs tendencies to violate 
human rights. On balance, human rights abuse tends to happen in relatively low-
capacity states. In general, the better the state apparatus, the safer its citizens will be 
from the depredations of non-state actors and rogue government officials. (Englehart, 
2009, p. 177) 
 
 
31 Zartman describes a collapsed state as one “where the structure, authority 
(legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart and must be 
reconstituted in some form, old or new” (Zartman, 1995, p. 1). 
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His argument overlooks the problem that sometimes the state is the 
violator. The problem continues to be the relationship between the 
state and human rights. Englehart’s study (2009), like many studies 
on failed states and responses, does not link human rights with 
migration, and his focus is not Africa. Although Castles (2009) does 
focus on Africa and migration through the window of development, 
he makes only one mention of human rights. Castles questions the 
idea that “international migration (especially from South to North) is 
a bad thing that ought to be stopped” (Castles, 2009, p. 2; emphasis in 
original). Castles argues that development aid to Africa is likely to 
increase migration – a point that is now widely accepted by migration 
scholars, but is not acknowledged by European political leaders – 
“because [the] increased economic resources and improved 
communications that development brings make it easier for people to 
seek opportunities elsewhere” (Castles, 2009, p. 2).  
Limitations of the theory of push and pull 
The push-pull theory of migration relies on assumptions of perfect 
knowledge (i.e., rational choice) and usually focuses on a linear route 
between point of origin and country of arrival. However, African 
migration does not fit this model. Hence, this study argues that 
traditional push-pull theories simply do not apply to the overall 
phenomena of contemporary African migration to Europe via the 
Sahara, Libya, and the treacherous Mediterranean Sea. 
 
It is true that migrants are encouraged to leave their home countries, 
at least in part, because of the failure of their state to provide a decent 
and safe living environment. And they are drawn toward Europe by 
the hope of a better life. But the full picture is more complex. The 
interviews for this study show that their migrations are far from linear, 
often involving multiple trajectories. Their decisions are based on 
social networks, not formed in advance, but on the journey, often for 
reasons of survival. While the push-pull theory provides an important 
starting point for such studies, much is left out. “Individual feelings 
and emotions, the angst that accompanies difficult decisions about 
whether or not to leave one’s home, family and friends, and the ways 
in which these attitudes and expectations have been shaped over time 
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by culture, communities and communication, are generally 
overlooked” (O’Reilly, 2015).  
 
“They [the journeys] may consist of multiple journeys going in various 
directions. As such, they question the linear logics of migration, 
having its foundation in push pull models of migration theory” 
(Schapendonk, Van Liempt, Schwarz & Steel, 2018). Furthermore, 
the African migrants interviewed for this study, for the most part, did 
not sit down calmly and rationally “weigh up the costs and benefits 
of various options before making their decisions”, as the push-pull 
theorists posit (O’Reilly, 2015). Some were lured into trafficking, 
some left rapidly, fleeing danger, most failed to calculate their 
potential earnings in Europe or consider the obstacles to getting work 
as a migrant, and most also failed to realise how dangerous the 
journey would be. 
Migrant journeys: Filling a gap in migration studies  
There is a small, but growing, amount of literature that focuses on 
what can be learnt about migrants on their journeys. The current 
study is located not in migration during normal times, but looks at 
migration in moments of crisis, specifically focusing on the journeys 
which migrants are making from Africa to Europe. Benezer and 
Zetter (2014) are among the migration scholars calling for more 
attention to be paid to migrants’ journeys. “The journeys of migrants 
have generally been overlooked as an important study object”, notes 
Schapendonk (2011, p. 233). Brachet also notes the lack of attention 
to the journeys: “Nowadays, the majority of the research work on 
international migration is carried out in two categories of specific 
points along the route: ‘departure’ places and ‘arrival’ places” (2012, 
p. 95). Benezer and Zetter (2014, p. 301) point out that this “lacuna 
of research exists in spite of the fact that the journey is a powerful 
notion in the human psyche”. “The first and most important 
argument is that the journey is a profoundly formative and 
transformative experience and a ‘lens’ on the newcomers’ social 
condition” (Benezer & Zetter, 2014, p. 302). They conclude: “We can 
better understand how the journey painfully enriches individuals and 
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communities and enhances their resilience and capacity for surviving” 
(Benezer & Zetter, 2014, p. 314). Mainwaring and Brigden emphasise 
the necessary adaptability of migrants during their journeys and point 
out that: “Determining the beginning of a journey becomes even 
more complicated when migrants change their destinations 
midstream, adjusting to unforeseeable events encountered en route” 
(2016, p. 245). 
 
As significant as the study of migrants’ journeys is for determining 
how this shapes migrants, this study goes a step further. The focus is 
on how the African migrants themselves recall their journeys, what 
they are willing or reluctant to comment on, how they see their own 
story and why they came to Europe.  
Research objectives 
The main research question that this chapter seeks to answer is: What 
are the personal stories of each refugee: how can we understand their personal stories 
as unique experiences? Now that the refugees are in Europe, how do African 
migrants look back on their journeys; how do they explain their story? What are 
their dreams of the future? Stories can offer the parameters of their 
experience, but the interviews with migrants who have arrived in 
Europe offer a window into how they see their journeys in terms of 
their strategic skills, negotiating abilities, fears, ability to survive and 
resilience. These face-to-face interviews by the author provide raw, 
unpackaged portraits that allow one to see migrants’ experiences as 
they see them, to hear what they recall, and infer from their silences 
what they do not want to recall. The research highlights some of the 
contradictions that exist in the layers of revealed reality.  
 
The main goal of this study is to provide insight into the nature, 
character, skills and dreams of African migrants with the hope that 
this information may influence an often sceptical public and inform 
policymakers. The European public may or may not be swayed by 
knowing more about African migrants, but at least the information, 
contrary to the images of migrants as hapless and helpless new arrivals 
rescued at sea, can offer a different and more realistic portrait. Fear 
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of the ‘other’ is always lessened when the mystery is reduced by facts 
about who they are. Interviews can help bridge the gap between myth 
and reality.  
 
Policymakers, on the other hand, are different. There the gap may be 
more between political ambition and the reality of who migrants are. 
Migrants make an easy scapegoat for economic woes, as seen in the 
United States and Europe. No additional information is likely to sway 
policymakers who consciously engage in the politics of fear. 
However, their impact may be lessened if an informed public comes 
to understand migrants better. 
Research methodology 
We were three days on top of the sea. We saw so many things. We saw a big ship. I 
don’t know which country it was [from]. They put us in the big ship. ...If not for the 
rescue at sea, I’d be a dead person. ...The water can change your brain. It’s in the 
hand of God. I’d like to stay here [Italy] (Diego, Nigerian, interview, face-to-
face, Perugia, May 2016) 
 
The journey of migrants “leaves physical, emotional and 
psychological traces on its survivors”; therefore, “researching and 
writing about migrant journeys requires reflexivity, humility and 
caution” (Mainwaring & Brigden, 2016, p. 251). Benezer and Zetter 
(2014, p. 313) argue that narratives are “the most obvious and 
powerful tool in researching journeys,” adding, however, that they are 
“time consuming [...] pose challenges for interpretation, [and require] 
great sensitivity” (Benezer & Zetter, p. 314.). Berriane and De Haas 
(2012, pp. 2–3), in a study of methodologies of African migration 
research, note that “many methodological challenges face researchers 
of African migration”, including that “the often vulnerable position 
of migrants within Africa makes it difficult to approach and interview 
migrants”.  
 
Winning migrants’ confidence for interviews was not easy and was 
done one-by-one. It often took a lot of time just being around them 
at reception centres and camps. In some cases, confidence came 
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quickly; in others, it was slow to come or did not come at all. The 
researcher was more hesitant to ask detailed questions during the first 
summer (2014) than was necessary, as some migrants welcomed the 
opportunity to talk. However, others were uneasy with detailed 
questions. One question the researcher avoided until the second and 
third summers was about whether the migrant had received 
permission to stay. Once broached, however, many migrants 
responded readily. 
 
The author conducted 60 interviews, mostly in English or French, 
between 2014 and 2018.32 Notes were handwritten and transcribed by 
the author. A tape recorder was rarely used, and then only with the 
migrant’s verbal permission. The interviews were transcribed and 
analysed. In order to protect the identity of the migrants, no real 
names are used in this chapter.33  
 
This study uses grounded theory to develop notions about African 
migrants based on a back-and-forth analysis of the interviews as they 
progressed and reflections on their significance. The author began the 
interviews in Perugia, Italy, the site of a major reception centre for 
migrants. Other interviews in Italy were conducted in Rome, Naples, 
Caserta, and Foggia. In addition, the author spent three days in 2016 
with migrants in a camp on the outskirts of Calais, France.  
 
The semi-structured interview method allowed for deviations from 
planned questions introduced by the migrants. What the author 
initially interpreted as mistrust when discussing motives for flight was 
later found to be reluctance on the part of the migrants to recall the 
trauma of their journeys. Many had faced death in Libya or at sea. 
The author had no way of verifying their accounts of why they had 
fled. What most migrants had in common was that they were escaping 
 
32 The author speaks conversational French, but is not fluent, so some details no 
doubt were not understood. When something was not clear, however, the author 
asked the migrant to repeat the statement. In the few cases where the migrant spoke 
Arabic or an Ethiopian dialect, other migrants were used to translate. 
33 This research methodology was approved by the Institutional Review Board of 
the University of Southern Mississippi. 
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from places that lacked a culture of human rights. Some migrants, 
once they were comfortable granting an interview, candidly identified 
themselves as what is commonly called ‘economic migrants’: they 
came to Europe looking for a better life, work and a way to get ahead, 
something they had not found at home. Some had come with the 
hope of playing for a professional sports team in Europe. Others told 
of political reasons for escaping their home country, which, if 
accurate, would make them good candidates for asylum status. These 
included war, terrorism or religious threats, human rights abuses, 
government repression, or threats due to a family member being in 
the political opposition. Some cited corruption that affected them 
personally. The study involved spending time with migrants at the 
reception centres and camps, on visits to their apartment, and just 
hanging around and walking.  
Results 
Having arrived in Italy or France and having survived the dangerous 
crossing of the Sahara, Libya, and the Mediterranean Sea, how do 
African migrants look back on their journeys; how do they remember 
them; how do they narrate their pain, resilience, and hopes? In 
individual interviews in informal settings where they could speak 
privately and personally, migrants shared what they wanted to share. 
Some avoided the most painful parts; others shared these in what 
seemed to be part of the healing process. Few volunteered their 
dreams, but when asked responded with a wide range of hopes for 
the future – hopes of safety, of usefulness, and of using their skills. 
What emerged from the interviews was an intimate glimpse into their 
character, strength, fears, resentments and determination to be 
someone, to be free, safe, and independent. Each person interviewed 
had suffered a lot; each was unique; most were discouraged – but 
none had lost hope. 
Down, but not out 
In a small, one-room apartment on a narrow street in the historic 
district of Perugia, Perry, a Nigerian from Edo State, welcomed me 
and agreed to tell his story of hardship and unbroken faith in the 
future. “I’m very sick; I have pain in my tummy”, he said. Perry was 
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suffering from abdominal pains, which he suggested traced back to a 
heavy labour job in Benin. He is a high school dropout and never 
knew his father. After his mother died, his grandmother took care of 
him. Eventually, he found a job as a driver for six years. He says that 
Nigeria’s failure to curb corruption and to provide a safe environment 
led him to flee his country in 2015.  
 
I left for the corruption; I was a truck driver. It was good. But the corruption was 
too much. It affected me. They can just attack you, beat you up, take your phone. 
That’s the reason I left the country. (Perry, Nigerian, interview, face-to-face, 
Perugia, Italy, 8 June 2016)34 
 
Originally, Perry had no plan to go to Europe. Like many others he 
had heard that Libya offered jobs to black Africans, as it had 
historically under Muammar Gaddafi until he was assassinated in 
2011. Since then, Libya has been largely lawless with rival factions and 
widespread abuse of African and other migrants (Human Rights 
Watch, 2018). To get to Libya, like countless thousands of others, he 
passed through the Sahara desert. It took five days by truck. “It was 
very bad; very complicated. You have no food. People were dying on 
the road; there were human beings on the ground.” People fall off the 
speeding, overcrowded pickup trucks and often are left to perish. 
Things got worse once in Libya. In Sabha, in southern Libya, a lawless 
city in a lawless state, a mafia-style militia imprisoned him. With 
echoes of post-Civil War in the former US Confederacy, when blacks 
were jailed on spurious charges then leased out for harsh labour, Perry 
was leased out to work for Libyans. His job: help build cement block 
houses. His boss later took him to Libya’s capital, Tripoli, where he 
found paid work at a car wash. It was there that he heard that many 
Africans were crossing the ‘river’, which he discovered was the 
Mediterranean Sea. Driven by his basic dream of finding safe 
 
34 He said that upon arrival in Italy in December 2015 he had received a deportation 
notice from the police before he had a chance to apply for asylum. If true, this 
violates Italy’s stated policy of granting a hearing to those who apply for asylum. 
He ignored the order to leave and later applied for asylum. At the time of the 
interview, he was still waiting for permission to stay in Italy. Attempts to reach him 
in 2018 were unsuccessful, although an Italian social worker said he was still in Italy. 
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employment and a decent life, he decided to cross. “I hadn’t heard 
about people dying. The water got inside the boat. People were crying. 
Water was coming in. They said we may die.” He was fortunate, they 
were rescued by an Italian ship and taken to the Italian island of 
Lampedusa and later to the mainland. When asked if he was 
discouraged about his future after all that, he said: “I’m confident”.  
Minors adrift 
At an age when they should be going to school, playing sports, and 
maybe falling in love, thousands of African youth have joined the 
adults migrating to Europe, enduring the same pain, shock, and 
bewilderment of confinement and near death along the way (The 
Guardian, 2016). Amelie, aged 18 at the time of the interview, is from 
Cameroon. She was trafficked to the Central African Republic. 
 
I didn’t know my mother; I was with my father. He had an accident and died when 
I was six. I lived with a lady. It was not easy with her. I met a Nigerian woman in 
Douala [Cameroon] who helped pay for my schooling and later took me to the 
Central African Republic on the promise of paid employment. It was contrary to 
what she said. Some men paid [for me]; they took off my clothes. I was obliged [to 
have sex]. I can’t think about it, I couldn’t live locked in. (Amelie, 
Cameroonian, interview, face-to-face, Perugia, 25 May 2016) 
 
She asked to continue the conversation later. On 6 July 2016, she 
agreed to another brief interview. She had come through Algeria then 
Libya. She spoke of being ‘tortured’ in prison. 
 
I didn’t know where we were. I had problems in Cameroon; that’s why I left. A 
man, the ‘Chef du village’ wanted to marry me. He already had a wife. I refused. 
He was too old, in his 30s. When someone is not agreeable with him, it is a problem. 
I wanted a new life. The new life is protection. (Amelie, Cameroonian, 
interview, face-to-face, Perugia, 6 July 2016) 
 
Tolessa looked back on his journey to Italy from Ethiopia with horror 
and shock; but he looks towards the future with hope and optimism. 
When interviewed, he was staying in a makeshift shelter in an alley in 
Rome, amid cardboard boxes, piles of clothing, and blankets. Several 
311 
 
minors, male and female, mixed with the adult refugees. “The 
Ethiopian government killed a lot of Oromo”, said Tolessa, “I left at 
15 [years of age]”. From Sudan, he rode 11 days in a big truck. Eight 
people died along the way. They had no water. In Libya, where he 
lived in a shipping container, it was worse. “Every day they kick you.” 
He was in Libya for five months.  
 
They hate black people. I hated my life in Libya. I lost my mind. [He holds his 
hands to his head.] They beat you. There were a lot of Oromo people. I was the 
‘baby’. They [the Oromo] gave me everything. (Tolessa, Ethiopian, interview, 
face-to-face, Rome, 16 July 2016) 
 
Like many migrants, he was obliged to form new networks on his 
journey, always wary of strangers, but needing help and turning to 
fellow Oromo. Others recounted, however, how Africans from their 
own country, sometimes their own region, betrayed them and sold 
them to Libyans for a profit. Tolessa recounted his experience 
crossing the Mediterranean Sea. He shakes his head slightly: “It is so 
bad. Oh my God. A lot of people said: ‘I’m dying’”. There were 400 
people on his boat. They had spent only one day on the beach and 
were launched that evening. Others recounted long stays near the 
beach with little to eat; one migrant called it the ‘slimming’ camp to 
make people thinner and lighter so more people could be packed into 
a raft or boat. Tolessa was at sea two days before being rescued by an 
Italian ship, probably the Navy. After a month on the island of 
Sardinia, he took a boat to Rome.  
 
In the same alley camp in Rome, Abdul, 17-years of age, from Sudan, 
wearing a blue t-shirt and black cap, recalled that in Libya “people 
took us in handcuffs. Some people were shot; they wanted money. 
They forced us to call our family [to demand ransom]”. Describing 
his Mediterranean Sea crossing, he calculated the number who had 
died: of 150, only 36 survived. “There was a fire in the ship. All people 
on the ship were black,” he said. He drew a diagram of the crowded 
ship, which may have been a raft, which are vulnerable to tipping over 
in the waves. “Some were swimming; some don’t know how to 
swim.” Another boat eventually rescued the survivors, apparently 
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after they had been in the water for some time (Abdul, Sudanese, 
interview, face-to-face, Rome, 16 July 2016).35 
‘Don’t destroy my hope’ 
My taxi driver to a sprawling migrant camp known as ‘the Jungle’, just 
outside the French resort town of Calais, complains that sensational 
reporting in the English press of a heavy police presence and running 
battles with refugees trying to board trucks for illegal passage across 
the channel has killed English tourism in the area. A military officer 
at the unfenced entry smiles as I greet him in French and walk into 
the sprawling camp, which has at least 7,000 migrants from various 
parts of Africa and the Middle East.36 The main ‘street’ of dirt and 
sand leads past wooden-framed food kiosks enclosed mostly with 
plastic sheeting. Most migrants are still in their tents. In a makeshift 
collection of wood and cardboard structures known as ‘Jungle 
Books’, the ‘School of English’ is empty. A sign near a model of the 
Statue of Liberty reads, ‘Send the homeless, tempest to me’. On a 
table, someone has written ‘A difficulty in every opportunity’ and 
‘Don’t give up’. On a wall is another sign: ‘Don’t destroy my hope 
please’. 
 
The hope of many in this camp is to get across the English Channel 
(via the ‘Chunnel’ railroad line) to the United Kingdom, where some 
have relatives from earlier migrations. They hope for education, jobs, 
freedom and safety, in a country where many of the migrants can use 
their English. The United Kingdom refused to accept more than a 
few hundred of the unaccompanied children from the camp and 
made it practically impossible for anyone to apply for asylum while in 
France (Bulman, 2017).  
 
 
35 Abdul is from the Darfur region of Sudan, which is the site of genocidal killings 
by pro-government militia. 
36 The camp was destroyed in late 2016 by the French government, which dispersed 
migrants countrywide (The Guardian, 2016). 
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A few, in desperation, break into trucks in an attempt to enter the 
United Kingdom covertly.37 Some, including Haro, from Sudan, 
decided to apply for asylum to stay in France: “I just want to be free 
in my life. I want to live in France. I want to stay here”. His dream? 
“I’d like to be safe, go to school (secondary), then university. Help 
the people. Everybody needs someone to help them,” he said in a 
loud voice (Haro, Sudanese, interview, face-to-face, Calais, 12 July 
2016).  
Contradictions and hidden layers of reality  
Later that morning, deep in the camp, I again meet with a group of 
young Sudanese migrants clustered around a small, dirt common area 
between their several tents, where they cook and eat their meals, 
sharing food provided by British and French volunteer groups. The 
previous day, I had instinctively refrained from asking for interviews. 
Today, the second day, having shared a couple of meals and hung out 
with the migrants, several Sudanese agreed to sit for interviews 
individually in the relative privacy of their tents.  
 
Toto, one of the Sudanese migrants in the camp, agrees to an 
interview. His candidness opens a window to the inner world that 
African migrants feel, but rarely reveal. In a 45-minute interview in a 
stand up tent, empty except for another sleeping Sudanese migrant, 
he tells his story of strength, resilience – and vulnerability and 
loneliness. A member of the anti-government Sudanese Liberation 
Movement, his village had been destroyed two years earlier by 
government-supported militia. His parents fled to the mountains 
where he later found them. “I got the idea it is easy to go to Europe, 
the land of tolerance. They [European countries] will give you your 
rights.” Therefore, Toto, who had taken some university classes 
studying broadcasting, fled to Libya, where he worked nine months 
as a house servant: “It was the most horrible time. They [Libyans] are 
primitive: they deal with us like an animal. They shout at your face”. 
 
37 One man somehow managed to walk the 26 miles to the United Kingdom in the 
narrow space between wall and tracks, avoiding being sucked under the wheels by 
speeding trains. Once in the United Kingdom he was allowed to apply for asylum. 
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After nine months, he escaped: “I opened the door and said I was 
going to the market”. 
 
After surviving a typically harrowing five hours on an over-crowded 
rubber raft on the Mediterranean Sea before his rescue, he was forced 
by officials in Sicily to be fingerprinted. Instead of staying in Italy until 
his asylum case could be heard, he headed north. On his fifth attempt 
to avoid French border guards (each time he was sent back to Italy) 
he managed to elude them and ended up in the Calais camp. Suddenly, 
he paused his narrative – and cried. “My wife…is she alive?” He was 
married only two months before he decided to run away. We are both 
silent for a few moments. No words seem appropriate (Toto, 
Sudanese, interview, face-to-face, Calais, 13 July 2016).  
 
In interviews with African migrants over the years, I have discovered 
several layers of reality:38 
  
Layer 1: Uncertainty, distrust. The first layer when meeting a 
researcher was caution and uncertainty and sometimes plain 
distrust. Who is this person who wants information from me: an 
undercover immigration official?  
Layer 2: Avoidance of painful memories. Once over the first 
barrier or layer, there is often a second layer: avoidance of painful 
details of the torture and other mistreatment experienced in Libya 
and on the migration journey, and the loneliness and fear of being 
on one’s own, forced to form new and uncertain networks in 
order to survive. Some would look away, one waved his hand 
slowly in front of his face, others made general comments and 
went no further. Gradually some migrants opened up, perhaps as 
they got to know me or as I got bolder.  
Layer 3: Candidness. Another layer is candidness. Once 
confidence in the interviewer was established, migrants were 
often willing to share painful details of their dangerous crossing 
 
38 This section does not claim to be a professional psychological explanation. It is 
simply what this researcher observed first-hand over several summers of interviews 
with African migrants. 
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of the Sahara desert, Libya and the Mediterranean Sea, recalling 
their sheer terror of knowing that they could die at any moment.  
Layer 4: Pretence. Typically, African migrants’ Facebook pages 
create a façade that is an image of success: photos of themselves 
in front of fancy cars and hotels, well dressed and with friends.39 
It is not a lie, but only part of the truth; it is their public image. 
These images are of real people, real places, but they do not tell 
the real story of their struggle. Migrants generally struggle to get 
permission to stay, to find work, and to survive. Most live in 
poverty, ranging from life in dirty, abandoned houses with no 
power or running water, to more comfortable living on reception 
programme stipends that provided only for the purchase of bare 
minimum necessities. 
Layer 5: Loneliness and vulnerability. The final layer (and 
there may be others that I never reached) is loneliness and 
vulnerability. Toto revealed this layer. Far from home, family, the 
security of loved ones, having no place of their own, no familiar 
network of friends they can rely on during their journeys, African 
migrants who were vulnerable on their journeys are also 
vulnerable in Europe. They are outsiders, observers of a society 
in which many feel unwelcome.  
 
A year earlier, I had seen that same loneliness and vulnerability that 
Toto expressed in the sad expression of Lamin, an African migrant 
from the Gambia. We met in a farm labour camp of wooden-framed 
cardboard ‘houses’ and shops near Foggia, in southern Italy. As the 
African migrants returned from the fields, with dark dirt stains on 
their pants and shoes, I am struck by the slowness of their gait and 
what appears to be a slight stoop as they walk toward their plastic 
bound houses, ready for an outdoor shower. Some of the young 
migrant workers explain that their back aches, their legs are sore and 
they are just plain tired. ‘Exhausted’ might be a better term, given the 




39 The author is Facebook friends with numerous African migrants. 
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In the late afternoon shade of trees at the edge of the camp, Lamin 
agrees to a photo on the condition of not using his name. Migrants 
refused to be photographed near the slum-like shacks of the camp to 
avoid the off chance that someone back home might see them living 
in such conditions. In person, and in the photo, Lamin looked deeply 
sad, and reminisced about his family back home: “I saw people 
coming back from Europe with fine clothes and things”. He was not 
doing well in the Gambia, and left during a period of political 
repression. He decided to head to Libya where he had heard there 
were jobs, but continued on to Italy. Once in Italy, he was unable to 
find steady work. He had just finished a full day of tomato picking 
and was aching: “My back hurts, my legs, my arms. This is hard 
work”. He repeats the phrase about hard work several times. He talks 
of his children back home. Lamin’s dreams of a better life to help his 
family have faded. He complains that he is trapped: undocumented, 
with little formal education (he is vague, but apparently started 
secondary school). He speaks only a little Italian. “If I could only find 
a good job”, he says (Lamin, Gambian, interview, face-to-face, 
Foggia, 29 July 2015). 
 
In the same migrant farm camp, Ali, from Niger, shows me photos 
of himself on his cell phone. “I've changed”, he said, “My friends 
when they came to the camp said they barely recognized me”. The 
photos show a slightly heavier version of himself, but, more 
importantly, dressed in fancy clothes. He had some kind of job 
working in a restaurant. Another photo shows him in sunglasses and 
dressed well. Tonight he is wearing an ordinary t-shirt. The one he 
wore earlier this afternoon had written on it in English ‘No pain, no 
gain’ (Ali, from Niger, interview, face-to-face, Foggia, 29 July 2015). 
Dreams of helping themselves – and others 
A typical theme among migrants interviewed was the desire to find a 
way to help their family at home, and sometimes others, in the future. 
Perhaps it was the hardships they survived that made them think of 
being generous. Sometimes the goal was political. In the migrant 
camp outside Calais, Adam, a former member of the rebel Sudanese 
Liberation Movement, explains that he wants to help the Sudanese 
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people “change the regime because it is a dictatorship”. On 26 April 
2004, he said, the government’s militia came to his village in Sudan 
on horses, killing his brother and sister. His parents fled and were still 
living in a refugee camp (Adam, Sudanese, interview, face-to-face, 
Calais, 12 July 2016). 
 
Ivie, from Nigeria, said, “I want to become a nurse; I want to save 
lives. I just pray my dream comes true”. As we sit in a former church 
courtyard in Perugia, Ivie is wearing black jeans and a pink sweatshirt. 
She sets her small backpack down on a stone ledge. After only a few 
minutes, she says, “I had no one” (referring to when she was in 
Nigeria). She starts to cry and pulls a handkerchief from her pack 
(Ivie, Nigeria, interview, face-to-face, Perugia, 25 May 2016). 
 
Tolessa, the Ethiopian teenager (then 16) interviewed in the alley 
camp in Rome, had not lost his hope for the future. He said his fellow 
Oromo had suffered in Ethiopia. Then in a multi-goal narrative about 
his plans, he said: “I have a lot of dreams. My wish is English. God 
willing I will go to Paris. I like Paris. I like football. My dream is 
playing in the UK. I want to make a film about Oromo history” 
(Tolessa, Ethiopian, interview, face-to-face, Rome, 16 July 2016). 
Looking forward, not back 
African migrants interviewed during the first few years of this 
research (2014–2016) were focused on their dream of getting 
permission to stay in Europe, some as a second home with plans to 
return home periodically or bring their family to Europe. As some 
received permission to stay and a few found entry-level jobs, their 
focus began shifting to making a life in Italy. One of those, Mokoba, 
fled Mali in 2013 for fear of his life, during his third year of university, 
after running afoul of the then political leadership. In 2015, he was 
actually leaving Libya on a ship for Australia when he spotted one of 
the overcrowded rafts with migrants leaving Libya for Italy. 
Preferring to be with Africans, he asked to leave the safety of the ship 




We are sitting in the courtyard of a former church in Perugia, Italy in 
2018. Mokoba is wearing a grey shirt and jeans; he pushes his 
sunglasses up onto his sputnik hairdo. “You decide to live or die”, he 
says, energetically (Mokoba, Malian, interview, face-to-face, Perugia, 
16 July 2018). After he secured a five-year renewable, permit to stay 
in Italy he began volunteering as a court translator for migrants and 
helping two migrant reception programmes: “It makes me happy to 
help my brothers and sisters. They [many of them] didn’t go to 
school”. Today he uses the Internet to try to help migrants find small 
jobs. Mokoba has many Italian friends, one of whom helped him 
enrol in a nine-month course near Perugia, Italy at the Università dei 
Sapori (University of Flavors). Today, Mokoba, an African migrant 
who risked his life for a new and safe start in Europe, helps make 
Italy’s popular ice cream, gelato. 
Conclusion 
The narratives of the African refugees and migrants reaching Italy and 
France demand a closer look at the failure of origin, transit and 
receiving states to protect their human rights. They also demand a 
more complex explanation than traditional push and pull theories of 
migration to explain their dangerous, multi-directional journeys, with 
their ever-changing social networks.  
 
In order to gain a greater understanding of what drives refugees, the 
differences among them and the unique situation of their 
circumstances we need to hear their stories. There is a great need to 
listen to the stories of refugees and to discover their personal 
experiences, which are unique and distinct. I have learnt that it takes 
effort to bring out those stories. In the course of this research I 
discovered that a relationship needs to be built in order to gain access 
to the personal stories of refugees. I identified the following 
processes:  
 




Layer 2: Avoidance of painful memories (difficulty telling 
traumatising events and experiences to the listener)  
Layer 3: Candidness (opening up once trust is established) 
Layer 4: Pretence (make believe in order to not be seen as a failure 
in the eyes of the listener) 
Layer 5: Loneliness and vulnerability (revealing loneliness and 
vulnerability to the listener) 
 
Beyond the theoretical arguments, the experience of listening to the 
stories of refugees, brought me to conclude that we need to put more 
effort into listening to their voices, to see them as individuals with a 
personal story, and to allow us, as listeners, to understand their 
courage and desperation, their ambitions and dreams, their 
vulnerability and strengths – as members of the fabric of mankind.  
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The Need for Trauma Support for Refugees 
 
Selam Kidane & Mia Stokmans 
 
Introduction  
On 3 October 2013 a boat went down off the Italian island of 
Lampedusa killing 366 people, 360 of which were Eritrea refugees40 
(Davies, 2013). The incident 
was by far the most 
devastating, even in a region 
where such deaths are a 
regular occurrence. Tens of 
thousands of refugees are 
known to have died making 
the same journey to Europe’s 
southern borders in the past 
20 years. The 2018 risk 
analysis by Frontex concludes 
that the sea, especially the 
Mediterranean Sea, will 
remain the most active route 
for the illegal crossing of the 
external borders of the 
European Union (EU), as well 
as one of the most dangerous 
for refugees (Frontex, 2018). The EU’s policy of deterring refugees 
does not seem to have stemmed the flow of desperate refugees from 
 
40 The word ‘refugee’ is used here in a non-technical sense to mean a person who 
has fled his/her country of origin either out of fear for their safety or in search of 
a better life, and is used interchangeable with the word ‘migrant’, which is also used 
in a general sense. 
The critical flaw in Europe’s migration 
policies is the logic that underpins them – 
that refugees’ decisions about migration 
are rational. But fleeing is not a rational 
process and often happens as a result of 
traumatising events, which can prompt 
refugees to take life threatening risks. 
This study examines the possibility of 
alleviating the worst symptoms of post-
traumatic stress by using an app offering 
psycho-social support in refugee camps in 
Ethiopia. The study finds that psycho-
social support can decrease trauma levels 
and significantly increase social and 
economic resilience among refugees. 
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endangering themselves in an attempt to reach Europe (Mackintosh, 
2017).  
 
One of the victims of the Lampedusa disaster was Yohanna, a young 
woman who is believed to have been about 20 years old. She was 
seven months pregnant and her baby boy was born as she drowned. 
The premature baby was found still attached to her, when divers 
finally pulled their corpses from the wreck. The diver who pulled her 
body out describes how shocked he was by the discovery and how 
the experience left him unable to sleep (Roberts, 2013). A Guardian 
newspaper article relates how rescuers found the two in the prow of 
the boat, after they broke through what was described as “a wall of 
bodies”, including another woman pressing a young child to her chest 
and a teenage boy wearing a T-shirt emblazoned with the word ‘Italia’. 
Rescuers tied Yohanna’s body with a rope to other bodies and then 
rose with them from the depths of the sea to the light where they 
realised that the she had a baby nestled in her clothes. It was a disaster 
unlike any they had ever experienced (Davies, 2013). And, yet, despite 
the enormous risks and devastating outcomes policymakers 
continued to cite the desire for economic advantages as the prime 
cause of migration. In the Prime Minister’s Questions in June 2015, 
David Cameron told the United Kingdom Parliament that: “The vast 
majority of people setting off into the Mediterranean are not asylum 
seekers, but seeking a better life”. Cameron claimed these people are 
primarily economic migrants, rather than people seeking refuge from 
war or persecution, though he provided no evidence to support this 
claim (Mepham, 2015). No one seems to want to understand what 
causes these people to take the risks they continue to take in search 
for protection and prospects. 
 
However, the danger at sea is not the only, nor necessarily the biggest, 
risk the refugees face on their journey. The desert route through 
North Africa is riddled with trafficking networks and terrorist groups 
intent on capitalising on the desperation of refugees. In 2015, Islamic 
State (ISIS) beheaded and shot 30 Ethiopians and Eritreans and 
released a video showing the whole event (Catholic News Agency, 
2018). News of disappearing and wrecked boats and lists of the 
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people who have died and are missing circulate rapidly on Ethiopian 
and Eritrean websites and social media. Yet, this information does 
not seem to deter the next group of refugees from tempting their fate. 
 
Similar to the deterrents put in place by EU policymakers, the actions 
of terrorist do not seem to stop the refugees. Nor do the traffickers 
who sell refugees in open slave markets in Libya (Naib, 2018). The 
risks that refugees take to obtain what they perceive as protection and 
prospects seem to outweigh the benefits they actually receive by far 
much too. 
 
It seems that the critical flaw in Europe’s migration policies is the 
logic that underpins them. There is an undeniable tendency to 
downplay the devastative impact of war and political violence and 
take a harsh approach to asylum seekers by removing the economic 
incentives that are assumed to be ‘pulling them’ to Europe. This 
policy is based on one of the oldest models of migration – the ‘push-
pull’ model (Ravenstein, 1889). This theory predicts the level of 
migration based on objective indicators such as the distance, 
population, and economic opportunities between the source and 
destination location. In this model, migration decisions are 
determined using ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ analysis (Lee, 1966; Passaris, 
1989). The push-pull model assumes rational decision making that 
takes only economic opportunities and threats into account.  
Research question and objectives 
As will be explained in this chapter, the glaring omission in the push-
pull theory is the impact of traumatic experiences on the push side, 
particularly their impact on rational decision making. For instance, in 
the case of Eritrea, many credible reports into human rights abuses in 
Eritrea (Amnesty International, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2009), 
including the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Commission 
of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea (UN Human Rights Council, 
2015), establish the existence of an atmosphere of extreme political 
repression, including torture and inhumane treatment perpetrated 
against ordinary citizens. Torture, political violence and armed 
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conflict, whether targeted at an individual or towards the population 
at large, pose an immense threat to people on various levels (Modvig 
& Jaranson, 2004). Indeed there is ample evidence suggesting that, 
aside from resulting in physical injury or death, political violence, 
including torture, constitutes a traumatic threat to the integrity of the 
self (Chapman & Gavrin, 1999).  
 
This chapter states that most people exposed to trauma will 
experience stress responses such as avoidance, sleep disturbances, 
hyper-arousal and hyper-vigilance. These are adaptive reactions that 
prepare the survivor to deal with ongoing risks (Chrousos & Gold, 
1992; Tsigos & Chrousos, 2002). Repeated or constant activation of 
the stress response on the body and brain, known as allostatic load 
(McEwen, 2003), which corresponds to post-traumatic stress, creates 
a state of fear, hopelessness or horror in the individual in response to 
the threat of injury or death (Yehuda, 2002). In this chapter, we will 
argue that these threats push people into flight mode, which overrides 
the rational decision-making process, irrespective of the high risks 
involved in migration. If this is the case, providing information about 
the risks of migration will not stop refugees from migrating, as this 
information is not processed due to the flight mode they are in, 
caused by the traumatic experiences. Hence, the main research 
question to be answered in this chapter is: Can trauma support for refugees 
decrease trauma levels and increase social and economic resilience? This research 
question will be investigated in a refugee camp in Ethiopia that gives 
shelter to many traumatised Eritrean refugees.  
 
The aim of the research is, first and foremost, to draw attention to 
the effect trauma has on the decision-making process of refugees 
experiencing post-traumatic stress. The effect of trauma is largely 
ignored in the scientific discourse about migration, and plays no role 
in migration policies. However, in order to design effective policies 
or interventions targeted at traumatised refugees, one should realise 
that they do not always react rationally, have a low capacity to take in 
information, and are less capable of processing information. The 
second aim of the research is to establish the effectiveness of a trauma 
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counselling programme being implement in refugee camps in 
Ethiopia. 
 
In the following sections we will first discuss the theoretical 
framework, which provides a base for the empirical study reported 
on in this chapter. Then the research method is presented followed 
by the results of the research. The next section discusses the 
effectiveness and usability of the trauma counselling programme 
designed for this study in targeting refugees. This is followed by a 
brief conclusion, which also looks at the implications of the study for 
designing interventions targeted at refugees or migration policies.  
Theoretical framework 
The section presents the theoretical framework, which consists of the 
key concepts used in answering the research question, namely: the 
trauma of Eritrean refugees, social economic resilience, and the 
psychological effects of trauma on the decision to migrate. 
Trauma of refugees  
Research into the levels of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in 
Eritreans has revealed an alarming level in many Eritrean refugee 
communities and communities inside Eritrea (Kidane & Van Reisen, 
2017). The World Health Organization estimates that in situations of 
armed conflict, 10% of the people who experience traumatic events 
will have serious mental health problems. The most common 
conditions are depression, anxiety, insomnia and psychosomatic 
problems (such as back pain and stomach aches). Furthermore, 
another 10% will develop behaviours that hinder their ability to 
function effectively (World Health Organization, 2001). One would 
expect traumatic events resulting from conflict to be a common 
experience of people in refugee camps, which may engender strong 
negative feelings and result in lower social and economic resilience 
for those involved.  
 
The psychological symptoms resulting from trauma are persistent and 
simultaneously damage the victim’s self-esteem as well as their trust 
in fellow human beings (Barudy, 1989). Studies of refugee 
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populations indicate levels of depression and PTSD ranging from 40 
to 70% (Baingana, 2003). Although this rate may be compounded by 
displacement, it indicates the possibility that a significant proportion 
of people in communities affected by conflict and political violence 
are debilitated by psychiatric illnesses or severe psychological 
reactions to trauma (Silove, Ekblad & Mollica, 2000). The impact of 
trauma on individual lives can also translate into a situation where the 
whole community succumbs to maladaptation, which is detrimental 
to the community’s wellbeing in the long term and can result in 
collective trauma (Chang, 2017).  
 
Collective trauma is defined as the effect felt by many in the aftermath 
of a traumatic event. It is a blow to the basic fabric of social life and 
damages the bonds that hold people together, impairing their sense 
of community (Erikson, 1976). Collective trauma impairs the ability 
of people to react to threats and opportunities, causing them to 
become trapped in cycles of vulnerability (Fullilove, 2013). In fact, 
many modern intra-state conflicts deliberately inflict traumatic events 
on many members of a community to induce collective trauma, in 
order to control these communities (Blin, 2011). 
Social and economic resilience 
Social and economic resilience is not well defined in the literature 
(Van Reisen, Stokmans, Nakazibwe, Baluka & Vallejo, 2019). 
According to Van Reisen et al., (2019), social resilience refers to an 
individual’s perception of his/her abilities, their social embeddedness 
in the community, as well as their trust in government. Economic 
resilience refers to perceived income security. In this study we relate 
social and economic resilience to the agency of an individual, that is, 
the human capacity to act based on understanding of the world 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). We define it as the ability to cope with 
and recover from the hazards and traumas experienced (see 
Bergstrand, Mayer, Brumback, & Zhang, 2015). 
Psychological effects of trauma on decision to migrate 
Researchers have found that a traumatic experience has an effect on 
the victim’s cognitive processes and functioning, including cognitive 
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appraisal, cognitive schemas, symptom expression, and symptom 
resolution, as well as their behavioural action and adaptive strategies 
in response to danger (Lerner & Kennedy, 2000). This has at least 
two consequences for the lives of refugees. Firstly, PTSD negatively 
affects their social and economic resilience and, secondly, it affects 
their decision-making ability (Collier & Hoeffler, 1999). We will 
discuss both effects successively. 
 
As indicated above, traumatic experiences and PTSD carry with them 
strong negative feelings. People regard feelings as information, with 
which they evaluate their situation (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Strong 
negative feelings indicate that the current situation might be 
dangerous and the individual can be especially receptive to negative 
information that backs up that feeling (Norman, 1990). This effect 
will only diminish if a person realises that the negative feelings have 
nothing to do with the situation at hand, but are caused by a negative 
state of mind (Schwarz, 2011). Negative feelings caused by a 
traumatic event can be characterised as a negative mood, such as a 
depression (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). In such cases, it is difficult to 
realise that the negative feeling is not causally link to the situation at 
hand, as moods have a more general impact than emotions (Schwarz, 
2011). According to this line of reasoning, refugees with PTSD will 
perceive fewer opportunities in their current situation and are 
expected to score low in terms of social and economic resilience.  
 
As decision making is a complex process that requires the ability to 
recognise and evaluate the probability and consequences of each 
available alternative, it can be expected that it is also affected by 
traumatic experiences. This suggestion is supported by research, 
which indicates that people often do not make decisions on the basis 
of the information available, even if they are not traumatised (Payne, 
Bettman & Johnson, 1993; Kahneman, 2011; Thaler, 2015). A large 
number of studies have shown that affective feelings can exert 
substantial influence on judgment (Schwartz & Clore, 2007; Cohen, 
Pham & Andrade, 2008; Isen, 2001; Pham, 2004). In particular, it has 
been shown that the influence of feelings typically increases in 
situations where ability to process information is reduced by various 
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factors, including cognitive load (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). It seems 
that a decrease in processing ability (such as associated with PTSD) 
results in feelings being substituted for substantive information, 
which requires more cognitive resources to process (Avnet, Tuan, 
Pham, & Stephen, 2012). 
 
Generally speaking, most studies identify symptoms of PTSD as 
factors in increased risk-taking behaviour (Ben-Zur & Zeinder, 2009; 
Rheingold, Acierno, & Resnick, 2004; Tull, Weiss & McDermott, 
2016). However, Augsburger and Elbert (2017), in a pioneering 
research using a computer-based task to assess risk behaviour in 
displaced individuals with extremely high levels of traumatic 
experiences, found that high risk-taking behaviour was not related to 
organised violence, such as war and torture. This study concluded that 
the association between risk-taking behaviour and traumatic stress 
might depend on the particular risk and be affected by culturally 
different concepts of risk behaviour, education and societal values.  
 
The effects of strong negative feelings on cognitive processes such as 
information processing and decision making can be explained by dual 
process theories (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000; 
Evans, 2006; Kahneman, 2011; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). These 
theories assume that information is processed and evaluated by two 
different systems: a cognitive system that requires a lot of processing 
capacity and an affective system that requires almost no processing 
capacity (Kahneman, 2011). Information is always processed by the 
affective system first and results in an indication of what to do based 
on a ‘gut feeling’. The cognitive system will only interrupt this 
decision if the decision is evaluated as inappropriate. In that case, the 
information is processed by the cognitive system more thoroughly, 
taking pros and cons into consideration (Kahneman, 2011). 
According to this theory, refugees will, in the first instance, react 
according to their gut feeling. Due to the traumatic experience, this 
gut feeling may be extremely negative and strongly indicate that the 
refugee should flee. The decision to flee what is perceived as a 
dangerous situation seems appropriate and the cognitive system sees 
no need to process information about the pros and cons of migrating. 
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This can explain why refugees migrate, despite information about the 
dangers that can be encountered on their journey. Due to their strong 
negative feelings, migrating seems to be a wise decision that needs no 
close consideration of the pros and cons. Information about the 
dangers is simply ignored.  
 
Although information processing might remain hampered by trauma 
during the flight of refugees, factual information about routes, 
destinations and facilitators is crucial and so refugees are very invested 
in staying connected with each other, despite the technological 
challenges involved. A study into information and communication 
technology (ICT) (Kidane, 2016) conducted as part of an initiative 
related to this research found that most people considered their 
fellow refugees as the best source of information regarding most 
things (in contrast to official information and members of the host 
community). The study also identified that much interaction and 
information exchange takes place on social media, where information 
is shared on a range of issues. Regular topics of discussion ranged 
from money and work to family and health. Migration was also 
discussed, but safety and security seem not to be discussed as much 
as other topics. 
 
Taken together, the above account shows that the little substantive 
information that finds its way to refugees on the move seems to come 
from fellow refugees, who are also most likely hampered by 
diminished cognitive capacity as a result of individual and collective 
trauma, and who potentially rely on their feelings to make decisions 
about their safety and prospects. In fact, it can be concluded that 
decision making is not only hampered by individual trauma (e.g. 






Figure 12.1 Information exchange in refugee communities 
 
This leads to a situation where refugees are unable or unwilling to 
process all the substantive information available to them, as this 
would require more cognitive resources than currently available to 
them due to individual and collective trauma. Meanwhile, they rely on 
their feelings of fear and despair to make crucial decisions on their 
prospects and safety. For factual information, they rely on their 
community, which may also be affected by individual and collective 
trauma. It follows that one should put the impact of traumatic ‘push’ 
factors that debilitate information processing, and the absence of 
adequate information, which pushes victims to over-depend on their 
feelings to make a decision, at the heart of discussions on refugees 
and their decisions to take enormous risks to obtain what they 
perceive as better protection and prospects for themselves and their 
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families. In this light, the objective of providing protection to 
refugees at the earliest safe point should include dealing with the 
trauma that might be underpinning their decision to move further, 
often taking shocking risks. 
Research method  
In order to investigate the research question, an experimental study 
was carried out in refugee camps in Ethiopia in spring 2017. This 
section briefly describes the methods used for the selection of 
participants, design of the study, Self Help Low Cost Post Traumatic 
Stress (SHLCPTS) programme, instruments used and ethical 
considerations. More can be found on this research report in Van 
Reisen, Nakazibwe, Stokmans, Vallejo and Kidane (2018) and Kidane 
and Stokmans (2018). 
Selection of participants 
As this research explores some extremely difficult experiences, 
participants needed to be willing to participate in the programme, as 
well as able to reflect on their experiences and communicate that 
reflection to the researchers, while remaining as near to the norms of 
their community as possible (Allen, 1971). Taking these 
considerations into account, participants were selected using 
purposive sampling approaches, which are described more 
extensively in Kidane and Stokmans (2018). Local research assistants 
were recruited and asked to draw a list of potential participants. The 
list was then finalised by the research team.  
Design of the study 
The research design can be characterised as true experimental (with 
random assignment of the videos to groups of participants and pre- 
and post-testing) carried out in a natural setting. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the trauma support programme. However, it 
would have been unethical and impractical to have a control group 
who received no trauma support (Bonell et al., 2011), because it would 
have denied trauma support to about half of the participants, even 
after they came in contact with, and opened up to, people who could 
potentially give them support. In addition, it would have been 
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impractical as the intervention relied on an app available on a mobile 
phone, so it would have been impossible to stop people from sharing 
their newfound knowledge and skills. So, it was decided that half of 
the participants would receive seven videos, while the other half 
would receive only two. The participants in the second group would 
be given the remaining videos at the conclusion of the study, together 
with an allowance to access them.  
 
Some refugees received additional livelihood support from non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in the camps; those refugees, as 
well as the refugees who did not receive livelihood support, were 
asked to participate in the study and randomly assigned to take part 
in either a short two session video or a longer seven session video. 
Figure 12.2 shows the distribution of participants across the groups. 
 
 
Figure 12.2. Distribution of research participants 
The trauma support programme (SHLCPTS) 
A problem with trauma support in poor post-disaster contexts is that 
it is costly and reliant on Western experts or local clinicians (Kidane 
& Stokmans, 2018). In order to overcome some of these difficulties, 
the SHLCPTS programme was developed. The intervention was 
inspired by the eye movement desensitisation reprocessing (EMDR) 
therapy. EMDR works by getting victims of traumatic stress to focus 
intensely on the emotions, sensations and meaning of their traumatic 
experiences in a safe setting, while engaging them in a bilateral 
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stimulation. The approach was first developed by Francine Shapiro 
in 1988 and has since been found to be an effective treatment for 
PTSD across many fields. A full description of this programme is 
given in Van Reisen et al. (2018). The application of this programme 
consisted of three components: 
 
• Component 1: Two educational video sessions to raise 
participants’ awareness of their symptoms and the causes of 
these symptoms 
• Component 2: Five coaching and exercises video sessions on 
techniques to gain control over distressing PTSD symptoms 
• Component 3: A session that encouraged participants to 
share their experiences with members of their community 
 
The SHLCPTS programme was delivered via a mobile phone app. 
This mode of delivery suited the highly-mobile population in the 
camp, most of whom had a mobile phone. However, there were 
connectivity problems. Therefore, the app was uploaded to the 
mobile phones of the research assistants and shared with participants 
via Bluetooth using an app called SHAREit (Chapter 6, Journeys of 
Youth in Digital Africa: Pulled by Connectivity, by Rick Schoenmaeckers). 
Measurement scales 
The pre-test and post-test interviews focused on three topics: level of 
individual trauma, social capital as a proxy for collective trauma, and 
social and economic resilience. Level of individual trauma was 
measured using an adapted version of the Impact of Event Scale-
Revised (IES-R) (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979). Our 
experience with the IES-R in a study in Uganda indicated problems 
with its length (Van Reisen et al., 2018). So it was decided to develop 
a shorter version that would be more user-friendly in an ICT context. 
To ensure the validity of this short version, the three constructs of 
the IES-R (intrusion, avoidance and hyperarousal) are all included (as 
suggested by Thoresen et al., 2010). We selected at least two items 
from each subscale according to the highest inter-item correlation, as 
found in the Uganda study (Van Reisen et al., 2018) and their face 
validity (i.e., the item makes sense as a measure of the construct in the 
eyes of the researcher) (Neuman, 2011). In addition, items that were 
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considered particularly relevant to refugees in a camp were also 
included. This resulted in seven items for the short version of the 
IES-R (Kidane & Stokmans, 2018). 
 
It is important to measure social capital, as studies have been 
consistent in finding that chronic civil war can lead to the depletion 
of social capital (Kawachi & Subramanian, 2006; Wind & Komproe, 
2012). Furthermore, one of the effects of collective trauma is that it 
damages the bonds that hold people together (Erikson, 1976) – in 
other words, it damages social capital. Given this relationship 
between social capital and collective trauma, loss of social capital is 
useful in measuring collective trauma (Somasundaram, 2014). 
 
The social capital scale used in this study, was developed by Dmitri 
Williams (Department of Speech Communication University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), and is known as the Internet Social 
Capital Scale, or ISCS (Williams, 2006). The scale was constructed in 
recognition of the fact that an increased level of social interaction now 
occurs online and happens in parallel, and conjunction, with offline 
interaction. It includes community networks, relationships, and civic 
engagement based on norms of reciprocity and trust in others who 
facilitate cooperation and coordination for mutual benefit (Cullen & 
Whiteford, 2001). 
 
Given our understanding of the continuous information exchanges 
across refugee communities and the impacts of collective trauma, it 
was crucial to capture the quality of the social capital held by refugees, 
which also impacts on the quality of information exchanges across 
communities. The more meaningful and deep the relationships (social 
capital), the greater the possibilities for exchanging information, other 
than traumatic information that affirms the need for a ‘fight or flight’ 
response. 
  
Social and economic resilience (SER) was conceptualised as ‘social 
resilience’, pertaining to an individual’s abilities, their social 
embeddedness in the community and trust in the government, and 
economic resilience, referring to their perception of income security. 
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In this study we made use of an adapted version of the SER tool used 
in the Uganda research (Van Reisen et al., 2018). In this tool the 
individual’s social resilience was established using several statements 
regarding ‘capability’ (to pay bills, get information, acquire skills, and 
in terms of communication skills), ‘empowerment’ (to act 
independently and out of free will, as well as improved self-esteem) 
and ‘worry’ (about all kind of things). The social embeddedness of 
social resilience is operationalised by one indicator: 
‘subjective/social’, which refers to the bonds an individual has with 
the family, community and the leadership of the community. Trust in 
the government is captured by ‘structural/system’, which taps into 
the person’s rights and access to services. ‘Economic resilience’ is 
operationalised as the perceived ability to make, save and manage 
money.  
 
The SER tool was adjusted to the current context in which the 
participants were individuals living in a refugee camp. To secure the 
validity of this short version, we selected at least three items from 
each of the six subscales of the SER tool (income, empowerment, 
structural/system, worry, capability, and social). In order to do so, we 
looked at the inter-item correlations reported in the Uganda study 
(Van Reisen et al., 2018) and checked whether the items were relevant 
for refugees in a camp (e.g., items relating to income from work had 
to be modified as most camp residents do not work). Some selected 
items were adjusted based on an intimate knowledge of the context 
and an understanding of cultural and linguistic nuances. 
Ethical considerations 
As mentioned above, it was felt to be unethical and impractical to 
leave respondents who came into contact with the research team 
without any support. Therefore, consideration was given to this in the 
context of the Eritrean refugee camps in Ethiopia, where services are 
extremely restricted, and the research design altered to take this into 
account. In addition, there was concern over the potential to re-
traumatise participants who were asked to reflect on traumatic 
experiences. To mitigate this risk, researchers identified potential 
services (within the extremely limited the camp setting) that could 
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provide ongoing support to participants who were finding 
participation in the study overwhelming. Informed consent was 
sought from every participant and all personal information gathered 
was anonymised with designated codes that split the person’s identity 
from the data. The data was then stored in accordance with Tilburg 
University’s data management procedures.  
Results 
In this section we explore whether the SHLCPTS programme was 
effective in reducing trauma levels, and whether this enhanced social 
and economic resilience. In addition, we look at the applicability of 
the trauma support services used in this research. 
Did the SHLCPTS reduce traumatic stress? 
In this research, individual trauma was indicated by post-traumatic 
stress, measured by a short version of the IES-R, and collective 
trauma was measured by the ISCS. For both trauma levels, the effect 
of the SHLCPTS programme was explored by means of a 2 (full 
programme: seven videos; short programme: two videos) x 2 
(livelihood support: yes, no) x 2 (time: pre- and post-test) repeated-
measure multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with trauma 
support and livelihood support as between-subject factors and time 
as a within-subject factor. 
 
If the dependent variable was post-traumatic stress, measured on the 
IES-R short version, the results indicate that post-traumatic stress 
changed between the first (pre-test) and second (post-test) 
measurement (F (1, 90) = 64.594, p<0.01).41 This indicates that post-
traumatic stress changed during the research period. The interaction 
time*SHLCPTS is significant (F (1, 90) = 91.80, p<0.01), which 
 
41 An ANOVA makes use of an F distribution to test the significance of the 
difference between the groups involved. The extent the groups differ is indicated 
by an F-value (F) and its significance depends on the degrees of freedom that goes 
along with this test. The degrees of freedom are indicated between brackets just 
after the F (df1, df2). Df1 is related to the number of groups involved in the 
comparison and df2 is related to the number of respondents included in the 
comparison (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). 
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indicates that during the research the change in post-traumatic stress 
was not equal for the two groups of participants (the two and seven 
video conditions). Inspection of the estimated means indicates that 
those who received the seven video programme reported less PTSD 
during the second measurement. Moreover, the interactions 
time*livelihood support and time*SHLCPTS*livelihood were not 
significant (F (1, 90) = 0.00, p = 0.995; F (1, 90) = 0.801, p = 0.373, 
respectively).  
 
In the case of collective trauma, measured by the ISCS, we conducted 
two analyses: one for online social capital and one for offline social 
capital as the dependent variable. If the dependent variable is online 
social capital, the results indicate a significant main effect of time (F 
(1, 90) = 14.859, p<0.01). This indicates that, overall, social capital 
online changed during the research period. The interaction 
time*SHLCPTS is significant (F (1, 90) = 32.203, p<0.01), which 
indicates that during the research the change in social capital online is 
not equal for the two and seven video conditions. Inspection of the 
estimated means indicates that those who received seven videos of 
SHLCPTS reported higher social scores. The results for the 
interactions time*livelihood support and time*SHLCPTS*livelihood 
were not significant (F (1, 90) = 0.675, p = 0.413; F (1, 90) = 2.719, 
p = 0.103, respectively).  
 
If the dependent variable is offline social capital, the results show a 
significant main effect of time (F (1, 90) = 55.409, p<0.01). This 
indicates that, overall, social capital offline changed during the 
research period. The interaction time*SHLCPTS is significant (F (1, 
90) = 82.733, p<0.01), which indicates that during the research the 
change in social capital offline is not equal for the two and seven 
video conditions. Inspection of the estimated means indicates that 
those who received seven videos reported higher social capital offline. 
The results for the interactions time*livelihood support and 
time*SHLCPTS*livelihood are not significant (F (1, 90) = 0.359, p = 




So, the results indicate that post-traumatic stress levels, as well as 
collective trauma levels, decreased due to the SHLCPTS, consisting 
of two educational videos and five coaching and exercises videos. The 
same effect was not established by means of only the educational 
videos (the two video condition) or livelihood support. 
Did the SHLCPTS increase social and economic resilience? 
In this research, social and economic resilience was operationalised 
using six subscales: income, empowerment, structural/system, worry, 
capability, and social. To explore the effect of the SHLCPTS 
programme on each of these dependent variables, a 2 (full 
programme: seven videos; short programme: two videos) x 2 
(livelihood support: yes, no) x 2 (time: pre- and post-test 
measurement) repeated-measure MANOVA was conducted, with 
trauma support and livelihood support as between-subject factors 
and time as a within-subject factor. 
 
Regarding the dependent variable income, the results indicate that the 
perception of income did not change between the first (pre-test) and 
second measurement (post-test) (F (1, 91) = 0.358, p<0.551). So, in 
general, the perception of income did not change during the research. 
However, the interaction time*SHLCPTS is significant (F (1, 91) = 
15.084, p<0.01), which indicates that during the research the 
perception of income did change for the two as well as the seven 
video conditions. Inspection of the estimated means indicates that 
those who received seven videos of SHLCPTS reported higher 
income scores and those who received two videos reported lower 
income scores during the second measurement. However, the 
interaction between time*livelihood was not significant (F (1, 91) = 
1.112, p = 0.294), which indicates that livelihood support did not alter 
the perception of participants of income. Finally, the (three-way) 
interaction time*SHLCPTS*livelihood is not significant (F (1, 91) = 
0.842, p = 0.361). So, receiving both the livelihood programme as 
well as the SHLCPTS does not result in a multiplier effect. 
 
For empowerment, the results indicate that the main effect of time is 
significant (F (1, 91) = 17.662, p<0.01). This indicates that, overall, 
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the scores for empowerment changed during the research. The 
interaction time*SHLCPTS is significant (F (1, 91) = 42.344, p<0.01) 
and indicates that during the research empowerment did not change 
equally for the two and seven video conditions. Inspection of the 
estimated means indicates that those who received seven videos of 
SHLCPTS reported higher empowerment scores than those who 
received only two videos. The results for the interactions 
time*livelihood support is not significant (F (1, 91) = 0.069, p = 
0.793); neither is the three-way interaction 
time*SHLCPTS*livelihood (F (1, 91) = 1.921, p = 0.169).  
 
Regarding the subscale structural/system, the results indicate that the 
main effect of time is significant (F (1, 91) = 23.480, p<0.01). This 
indicates that, overall, the scores for system changed during the 
research. The interaction time*SHLCPTS is significant (F (1, 91) = 
38.632, p<0.01), which indicates that during the research the scores 
for system did not change equally for the two and seven video 
conditions. Inspection of the estimated means indicates that those 
who received seven videos of SHLCPTS reported higher system 
scores. The two-way interaction time*livelihood support and the 
three-way interaction time*SHLCPTS*livelihood are not significant 
(F (1, 91) = 1.983, p = 0.162; F (1, 91) = 0.311, p = 0.579, 
respectively).  
 
For worry, similar results were found. The results indicate that the 
main effect of time is significant (F (1, 91) = 5.090, p = 0.026), 
indicating that; overall, the scores for worry changed during the 
research. The interaction time*SHLCPTS is significant (F (1, 91) = 
13.438, p<0.01), which indicates that during the research the scores 
for worry did not change equally for the two and seven video 
conditions. Inspection of the estimated means indicates that those 
who received seven videos of SHLCPTS reported less worry. The 
two-way interaction time*livelihood support and the three-way 
interaction time*SHLCPTS*livelihood are not significant (F (1, 91) = 




Regarding the subscale capability, the results indicate that the main 
effect of time is significant (F (1, 91) = 21.708, p<0.01). This indicates 
that, overall, the scores for capability changed during the research. 
The interaction time*SHLCPTS is significant (F (1, 91) = 69.565, 
p<0.01), which indicates that during the research the scores for 
capability did not change equally for the two and seven video 
conditions. Inspection of the estimated means indicates that those 
who received seven videos of SHLCPTS reported higher capability 
scores. Again, the two-way interaction time*livelihood support and 
the three-way interaction time*SHLCPTS*livelihood are not 
significant (F (1, 91) = 0.644, p = 0.424; F (1, 91) = 0.644, p = 0.424, 
respectively).  
 
Regarding the subscale social, the results indicate that the main effect 
of time is significant (F (1, 91) = 9.105, p<0.01). This indicates that, 
overall, the scores for social changed during the research. The 
interaction time*SHLCPTS is significant (F (1, 91) = 22.474, p<0.01), 
which indicates that during the research the scores for social did not 
change equally for the two and seven video conditions. Inspection of 
the estimated means indicates that those who received seven videos 
of SHLCPTS reported higher social scores. The two-way interaction 
time*livelihood support and the three-way interaction 
time*SHLCPTS*livelihood are not significant (F (1, 91) = 0.808, p = 
0.371; F (1, 91) = 0.091, p = 0.763, respectively).  
 
In summary, the results indicate that the social and economic 
resilience of refugees increased due to the SHLCPTS programme, 
which consisted of two educational videos and five coaching and 
exercises videos, and that this effect was not established by the 
educational videos alone. In addition, livelihood support did not have 
any significant effect on social and economic resilience. Furthermore, 
none of the three-way interactions time*SHLCPTS*livelihood were 
significant indicating that the impact of receiving both SHLCPTS and 
livelihood support is not larger than the sum of each programme 
independently (no multiplier effect). Remarkably, the SHLCPTS 
programme resulted in improvements to the participants’ perceptions 
of their income levels, even when actual income levels stayed the 
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same and even where provision of livelihood support had no such an 
effect.  
Suitability of the SHLCPTS as an app in a refugee camp 
The results in terms of psychosocial improvements indicate the 
potential of the trauma support delivery approach used in the 
SHSCPTS programme. Indeed focus group discussions, as well as 
individual feedback, highlighted the main advantages of delivering 
trauma support via ICTs (for a full report see Kidane & Stokmans, 
2018). The ability to choose your own time and space was a great 
advantage, reinforcing the idea of regaining control over one’s own 
healing. The ability to obtain information and treatment in your own 
language was another advantage raised by many. Finally, the ability to 
go over things again and obtain additional information on aspects that 
were not initially clear was another advantage of the approach.  
 
However, the approach was not without its problems. Delivering a 
service via an app and through social media proved difficult, and even 
impossible in some cases, due to lack of connectivity and the 
unreliability of the weak connection in the camp for downloading 
videos. Alternatives suggested by the refugees themselves to address 
some of these concerns included downloading all the videos to one 
phone (from a memory card) and then sharing them using Bluetooth. 
This worked well and resolved much of the technical hurdles, but it 
also meant that the interactive aspect of the service was lost. 
Participants could no longer leave messages and feedback, as was the 
original idea. 
 
This led to an additional and more serious problem: participants felt 
alone, as they were processing potentially difficult material by 
themselves without the interactive features of the app. This gave rise 
to the possibility of participants dropping out altogether or at least 
losing the motivation to fully process traumatic memories. Many 
participants found the resourcing techniques (breathing exercises and 
‘safe calm place’) more attractive than the bilateral stimulation, which 
requires greater commitment and deeper engagement to focus on and 
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process traumatic memories. Feedback from one of the most severely 
traumatised participants captured this well during the interview: 
 
…It [the SHLCPTS programme] is really helpful. It made sense to me, it touched 
everything I felt and was happening to me and, eventually, the butterfly hugs were 
helpful too, but I felt physically tired every time I did them. I really hated how it 
initially made me feel; I hated your voice on the video. There were times when I felt 
physically ill, but then I started to notice I was calmer and less anxious. I started 
sleeping better and now I see how it helped. But it really is tough and there should 
be a contact person to tell you it will be ok in the end. (A, interview, Hitsats, 14 
August 2017) 
 
Without major improvements to the technology, delivering the whole 
SHLCPTS programme via ICT risks either a high dropout rate or 
unnecessary distress for those who carry on with the programme. 
Discussion  
Much of the individual trauma found in the camps can be described 
as complex PTSD, as it has resulted from prolonged exposure to 
traumatic events in the context of conflict and political violence. 
Trauma treatment literature is consistent that the phase-oriented 
approach we took in developing the trauma intervention is most 
effective in such circumstances (Briere & Scott, 2006; Brown, 
Scheflin, & Hammond, 1998; Courtois & Ford, 2009; Ford, Courtois, 
Steele, Van der Hart, & Nijenhuis, 2005; Van der Hart, Nijenhuis, & 
Steele, 2006). The objective of the intervention was to both relieve 
the symptoms of PTSD and help the refugees develop the skills to 
improve their functioning and relationships.  
 
One clear advantage inherent in the EMDR technique used in the 
SHLCPTS programme is the opportunity to focus on the traumatic 
experiences and associated beliefs and behaviours that hold victims 
back. The programme helps the brain to process the traumatic 
memory, enabling the person to resume normal information 
processing (Shapiro, 2007), addressing the alterations to the ability to 
process contextual information, including information related to 
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danger and safety, caused by PTSD. This means that with the 
lowering of trauma levels, that refugees would be able to assess their 
prospects and protection in their current location, taking into account 
all available contextual information, rather than basing their decision 
on the emotional fight-flight response. The results of this study 
support this line of reasoning. The full seven-session programme 
enhances social and economic resilience and perception of income, 
although this did not necessarily change objectively. 
 
The research did not specifically ask about imminent decisions 
pertaining to secondary migration, as this is seldom answered 
truthfully in formal circumstances; however, there was plenty of 
evidence during discussions to suggest a gradual ability to take in and 
process contextual information. One such example came at the end 
of a focus group discussion in Hitsats refugee camp. The participant, 
a young man who was part of the group who took up the full 
programme, hesitantly asked: “this may not be relevant, but ever since 
listening to you on the videos I have been wondering if in Europe, 
where you live, there are traumatic events and if people there also 
suffer from PTSD?” (Kidane & Stokmans, 2018). Nearly everyone in 
the group was interested in the answer to this. The question and the 
enthusiasm to hear the answer was a reflection of their increased 
capacity to begin taking in relevant information. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, neither trauma levels, nor social and economic 
wellbeing, was impacted on by the availability of livelihood support. 
This is surprising given the link between resources and resilience. It 
seems that the little livelihood support available in the camps is not 
perceived by the recipients as contributing to their social and 
economic resilience, nor is livelihood support currently contributing 
to protection against the impacts of trauma or collective trauma, as 
measured by social capital. 
Conclusion 
Post-traumatic stress is not only the result of fear-inducing 
circumstance, it also creates a state of fear and this explains that 
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continuous threats push refugees into a continuous flight mode. Such 
a state of mind results in what Kahneman refers to as a ‘thinking fast’ 
mode, which is no longer a rational decision-making process. We 
have argued that if this is the case, providing information about the 
risks of migration will aggravate the negative mind-set and increase 
the risk of further flight. The main research question of this research 
was: Can trauma support for refugees decrease trauma levels and increase social 
and economic resilience? It was investigated with an experimental set up 
of a treatment provided on the mobile phone in a refugee camp in 
Ethiopia where Eritrean refugees are protected. The majority of the 
refugees had high levels of trauma, as measured in this research. 
 
The programme, called Self Help Low Cos Post Traumatic Stress 
programme (SHLCPTS) was provided through seven short videos 
offered on a mobile phone. Despite the shortness of the programme 
(given the high levels of traumatic stress and its complex nature), as 
well as the difficulties associated with delivering therapy through ICT, 
the programme was successful in decreasing trauma levels and 
increasing social economic resilience. It can be concluded that the 
SHLCPTS programme did decrease levels of individual trauma and 
collective trauma (operationalised as social capital), and increase the 
participants’ perceived social and economic resilience. Treating PTSD 
had positive impacts on mental health and perceptions of socio-
economic status, as well as community-wide relationships.  
 
The results further show that the full seven-session programme of 
treatment was significantly more effective than the short two-session 
programme in reducing individual and collective trauma and in 
enhancing social economic resilience. Based on these results it can be 
determined that it is not sufficient to educate refugees about PTSD 
(component 1, two videos treatment), but that treatment must include 
coaching and actions to relate the treatment to the social network of 
the participant (component 2 and 3, full seven videos treatment). 
 
The findings of this study have wider implications for migration 
policy. Increasing the obstacles for refugees seeking protection will 
only further increase the stress on their mental health, increasing risk-
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taking ways to seek protection. Therefore, in designing interventions, 
trauma counselling should be recognised as necessary in order to 
enhance the social and economic resilience of refugees suffering from 
PTSD and, thereby, their ability to cope with and recover from the 
hazards they have experienced. We recommend that each 
rehabilitation intervention targeted at refugees suffering from PTSD 
should start with trauma counselling. The critical flaw in current 
European migration policies is the rationale that refugees’ decisions 
about migration are rationally based on push and pull factors, whilst 
in the reality of lived experiences, fleeing is not a rational process and 
often happens in the context of severely traumatising events, which, 
left untreated, can prompt refugees to take life threatening risks.  
 
One of the barriers to delivering trauma support in emergency 
contexts, such as the Eritrean refugee camps in Ethiopia, is the level 
of resources required for mental health services. This research has 
proved that even a short self-help programme focused on treatment 
of PTSD delivered by a mobile phone app can make a significant 
difference to decrease trauma and increase resilience.  
 
Would a brief trauma support delivered on her phone, in her 
language, have prevented Yohanna, the young woman who drowned 
as she gave birth from making the decision to embark on that ill-fated 
journey to Lampedusa in October 2013? It is difficult to conclude one 
way or another. However, what is clear is that without the 
opportunity to deal with the chronic PTSD resulting from 
experiences endured as a result of violence and conflict, many 
refugees will continue to make decisions devoid of appropriate 
information, relying heavily on their emotional response, which is 
overwhelmed by PTSD. The study has shown that investment in 
psycho-social support can be cost effective and that it will render 
positive results by increasing the socio-economic resilience of 
refugees. It is argued that this will help in strengthening their capacity 
to make informed decisions. It follows that this would decrease panic-
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Identifying Survivors of Torture: 





This chapter focuses on the 
conduct of the Israeli 
government, specifically the 
Israeli immigration 
authorities, towards asylum 
seekers43, mostly from Eritrea, 
but also from Ethiopia, Sudan 
and other countries, who are 
survivors of Sinai torture 
camps and victims of human 
trafficking and slavery in the 
Sinai desert. It reviews policy 
changes since 2009 and 
describes the situation of 
these survivors up to 2016, 
seven years after the first 
survivor arrived in Israel 
(Physicians for Human 
Rights-Israel, 2010).  
 
42 This chapter was originally published in Hebrew: Rozen, S. (2017). I never told 
what happened to me in Sinai. Hagira-Israel Journal of Migration, Volume 7, 2017 
(translated and edited by Danna Har-Gil). Available from: https://bit.ly/2yu1NVR 
(accessed 13 March 2019).  
43 As of 2018, Israel has officially recognised only 10 Eritrean and 1 Sudanese 
asylum seekers as refugees, who receive the rights and benefits inherent to this 
status. Although thousands of others have applied for asylum, their status is still 
either undetermined or defined as temporary protection. For this reason, they are 
referred to as ‘asylum seekers’, and not ‘refugees’, throughout this chapter. 
Human rights organisations estimate 
that there are around 4,000 survivors of 
Sinai torture camps in Israel today. 
However, survivors of trafficking and 
slavery end up incarcerated with other 
refugees and migrants under Israel’s 
harsh law for ‘infiltrators’. These 
survivors need to be identified and 
provided with support, including health 
and social benefits, in order to help them 
rehabilitate and reintegrate into society. 
In line with international law, they need 
to be recognised as victims of torture and 
human trafficking and offered long-term 




Human rights organisations estimate that 4,000 survivors of torture 
camps remain in Israel today. According to the Ministry of Justice’s 
Office of the National Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, there are 
approximately 3,000 victims of Sinai torture residing in Israel 
(Dominitz, D., Coordinator of the Anti-Trafficking Unit, Knesset 
Subcommittee on the Elimination of Trafficking in Women, 7 March 
2018).44 And, according to the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugee, approximately 7,000 Eritrean refugees were victims of 
torture in the Sinai from 2010 to 2012 (Israeli State Comptroller, 
2014; UNHCR, personal communication, 2014). Most of the torture 
camp survivors entered Israel in 2011, when 17,306 asylum seekers 
arrived (Population Immigration and Border Authority, 2014). A 
report published by Europe External Policy Advisors (EEPA) and 
Tilburg University, estimated that over 4,000 asylum seekers did not 
survive the journey to Israel and died in the desert between 2008 and 
2012 (Van Reisen, Estefanos, & Rijken, 2012). 
 
Between 2010 and 2012, Physicians for Human Rights-Israel 
collected testimonies from more than 1,300 camp survivors who 
visited their open clinic. These testimonies shed light on the extent of 
this phenomenon.45 Analysis of the information collected from these 
survivors revealed that 7.2% of them were kidnapped from refugee 
camps in Sudan and Ethiopia and brought involuntarily to the Sinai 
and Israel; 91% were transferred from captor to captor (‘bought’ and 
‘sold’) between three to six different smuggling/trafficking groups; 
24% endured severe physical and psychological abuse at the hands of 
their captors;46 59% had severe nutritional deficiencies; and 53% 
reported having been denied access to water.47 
 
44 The information was provided during a visit by the Subcommittee on the 
Elimination of Trafficking in Women to south Tel Aviv on 7 March 2018. 
45 Most of the figures are based on an analysis of 890 testimonies of Eritreans and 
Ethiopians (511 men and 469 women) collected in interviews conducted by 
Physicians for Human Rights-Israel between November 2010 and May 2012.  
46 This abuse included beating, whipping, burning, singeing, electric shock, burial 
(alive) in sand or dirt, hanging from limbs, exposure to sun, sexual abuse, threat of 
execution, shooting, and threat of organ extraction for transplants. 
47 Based on the testimonies of 1,142 Eritreans, Sudanese and Ethiopians collected 
during interviews conducted by Physicians for Human Rights-Israel between 








Figure 13.1. H., Eritrean asylum seeker kidnapped from Sudan and tortured in Sinai 
until his family paid USD 30,000 for his release; photographs taken in Tel Aviv on 
18 May 2012, 22 days after his release. 
Photographs: Sigal Rozen 
 
With the completion of the border fence between Egypt and Israel in 
the middle of 2012, asylum seekers stopped coming to Israel almost 
completely. Those who reached the border were forced to wait on the 
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Egyptian side of the fence until the Israel Defence Forces contacted 
the Egyptian forces who took them to prisons in Egypt, from where 
they were usually deported back to their countries of origin or to 
Ethiopia. Soldiers serving at the border at this time stated that entry 
to Israel was permitted only to survivors of severe abuse. In an 
interview to the daily newspaper, Yediot Aharonot, a soldier in the 
reserves stationed at the border described how the situation with the 
survivors was handled: “It’s true that sometimes it is unpleasant to 
see people with wounds and thin as skeletons, but they might 
compromise state security, and what we do is very important in our 
eyes” (Yahav & Siver, 2012). 
 
The Israeli State Comptroller Report clarified:  
 
A torture victim who was not held in conditions of slavery will not be recognized as 
a human trafficking victim as defined by punitive laws. Thus, if the detainees suffered 
inhumane torture but were not forced to work or provide any type of services, including 
sexual services, they will not be recognized as victims of human trafficking, though 
their immense suffering should not be overlooked, and will receive minimal state 
services, as received by the entire foreign population. (Israeli State Comptroller, 
2014) 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the conduct of the state 
authorities in Israel towards survivors of the torture camps, among 
whom are survivors of trafficking and slavery. It also elaborates on 
why most of these survivors are not recognised as such and do not 
enjoy the rights they deserve according to the international 
conventions signed by Israel and under the national laws of Israel. 
Methodology 
The data in this chapter is comprised of primary as well as secondary 
research. The information and data presented was collected primarily 
by the volunteers and employees of the Hotline for Refugees and 
Migrants (HRM). This is non-profit organisation for rights of 




The staff of HRM went regularly (on average every two weeks) to 
visit Israeli detention centres in which asylum seekers are held. The 
material from these visits has been recorded through interview 
reports, observation reports and other communications. The HRM 
files are located in their offices. This study is based on an analysis of 
these files. 
 
In addition, various unpublished documents and testimonies were 
analysed for the purpose of this research. These include documents 
related to hearing protocols from the Detention Review Tribunal of 
torture survivors transferred by the Tribunal adjudicators to the Anti-
trafficking Unit for examination and data collected during visit by the 
Subcommittee on the Elimination of Trafficking in Women to south 
Tel Aviv and Jaffa, as well as testimonies collected during interviews 
conducted by Physicians for Human Rights-Israel.  
 
The secondary research has been conducted through a systematic 
desk research of legal documents, court cases, reports and other 
relevant publications. The documents are separately referred to in the 
text, unless these are part of the HRM files, in which case they are 
referred to as such. The author has the original files. Given the 
sensitive nature of this research, all names of torture and human 
trafficking survivors and asylum seekers are withheld. The names are 
known to the author. 
Definitions: Human trafficking, slavery and torture 
This section provides definitions of human trafficking, slavery and 
torture, as per international law and the laws of Israel. 
Human trafficking 
In Israel, the Prohibition of Human Trafficking Law defines human 
trafficking as selling or buying a human being, or carrying out a 
transaction involving a human being, with or without barter (State of 
Israel, 1977). This definition is limited in comparison to that in the 
Palermo Protocol (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
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Organized Crime, see United Nations, 2000). The Prohibition of 
Human Trafficking Law forbids trading in persons, or negotiating to 
trade in persons, that would bring the person into a state of slavery, 
forced labour or prostitution, or for committing a sexual offence 
against that person (State of Israel, 1977, Article 377A).  
Slavery  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “No one shall 
be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be 
prohibited in all their forms” (United Nations, 2017, Article 4). Since 
that statement was made, slavery has been prohibited by a long list of 
International Human Rights instruments.48 In addition, the 
Prohibition of Human Trafficking Law in Israel prohibits “holding a 
person for the purpose of providing services or labour, including sex, 
holding a person in a state in which they are being treated as property, 
including control of their life and the abrogation of their liberties” 
(State of Israel, 1977, Article 375A). The legal definition of forced 
labour is “the use of force or other means of pressure, or threats, or 
compliance obtained fraudulently, with or without payment” (State 
of Israel, 1977, Article 376). 
Torture 
The Convention Against Torture (UN General Assembly, 1984) 
defines torture as where “An act by pain or suffering, whether 
physical or psychological, is intentionally inflicted upon a person”. 
The right to be free from torture is one of the core fundamental rights 
in international law, and one of the legal principles granted the status 
of customary law, which is binding upon every state in the world. As 
well as the Convention Against Torture, torture is also prohibited by 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN General 
Assembly, 1966a). Both conventions were signed by the State of 
Israel, although neither is guaranteed by Israeli law. 
 
 
48 Among these International Human Rights instruments are Article 8 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966a) 
and Articles 5–8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966b) and more.  
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The main obstacle in persuading the Israeli authorities to recognise 
the survivors of Sinai torture camps as survivors of torture under 
international law is that they are non-Israeli survivors who were 
tortured on Egyptian soil by Egyptian citizens. The Convention 
Against Torture only applies: “…where such pain or suffering is 
caused by the approval or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person serving in an official position or in his solicitation” (UN 
General Assembly, 1984, Article 1). Israeli government officials claim 
that survivors of the torture camps in the Sinai are not included in the 
Convention’s definition because they have been tortured by Egyptian 
citizens and not by Egyptian officials, despite evidence of the 
involvement of the Egyptian authorities in the existence of the torture 
camps, or at least evidence of their ‘silent consent’ to their existence 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014). 
 
Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture imposes upon its 
signatories the obligation of rehabilitating survivors of torture in their 
territory (UN General Assembly, 1984). The UN Committee Against 
Torture has determined that the states signatory to the Convention 
are required to establish accessible and available facilities for survivors 
of torture, as soon as possible after being examined by a physician, 
and to provide them with rehabilitation services to regain their 
independence as well as their physical, mental, social and professional 
capacities. Furthermore, signatories must establish programmes for 
the identification of survivors, which offer medical, psychological, 
legal and social aid (United Nations Committee Against Torture, 
2012, para. 11–15). 
 
The distinction between slavery and torture is not simple. According 
to Israeli law, for a person to be recognised as a survivor of slavery, 
and to be referred to a shelter for trafficking survivors, the Police 
Anti-Trafficking Unit must be convinced that prima facie proof exists 




committed (Decision 2806, State of Israel, 2002).49 For example, a 
person kidnapped from a refugee camp in Sudan, sold to captors in 
the Sinai for cash, bound in chains and severely tortured for a year 
will not be recognised as a slavery survivor. If that person was 
required to prepare food for the captors, wash their clothes or work 
in their fields for at least a few weeks, it is likely that he or she will be 
recognised as a survivor of slavery. If that person is raped two or three 
times during captivity, they are unlikely to be recognised as a slavery 
survivor. If one or more persons rapes them regularly, they are more 
likely to be recognised as a slavery survivor for providing sexual 
services (State of Israel, 2006; Rozen, 2012). 
 
Since the survivors of torture camps began arriving in Israel, the 
distinction has become clearer. However, the requirement of prima 
facie evidence is sometimes a liability: the Police Anti-Trafficking 
Unit only recognises prima facie evidence in which the survivors 
described the torture they underwent and the services they provided 
in the first interview conducted by the border control officers and the 
adjudicators of the Detention Review Tribunal. The Police Unit does 
not attribute enough importance to the fact that these first interviews 
do not usually cover the events in the Sinai. In addition, the manner 
of inquiry by the border control officers and the various tribunal 
adjudicators does not encourage asylum seekers to talk about their 
experiences (Rozen, 2012). 
Procedures for the absorption of torture camp survivors  
In 2010, Maria Rabinovitch, a researcher at the Knesset Research and 
Information Centre, explained why only a few of survivors of torture 
and rape reported their experiences to Israeli authorities: 
 
From the border, asylum seekers are transferred to the Interior Ministry’s Refugees 
and Infiltrators unit, which is actually the first to question them. This unit has the 
 
49 Decision 2806 by the State of Israel regarding human trafficking for the purposes 
of prostitution states that a shelter should be established “…for all victims of 
human trafficking for whom the first and foremost offenses against them are 
trafficking in the prostitution trade, or similar offenses” (State of Israel, 2002). 
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first opportunity to notice any signs of problems. However, this does not usually 
happen because the women are not willing to talk, and those doing the questioning 
are mostly men. In addition, the questionnaire used in these interviews (to which we 
gained access) included no questions about the health and mental status of the women. 
(Knesset Subcommittee on the Elimination of Trafficking in Women, 
2010) 
 
As explained previously, the State of Israel only feels compelled to 
locate and identify survivors of slavery, and no efforts are made to 
locate and identify torture survivors who did not provide services for 
their captors. This section will detail the absorption procedures of the 
Israeli authorities, including the methods of locating and identifying 
the survivors of the Sinai torture camps who provided services to 
their captors and are, therefore, entitled to be recognised as survivors 
of slavery (Hacker & Cohen, 2012).  
 
Before completion of the border fence in 2012, asylum seekers, 
including survivors of torture, crossed into Israel and waited for the 
Israel Defence Forces military patrol on Route 10, which would 
transfer them to a nearby military base. When there were enough 
asylum seekers to fill a bus, they would be handed over to the Israel 
Prison Service, which then transferred them to Saharonim Prison. 
There, after being registered, they were taken by bus to Soroka 
Hospital for medical examination and then returned to Saharonim. 
Survivors of torture and slavery who reached the border with visible 
injuries or who were in a state of malnutrition were immediately 
hospitalised at Soroka and returned to prison when their condition 
improved. After 2012, the process of absorption remained similar, 
but the medical examinations were conducted at Saharonim (HRM 
files, Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013 & 2014). Since the end of 2016 up until the end of April 2019, 
due to the border fence and the Israeli Defence Force push-back 
policy, not a single person has crossed Israel’s southern border 
illegally )Population Immigration and Border Authority, 2019). 
 
Many of the survivors of the torture camps entered Israel shortly 
before or during the period of Amendment No. 3 to the Anti-
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Infiltration Law, under which they were detained at Saharonim 
Prison, a facility with 2,000 beds. During that time, four social 
workers were employed at the prison, one of whom spoke Tigrinya, 
the language of most of the survivors. A hearing was held for the 
detainees by the Border Control Office within seven working days of 
their entry into Israel (Anti-Infiltration Law, State of Israel, 2012, 
Article 30[a]A). If the detainees showed overt signs of severe torture, 
the doctor might suggest that they meet with a social worker. If not, 
the first person to speak to them was the border control officer, an 
official of the Interior Ministry who was authorised to issue a 
detention and removal order and continue their administrative 
detention, or to set conditions for their release from custody (Hotline 
for Refugees and Migrants, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 & 2014). 
 
On 19 February 2012, as a result of tremendous efforts by the 
National Anti-Trafficking Unit in the Ministry of Justice, the Israel 
Prison Service introduced a procedure for identifying victims of 
trafficking and conditions of slavery. Within 15 days, with only one 
Tigrinya speaking social worker, 24 victims of torture were identified. 
However, most of them received no treatment because they were not 
defined as slavery victims. On 7 March 2012, the Ministry of Welfare 
reported that it was waiting for the conclusions of the government 
Subcommittee on the Elimination of Trafficking to decide how to 
deal with the issue of torture survivors (Protocol of the 
Subcommittee on the Elimination of Trafficking in Women, State of 
Israel, 2012). However, in the seven years that have passed since, no 
treatment has been offered to torture survivors who did not provide 
services to their captors. 
 
According to the procedure, when a border control officer, 
adjudicator of the Detention Review Tribunal or a social worker 
suspects that a detainee is a survivor of slavery they must notify the 
Legal Aid Department at the Ministry of Justice. The Department 
sends a lawyer to interview the detainee and to examine whether they 
are merely a survivor of torture or had also been forced to provide 
services to traffickers, making them a survivor of slavery. The lawyer 
documents the testimony of the survivor, includes their own legal 
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opinion, and transfers it to the Legal Aid Department, which then 
transfers it to the Police Anti-Trafficking Unit. The Unit decides 
whether the person will be recognised as a survivor of slavery. If the 
survivor is recognised as a survivor of slavery, and there is a space 
available in the shelter for trafficking and slavery survivors, the 
Detention Review Tribunal releases them to the shelter (Israeli law 
provides the same rights to shelter for victims of slavery and 
trafficking alike) (State of Israel, 1977).  
 
Despite the tremendous efforts and the strenuous work of the Legal 
Aid Department, most survivors of the torture camps do not enjoy 
legal representation, because, according to their own testimony, 
although they were severely tortured, they did not provide services to 
the traffickers. Of the 5,000–7,000 torture camp survivors who 
arrived in Israel between 2009 and 2012 (Israeli State Comptroller, 
2014), only about 500 had been recognised as survivors of trafficking 
and slavery by the end of 2018 (Dominitz, D., Coordinator of the 
Anti-Trafficking Unit, Knesset Subcommittee on the Elimination of 
Trafficking in Women, personal communication, 7 March 2018).  
 
An examination of the minutes of the Border Control Office’s 
hearings and the Detention Review Tribunal50 regarding the camp 
survivors shows that, in most cases, survivors refrain from telling the 
authorities what happened to them. For example, in a review of 
protocols carried out by HRM, of the 1,543 asylum seekers who 
entered Israel in June-September 2012, only 30 (less than 2%) 
protocols of torture survivors were referred by the Detention Review 
Tribunal to the authorities to ascertain whether they were survivors 
of slavery (Rozen, 2012). However, interviews conducted by UNHCR 
in Israel revealed that, of 33 asylum seekers who arrived in Israel in 
November 2012, 16 (48%) were tortured in camps in Sinai (UNHCR, 
2012). 
 
50 HRM reviewed 30 hearing protocols from the Detention Review Tribunal of 
torture survivors transferred by the Tribunal adjudicators to the Anti-trafficking 
Unit for examination, between June and September 2012 (out of 1,543 asylum 
seekers who entered during these months). 
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Additional evidence of a lack of reporting by authorities can be found 
in the data collected by the open clinic run by Physicians for Human 
Rights-Israel. Of the 1,996 women who arrived in Israel through the 
Sinai in 2011, only 54 complained at Saharonim of sexual assault in 
the Sinai (Zohar, S., Knesset Subcommittee on the Elimination of 
Trafficking in Women, 15 July 2012).51 This means that less than 3% 
of the women claimed, in the presence of Israeli authorities, that they 
were sexually assaulted. That same year, Physicians for Human 
Rights-Israel referred 1,585 women to gynaecologists and assisted in 
21 abortions. The number reflects all referrals to gynaecologists 
provided by the Open Clinic run by Physicians for Human Rights. 
Most of these patients were from Eritrea and Sudan (Rozen, 2012).  
 
Not all the women who applied to Physicians for Human Rights-
Israel came from the Egyptian border, and not every asylum seeker 
who needed gynaecological treatment was necessarily a survivor of 
rape. However, at the same time, although all the survivors of rape 
reached Saharonim, not all found their way to the Physicians for 
Human Rights-Israel Open Clinic after their release from prison. The 
huge gap between the number of rape survivors located and identified 
by the Israeli authorities in prison and those located and identified by 
Physicians for Human Rights-Israel reveals the failure of the system 
in 2011 to identify survivors of slavery, even though they were 
entitled to assistance and rehabilitation by law. 
Identification of slavery survivors  
I’m a religious person. I grew up in a church ... I never told what happened to me in 
the Sinai. It is very hard to talk about it even now, with you. How could I talk 
about it with a stranger I do not know? How could I expose myself to someone I do 
not know who comes to me for the first time and asks me to talk about what 
happened to me? (S.M., interview with Alexandra Roth-Ganor, HRM, 
Saharonim, 26 March 2015)  
 
51 This information was provided by Sigalit Zohar, an attorney from the Legal Aid 
Department, during a visit by the Subcommittee on the Elimination of Trafficking 




These words, which testify to the difficulty survivors of torture camps 
have in sharing their experiences, were expressed very emotionally by 
one of the survivors to an HRM activist after several lengthy meetings 
and conversations between the two. This section specifies the reasons 
for the huge gap between the number of actual survivors of slavery 
and their number reflected in the official interviews conducted with 
asylum seekers. 
 
A rare news report broadcast on Channel 2 News at the end of 2011 
followed the first steps of Sudanese and Eritrean asylum seekers in 
Saharonim Prison and makes it clear why most of them chose not to 
share their experiences of captivity in the Sinai. Not only did the 
Channel 2 camera unit accompany the arrival of the ‘infiltrators’ from 
the military base to Saharonim and document the activity of the 
immigration officers in the prison, it also revealed the names and 
exposed the faces of dozens of Sudanese and Eritreans, violating 
basic interview protocol and the interviewee’s right to privacy 
(Channel 2 TV, 2011).  
 
During the interview, Amir Peretz, head of border control at 
Saharonim at that time, never addressed the asylum seeker directly, 
did not identify himself to the asylum seeker or explain his authority, 
nor did he explain to the asylum seeker the purpose of the interview 
and its possible consequences. He spoke only to Anat, the translator. 
Peretz also allowed the reporter, Danny Kushmaro, to interrupt and 
pose questions for the camera and the viewers.  
 
Much can also be learnt from this report about the problems involved 
in translation between asylum seekers and immigration authorities: 
Peretz asked Anat to ask Tedros, the asylum seeker (who did not want 
to be identified on camera, but whose wishes were ignored), if the 
Bedouins treated him well during the two weeks he spent in the Sinai. 
Tedros replied in Tigrinya: “They did not beat me” (in Tigrinya, 
aytharemkun). Anat, instead of providing a simple, direct translation, 
said “There was no problem, they brought them by car to the border, 
and close to the border they got off, and were told ‘go’”. Berihu, 
another asylum seeker from Eritrea, was also summoned for an 
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interview. To the same question, Berihu answered: “There is no one 
who does not say ‘Israel’ after opening his eyes” (in Tigrinya, kulu ayni 
znqoh Israel zybl yelen). However, a simple, literal translation was not 
enough for Anat, who said, as though translating Berihu’s exact 
words: “All Eritreans want to come to Israel, and anyone who opens 
his eyes, meaning as soon as he can, everyone wants to come to 
Israel”. The conduct of the border control officer and the flawed 
translation services revealed in the report clearly explain why so few 
torture survivors share their experiences with the authorities. 
 
Although more survivors have shared their experiences of torture and 
slavery with the Detention Review Tribunal adjudicators than with 
the border control officers, many are still unwilling to share this 
information with the adjudicators for several reasons. According to 
the Public Defenders’ report on the legal treatment of asylum seekers 
in Saharonim Prison in 2011, the number of adjudicators and their 
working hours had not been adjusted to the number of detainees. 
Consequently, the court found it difficult to keep up with the heavy 
workload (about 100 hearings per day, 4 times the number of hearings 
conducted by an adjudicator today). In the same year, additional 
facilities were allocated for the use of the court, which was a 
significant improvement. However, the holding conditions during the 
waiting period were deemed inappropriate: the asylum seekers had to 
wait in very crowded ‘waiting pens’, long and narrow cells similar to 
a cage, while sitting on the floor (Israeli Public Defender’s Office, 
2011). These conditions while awaiting a hearing, combined with 
overworked adjudicators, did not encourage the survivors to 
elaborate on their experiences. For example, during a visit to 
Saharonim Prison in July 2012, a UNHCR staff member identified 
five survivors of slavery and torture who did not mention their 
experiences to the Border Police or the Detention Review Tribunal 
(Zohar, S., Knesset Subcommittee on the Elimination of Trafficking 
in Women, 15 July 2012).52 
 
52 This information was provided by Sigalit Zohar, an attorney from the Legal Aid 
Department, during a visit by the Subcommittee on the Elimination of Trafficking 




The adjudicators, who had to conduct about 100 hearings a day 
during these years, used a fixed format of protocols and a fixed text 
for the detainees’ statements, some even written before they were 
brought before the adjudicator. Thus, of the 30 protocols that the 
adjudicators chose to transfer to the Police Anti-Trafficking Unit, all 
the minutes of the hearing by Adjudicator Dorfman had an identical 
opening sentence: “I am a citizen of Eritrea”. The opening sentence 
in the minutes of Adjudicators Silberschmidt, Halabga and Raja, is 
also identical: “I am not represented”.53 
 
A total of 17 of the 30 protocols indicate that the survivors said they 
came to Israel to work. All the survivors who said they had been 
kidnapped declared this before Adjudicator Dorfman and this is 
reflected in his protocols. It is possible that survivors who appeared 
before other adjudicators were also kidnapped from refugee camps in 
Sudan and Eritrea, but unless the adjudicator specifically asked about 
the circumstances of their arrival, these details were not mentioned.  
 
A total of 21 of the 30 protocols were written by Adjudicator 
Dorfman. In these 21 protocols, 11 survivors reported that they had 
been kidnapped without any intention of coming to Israel, while 9 
allegedly declared, “I came to Israel to work”. All the survivors 
brought before Adjudicator Silberschmidt were quoted as saying: “I 
came to Israel to live and work”. All detainees brought before 
Adjudicator Halabga were attributed as saying “I arrived in Israel for 
the purpose of work”. The identical wording of the detainees’ 
statements is evidence of the great burden placed on the adjudicators, 
a burden that caused them to ‘copy and paste’ the detainee’s words 
before they were spoken, and sometimes even caused them to forget 
to erase the words if the detainee did not say them. The heavy 
workload discouraged adjudicators from dwelling on and discussing 
problems and difficulties that detainees did not bring up themselves 
(Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 & 
 
53 HRM reviewed 30 hearing protocols from the Detention Review Tribunal of 
torture survivors transferred by the Tribunal adjudicators to the Anti-trafficking 
Unit for examination, between June to September 2012 (out of 1,543 asylum 
seekers who entered during these months). 
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2014). Of those 30 survivors, only 6 (4 women and 2 men) were 
ultimately recognised as survivors of slavery. During 2012, only one 
of the men (of the 6 who were recognised) was transferred to a 
shelter. The 4 women and another man waited in prison until 2013, 
when they were finally transferred to a shelter (HRM files, Hotline 
for Refugees and Migrants, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 & 2014). 
 
Survivors of torture camps who provided services to their captors 
often failed to mention the services they were forced to provide. 
When HRM representatives asked the camp survivors to clarify why 
they did not say that they worked for their captors in the desert, most 
of the survivors did not understand the question. Even when asked 
about torture, they talked about it only to clarify the source of their 
distress or injuries. Survivors working in the traffickers’ fields, 
building their homes, or providing cooking, cleaning, or translation 
services reported that hard work was actually a relief in their routine 
during captivity. Most of them welcomed the opportunity to be free 
from the chains that restrained them day and night. They were happy 
to leave the cramped, stuffy compound, where they were chained with 
many others, some of whom had died and whose bodies still 
remained in the chains. The work, at least, released them from the 
sickening smell of the bodies. Because many reported being trapped 
in underground structures, often with their eyes covered throughout 
their long captivity, going out to work was an opportunity to see the 
light of day. During the long months of captivity, the physical torture 
was many times worse and, therefore, they did not think it was 
important to describe the services they provided the traffickers (HRM 
files, Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013 & 2014). 
 
Even when the right questions were asked in the right language, many 
survivors did not understand them correctly. For example, a number 
of survivors answered me in the negative when asked whether they 
worked for their captors. However, when I asked them to describe 
their daily routine in captivity, night construction work was added to 
the schedule. In another case, preparing food for the detainees and 
their captors was part of the routine. When I explained to the 
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interviewees that if they prepared food or did construction work 
under the orders of their captors, they did indeed work, they rejected 
this: preparing food was not considered a job, as the food was for 
them as well. A detainee who was engaged in construction work, for 
example, claimed that it was not work, because he had not received a 
salary for it. Sexual abuse is even more difficult to report for the 
survivors of the torture camps in the Sinai. Even when they were 
asked and understood that reporting sexual abuse would promote 
their release from detention, many did not dare, and still do not dare 
to report it, because of the shame involved. These examples illustrate 
why relying on old protocols when discussing the experiences of 
slavery survivors, who now seek recognition of their status, is 
unreasonable (HRM files, Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 & 2014). 
Imprisonment of torture survivors under the Entry to Israel Law 
The Bedouin smugglers who promised to transfer us to Israel abused us badly. They 
tortured my partner before my eyes; they slowly burned parts of his body until he died 
of his wounds. His body was thrown to the road. I was raped and severely beaten by 
the smugglers. (P.M.H., interview with HRM, Saharonim, 22 July 2009) 
 
P.M.H., a 28-year-old asylum seeker who fled Eritrea with her partner 
and was the victim of trafficking in the Sinai, is one of only six women 
who told HRM volunteers in 2009 about instances of rape on the way 
to Israel. Like the other asylum seekers, P.M.H. was held in 
administrative detention in Saharonim for illegal entry and stay in 
Israel, under the Entry to Israel Law (State of Israel, 1952).54 The 
period of detention and the date of release of asylum seekers was not 
stated specifically, but can be determined by the number of new 
asylum seekers entering Israel and, hence, the demand for the 2,000 
beds in Saharonim. The detention, which allows for the detention of 
asylum seekers, is ordered by border control officers and is subject to 
judicial review by the Detention Review Tribunal within 4 days, and 
periodic review every 30 days (State of Israel, 1952). 
 
 
54 P.M.H was released from prison in September 2009. 
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Although there were still no guidelines for the treatment of trafficking 
and slavery survivors from the Sinai at that time, a Detention Review 
Tribunal adjudicator referred P.M.H. to a social worker in Saharonim. 
He later accepted HRM’s request to release the woman to a shelter 
run by a private non-profit organisation in northern Israel. 
 
The following experience was reported by asylum seekers (two 
sisters) from Ethiopia to HRM volunteers in Saharonim, the bruises 
still fresh on their bodies, before their detention began in June 2009. 
 
I am 26 years old and my sister is 21 years old ... Two attackers entered the place 
where we slept and said that since we refused to have sexual relations with them, we 
will no longer receive drinking water ... The attackers ordered to deny us food and 
drink. The newly-arrived Bedouins also beat us and demanded that we have sex 
with them in exchange for water [...]. (A.T.T. and A.T.T., interview with 
HRM, Saharonim, 7 July 2009)55 
 
HRM requested that the sisters be transferred from the remote 
Saharonim Prison to Givon Prison, and that an attorney from the 
Legal Aid Department in the Ministry of Justice be appointed to 
them.56 When an attorney failed to be appointed, HRM requested that 
the Tribunal release them, and in September 2009, the two were 
released from prison (Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013 & 2014). 
 
55 These sisters were released from prison in September 2009. 
56 HRM’s request was based on the Legal Aid Law, 1972, which was amended 
according to the Law for the Prevention of Human Trafficking 2003. The 
amendment ensures that legal aid is provided to all trafficking victims, whether or 
not they testify against their traffickers. In addition, this amendment stated that 
legal aid can be provided in stages. During the first stage legal aid was provided to 
women in the Maagen shelter, and only until 1 August 2006. As of April 2006, legal 
aid was provided to all trafficking victims, including those detained in immigration 
detention facilities. On 29 October 2006, the Law against Human Trafficking came 
into force. At the same time a temporary law was implemented, extending legal aid 
to victims of slavery trafficking.  
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Government policy on the rights of torture survivors 
In 2010, the severity and extent of the torture camp situation in the 
Sinai became clear. Serious indictments for extortion, holding people 
in conditions of slavery and human trafficking were filed in January 
2010 by the Jerusalem Magistrate’s Court against Negassi Habtai, an 
Eritrean citizen, and Fitwi Mahari, an Ethiopian immigrant. The 
indictments raised awareness of the phenomenon. According to the 
indictments, the two were part of an Egyptian-Eritrean gang that took 
asylum seekers as hostages and tortured them, while extorting their 
relatives for ransom for their release (Hananel, 2010). 
 
In the absence of clear guidelines, torture survivors were sometimes 
released by the Detention Review Tribunal to a private shelter run by 
volunteers, funded by a messianic Jewish community in northern 
Israel. Sometimes the release involved difficulties: M.S., a citizen of 
Eritrea, was raped and severely tortured in the Sinai (M.S., interview 
with HRM, Saharonim, 3 January 2010), however, the Detention 
Review Tribunal rejected HRM’s request to release her to the shelter, 
because the adjudicator said that she could receive appropriate 
medical treatment in the Israel Prison Service clinic. HRM submitted 
another request to the Tribunal, which demanded a psychiatric 
opinion, following which the adjudicator ruled that she would be 
released for 60 days, and even authorised an extension, at the end of 
which M.S. would have to return to prison (Rozen, Leibowitz & 
Bornstein, 2010). 
 
On 8 June 2010, HRM initiated a discussion in the Knesset 
Subcommittee on the Elimination of Trafficking in Women, and 
accompanied M.S. to speak before the committee members. Rachel 
Gershuni, head of the Anti-Trafficking Unit in the Ministry of Justice, 
and an attorney who has, for many years, fought for recognition of 
the rights of survivors of trafficking and slavery, made it clear that 
M.S. was entitled to the status of trafficking survivor: 
 
M.S.’s case, which we have just heard, is a case I have reviewed and reached the 
conclusion that there is a suspicion of slavery here. Why? Not because she was 
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raped ... In order for this to be slavery, several conditions must exist, as is in 
her case, such as being treated as property, being held for three weeks without a 
chance to leave, being raped by several people, and being claimed as property: 
the Bedouin who held her said “you are mine forever”. These are clear signs that 
she has been objectified, treated as property, controlled, deprived of liberty. 
Although it is a short period, it can be regarded as slavery, which is why she 
was transferred to this shelter. (Knesset Subcommittee on the Elimination of 
Trafficking in Women, 2010) 
 
Gershuni’s words, and perhaps the fact that M.S. gave her testimony 
before the Knesset Committee, helped to prevent M.S. from being 
returned to prison and to be granted recognition as a survivor of 
slavery.57 Her words encouraged committee chairwoman, MK Orit 
Zuaretz, to summarise the matter saying: “We are moving in the 
direction of understanding the need for an additional shelter that will 
provide a different solution for victims who are refugees and migrants 
who come here through the border; this is another requirement” 
(Knesset Subcommittee on the Elimination of Trafficking in Women, 
2010). 
 
Indeed, in the course of 2010, 11 survivors of slavery from the Sinai 
were recognised and transferred to shelters (Atlas & Maagen Shelters, 
2015). In contrast, survivors of torture who arrived in the same period 
were detained in Saharonim in conditions described by the Public 
Defender’s Office as miserable, overcrowded and unsanitary (Israeli 
Public Defender’s Office, 2011, p. 68). 
The incarceration of asylum seekers, including survivors of 
trafficking, torture and slavery 
Because of the experience involved in seeking asylum and the traumatic events 
often preceding their escape, asylum seekers may suffer symptoms of psychological 
illnesses such as trauma, depression, anxiety and aggression. When examining 




57 M.S. was released from prison on 15 March 2010. 
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This section describes the laws that have allowed, and still allow, the 
detention of torture survivors and details the enormous difficulties 
involved in locating, identifying and releasing those survivors over the 
years. 
 
In 2010 and 2011, the Israeli government decided to take significant 
measures to “stop infiltration” from Egypt (Natan, 2011). These 
included building a fence along the border and a detention camp 
capable of holding thousands, as well as punitive measures against 
employers of asylum seekers (Rozen, 2012).58 In addition, legislation 
was enacted that would allow the prolonged detention of asylum 
seekers (Natan, 2011). These decisions began to affect asylum seekers 
in Israel in the middle of 2012, when the construction of the fence 
was completed, the capacity of Saharonim was doubled, and 
Amendment 3 to the Anti-Infiltration Law came into effect (Sabar & 
Tsurkov, 2015). 
 
In 2011, a record number of 17,306 asylum seekers entered Israel 
from the Sinai (Population Immigration and Border Authority, 2014), 
and the practice of trafficking for ransom was thriving. In the absence 
of places for detainees, the Immigration Authority was forced to 
release detainees from Saharonim after a very short period. However, 
the conditions of detention may have been traumatic for the survivors 
of the crowded Sinai camps. The report of the Public Defender’s 
Office, which reviewed prison conditions in 2011–2012, showed that 
in Saharonim, each detainee was allocated 2.1 square metres (Israeli 
Public Defender’s Office, 2013, p. 10), while the regulatory minimum 
area deemed as an appropriate standard is 4.5 square metres (Israeli 
Public Defender’s Office, 2013, p. 5). This is at odds with standard 
living space in prisons in western countries, which is 8.8 square metres 
per prisoner (Israeli Public Defender’s Office, 2013, p. 4). 
 
Between 2012 and 2015, the Knesset passed three major amendments 
to the Anti-Infiltration Law aimed at deterring those trying to enter 
 
58 Until June 2012, Saharonim prison had 8 sections of tents, each of which held 
250 prisoners. In June 2012, additional new wings were added that replaced the tent 
sections. Each of the new wings could hold 500 prisoners.  
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Israel from Egypt and encouraging the departure of those already in 
Israel. In January 2012, Amendment 3 to the Anti-Infiltration Law 
was enacted (State of Israel, 2012), although it has been postponed 
from coming into force repeatedly since 2006 due to severe public 
criticism. Unfortunately, years of systematic incitement of public 
opinion against asylum seekers by decision makers and politicians has 
steered the public to accept the law, which has undergone a number 
of amendments (Tsurkov, 2012). Amendment 3 of the law (State of 
Israel, 2012) allowed a detention period of three years for asylum 
seekers who did not enter through a regular border crossing. Those 
coming from an enemy state could be detained indefinitely.  
 
A petition by human rights organisations led to the annulment of the 
amendment in September 2013 (Israel High Court of Justice, 2013b) 
and the enactment of Amendment 4 within three months in a hasty 
proceeding. Amendment 4 reduced the detention term to one year, 
but established the Holot facility, where ‘infiltrators’ released from 
Saharonim and ‘infiltrators’ summoned from around the country 
could be detained indefinitely (State of Israel, 2013). Human rights 
organisations again petitioned the High Court of Justice, which 
annulled Amendment 4 (Israel High Court of Justice, 2014a). In 2014, 
another amendment, aimed at preventing infiltration and ensuring the 
departure of ‘infiltrators’ from Israel, was enacted in less than three 
months. This amendment reduced the period of detention for new 
‘infiltrators’ from one year to three months and restricted the period 
of detention in Holot to 20 months. The law included economic 
sanctions against ‘infiltrators’ who had yet to be sent to Holot, and 
their employers. Human rights organisations filed a petition against 
the law. In August 2015, the High Court of Justice rejected the 
petition, but reduced the maximum period of detention at Holot to 
12 months (Israel High Court of Justice, 2015). On 8 February 2016, 
the Knesset amended the law accordingly (Hartman, 2016). 
 
During the 15 months in which Amendment 3 was implemented, 
only 136 people were released from detention (Israel High Court of 
Justice, 2013a). The law allowed the Border Control Office to release 
‘infiltrators’ if the officer was convinced that incarceration was 
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detrimental to their health (State of Israel, 2012, Section 30A[b]1). 
Despite the serious medical problems exhibited by some of the 
detainees, HRM was unable to secure the release of any detainees on 
the basis of this section. HRM’s efforts, in cooperation with the 
Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, to bring volunteer doctors to the 
prison to examine the detainees were unsuccessful, and requests for 
the release of torture camp survivors were denied on the grounds that 
torture does not constitute a special humanitarian cause for release 
(Beersheva District Court, 2013a).  
 
The story of Waldo from Eritrea illustrates the difficulties faced by 
the survivors of the Sinai torture camps. Waldo arrived in Israel on 
21 July 2012 after being tortured, beaten, and burned for many 
months in the Sinai. After his family raised the ransom required for 
his release, he reached the Israeli border and was transferred to 
Saharonim Prison. After the Detention Review Tribunal refused to 
consider torture as a humanitarian cause for his release, HRM 
attorney Raya Meiler appealed to the District Court of Beersheva. 
District Court Judge Bitan agreed with the Tribunal, stating: 
 
The harassment and torture of infiltrators on their way to Israel is a widespread 
phenomenon. To view this as a special humanitarian case, there must be a connection 
to the mental state of the infiltrator which would justify his release. (Beersheva 
District Court, 2013a)  
 
Judge Bitan rejected HRM’s appeal and attorney Meiler then turned 
to the Supreme Court, where Judge Fogelman returned the case for 
re-examination by the Detention Review Tribunal, ruling: 
 
There is therefore no place to rule categorically that abduction, imprisonment, torture 
and other abuses suffered by many of those who made their way from Africa to Israel 
are not ‘special humanitarian reasons’ which provide grounds for release from custody. 
Each case must be examined individually, based on its specific circumstances. (High 
Court of Justice, 2013a, 1689/13) 
 
In accordance with the opinion of a social worker in Saharonim, 
Detention Review Tribunal adjudicator Marat Dorfman agreed to 
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release Waldo. The Immigration Authority, however, appealed the 
decision to transfer the case to the District Court of Beersheva 
(Beersheva District Court, 2013b). Honourable Judge Dovrat 
accepted the state’s appeal and cancelled the decision to release 
Waldo, but criticised the examination conducted at the prison in 
English and determined that he would be re-examined. After the 
examination, the adjudicator again decided to release him. On 27 June 
2013, Waldo was released after 11 months of detention at Saharonim 
(Detention Review Tribunal, 2013a).  
 
During the 15 months of the law’s implementation, HRM was able to 
obtain the release of only five survivors of the torture camps. In 2013, 
HRM succeeded in having 14 survivors of slavery recognised. The 
average period between the day of detention and release to a shelter 
was six months. When the law was annulled in September 2013, 149 
survivors of torture were still held at Saharonim, the vast majority of 
them for over a year (UNHCR, 2013). After several explicit requests 
submitted by HRM to the Detention Review Tribunal, many of them 
were released, while others were released when the law was annulled, 
regardless of their being survivors of torture (HRM files, Hotline for 
Refugees and Migrants, 2012 & 2013). 
 
In December 2013, approximately 500 asylum seekers, among them 
survivors of torture camps, were transferred from Saharonim Prison 
to the Holot facility, a violation by the Immigration Authority of the 
High Court’s instructions to release them (Israel High Court of 
Justice, 2013b). In 2014, the procedure for recognising slavery 
survivors among the asylum seekers had not yet been fully 
implemented. In 2014, HRM volunteers and employees in Saharonim 
and the Holot identified 87 survivors of torture who had been 
detained for over two years. HRM succeeded in releasing 42 survivors 
of torture camps. Two were released due to a petition sent on their 
behalf to the District Court, while the others were released on 6 
November 2014, only because they were part of a group of 138 
petitioners who had been detained for more than two years, unrelated 
to the fact that they were torture survivors (Israel High Court of 
Justice, 2014c). A total of 29 of the 87 camp survivors provided 
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services to their captors (HRM files, Hotline for Refugees and 
Migrants, 2014). 
 
In 2014, after more than two years in prison, at least five torture 
survivors identified by HRM surrendered to the intense pressure 
exerted on them while in Saharonim and chose to leave Israel 
‘voluntarily’; their fates remain unknown. During the Passover 
holiday of 2014, three survivors of the torture camps left Israel, at 
least one of whom was entitled to the status of survivor of slavery 
(HRM files, Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 2014). N.M.S. 
entered Israel on 23 January 2012 and was detained in Saharonim. In 
all of the 13 Detention Review Tribunal hearings on his case carried 
out in Tigrinya, the Eritrean language, he insisted he was a citizen of 
Eritrea. The Immigration Authority claimed that he was an Ethiopian 
citizen. In February 2014, N.M.S. told HRM’s volunteers: 
 
I was in Sinai for a month. They beat me in the head a lot. I have marks of the 
blows. Every night they took us to work. We built the houses of the Rashida (the 
smugglers, members of the Rashida tribe). I did not tell this to the Interior Ministry 
because they did not ask me. They only ask all the time if I want to go back to 
Ethiopia. (N.M.S., interview with HRM, Saharonim, 5 February 2014) 
 
On 23 February 2014, HRM sent a request for his release to the 
adjudicator, but a month later N.M.S. gave in and left Israel 
‘voluntarily’, after two years and two months in Saharonim.  
 
Other survivors, F.A.M. and J.I., did not even intend to come to 
Israel. They were abducted from Kassala on the Sudanese border in 
2012, held in various torture camps and released along the Israeli 
border after their ransom was paid in August 2012. They also 
succumbed to the pressure and returned to Eritrea in March 2014, 
after a year and five months in prison (HRM files, Hotline for 
Refugees and Migrants, 2014). 
 
Due to the efforts of the Anti-Trafficking Unit, Amendment No. 3 
to the Anti-Infiltration and Assurance of the Departure of Infiltrators 
from Israel Law specifies that survivors of trafficking and slavery will 
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not be sent to Holot (State of Israel, 2012, Section 32D, Article 6C). 
However, this law does not grant the right to liberty to survivors of 
torture who have not worked for their captors. These survivors are 
sent to Holot like other asylum seekers. To clarify the difficulties 
involved in releasing survivors of slavery from detention, let us 
describe the sequence of events in the case of one of them.  
 
S.M., an Eritrean citizen, entered Israel in September 2011 and was 
released in November 2015 after more than four years in Saharonim. 
 
[...] There was severe violence in the Sinai. Every morning they would ask us to call 
[family members] to get the money ... When I was in the second hut, they took me 
to work in the building at night ... I worked for two weeks every day from eight in 
the evening until two or three in the morning. Because of all the torture and beatings 
I got, I became very ill, my whole body swelled up, my mouth too. The children of the 
smugglers who guarded us with rifles decided not to take me to work anymore ... I 
could not sit because they burned me in the back ... I sat naked because I was so 
wounded that I could not wear clothes. I did not tell anyone what happened to me. I 
was never asked the way you are asking me. (S.M., interview with Alexandra 
Roth-Ganor, HRM, Saharonim, 26 March 2015) 
 
In April 2015, Emi Saar, head of the HRM human trafficking combat 
team, sent a request to the Police Anti-Trafficking Unit to recognize 
S.M. as a slavery survivor, but the request was denied. In October 
2015, after the head of the Police Unit was replaced, Saar sent another 
request. In December 2015, S.M. was finally recognised as a slavery 
survivor, released from Saharonim Prison and transferred to a shelter 
(HRM files, Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 2015a). 
 
During 2015, HRM referred 28 slavery survivors who worked for 
their captors to the Police Anti-Trafficking Unit; 19 of them (13 men 
and 6 women) were recognised as survivors during that year. In 2015, 
additional difficulties arose in preventing the transfer of survivors of 
torture and slavery from Saharonim to Holot. Although Holot had 
only 3,360 beds, the Immigration Authority admitted it sent no fewer 
than 12,425 asylum seekers there during 2015, among them at least 
2,000 survivors of the torture camps (Bureau of Democracy, Human 
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Rights and Labor, 2017; HRM files, Hotline for Refugees and 
Migrants, 2015a).  
 
Survivors’ testimonies reveal a disturbing picture of how torture 
survivors who were incarcerated for long periods were re-detained in 
Holot, while the authorities overlooked the fact that some of them 
provided services to their captors and were, therefore, entitled to 
recognition as survivors of slavery. During 2015, 235 survivors of the 
torture camps in the Sinai turned to HRM after being sent to Holot, 
of whom about 200 were detained there (HRM files, Hotline for 
Refugees and Migrants, 2015a). Although authorities referred to the 
Holot facility as an ‘open stay centre’, the High Court of Justice 
recognised it as a detention facility, in which stay must be limited to 
a maximum of one year (Israel High Court of Justice, 2015). Although 
the detainees of Holot could leave the facility during most hours of 
the day, the conditions in the facility exacerbated the post-traumatic 
stress symptoms of survivors suffering from this disorder. The 
authority of the Border Control Office to send asylum seekers to 
Holot in cases where their health, including mental health, might 
deteriorate due to their stay there, could be limited (State of Israel, 
2012, Anti-Infiltration Law, Section 32D[b]), but in any case the 
Border Control Office was in no hurry to grant any requests that 
might result in detainees not being sent to Holot due to medical 
conditions. 
 
Many survivors cannot explain why staying in Holot worsened their 
sense of vulnerability and mental state. Yet the following picture 
emerges from their testimonies: the facility is isolated, located on the 
Egyptian border, and surrounded by barbed wire. The desert 
landscape is identical to the landscape in the Sinai. The sounds of 
sudden and powerful gunfire are often heard from nearby Israel 
Defence Forces bases and military zones, reminiscent of the sounds 
of the shootings which killed their friends in the Sinai. From 10 pm 
at night to 6 am in the morning, Holot inmates are locked in different 
sections of the facility. The biometric controls required to pass from 
one section to another, or to leave the facility, are not in operation at 
night, and the sense of confinement is suffocating. Because of the 
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cold desert nights, especially in the winter, detainees often stay in their 
rooms, 10 crowded together in 5 bunk beds per room. During the 
day, they are forced into long queues in the dining room, the 
Immigration Authority Office (when they need any of their services), 
and sometimes even at the exit and entrance to the facility, especially 
when there are visitors coming to meet them.  
 
The crowding increases the survivors’ sense of trauma. Armed 
uniformed wardens guard the detainees and control their daily lives. 
Sometimes they raid the detainees’ rooms to search for hot water 
kettles, ovens, and other prohibited equipment (Hotline for Refugees 
and Migrants, 2015b). The sudden entry of armed men triggers 
flashbacks to camps in the Sinai, where their captors would enter and 
wake them for another round of torture. Sudanese detainees and 
Arab-speaking guards in Holot reminded the Eritrean prisoners of 
their captors’ language. Even survivors of torture who were not 
confined to Holot, but who were merely summoned for a hearing, 
waiting many hours in line, reported that their condition had 
worsened due to the conditions they encountered at the facility (HRM 
files, Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 2014 & 2015a). 
 
The conduct of the Immigration Authority in M.Y.W.’s case is a good 
example of the way it conducts the summoning of torture survivors 
to Holot. M.Y.W., 29, was abducted from the Eritrean-Sudanese 
border to the Sinai at the end of 2010, severely tortured for nine 
months and then dumped in July 2011, unconscious and in a serious 
medical condition on the Egyptian-Israeli border. He was taken by 
the Israel Defence Force to Soroka Hospital and, after his condition 
improved, was detained for two years and four months starting in 
November 2013. He was released with hundreds of other Eritreans 
following a High Court decision (Israel High Court of Justice, 2013). 
In November 2015, M.Y.W. was summoned to Holot. He turned to 
HRM, which referred him to a clinical social worker who specialises 
in psychotherapy. After examining his condition, the expert noted 
that sending him to Holot would constitute a real risk to his mental 
health, after which HRM sent a request to the Detention Review 
Tribunal, accompanied by the professional opinion. The request was 
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not answered and HRM filed an appeal that was accepted by the 
Court of Appeals and M.Y.W. was temporarily prevented from being 
detained in Holot (Beersheva District Court of Appeals, 2015). 
 
M.Y.W.’s situation is similar to the other 235 people who reached out 
to HRM during the course of 2015, requesting that their summons to 
the Holot facility be cancelled. However, due to lack of resources, 
HRM could not handle all the requests and many of the survivors 
were detained there. Those who could not bear the thought of 
returning to detention and could not hire legal services decided not 
to answer the summons to Holot, risking difficulties in finding work 
in the absence of a visa, arrest and detention in Saharonim Prison 
(HRM files, Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 2014 & 2015a).  
 
Camp survivors found it more difficult than other asylum seekers to 
return to detention facilities. Burdened with a strong sense of debt to 
relatives who raised tens of thousands of dollars to pay the ransom 
that saved their lives, they found it hard to return to a facility where 
they could not work to pay back that money, even in part. This great 
sense of debt was added to the anxiety brought on by conditions at 
Holot, which reminded them of the torture camps (HRM files, 
Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, 2014 & 2015a). And despite the 
impressive achievements of the Ministry of Justice’s Anti-Trafficking 
Unit in removing survivors of slavery from the list of those 
summoned to that facility (State of Israel, 2012, Anti-Infiltration Law 
Section 32D of Article 6C), survivors of slavery were still being legally 
summoned to Holot. 
 
The hearing prior to being sent to Holot was an opportunity to reveal 
the details of the situation they had suffered in the Sinai and perhaps 
avoid being sent there. However, the way hearings were conducted 
prevented asylum seekers from doing so. HRM representatives 
attended many hearings during 2015 and found it difficult to 
understand how torture survivors were expected to describe what 
they had undergone in the actual hearing conditions. This is how the 




Sometimes two interviews are conducted simultaneously in the same small room. A 
man or woman is required to talk about their intimate relationship, while at the 
same time another person must explain his trauma following the torture, extortion 
and rape he experienced in the Sinai torture camps on the way to Israel. This happens 
while officials enter and leave constantly, with a hostile attitude. The officials’ basic 
position is that they are being lied to. (Attar, 2015) 
 
The following is how a border control officer spoke at a hearing held 
for B., who was summoned to Holot after a year and a half in 
Saharonim: 
 
I do not accept your words. I have examined the minutes of your hearings in the 
Detention Review Tribunal at Saharonim, and not once you did you claim that you 
were raped ... They [officials at Saharonim] are all liars and you are telling the 
truth? (Border Control Office, 2015) 
 
Having finally found the courage to tell the border control officer that 
he had been raped in the Sinai, it is not hard to imagine how this 
reaction would discourage the detainee from insisting on the matter. 
Experience shows that even when asylum seekers attend hearings at 
the Immigration Authority accompanied by an assertive human rights 
activist, the protocol does not reflect what is said at the hearing.  
 
At a hearing in which I represented a Hebrew-speaking asylum seeker 
in January 2015, an interpreter was not needed, but when the border 
control officer asked him, “Were you at the shelter?” the interviewee 
did not understand what he meant. Despite speaking Hebrew well, he 
also did not know the words ‘trafficking’ and ‘slavery’. He recognised 
the word ‘victim’, but instinctively rejected the idea that he was the 
victim of something. I made it clear to the border control officer that 
the questions were not clear to anyone who was not an expert on the 
subject of trafficking, even if he was a victim of it. The border control 
officer, who typed the protocol using two fingers during the hearing, 
omitted many facts that were shared by the interviewee. When I 
confronted him with their absence from the protocol, he claimed that 
those things were unimportant and, therefore, he did not type them. 
Only after I insisted on their importance did the officer agree to add 
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some of the facts to the protocol that was typed in Hebrew. During 
the hearing, many officials entered and left the room to ask questions 
and search for documents.  
 
This description explains why, even when the asylum seekers are 
brave enough to talk about what they went through in the Sinai, when 
examining the minutes of their hearings, one realises that the things 
they managed to say, sometimes at a very high psychological cost, 
were never recorded. When things are not recorded in the protocol, 
the result is a border control officer who attacks the frightened 
asylum seeker with “I have examined the minutes of your hearings in 
the Detention Review Tribunal at Saharonim, and not once did you 
claim that you were raped” (Border Control Office, 2015). 
Identification of victims of torture by non-governmental 
organisations 
Despite the many difficulties experienced by camp survivors in 
communicating their experiences, and despite the fact that 
immigration officials and the Detention Review Tribunal do not, in 
most cases, identify the survivors of slavery among them, the 
proportion of camp survivors in the Sinai among the inhabitants of 
the shelters continued to grow. Table 13.1 shows the numbers of 
survivors admitted to shelters in 2010–2015 (information provided to 
HRM by Atlas & Maagen Shelters, 2015). 
 
Table 13.1. Survivors of torture camps admitted to shelters in Israel 2010–2015 
 
Year Number of men Number of women 
2010 6 5 
2011 7 6 
2012 25 21 
2013 24 37 
2014 21 30 
2014 21 30 
2015 27 9 
Source: Atlas & Maagen Shelters, 2015 
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In 2014, state authorities reported that they identified 4 survivors of 
slavery from the Sinai in detention. HRM identified 29 slavery 
survivors in detention that year and referred them to the Anti-
Trafficking Police Unit. As a result, 8 were recognised and released 
(see Trafficking in Persons Report, US State Department, 2014). Of the 
27 men who survived the camps and resided in the shelter in 2016, 
HRM located and referred 16. Of the 9 female Sinai survivors who 
were admitted during 2015, HRM located and referred 7. In effect, 
more than half of the survivors of torture camps in the Sinai who 
were in the shelters during 2016 were located and referred by HRM, 
a non-governmental organisation (NGO) whose entry into detention 
facilities is limited and is not supported by state authorities. 
 
In 2015, the Anti-Trafficking Police Unit identified 27 men and 8 
women as survivors of slavery – 35 survivors of slavery from the Sinai 
in total (Tene-Gilad, H., Ministry of Justice, personal communication, 
by email, 16 January, 2016). During that year, HRM identified and 
referred 28 survivors of slavery to the Police Unit, of whom 19 were 
recognised by the end of 2015. The Aid Organization for Refugees 
and Asylum Seekers (ASSAF) referred 7 survivors of slavery, 6 of 
whom were recognised. UNHCR referred 6, 3 of whom were 
recognised. Of the 35 survivors of Sinai camps recognised as 
survivors of slavery in 2015, NGOs identified, interviewed and 
prepared applications for at least 28, 80% of whom would not have 
been recognised were it not for the activities of these organisations 
who, in the absence of government bodies to carry out this 
responsibility, took it upon themselves to locate survivors and 
conduct interviews. In recent years, these groups have also located 
and investigated supporting witnesses in cases where the testimony 
of the survivor is not reflected in the hearing protocols. 
Conclusion 
The research presented in this chapter aims to describe how the state 
authorities in Israel treat survivors of the torture camps in the Sinai. 
The question is why most of these survivors are not recognised as 
survivors of torture, human trafficking and slavery.  
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In Israel, those recognised as survivors of slavery receive 
rehabilitation services in shelters; survivors of torture are not entitled 
to any support. Based on careful assessment, some 4,000 camp 
survivors remain in Israel, among them several dozen in dire mental 
and health condition. These survivors should have been housed in 
shelters such as Atlas and Maagen. Several hundred more camp 
survivors would benefit from psychological and psychiatric services. 
For the vast majority, greater stability in their lives and the possibility 
of working legally would help their rehabilitation. The requirement of 
renewing their permit to stay once every two months while standing 
in endless queues, is degrading and inhumane. 
 
In Israel, the survivors of human trafficking, slavery and torture are 
in urgent need of support. Currently, they do not enjoy protection 
under Israel’s national laws or the international conventions signed 
by Israel. At the very least, Israeli authorities should promote the 
rapid identification and location of survivors of torture, human 
trafficking and slavery, release them from detention and regularise 
their status, assess their mental and health status, and provide 
rehabilitation services to those in need. Much work remains to be 
done by the Anti-Trafficking Unit of the Ministry of Justice, which 
should speed up the recognition of survivors of the torture camps 
and promote their rights.  
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Refugee Parenting in Ethiopia and the Netherlands: 
Being an Eritrean Parent Outside the Country 
 
Bénédicte Mouton, Rick Schoenmaeckers & Mirjam Van Reisen 
 
Introduction 
An estimated 20,000 Eritreans live in the Netherlands, constituting 
the second largest group of asylum seekers in the country after Syrians 
(Sterckx, Fessehazion, & 
Teklemariam, 2018). Among 
them, many have 
experienced post-traumatic 
stress (PTS) symptoms due 
to traumatic experiences. 
These are related to direct or 
indirect exposure to death, 
torture, sexual abuse, and 
deprivation, both before and 
during their migration 
journeys, particularly in 
relation to human trafficking 
(Van Reisen & Mawere, 
2017). But PTS can also be 
prolonged by post-migration 
stressors related to 
acculturation, even after 
arriving in a safe place (e.g., 
not understanding the 
language, finding a job and housing, going to school or studying, 
caring for the family with insufficient finances, etc.) (Deater-Deckard 
et al., 2018). Acculturation is defined as a complex intra- and inter-
personal process by which an individual who comes into contact with 
one or more additional cultures modifies her or his own behaviour, 
Refugee parents often experience post-
traumatic stress due to their past 
experiences, but how does this affect their 
parenting? Surprisingly, this study found 
a high level of parental self-efficacy among 
Eritrean refugee parents in the 
Netherlands and Ethiopia. However, 
this raises concerns about the emotion 
regulation skills of refugee parents, who 
have a high level of emotional control and 
may have learnt to value self-reliance, 
which can impact on the socio-emotional 
development of their children. This 
requires further research as it may affect 
the long-term development of children of 




beliefs and self-constructs (including identity) in ways that may be 
adaptive or maladaptive. Understanding a new language and 
accepting new family representations and other ways of thinking and 
doing can be a source of major stress for refugee parents (Deater-
Deckard et al., 2018). 
 
Beyond individual trauma, the issue of collective trauma is also at 
stake for Eritrean refugees. Collective trauma is defined as “a socially 
constructed process with an impact on the identity of the group and 
its individual members” (Kidane & Stokmans, 2018, p. 21). This 
concept of collective trauma implies that trauma could be passed on 
to the next generation, notably through the family system and parents 
in particular. Research has documented that traumatic stressors 
experienced by one member of a family (e.g., a parent) may impact 
on all members, which is known as secondary traumatisation or the 
intergenerational transmission of trauma (Sherman, Gress Smith, 
Straits-Troster, Larsen, & Gewirtz, 2016). This transmission is 
particularly strong in the relationship between parents and children, 
through parenting. The concept of parenting covers both parenting 
behaviour (e.g., providing instrumental care such as feeding, clothing, 
nursing, emotional support, explaining and monitoring rules) and 
parental cognitions (e.g., beliefs and expectations about parenting and 
child development, sense of competence or satisfaction as a parent, 
etc.) (Baumrind, 1971). 
 
This study explores some of the manifestations of collective trauma 
in the Eritrean refugee population by focusing on the issue of 
parenting. The research question in this explorative study is: To what 
extent is the efficacy experienced by parents in parenting affected by PTS among 
Eritrean refugee communities in the Netherlands and Ethiopia?  
 
First, we investigate the literature on the intergenerational process of 
trauma, focusing on the relationship between a parent’s PTS and their 
parenting and the possible impact on children’s mental health (see 










Figure 14.1. Theoretical model of intergenerational trauma 
 
Then, we explore the specific impact of PTS on parental cognition, 
looking particularly at refugee parents’ feelings of competence as a 
parent and their sense of safety and control, all related to the concept 
of agency. When applied to parenting, this concept of agency can be 
investigated through parental self-efficacy (PSE), which can be 
described as beliefs that parents have about their ability to positively 
influence their child’s development (Coleman & Karraker, 2003). 
According to Bandura, this belief is nourished by four sources: past 
experiences (performance accomplishment), comparison to others 
(vicarious experiences), feedback from others, and physiological and 
emotional state (Bandura, 1977). We will investigate if, and to what 
extent, these sources are made use of by the study population (see 











Figure 14.2. Theoretical model of the relationship between trauma and parental 
cognition 
 
Finally, qualitative data is collected through interviews with Eritrean 
refugee parents to explore parenting by focusing on parental 
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aims to contribute to our understanding of the needs of refugee 
families and to provide relevant support for these families. 
Trauma, parenting and child development 
The latest research on refugee parenting confirms that PTS affects 
child development. Bryant et al. (2018) analysed 394 refugee parents 
in Australia, coming mostly from Afghanistan and Iraq. They studied 
the effect of refugee caregivers’ previous trauma and ongoing 
stressors on current PTS and how this influences their parenting 
behaviour and, consequently, child mental health. They found that: 
 
PTS in refugees is associated with harsh parenting styles, leading to adverse effects 
on their children’s mental health. Programmes to enhance refugee children’s mental 
health should account for PTS in parents and caregivers, and the parenting 
behaviours that these children are exposed to. (Bryant et al., 2018, p. 249) 
 
These results describe the two dimensions of parenting affected by 
PTS. First, PTS may impact on parents by leading to harsher 
parenting practices (i.e., hitting, shouting at the child), lower warmth 
(i.e., limited manifestation of affection or positive comments to the 
child) and lower availability of the parent for the child’s needs (i.e., 
weak understanding of the child’s needs and limited care and 
emotional support for the child), as we will detail later in this chapter. 
In this way, PTS may also impact on the child’s mental health 
indirectly, mostly in terms of emotional disorders (i.e., difficulty in 
regulating emotions, depression, hyperarousal) and externalising 
behaviour (i.e., aggression, non-compliance, inattention, 
hyperactivity).  
 
However, other studies (Graham, Minhas, & Paxton, 2016) identified 
an ‘academic resilience’ or positive deviance in children from a 
refugee background, who had better mental health than would be 
predicted based on their life experience and social situation. These 
authors show mixed evidence on the impact of trauma on the child’s 
cognition and school outcomes, depending on the type of trauma. 
Collective trauma related to genocide or discrimination had no impact 
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on cognitive test results, whereas secondary trauma related to parental 
war experience improved reasoning, processing speed and working 
memory. According to these authors, academic resilience is found 
when trauma becomes part of individual motivational narratives and 
teachers are supportive. They also mention a possible survival bias, 
based on the assumption that the most resilient successfully migrate.  
 
After several years, the negative impact on children identified in some 
research tends to diminish, as shown by Zwi et al. (2018). In an 
Australian longitudinal study, they showed that refugee children’s 
development was comparable to that of children from the general 
population after three years. The only remaining difficulties related to 
language or cognitive development, partly due to acculturation, 
adaptation to a new culture and language.  
 
A recent meta-analysis on parenting in times of war (Eltanamly, 
Leijten, Jak, & Overbeek, 2019) looked at complementary knowledge 
on these issues by investigating the impact of the exposure of parents 
to war on their parenting and child development. They found that 
war-exposed parents showed less warmth and more harshness 
towards their children. This partly mediated the association between 
war exposure and child adjustment (measured in terms of PTS, 
depression, anxiety, social problems and externalising behaviour). 
Interestingly, the authors identified that the nature of war-related 
trauma affected parenting differently. Parents showed harshness, 
hostility, inconsistency and less warmth in highly-dangerous settings, 
but more warmth and overprotection when living under threat. 
The specific impact of trauma on parental self-efficacy 
Parental self-efficacy and parenting 
Parental self-efficacy is defined as parents’ perceived self-competence 
in their role. In other words, beliefs that parents have about their 
ability to positively influence their child’s development. It covers the 
beliefs, thoughts, values and expectations that are activated when one 
is in charge of a child’s upbringing (Coleman & Karraker, 2003; 
Meunier & Roskam, 2007).  
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Based on the social learning theory of Bandura (1977), self-efficacy is 
a key concept that helps in understanding the transaction between an 
individual and his environment. It relates to the concept of human 
agency, defined as an intentional behaviour reflecting one’s general 
feeling to be able to influence his or her environment (Bandura, 
1989). As such, self-efficacy contributes to predicting behaviour and 
persistence in times of adversity, “the stronger the perceived self-
efficacy, the more active the efforts” (Bandura, 1977, p. 194). This is 
of particular interest in the field of parenting, considering that all 
parents encounter difficulty with their child at some point or another. 
It is an indicator of parental engagement, satisfaction and adjustment 
in parenting tasks (Meunier & Roskam, 2009).  
 
In opposition to the idea of a maternal instinct or a personality 
characteristic, PSE is related to experiences lived by the parent with 
his or her child. It is not acquired once and for all, but questioned 
continuously and modifiable (Coleman & Karraker, 2000). In social 
learning theory (Bandura, 1989), four factors influence beliefs about 
parental self-efficacy. The first factor is performance 
accomplishments, which encompasses all past and present successes 
and failures experienced by the parent in his or her relationship with 
the child. Compared to the other three, this factor is considered the 
most influential (Kendall & Bloomfield, 2005). The second factor 
relates to vicarious experiences; it is an evaluation process based on 
observing other parents engaged in similar parenting tasks. In 
comparison with these model parents, who may strive or succeed as 
well, the parent evaluates his or her own capacity to overcome 
difficulties. The most influential models often belong to the family 
and close social networks. The third factor is verbal persuasion based 
on feedback received by parents from close and significant people. 
These comments deal with the way they practice their parenting, their 
child’s characteristics and the quality of their interactions. For 
instance, negative statements from a teacher about their child’s 
difficult behaviour in class tend to weaken PSE. In contrast, receiving 
positive comments about the same child from a friend strengthens it. 
The influence of verbal persuasion varies according to the feedback 
provider’s characteristics: the more legitimate, competent, reliable 
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and close to the parent, the more his or her influence. The fourth and 
last factor relates to the parent’s emotional and physiological state. 
Anger, irritation or frustration felt anticipatively about an interaction 
with the child can diminish PSE. For instance, a parent daily 
confronted with tension at meal or bedtime can anticipatively feel a 
cardiac acceleration or stomach ache. The anxious anticipation of a 
negative interaction with the child, felt at the physiological level, 
reduces the perception that parents have of their own skills to 
overcome difficulties in this situation.  
 
A link between high parental self-efficacy and positive parenting 
practices has been well documented (Leerkes & Crockenberg, 2002; 
Márk-Ribiczey, Miklósi & Szabó, 2016; Sevigny & Loutzenhiser, 
2010; Sierau, Lehmann & Jungmann, 2011; Teti & Cole, 2011; Teti, 
O’Connell & Reiner, 1996; Trifan, 2015). Parents who feel competent 
more often provide a positive educative environment, characterised 
by a high level of support and a low level of negative control. Support 
relates to affection, warmth, engagement and support provided by the 
parent, while negative control relates to psychological control, harsh 
punishment, ignorance, guilt induction and inconsistent discipline. 
Such parents will use less harsh punitive practices and prefer 
consistent and predictable discipline (Trifan, 2015). Parents who feel 
competent engage more in educative tasks and interactions with their 
child. Their satisfaction is higher, their stress less, and their 
persistence stronger when faced with difficult situations than parents 
with low self-efficacy (Deković et al., 2010).  
 
Thanks to its influence on parental behaviour, PSE also indirectly 
affects child behaviour. It can be seen as a distal variable that directly 
influences parents’ behaviour and then indirectly affects their child’s 
behaviour. A high PSE favours the use of positive parenting, which 
in turn favours the child’s behavioural adjustment. Moreover, a child’s 
positive behaviour, in a retroactive cycle, contributes to reinforcing 
PSE. On the contrary, when a parent faces a child’s non-compliance, 
agitation or aggressiveness on a daily basis, they come to doubt their 
ability to reach their parenting goals and to positively influence their 
child’s development. Parents develop a more and more negative 
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perception of their own skills, and this directly influences their 
behaviour (Coleman & Karraker, 2003; Hoza & Owens, 2000; Jones 
& Prinz, 2005; Primack et al., 2012; Slagt, Deković, De Haan, Van den 
Akker & Prinzie, 2012).  
Post-traumatic stress and parenting 
Post-traumatic stress can be understood as a set of symptoms such as 
re-experiencing the trauma, avoidance, negative moods and 
cognitions, and automatic hyperarousal, as well as other co-morbid 
conditions such as depression, anxiety, substance abuse or 
somatisation (Horesh & Brown, 2018). Beyond these symptoms, PTS 
affects information processes and may lead to cognitive bias, 
particularly negative ones (Creech & Misca, 2017). Chronic stress 
tends to make people more likely to process information 
automatically and habitually, instead of in a controlled and flexible 
manner.  
 
In terms of parenting practices, research describes PTS as a risk factor 
for altered parenting capacities. Parents tend to become 
overprotective (Bryant et al., 2018), over reactive, feel anger, use harsh 
practices with their children (hitting, shouting, slapping) and are less 
warm (Eltanamly et al., 2019). A reversal of parent-child roles, or 
‘parentification’ is also observed. This occurs when children are 
worried about their parents and take over some parenting 
responsibility on a daily basis. Several meta-analyses show a 
relationship between the negative mental state of parents and their 
children’s psychological problems. Lambert, Holzer, and Hasbun 
(2014) reported a significant effect of parental PTS on child mental 
health (r=0.35), similarly to Van Ijzendoorn, Bakermans-Kranenburg 
and Sagi-Schwartz (2003) who analysed 32 studies on the children of 
Holocaust survivors, and Hershkowitz, Dekel, Fridkin, and 
Freedman (2017), in his study of 200 trauma experienced civilian 
parents in Israel.  
 
Some authors explain the impact of parent PTS on childhood 
difficulties through a PTS-biological pathway, showing biological 
processes for the intergenerational transmission of stress. In their 
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review, Bowers and Yehuda (2016) identified the intergenerational 
transmission of stress via in utero effects and gametes. In a study on 
rodents, Debiec and Sullivan (2014) documented the social 
transmission of mother-to-infant fear. This transmission takes place 
through an increase in the stress hormone corticosterone and 
amygdala activation, which induces a cue-specific fear learning. The 
authors show that specific fears may be transferred across generations 
through maternal emotional communication and the infant’s 
associative learning mechanisms.  
 
Complementary to this, other authors have explained the impact of 
parent PTS on childhood difficulties through the PTS-harsh 
parenting pathway (Bryant et al., 2018), combined with a reduced 
understanding of the child’s needs and weakened emotional 
availability due to a limited reflexive functioning. Parents are less able 
to understand their child’s behaviour in context and are at risk of 
making negative attributions (Milner, 2000; Milner & Crouch, 2013). 
When asked about their child’s behaviour, parents may report more 
negative behaviour than is true in reality, because of the negative 
cognitive bias inherent to PTS (Creech & Misca, 2017). 
 
The cognitive behavioural interpersonal theory (C-BIT) of PTS is an 
interesting model applicable to family functioning, which contributes 
to understanding the impact of parent PTS on child development 
through parental cognition. It emphasises the role of three processes 
that both maintain PTS symptoms and negatively impact on family 
functioning (Creech & Misca, 2017). First, behavioural avoidance and 
accommodation can be described as coping strategies for flashbacks 
and intrusive thoughts, contributing to the automatic emotional 
activation of the parent. In such cases, the emotion regulation skills 
of parents may be hampered by this uncontrolled emotional 
activation. This can lead to over-reactivity or, the opposite, avoidance 
and laxness about the child’s behaviour or its effects. In reaction, 
children may modify their own actions and reactions to limit the 
reminders that cause their parents trauma-related distress (e.g., 
avoiding group activities because a parent finds crowds distressing or 
providing practical and emotional support), as detailed in the 
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qualitative study by Sherman et al. (2016). The second process 
described in the C-BIT model relates to cognitive processes and 
thematic content, referring to rigid and maladaptive schemas about 
past experience, trust, control or intimacy. Attention bias toward 
threat and amplified attention on safety may lead to overprotective 
parenting. These maladaptive schemas also affect parental self-
efficacy through a negative bias about one’s worthiness as a parent. 
The last process relates to emotional disturbances, such as blunted 
positive emotions or increased anger, sadness, guilt or shame, which 
can lead to behavioural avoidance. A meta-analysis showed a medium 
effect (r=.35) of parental PTS on child emotional distress and 
behavioural problems (Lambert et al., 2014). Effects are particularly 
strong when parents have experienced torture, with children 
exhibiting more anxiety, depression, PTS, attention deficits and 
behaviour disorders than children from parents who experienced 
violence, but not torture (Daud, Skoglund & Rydelius, 2005).  
 
Yet, results from meta-analyses on parental transmission of trauma 
through parenting practices remain mixed and there are several 
limitations due to the small size and specificity of samples. It is also 
important to differentiate between parents who have been neglected 
or abused as a child (because of the war or a high-stress level in their 
own parents), from those who had a childhood without neglect or 
abuse and experienced trauma later as adults.  
 
In conclusion, secondary traumatisation or intergenerational 
transmission of trauma from parent to child has been widely 
documented. Yet, research on the parental cognitive processes 
remains limited. It seems that PTS does not affect parents’ 
satisfaction with their family life, with no relation found between PTS 
and parental satisfaction (Hershkowitz et al., 2017). In terms of 
parental self-efficacy beliefs, exposure to war may reduce parental 
self-efficacy, in particular their beliefs about their ability to provide 
safety for their children, which is compromised in war time 
(Eltanamly et al., 2019). But empirical evidence suggests that 
heightened exposure is not necessarily associated with lower PSE, but 
sometimes higher PSE. In a study of 293 Israeli fathers (Pagorek-
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Eshel & Dekel, 2015), the authors found that fathers exposed to 
political violence reported higher levels of PSE in times of threatened 
security than non-exposed fathers did. This high PSE contributed to 
paternal involvement in concrete and emotional care. Elements of 
strength and resilience are also identified in parents who have 
experienced trauma, through a positive perception of one’s capacity 
to survive in very difficult times (Eltanamly et al., 2019): “Such 
increased perceptions of resilience might translate into increased self-
efficacy beliefs which is evident among parents who rely less on 
maladaptive parenting practices”. According to this author, some 
families may be able to cope adequately with the stress and challenges 
of war exposure, and:  
 
…some parents may even change for the better, with increased positive parenting as 
a consequence. While there is evidence to suggest that war exposure might contribute 
to adverse parenting practices, there is also evidence to question whether this is indeed 
the general pattern for all war-related families. (Eltanamly et al., 2019, p.5) 
Method 
For the qualitative part of this study, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with Eritrean refugee parents in Ethiopia and the 
Netherlands (11 interviews) and experts on the Eritrean population 
in these places (2 interviews and 1 workshop). The interviews focused 
on parents’ PTS (not depression or anxiety) and on parental cognition 
(not parenting behaviour). The impact on the child is not explored. 
Based on previous research on refugee parents, low parental self-
efficacy and limited feelings of safety, control and satisfaction were 
expected. 
Sample 
Parents were selected for face-to-face interviews according to the 
following inclusion criteria: They had to be a parent (mother or 
father) of at least one living child under 18, Eritrean, refugees in 
Ethiopia or the Netherlands, and had experienced trauma. The 
parents interviewed (n=11; 6 mothers and 5 fathers) were 31-years 
old on average and had between 1 and 5 children. Their children were 
9-years old on average and two-thirds of them were boys (see Table 
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14.1). Most of the children of the sample parents (n=28) were born 
in Eritrea, only a few were born in Ethiopia or Sudan during the 
migration and two in the Netherlands. One of the interviewed fathers 
was expecting his second child. The great majority of these children 
now live with both parents in Ethiopia or the Netherlands. Often, the 
father left Eritrea first, leaving his family behind for several months, 
travelling through Ethiopia, Sudan, the Sinai (Egypt), Libya and Italy. 
Most of the mothers left Eritrea later with their children to join the 
fathers and stayed in camps in Ethiopia for several months, 
sometimes more than a year, before arriving in the Netherlands in the 
last six months. Two parents were still separated from several of their 
children, who remained in Ethiopia or Eritrea awaiting family 
reunion. The preliminary findings of this study were discussed with 
two experts on Eritrea and Eritreans in camps in Ethiopia, as well as 
with the participants of a workshop on Eritrea in December 2018.  
 
Table 14.1. Socio-demographic statistics of the sample group 
 
Procedure 
The interviews took place between August and December 2018 in 
Ethiopia (2 in Hitsats refugee camp), the Netherlands (5 in parents’ 
homes, 4 in the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers) 







Parent’s gender 54.5% 45.5% 100% 
Parent’s age (years; average 
and range) 




Number of children 







Children’s age (years; 







Children’s gender (boys) 71% 63% 68% 
Country of residence: 
- Netherlands 












interviews were conducted in Dutch, English or Tigrigna with an 
interpreter. The interviews with parents were conducted face-to-face 
based on a semi-structured questionnaire by Bénédicte Mouton and 
Rick Schoenmaeckers with the help of Klara Smits and Jakob 
Hagenberg. Each interview lasted between 45 to 90 minutes. Parents 
signed an informed consent form to participate and were guaranteed 
confidentiality. The data from the interviews has been anonymised 
and names, dates and places of the interviews are not detailed to 
guarantee confidentiality. The interviews with experts and the 
workshop were conducted in English by Bénédicte Mouton, Rick 
Schoenmaeckers, Jakob Hagenberg and Mirjam Van Reisen. All 
information is available from the authors on request. 
 
The interviews covered the following four issues: 
 
• Feelings about parental satisfaction, safety, control, 
competence 
• Assessment of parental self-efficacy using the ‘me as a parent’ 
(MaaP) questionnaire (Hamilton, Matthews & Crawford, 
2015) 
• Sources of parental self-efficacy: past experience, vicarious 
experience, feedback from others, physiological and 
emotional input 
• Assessment of level of trauma using the short version of the 
Impact of Events Scale (IES-Short), as used by Kidane and 
Stokmans (2018) 
Measures 
Parental self-efficacy was measured using the Maap questionnaire 
(Hamilton et al., 2015). This self-report consists of 16 items using a 
1–5 Likert type scale (from strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
measuring parental self-efficacy, personal agency, self-sufficiency and 
self-management. Scores can range from 16 to 80 on the total scale 
and 4 to 20 on each of the subscales. According to the authors, this 
shows good internal consistency for the total scale and separate 
subscales (Cronbach’s from α=.85 to .63). Note, one mother could 
not be interviewed on this questionnaire because of time constraints. 
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Trauma was assessed using the IES-Short (Kidane & Stokmans, 
2018). This scale is a 7-item self-reporting tool that measures 
intrusion, avoidance and hyperarousal. Scores range from 1 (not at 
all) to 5 (extremely), with a mean score as total score. In addition, the 
semi-structured questionnaire investigated parents’ feelings of 
agency, safety, competence and satisfaction, as well as the four main 
sources of self-efficacy identified by Bandura (1977) (past 
experiences, vicarious experiences, feedback from others and 
physiological/emotional input) through open-ended questions and 
visual scales from 0 to 10. 
Results 
The feelings expressed by most interviewees about being a parent 
were very positive: “I feel happy. When my child is happy, I am 
happy” (Mother#2, interview, Ethiopia, 27 August 2018). Only three 
parents expressed mixed feelings. A mother whose children are still 
in Ethiopia and with whom she has been separated for the last six 
months explained that it was a difficult situation for her, knowing that 
they were alone there in an unsafe situation, especially one of her girls. 
Here, being a good parent was related to being present with the family 
in times of hardship. Similarly, a father separated from three of his 
four children (captured or alone in Eritrea) explained that he did not 
feel entirely good because he could not see his children grow, live, 
eat, drink (Father#5, interview, the Netherlands, 22 September 2018). 
When not present with their children, the interviewed parents 
reported feeling scared, guilty and powerless. 
 
One father also mentioned post-migration stressors. He expressed his 
happiness about being a father, but described stress due to the 
responsibility involved and lack of resources:  
 
Everybody looks up to me, they want things from me, nobody supports me. [...] when 
I got the second child, I got more stress. […] The good side is to have a family, but 
to have a good family without anything is difficult. […] They need clothes, food, to 
go to school. I think about that, next year, next month. This makes me very stressed. 
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I have stress, but what can I do? I continue with my stress. (Father#1, interview, 
Ethiopia, 27 August 2018) 
 
When asked about what makes a good parent, most parents 
highlighted the necessary skills it takes to parent, as well as warmth: 
“who cares for his child and who has love in his home is a good 
parent” (Mother#2, interview, Ethiopia, 27 August 2018). When 
specifically asked about skills compared to luck to explain what it 
takes to be a good parent, all parents interviewed clearly expressed 
the view that what makes a good parent is not luck or destiny, but 
possession of the skills to raise children. “My children are raised by 
my choices, not by luck”, explained one father (Father#1, interview, 
Ethiopia, 27 August 2018). “Sometimes it is difficult, it needs hard 
work, to see everything the child needs and for the child’s ambitions. 
Family making is a process, luck can be part of it, but it is mostly hard 
work”, said another father (Father#3, interview, the Netherlands, 12 
September 18). “You need a good education to be a good father”, he 
continued. Several of them had religious beliefs, but insisted that “It 
is first because of us. If you do something, you get something from 
God” (Mother#7, interview, the Netherlands, 9 October 2018). 
Another mother explained “I do my best and God also contributes” 
(Mother#8, interview, the Netherlands, 9 October 2018).  
 
Their feeling of safety was high. All interviewees, both in Ethiopia 
and the Netherlands, expressed a feeling of safety as a parent 
(between 8 and 10 on a scale from 0 to 10). They expressed very 
limited fear, only the fear that any parent would feel about their 
children (“that he falls or hurts himself, just life” (Mother#7, 
interview, the Netherlands, 9 October 2018). Similarly, feelings of 
control and satisfaction were highly rated (between 9 and 10): “I am 
happy because there is not more I can do” (Mother#2, interview, 
Ethiopia, 9 October 2018). “Here, I feel safe and free, I can do 
everything, I get attention and help” (Mother#10, interview, the 
Netherlands, 9 October 2018). Yet, some nuances were expressed in 
relation to this feeling of control. One mother separated from her 
children said that it was difficult, but she added: “I have to be in 
control because I am a mother, but it is difficult” (Mother#8 
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interview, the Netherlands, 9 October 2018). This may indicate a 
feeling of control perceived as a parental requirement, a ‘must-feel’ 
more than a genuine feeling of control, relating to a coping strategy 
for PTS. 
 
These feelings of safety, control and satisfaction differed when we 
asked interviewees how they felt back in Eritrea. “In Eritrea, it was 
good and difficult. I was in the army but happy to have a child. But I 
could see my wife only once a year” (Father#6, interview, the 
Netherlands, 9 October 2018). Most mothers felt alone because of 
the absence of their husbands who had gone to the military. The 
feeling of safety of interviewed parents lowered to 0 and maximum 5 
(out of 10). Fears were much larger, related to being alone for some 
mothers and scared for themselves, their children and their husband. 
The feeling of control as a parent seemed less strong too: “sometimes 
I controlled, not always” (Mother#7, interview, the Netherlands, 9 
October 2018). But satisfaction and competence were positively 
evaluated even then. “The love I have for my children is the same 
here and in Eritrea” (Mother#9, interview, the Netherlands, 9 
October 2018). But several mothers mentioned that, even though 
they did their “best as a mother; it was not always good there” 
(Mother#8, interview, the Netherlands, 9 October 2018). “It was not 
possible to be a good mother there. I could not control things, my 
children would go to the military59 and I did not have enough money” 
(Mother#9, interview, Netherland, 9 October 2018). Another mother 
shared that, for her own mother who lived in Eritrea, “Being an 
Eritrean mother in Eritrea is to be a mother, but not have children” 
(workshop discussion, Belgium, 13 December 2018). Her mother had 
gone through the loss or disappearance of all her children. Some were 
sent to military service and died, some were imprisoned, and some 
were kidnapped from her home. Hence, she was mother, but without 
children. 
 
59 In Eritrea, there is currently indefinite military service for anyone aged 17 or more 
(Sterckx et al., 2018).  
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High level of parental self-efficacy 
All parents said that they felt competent as a parent. In our sample, 
fathers had a higher level of self-efficacy than mothers and a lower 
level of trauma (see Table 14.2). One parent in the Ethiopian camp 
expressed a more nuanced feeling of competence in the domain of 
teaching her child: “I teach him as I can. I don’t know if this is 
enough, but I teach him” (Mother#2, interview, Ethiopia, 27 August 
2018). She expressed feeling competent to teach her child about the 
world, at least until her child went to school. When asked about 
staying focused on the things they have to do as a parent, even when 
they have had an upsetting experience, most parents said that they 
could do it. The mother separated from her children explained: “[I 
try] to protect myself as much as possible. When it becomes difficult, 
I go outside to cry” (Mother#8, interview, the Netherlands, 9 
October 2018). 
 
Compared to norms in the general population (Hamilton et al., 2015), 
the Eritrean parents interviewed here showed higher scores, 1.19 
standard deviation above the mean for total score, 0.63 for mothers 
and 1.79 for fathers, respectively.  
 









Parental self-efficacy:    
Self-efficacy 16.8 18.4 17.9 
Self-sufficiency 17.0 18.4 17.7 
Self-management 16.8 18.8 17.8 
Parental agency 16.6 18.4 17.5 
Total score 67.8 74.0 70.9 
Trauma:    
Intrusion 3.40 4.00 3.50 
Avoidance 3.50 4.00 3.60 
Hyperarousal 3.00 2.33 2.90 
Total score 3.48 3.29 3.38 
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Limited use of parental self-efficacy sources 
Most parents seemed to have limited access to past positive or 
negative experiences as a parent. Most responses were non-specific 
and global, demonstrating a global perception of their parenting. “I 
have always been happy as a mother” (Mother#11, interview, the 
Netherlands, 9 October 2018). “When I was a child, I thought I 
would be a good parent” (Mother#2, interview, Ethiopia, 27 August 
2018). A father mentioned the delivery of his baby (which he heard 
on the phone) as a positive experience, which made him feel proud. 
Another father explained that he received a prize at school for 
supporting his child, which made him feel proud. “I play a great role 
in helping him” (Father#4, interview, the Netherlands, 15 September 
2018). When asked about negative past experiences as parents, most 
interviewees said that they had never had a negative experience as 
parent. Only separation from their children was mentioned as a highly 
negative parenting experience. This was the case for the mother 
separated from her children, who clearly recalled the moment when 
she left her children as the worst moment of her life as a parent. 
Similarly, a father mentioned that when his wife and his child were in 
Sudan without him, “I was nothing for him. My child grew in Sudan 
and I was not good for them. But when they came, I felt I became a 
good leader of the family” (Father#1, interview, Ethiopia, 27 August 
2018). One father felt sad because he was not able to give gifts on his 
children’s birthdays, because of lack of a job and income. 
 
When asking about vicarious experiences, several parents mentioned 
that they had no model of a good parent. “I do not want to compare 
to others, I want to be self-reliant” explained a mother (Mother#11, 
    
Note: Parental self-efficacy was measured using the Maap questionnaire, 
which is a 16 items self-reporting tool using a 1–5 Likert type scale 
(from strongly disagree to strongly agree) measuring parental self-
efficacy, personal agency, self-sufficiency and self-management. Scores 
can range from 16 to 80 on the total scale and 4 to 20 on each of the 
subscales. Trauma was assessed using the IES-Short scale, which is a 7-
item self-reporting tool that measures intrusion, avoidance and 
hyperarousal. Scores range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely), with a 
mean score as total score. 
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interview, the Netherlands, 9 October 2018). “They are no model. 
Everybody is different. I do my best” (Mother#9, interview, the 
Netherlands, 9 October 2018). When they reported a model, it was 
almost exclusively about their own mother or father, which is the case 
for most parents in the general population too. “My father is my 
model, he is a good father, he knows everything” (Father#1, 
interview, Ethiopia, 27 August 2018). “My mother! She is still alive, 
we talk on the phone every two weeks” (Mother#8, interview, the 
Netherlands, 9 October 2018). Only two parents mentioned other 
models: For one mother, Dutch mothers were a model. She 
explained: “When I came to the Netherlands, I said I have to become 
like Dutch mothers. To take responsibility for my children” 
(Mother#7, interview, the Netherlands, 9 October 2018). One father 
mentioned Obama as a role model, which could also be an illustration 
of this global perception of parenting, generalising life or political 
models to the specific field of parenting. 
 
Most parents explained that they had limited communication with 
others about their parenting. They only discussed parenting with their 
husband or wife. A mother in Ethiopia explained that she discusses 
parenting only with her husband: “if he didn’t know about it, I discuss 
with him so he knows. We only discuss about living conditions, how 
to live” (Mother#2, interview, Ethiopia, 27 August 2018). The 
mother separated from her children expressed a different experience. 
She felt that it was “nice to talk to the other mothers, neighbours, to 
share experiences. They all left someone behind” (Mother#8, 
interview, the Netherlands, 9 October 2018). A father living in a camp 
in Ethiopia also mentioned that he talks “maybe with some older 
neighbours in our community, if we believe it is good, we use this in 
our house” (Father#1, interview, Ethiopia, 27 August 2018). 
 
Almost all parents had no or very limited access to physiological and 
emotional sensations about parenting, only a very global perception: 
“In all parts of my body, I am happy” (Mother#2, interview, Ethiopia, 
27 August 2018). When a body part was mentioned, it was most often 
the head: “My head is busy, I am stressed, I am troubled, I don’t 
understand what I am doing, I don’t feel in control” (Father#1, 
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interview, Ethiopia, 27 August 2018). For the separated mother, the 
main sensation was in her chest: “I am not calm in my chest” 
(Mother#8, interview, the Netherlands, 9 October 2018). A father 
mentioned his stomach as the part where he felt the pride of being a 
father. 
High level of trauma 
The level of trauma of parents in this sample can be considered as 
high, based on the means and cut-offs used in Kidane and Stokmans 
(2018) study in Ethiopia. We found similar findings about 
hyperarousal, being the scale where Eritrean parents score the lowest, 
demonstrating a high level of emotional control. A higher level of 
trauma is found in parents whose children were left behind in Eritrea 
or Ethiopia or in young mothers who left their own mother or father 
behind, illustrating the key issue of family separation. 
Discussion 
Contrary to expectations, the Eritrean refugee parents interviewed in 
this study expressed a high level of parental self-efficacy and feelings 
of control, safety and satisfaction when living with their children. 
Their level of parental self-efficacy is higher than norms in the general 
population. It seems that family is perceived by Eritrean refugee 
parents as the first source of resilience, a “step in life, a step of best 
life”, explained a father (Father#3, interview, the Netherlands, 9 
October 2018). However, parents who were separated from their 
children, awaiting family reunion, expressed more negative parental 
cognition. 
 
Several hypotheses can be discussed to explain the high level of 
parental self-efficacy and feelings of control, safety and satisfaction 
reported in this study. First, the parenting beliefs of the Eritrean 
parents interviewed may be related to a perception of parenting as a 
role and a status, more than related to the actual daily experience with 
the child. In this view, parenting is about ‘being’ a parent (a static 
global concept), rather than ‘acting’ as parent (a dynamic specific 
experience) and may be less influenced by external elements 
(feedback from others, vicarious experience or role-models).  
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Another possible explanation for these positive parenting beliefs is 
related to the specificity of the Eritrean family culture. Many parents 
described being a parent as a genuine source of pride related to 
belonging to the community, their role in the group in Eritrean 
culture, characterised by its collective nature. Back in Eritrea, children 
are the main insurance for their parents, their ‘shoulders during old 
age’. In such a community family system, contrary to the nuclear 
family system, children are considered an investment. They are taught 
skills to look after animals, for instance, so that they can take on this 
task when their parents are too old to do it. Children are also raised 
with positive thinking (e.g., ‘you will become a pilot’) and parents 
encourage their education, with high expectations. That way, “they 
make parents hopeful” (Expert#1, expert meeting, the Netherlands, 
23 December 2018). 
 
The Eritrean political and social context may also contribute to such 
parental cognition. It is characterised by a high level of political 
control over the population, even outside the country (Sterckx et al., 
2018). In such a context, having a child is an achievement, a sign of 
protection (especially for girls for whom becoming pregnant is a way 
of avoiding the military service) and, for some parents, an expression 
of resistance to political intrusion into the family unit by the 
government. Being a parent can be the first element contributing to a 
feeling of control and a factor in resilience.  
 
Trauma may also have affected these parents’ beliefs. As detailed 
earlier, trauma affects cognitive abilities and perceptions 
(Cunningham & Renk, 2018). The coping strategies put in place by 
traumatised parents may reinforce the necessity to have a positive 
perception of oneself, even if it is distorted. This positive cognitive 
bias may have contributed to these highly positive parenting beliefs. 
The comparison with their very difficult situation before migrating or 
to the situation of other parents who remain in their home country 
may contribute to a biased positive perception of their current 
parenting context. How can a parent express any negative feelings in 




Trauma may also explain the limited use of PSE resources. The 
parents interviewed had limited access to their past experiences 
(memories), positive or negative, and almost no access to any 
physiological sensations related to parenting. A PTS avoidance 
coping strategy may explain this. The parents interviewed also made 
little use of vicarious experience based on good parenting models, 
except their own parents who were sometimes dead. Trauma may 
have contributed to a learnt self-reliance or self-sufficiency strategy 
that contributed to their survival. This could also partly explain the 
fact that another source of PSE was rarely used: feedback from 
others. Most parents explained that they barely communicated with 
others about their children and themselves as a parent.  
 
Besides the impact of trauma, the issue of mistrust in the Eritrean 
population may be another explanation. This issue of trust has been 
raised by many researchers interviewing Eritrean refugees in the 
Netherlands (Graf, 2018; Sterckx et al., 2018). In Eritrean culture, the 
expression and sharing of negative impacts or thoughts is not valued. 
This was particularly strong among the mothers interviewed, who had 
only a limited possibility of expressing negative comments about 
parenting in the culture, in the presence of their husbands. But the 
experts interviewed in this study explained that this should not be 
perceived as a cultural characteristic of Eritreans, but rather as a 
“learnt lack of emotionality” in response to terror: “You don’t discuss 
the problems of your household with a neighbour, as it could be 
devastating for your child” (Expert#2, expert meeting, the 
Netherlands, 23 December 2018). In the last few decades, Eritreans 
have learnt that sharing emotions might be dangerous for them, but 
also for others. If one expresses a negative emotion (fear, anger, 
sadness), it can be interpreted as a criticism of the government, with 
the risk of retaliation by the government on relatives: “You risk 
punishment if you show your feelings. We cannot show compassion, 
we would put the lives of our relatives in danger. Your child could be 
kidnapped or killed just in front of you” (Expert#2, expert meeting, 
the Netherlands, 23 December 2018). It seems that self-censorship is 









Figure 14.3. Theoretical model of the relationship between parent trauma, parental 
cognition, parental behavior and child psychological health 
Conclusion 
This explorative study investigated to what extent the efficacy that 
parents experience in their parenting is affected by PTS among 
Eritrean refugee communities in the Netherlands and Ethiopia. 
Following a literature review, qualitative data was collected and 
analysed. The hypothesis was that efficacy was negatively affected by 
the high levels of PTS that new incoming Eritrean refugees 
experience, both as a result of individual trauma and collective 
trauma. The expectation was that people with high PTS would 
experience less positive efficacy in parenting and that this would 
contribute as intergenerationally transferred trauma into an element 
in collective trauma. 
 
Contrary to expectations, the refugee parents interviewed in this 
qualitative study showed a high level of parental self-efficacy, except 
for parents separated from their children who face the most difficult 
situation in terms of parental cognition. For the other parents 
interviewed, the results are reassuring considering the fact that higher 
levels of self-efficacy are related to more positive parenting and more 
positive child development.  
 
Yet, our results raise concerns about the emotion regulation skills of 
traumatised parents, for whom trust is yet to be experienced. Children 
may be at risk in terms of their socio-emotional development when 
they grow up with parents who do not share their emotions and have 
learnt to value self-reliance and exhibit a high level of emotional 
control. Emotional regulation is firstly about identifying and 
accepting emotions, and secondly about using strategies to reduce the 













intensity of emotions when they are uncomfortable or not socially 
adapted. Children might learn implicitly and reproduce by imitation 
that one has to hide emotions, ignore them, and control them, 
entailing the risk of arousal.  
 
Therefore, the issue here may not be how to increase parental self-
efficacy, but how to improve the access of parents to the various 
sources of self-efficacy, which seem, paradoxically, to be underused. 
Increasing trust and communication with other parents, improving 
access to internal physiological and emotional states and increasing 
self-reflection on parenting experiences could be interesting ways 
forward for these traumatised parents. This could be particularly 
helpful in case of acculturation stressors.  
 
But we have to keep in mind the possible challenges of an approach 
that aims at improving parenting through cognition. Eritrean refugee 
parents may have found a ‘sufficiently good’ enough way of 
parenting, even if it implies high emotional control and self-reliance. 
They may experience parenting as a safe place for them as parent and, 
by extension, for their child. Supporting parenting as a better place, 
and not only a safe place, through the objective of increased self-
disclosure with others, could open up some difficulties for parents, if 
not accompanied and supported by mental healthcare professionals. 
A trade-off or balance has to be found between these two parenting 
goals by taking the time to build a trusting relationship with Eritrean 
parents. 
 
These conclusions also lead to questions about the assessment of 
parental self-efficacy in traumatised parents by instruments used in 
the general population, such as the self-report questionnaire. Trauma 
may have impacted cognitive processes to such a degree that 
responding to this type of self-reflecting questions may be a difficult 
task for these parents. It clearly needs time and trust between the 
interviewees and the interviewer to access such internal processes. 
Parental cognition is complex and may not be easily accessible for 




Yet, it would be adequate to find creative and respectful ways, 
considering the key role played by cognition on the relationship 
between parents and children and the intergenerational impact of 
trauma. Teti et al. underlined how parental self-efficacy serves as the 
“final common pathway” in the prediction of parenting behaviour 
and parental sensitivity towards the child in particular (Teti et al., 
1996). On this basis, these authors recommended that: 
 
…although the construct of self-efficacy in clinical experimental research is well 
established (Bandura, 1986), its importance as a determinant of parenting 
behaviour, and as a primary target of intervention in its own right, is still evolving. 
This is a positive trend and one that we hope continues. (Teti et al., 1996, p. 247)  
 
In the specific context of parental trauma, some authors suggest that 
PSE is a complex cognitive construct which may vary in accordance 
with the specific situation parents are confronted with (Eltanamly et 
al., 2019; Pagorek-Eshel & Dekel, 2015), but that it has a positive 
effect on parental involvement. It could also reduce the potential 
negative impact of acculturation stressors mentioned by some to the 
interviewed parents. PSE could, therefore, be targeted in support 
programmes for refugee parents, in complementarity with stress 
regulation, emotional regulation and attachment-based intervention 
(Juffer, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2008). Such 
programmes could support refugee parents to respond to their young 
children’s emotional cues while at the same time attending their own 
emotional state, one of the main sources of PSE.  
Limitations 
The qualitative part of this study explored several key issues in 
relation to refugee parenting in the Eritrean refugee population in 
Ethiopia and the Netherlands. However, it has several limitations. 
The first relates to its small sample size (11 interviewees) and the 
convenient nature of the sample, with a possible survival bias (the 
most resilient successfully migrate). It was not possible to use a robust 
selection method, due to the ethical and practical challenges of 
working with a highly vulnerable population (Graham et al., 2016). 
420 
 
The second relates to the limited duration of interviews (45–60 
minutes), which might not have been enough to build sufficient trust 
with the interviewee. A longer period of time or repeated interviews 
would be needed to build trust between the researchers and 
interviewees. Thirdly, the instruments used to measure parental self-
efficacy were also questionable in terms of their universality. For 
instance, the interviewees were asked about ‘discussing parenting with 
others’ as a way to measure if Eritrean parents use the resource of 
feedback from others and vicarious experiences to feel good about 
themselves as parents. However, maybe exchange with others is done 
through different means, such as spending time together, watching 
the parenting of other mothers or fathers, and taking care of others’ 
children without explicitly discussing parenting. Lastly, the translation 
into three different languages (English-Dutch-Tigrigna) may have 
made it difficult for Eritrean parents to understand the questions, in 
particular when exploring cognition.  
 
In further studies, it would be interesting to disentangle trauma and 
the sources of stress. Exposure to death or violence (direct versus 
indirect) may have different effects than displacement or 
acculturation. Acculturation stressors were not discussed specifically. 
One father expressed his stress as a father in relation to acculturation: 
“You have the role, the position but without the information, where 
to go when there is a problem. Also here ladies express more their 
needs. In Africa, as a father, you have to guess” (Father#4, interview, 
the Netherlands, 15 September 2018). A mother mentioned stress due 
to the freedom children have here (in playgrounds, for instance) with 
so many different people around them. Stress might be a better, or at 
least a complementary, measure than trauma alone.  
 
Therefore, more in-depth research is necessary to explore the wider 
relationship between parental trauma and the parents’ relationship 
with their child, and the child’s psychological health, with a possibility 
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Journeys of Trust and Hope: Unaccompanied Minors 
from Eritrea in Ethiopia and the Netherlands 
 
Rick Schoenmaeckers, Taha Al-Qasim & Carlotta Zanzottera 
 
Introduction 
The Netherlands has received a large number of unaccompanied 
minors from Eritrea, with 3,017 arriving between 2014 and 2017 
(Immigratie-en 
Naturalisatiedienst, 2016; 
2017). They travel alone or in 
groups, either not 
accompanied by parents or 
guardians or separated from 
them. The journeys they have 
travelled are complex and full 
of danger. Many arrive 
traumatised because of what 
they have been through in 
Eritrea or during their travels 
(Sterckx, Fessehazion, & 
Teklemariam, 2018). When 
they arrive in the 
Netherlands, a new journey 
starts full of bureaucracy and 
legal procedures, which lead 
to stress and uncertainty among the young refugees. 
 
This chapter looks at the way in which these minors settle in the 
Netherlands after their dangerous journeys through the Horn of 
Africa. Differences are investigated in terms of personal relationships 
and trust at their first place of arrival after leaving Eritrea, the refugee 
camps in Ethiopia, and after settlement in the Netherlands. In 
This study looked at unaccompanied 
Eritrean refugee minors and their 
relationships with their caregivers in 
Ethiopia and the Netherlands. It found 
that there is misunderstanding and 
mistrust on both sides of the relationship, 
which affects the way the refugee minors 
receive and process information. The 
authors conclude that discussion of the 
issues that affect trust would improve the 
relationship between caregivers and 
minors. Understanding would provide a 
strong basis for forging better connections 
between caregivers and minors and 
improve the life satisfaction of the minors. 
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Ethiopia, the guardianship for unaccompanied refugee minors is with 
the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) and the 
Norwegian Refugee Council. In the Netherlands, they fall under the 
authority of the Nidos Foundation (Schoenmaeckers, 2018; Nidos, 
2018). 
 
Eritrean refugees have particular difficulties when settling in the 
Netherlands. They often feel misunderstood and not taken seriously 
by institutions, and they can have difficulties participating in Dutch 
society and finding a job. This is partly to do with the fact that the 
majority have never received much education. They can read and 
write in their own language, but usually not much more than that. 
Apart from those who studied in bigger cities at one of the nine 
colleges in Eritrea, most of the arrivals in the Netherlands come from 
remote rural areas (Sterckx, Fessehazion, & Teklemariam, 2018).  
 
Research among Eritrean unaccompanied minors in the Netherlands 
(Kulu-Glasgow, Noyon, Smit, & Shagiwal, 2018) shows similar 
findings. Additionally, Eritrean minors often have problems with 
trust and feel that they are not taken seriously by adults. 
Schoenmaeckers (2018) highlighted that most minors who leave 
Eritrea come from small border villages. Their education stops at the 
age of 17, when they are redirected to Sawa Military Training. As well 
as school, many have worked as shepherds and helped their mothers 
in the household. Practical or professional skills, other than working 
on the land and looking after cattle, are seldom acquired.  
 
Eritreans have lived under constant surveillance and control by the 
state. In Eritrea, almost no-one can work or move freely. Family-
members receive fines when their children escape the country and 
intimidation by government officials is a common method of control. 
This results in a culture of fear and secrecy, affecting young Eritreans 
and forcing them to leave the country (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). 
Most of the unaccompanied minors from Eritrea did not inform their 
parents at the time they left Eritrea, and only got in touch with them 
once they were outside the country (Chapter 6, Journeys of Youth in 
Digital Africa: Pulled by Connectivity, by Rick Schoenmaeckers). Van 
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Reisen, Al-Qasim, Zanzottera and Schoenmaeckers (2018) 
investigated the situation of the minors in the care-situation 
coordinated by Nidos. This research concluded that Eritrean minors 
suffer from the psychological burden resulting from the particularly 
harsh journeys they undertook and the ongoing uncertainty and 
hardships faced by their relatives in Eritrea. More particularly, the 
research investigated how the minors relate to the carers in their new 
home country. The research revealed serious trust deficits, which 
negatively affect the ability of the carers to guide the minors – who 
are often desperately in need of such guidance. 
 
The research presented here builds on the investigation carried out 
by Van Reisen et al. (2018) in the Netherlands, but also studies the 
lack of trust observed in Eritrean unaccompanied minors, in part 
because of their journeys to the Netherlands. In order to do so, the 
situation of minors in the refugee camp of first arrival – Hitsats, in 
northern Ethiopia – was studied during a three-month period of field 
work. The findings of the field work in Hitsats were analysed 
alongside the findings of the research carried out in the Netherlands.  
 
The design of this research is not just a comparative design in multiple 
settings. Many unaccompanied minors in the Netherlands have 
travelled through Hitsats camp, or the other three camps in northern 
Ethiopia. This research, therefore, allows the investigation of how 
issues of trust emerge and develop over time, as the minors travel 
through these different locations, towards the final destination (in this 
case the Netherlands). The study was carried out as ethnographic field 
research, making use of observations-in-presence, interviews and 
focus group discussions.  
Feelings as information 
The chapter is based on the theoretical framework of Schwarz (2010), 
the feelings-as-information theory. This theory outlines how 
emotions, moods, metacognitive experiences, and bodily sensations 
influence one’s feelings and judgements. Consequently, feelings are 
considered an important way of processing information. The way 
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information is received and processed, differs from person to person, 
as well as at different times and in different situations. If someone is 
in a good mood when receiving bad news, the news is processed 
differently than if they are in a bad mood. “The theory [of feelings-
as-information] postulates that people attend to their feelings as a 
source of information, with different types of feelings, providing 
different types of information” (Schwarz, 2010, p. 8). Raghunathan 
and Pham (1999) outline how feelings interfere with one’s ability to 
process information. If people are sad or anxious, they might process 
information less systematically when making judgements or decisions. 
This is also reflected in people’s motivation to achieve tasks: sad or 
anxious people tend to choose emotionally rewarding options instead 
of the best option to achieve a certain result. Such decisions are made 
in order to ‘feel good’ at the specific moment, not necessarily to 
improve the long-term situation.  
 
Jonas-Simpson (2001) highlighted how being misunderstood can lead 
to feelings of isolation and being disconnected – whereas being 
understood, can lead to feeling connected. Jonas-Simpson used 
psychology literature for her analysis. She outlined that the feeling of 
being understood is linked to receiving empathy. Receiving empathy 
makes one feel valued, cared for and accepted, and dissolves feelings 
of alienation. Consequently, Condon (2010) described how feeling 
misunderstood can lead to a feeling of being betrayed, disappointed, 
lonely, out of place, disregarded and judged. These feelings affect the 
way information is processed and consequently harm trust.  
 
Unaccompanied minors from Eritrea have difficulty trusting adults, 
including the people who are supposed to take care of them. In 
Nidos, the minors are cared for by adults who work as social workers 
and guardians and who, subsequently, develop difficulties trusting the 
minors as well (Van Reisen et al., 2018). Such a relationship can have 
a negative effect on the minor’s integration and participation in the 





Trust is defined in this research as a: “positive feeling about or 
evaluation of the intentions or behaviour of another, and 
conceptualize[d] …as a discursively created emotion and practice 
which is based on the relations between the ‘trustor’ and the ‘trustee’” 
(Lyytinen, 2017, p. 489). Trust is, therefore, the basis for harmonious 
relationships. The ability of refugee children to trust adults to take 
care of them is often shaken by past experiences, such as experiences 
in their country of origin and during their migration journey, as a 
result of which a psychosocial crisis can develop, the symptoms of 
which can include a feeling of mistrust, self-doubt and inferiority 
(Lustig et al., 2004).  
 
Accordingly, this research looks at the role of feelings in the 
development of trust in the personal relationships of unaccompanied 
minors from Eritrea in Ethiopia and the Netherlands. It seeks to 
answer the following research question: To what extent can the concept of 
feelings-as-information help explain trust (or lack of it) in the personal 
relationships of Eritrean unaccompanied minors on their migration trajectories 
and with their caregivers in the Netherlands? 
Context 
In Ethiopia, refugees from Eritrea arrive daily in the northern 
province of Tigray. The Eritrean refugee population in Tigray was 
72,772 on 31 December 2018. Of this number, 10,540 were 
unaccompanied minors (UNHCR, 2018). They are provided with 
shelter and basic resources in four refugee camps: Mai Ayni, 
Shimelba, Adi Harush and Hitsats. Most unaccompanied minors stay 
in Hitsats. The children fall under the responsibility of ARRA; in 
Hitsats the Norwegian Refugee Council takes responsibility for the 
care of the children. They are housed in different care arrangements 
including foster, kinship and community care. Most minors live in 
community care. In this arrangement, they live together with 10 peers 
in houses of approximately 10 square metres in size. Social workers 
are employed by the Norwegian Refugee Council; they are refugees 




Most minors want to reach Europe or the United States via the legal 
registration and resettlement procedure of the United Nations High 
Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR). However, registration for 
resettlement in Hitsats is for refugees aged 18 years and over. This 
means that the minors have to wait, sometimes many years, to 
register. After being registered, people have to wait an undefined 
period of time before being resettled – if they have a strong case. 
Minors who have resided in the camp for many years before turning 
18-years old do not generally have a strong case, which means that 
their future involves many years of uncertainty. Additionally, family 
reunification processes outside Ethiopia are complex. Procedures are 
time consuming and minors can have difficulty getting in direct 
contact with the responsible officials from UNHCR. They also lack 
the assets to communicate easily and directly with family members 
abroad, which complicates the process further (Schoenmaeckers, 
2018). 
 
Between January 2014 and July 2017, 10 to 15% of all asylum 
applications in the Netherlands were from Eritreans, a total of 17,000 
people. Although immigration and asylum policies are becoming 
more and more restrictive, most refugees from Eritrea are granted 
asylum in a relatively short period of time (Rath, 2009; Sterckx et al., 
2018). Whereas the majority of the Eritrean refugees arriving in the 
Netherlands are single young men, a considerable number are 
unaccompanied minors. Many of them become embroiled in a long 
and frustrating process of family reunification. Most of the time 
family reunification does not succeed due to missing documents. 
Such documents are absent because they were never issued in the 
small rural villages where the minors are from, or because were lost 
during their journey (Sterckx et al., 2018; see Chapter 16, Refugees’ Right 
to Family Unity in Belgium and the Netherlands: ‘Life is Nothing without 
Family’, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Eva Berends, Lucie Delecolle, Jakob 
Hagenberg, Marco Paron Trivellato & Naomi Stocker).  
 
In the Netherlands, unaccompanied refugee minors fall under the 
legal responsibility of Nidos. In 2017, 4,469 minors received 
guardianship from Nidos, of which 1,436 were unaccompanied 
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minors from Eritrea (Nidos, 2018). Nidos assigns a mentor and a 
guardian to each minor and provides accommodation. The different 
care arrangements in the Netherlands include foster and kinship care, 
as well as group care facilities. In the smaller units, children live in 
groups of 6 to 10 and receive care from their mentor 24-hours a day. 
In other living units, minors live more independently with 16 or 17 
others. There is also campus housing, where approximately 80 to 100 
minors live together.  
Methodology 
The field work for this study was conducted in Ethiopia (by Rick 
Schoenmaeckers) and the Netherlands (by Taha Al-Qasim and 
Carlotta Zanzottera) from January to August 2017. In Ethiopia, the 
main part of the research was conducted in Hitsats Eritrean Refugee 
Camp, but data was also collected in Shimelba Eritrean Refugee 
Camp, Endabagoona Screening and Reception Centre and in the city 
of Shire. In the Netherlands, the field work was carried out in six 
refugee centres for unaccompanied minors, located in the centre, 
south, south-west and south-east of the Netherlands.  
 
In Hitsats, 16 minors were interviewed. Focus group discussions and 
workshops were held with the same group of participants in two age 
groups: 12 to 14 and 15 to 17 years old. Most of the minors who 
participated in the study came from southern rural regions of Eritrea 
and belonged to the Christian Tigrinya ethnic group. Seven interviews 
were conducted with ARRA camp coordinating officers, UNHCR 
officials and officers from the Norwegian Refugee Council. In 
addition, informal interviews were conducted with officials of 
livelihood and relief providing non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). Apart from one of the research coordinators who speaks 
the languages of the minors (Arabic and Tigrinya), the other 
researchers made use of translators during the field work. Particular 
precautions were taken to vouch for the integrity of the interpreters, 
who were asked to also assist in a cultural interpretation of the 
questions to build a conducive environment for the research. For this, 
the translators received training.  
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In the Netherlands, the first three respondents were selected together 
with Nidos. The rest were introduced by the participants using 
snowballing technique. In total, 25 minors, 11 guardians, 7 mentors, 
and 2 regional managers of Nidos were interviewed. Most of the 
minors were 17-years old and were Christian Tigrinyans. Most of 
them came from rural southern and central parts of Eritrea. A few of 
them belonged to the Muslim Tigre ethnic group, from western rural 
parts of Eritrea. Only two boys came from the cities of Keren and 
Asmara.  
 
The data consists of transcripts of interviews and notes of 
observations, workshops and focus group discussions. The data was 
analysed with the use of the qualitative analysis program Atlas.Ti. 
During the first phase of the analysis, coding sessions helped to create 
structure in the data. Thereafter, thematic coding sessions made it 
possible to find related and coherent issues. Relational concept trees 
and a structured database were used to analyse the data in a 
comparative way between the different areas (Bryman, 2012). 
Ethical considerations 
Parental consent is key when talking about ethical research on 
children (Morrow & Richards, 1996, p. 90). The issue in this research 
was that the parents of the participants were absent. Therefore, the 
legal guardians were carefully informed and their consent obtained. 
In Hitsats, the research was carried out with the approval of ARRA 
and the Norwegian Refugee Council and, in the Netherlands, with the 
approval of Nidos. Secondly, informed consent was carefully 
obtained from all participants. In this way, the autonomy and safety 
of the individual was respected and it was ensured that the 
participants were fully aware of what they were participating in (Ellis, 
Kia-Keating, Yusuf, Lincoln, & Nur, 2007). In addition, 
unaccompanied Eritrean minors are often traumatised; hence, they 
are a vulnerable group that should be approached carefully and 
ethically conscious (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). Therefore, the 
interpreters and translators who assisted during the research received 
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training on how to be ethically responsible while conducting research 
on unaccompanied minors.  
Ethiopia: Trust in the refugee camps 
When minors from Eritrea decide to cross the border into Ethiopia, 
they enter a trajectory in which they encounter new experiences and 
difficulties. As soon as they are collected by the Ethiopian military 
after crossing the border, they are brought to the Endabagoona 
Screening and Reception Centre. During a visit by one of the 
researchers to Endabagoona, there was a new group of approximately 
80 refugees, many young children, but also adults and the elderly. 
Some had arrived after days of dangerous travel to the border and 
others after a walk of just a few hours without any difficulties. All 
people sat in the sand on the ground and were looking around 
expressing fear and uncertainty. After Endabagoona, most 
unaccompanied minors are redirected to Hitsats. 
 
In Hitsats they encounter new structures and people from different 
organisations. The people who the minors feel most confident with 
are the social workers. The social workers are mainly young refugees 
themselves and hold positions such as team leader and community 
leader for the unaccompanied minors. In these positions, they 
monitor and motivate the minors to go to school and intervene when 
there are arguments between minors. They are mentor figures to 
whom the minors can go whenever they encounter a problem or have 
a question. They are employed by the Norwegian Refugee Council 
and are paid a small salary for the work they do. The comfortable 
relationship between the minors and the social workers highlights the 
importance of equal relationships in which hierarchical differences 
are less dominant. The social workers live with the minors in their 
communities and spend much of their time with them. This, together 
with the fact that they are refugees themselves, makes them feel like 
‘one of them’. Consequently, this feeling creates a relationship in 




Power differences between the refugees and staff – other than social 
workers – in the camp are evidenced by clear demarcations. In 
Hitsats, this demarcation is physical, in the form of an unpaved road 
that splits the humanitarian organisations (in enclosed compounds) 
from the refugee dwellings. At the end of the road is Hitsats town, 
which is only accessible to refugees before 9 pm. When camp 
residents were invited by the researchers into the compounds of the 
NGOs, they denied the invitation, preferring to wait outside on ‘their’ 
side of the road. It could be observed that the refugees did not feel 
comfortable going into the NGO compounds, evidenced by their 
reluctance to enter.  
 
Another example that emphasised the distance between the camp 
residents and the personnel of the humanitarian organisations is that 
during the field work in the camp, humanitarian staff barely walked 
around inside the camp, nor were they seen spending time with the 
refugees inside their communities. The personnel of these 
organisations, usually entered the camp in vehicles that took them to 
specific places inside the camp where they had planned activities or 
meetings.  
 
Furthermore, camp policies include regulations on the times that the 
staff of humanitarian organisations can and cannot enter the camp. 
After sunset, the personnel of the organisations are not allowed to 
enter the camp because of possible danger, but the camp is full of 
young children and vulnerable people who are supposedly not 
susceptible to these dangers. These rules give the impression that 
‘danger’ means something different for people who work for an 
NGO than for people who live inside the refugee camp, and that 
refugees are valued differently.  
 
In Hitsats, the first interview that was conducted was with R. This 
interview took place in the company of the case manager from the 
Norwegian Refugee Council, who is in charge of unaccompanied 
minor coordination. The interview was difficult and R’s distrust was 
noticeable in her attitude and behaviour. Answers were whispering 
and were mainly ‘yes’, ‘no’ or socially-desirable responses. R did not 
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dare to speak freely about difficulties in the camp or topics like 
education. The case manager from the Norwegian Refugee Council 
recognised the behaviour and admitted that more information would 
not be provided by the minors if the interviews were conducted in his 
presence.  
 
A gap in communication existed between NGOs and the refugees in 
Hitsats. For the young refugees, there is a clear division between 
officials of humanitarian organisations and the residents of Hitsats. 
Although officials did their utmost to make the communication as 
inclusive and equal as possible, the gap was palpable. This sense of 
discomfort with NGOs was not directly acknowledged by any of the 
respondents; however, certain thoughts about UNHCR were 
expressed. During his interview, M made his opinion about UNHCR 
clear: 
 
RS: Is there anything you miss here in the camp, anything that you would like to 
have? 
M: I don’t have any relatives in the camp, and also no parents, so I would like to 
register for a resettlement case, a UNHCR case. That is what I really want. 
RS: Didn’t you do that yet? 
M: No. 
RS: Why not? 
M: They are not serious about the under-aged children. 
RS: How do you know that? 
M: Because other children, friends of mine, they have already been registered for two 
years and they did not get any response yet. 
RS: But won’t you try it yourself then? 
M: Yes… eh… no. 
RS: How do you see your near future? What will you do in the next couple of 
years? 
M: I am only looking forward to my resettlement registration at the UNHCR. 
RS: Are you going to wait until you are 18 then? 
M: Yes.  




M’s confidence in UNHCR was limited. Certain ideas about UNHCR 
were common among the minors, who had little or no confidence in 
their procedures. Additionally, information about procedures or 
other issues was mainly spread by the refugees among themselves. 
Whenever minors were asked where they got their information from, 
they always said: “from people” or “from friends”. Most information 
about the camp was also spread via backchannels. This is confirmed 
by Kulu-Glasgow et al. (2018), who reported that these informal 
sources of information shape the expectations and perceptions of 
minors of life in Europe. In addition, the minors received information 
from ARRA who drive through the camp with speakers on their 
vehicles to make important camp-related announcements.  
 
The respondents also said that they received information from social 
workers. Personal issues or more intimate concerns were discussed 
with the social workers. The minors were generally positive about 
social workers and stated that they trust them more than the other 
officials who work in the camp. In the interview with Y, the following 
came forward: 
 
Y: I decided not to go to Libya and stay here. I will wait for a legal process. 
RS: Are you already registered for a legal process? 
Y: No. 
RS: Why not? 
Y: Firstly, I don’t know where the UNHCR office is. Secondly, I don’t know 
how I have to speak with them – how to speak, how to listen to them, I just don’t 
know. 
RS: But what is your plan than in order to end up in Germany eventually? 
Y: I have decided to go to the team leader, and together we will go to the UNHCR 
office to register my case. 
RS: Did you do that already, or are you planning to do that? 
Y: I am planning to first discuss this with my team leader.  
(Y., interview with Schoenmaeckers, face-to-face, Hitsats, 7 July 2017) 
 
Y is 12 years old, this means that he has to wait another 6 years in 
Hitsats before he can apply for resettlement. When he is 18, the 
probability that Y will have a strong case and be eligible for 
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resettlement is small, which reveals the hopelessness of the situation 
for minors.  
 
Whereas confidence in UNHCR was low, whenever minors had 
relatives outside Africa, they assumed that eventually reunification 
would be realised. This was the case with A, he had been in Ethiopia 
for almost one and a half years and was waiting for reunification with 
his father in Germany: 
 
RS: You told me that you want to go to Germany, do you know how to get there? 
A: My father, I am waiting for my father who will send a message to start the 
process. He will arrange it with UNHCR. 
RS: So for now you will wait until you can go to Germany via the reunification 
process? 
A: Yes. 
RS: Do you know how long this will take? 
A: One year.  
(A., interview with Schoenmaeckers, face-to-face, Hitsats, 5 July 2017) 
 
This timespan was also estimated by many other interviewees, 
especially those waiting for reunification. Minors – as well as adults – 
do not have a clear idea of how long processes will take, because this 
information is not provided to them. Therefore, people guess how 
long it will take, based on the time it took the people around them to 
have their applications processed.  
 
Regarding this issue, the data demonstrated that unaccompanied 
minors are too often left without an explanation about how legal 
procedures work. Therefore, they live in limbo, basing their 
understanding of the legal procedures and processes on guess work 
and asking peers or other refugees who are living in the same limbo 
for answers. These strategies for obtaining information are highly 
influenced by the way the minors feel – which determines the way in 
which information is perceived and processed (Schwarz, 2010).  
 
The relative stability that minors had at home in their places of origin 
changes substantially when they arrive in the refugee camps. Back in 
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Eritrea, most of the children lived with their mothers and siblings. 
Their fathers were absent in their daily lives because they were serving 
in the National Service or had already left Eritrea. Back in Eritrea, the 
minors went to school, helped in the household and worked as 
shepherds or searched for gold. In Hitsats, they were usually unable 
to continue their education. They lived together with their peers and 
parental authority was absent. As only primary education was 
available in the camp at the time of the research, only the youngest 
children could go to school. However, there was no obligation to do 
so, hence, they could also decide not to go. If not attending school, 
the minors went to church, played with their friends or stayed in their 
houses.  
 
In this setting, dependency and reliance on peers was evident. This 
reliance became clear in various situations. For instance, minors 
described how they supported and helped each other. The strong 
interdependence between the minors was expressed in several 
interviews. During one interview, M described how the young girls 
support each other: 
 
RS: Do you have any very bad experiences that maybe left a mark on your life, 
something very stressful? 
M: I have a medical problem. 
RS: Ok… 
M: Whenever I am asleep, suddenly I wake up and walk outside. When this 
happens, my friends go outside and try to catch me and bring me back. When I am 
outside in the night a lot of stress is triggered. 
RS: How has this left a mark on your life? Does it feel like a life-threatening 
situation for you? The sleepwalking I mean. 
M: Yes. Sometimes I want to commit suicide. 
RS: Does anybody know about this? 
M: Yes, they know. 
RS: Do you have psychological help? 
M: No, but I use traditional water – like holy water. There is this religious place, 
traditional religious place, where they use this water, like a medicine. I am using 
this now for seven months.  
RS: Is that helping you? Do you know the reason why you are so sad?  
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M: I think that… when I walk alone, someone is following me, like Satan; Satan 
is in me. 
RS: Are you followed by Satan? 
M: Yes. 
RS: What does he do? 
M: At midnight he makes me walk outside. 
RS: Was this also in Eritrea or just here? 
M: It started here.  
(M., interview with Schoenmaeckers, face-to-face, Hitsats, 6 July 2017) 
 
The way M is dealing with her problem shows resilience. Stories like 
M’s are not unique; other minors explained that friends of theirs were 
possessed by evil spirits such as Buda or Zar60 and described how they 
help each other. One boy explained in detail how they tried to get a 
bad spirit out of their friend’s system by using methods they had 
learnt back in their villages: 
 
When Buda attacks you, your friends have to grab you and ask you “who is the 
Buda inside you?”. If you don’t say who it is, they will punish you until you say it. 
We do it like this: We put water in your nose until you tell us, if necessary, we empty 
a whole jerry can in your nose! As soon as we know Buda’s name, we will ask him 
to get out and leave. (Focus group discussion, Schoenmaeckers with 4 
respondents, face-to-face, Hitsats, 2 August 2017) 
  
The method outlined above emphasises the need the minors feel to 
fight evil spirits and the effort they put into helping each other in such 
situations. Trust and loyalty between peers and friends was evident. 
As such, resilience, and reliance on each other carried the young 
refugees through difficult situations. Nevertheless, in the Ethiopian 
refugee camps, the unaccompanied minors from Eritrea live a life of 
uncertainty and hardship. The lack of basic resources 
(Schoenmaeckers, 2018) makes it even more difficult and is pushing 
 
60 Buda and Zar are evil spirits that can take control of people. It is argued by Baye 
Berihun Asfaw that Zar is “haunting and controlling people and making them their 
own property” (Asfaw, 2015, p. 83). The Buda spirit is transmissible: “The evil spirit 
lives in people’s the families. If a person is possessed by Buda, it takes seven years 
until one becomes capable of transmitting the evil spirit” (Asfaw, 2015, p. 84). 
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even the youngest refugees out of these situations. The next step 
many take is the dangerous and difficult journey to Sudan, Libya and 
Europe.  
The Netherlands: Dealing with a new hierarchy  
In the refugee centres in the Netherlands the minors come across 
different hierarchical structures than in Hitsats camp. Minors in the 
Netherlands have to deal with many different practitioners: mentors, 
guardians, cultural mediators, translators, and lawyers, etc. This 
results in confusion in terms of roles and a distance between the 
minors and the (long chain of) caregivers. From the minors’ 
perspective, the child-care system in the Netherlands is a fixed and 
structured hierarchy.  
 
In addition, long and bureaucratic processes are encountered in the 
Netherlands. These processes bring with them difficulties for the 
minors in the new environment. The need of caregivers to fill in 
forms and documents in order to share a common guideline 
concerning guardianship is perceived as an imposition of the system 
on the minors. They reported feeling like ‘objects of scrutiny’, instead 
of subjects in charge of their own lives. Overly technical procedures, 
such as document finding and the filling out of forms, are experienced 
as alienating. Feeling like an object of scrutiny negatively affects these 
children. Consequently, such negative feelings might alter the 
information the minors receive from and about their caregivers, 
leading to a biased perspective (Schwarz, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, the workload of guardians and mentors is experienced 
as too heavy, which makes spending quality time with their pupils an 
issue. The average caseload of one guardian can be up to 20 children. 
In the Netherlands, minors and caregivers reported that spending 
quality time and being around helps in building trust (Van Reisen et 
al., 2018). 
 
When the minors arrive in the Netherlands, the social context is 
completely new. For Dutch caregivers, the social context of the 
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unaccompanied minors from Eritrea is also new and relatively 
unknown. This dynamic brings with it misunderstandings, suspicions 
and, as a result, mistrust on both sides. The inability to understand 
and acknowledge each other’s social context is explained in the words 
of the following two minors: 
 
If you question them [caregivers] about family reunification they say: bring the 
documents. But to get these documents […] they don't know how we can, they don't 
have a clue about the problem. Our country's situation is extremely unique. They 
don't understand. (S.A., interview with Al-Qasim, face-to-face, the 
Netherlands, 18 May 2017) 
  
We cannot talk to our parents, how are we supposed to get our documents here to 
start the procedures of family reunification? People here don't understand us. I don't 
think our mentors and guardians have a broad picture of our situation. (SI, 
interview with Al-Qasim, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 19 May 2017) 
 
These quotes show that the minors feel that they have to continually 
repeat the fact that it is impossible to obtain the documents required 
for the family reunification process, which leads to frustration and a 
feeling of being misunderstood. Additionally, it reveals the lack of 
familiarity of caregivers with the situation in Eritrea. However, these 
documents are required by law and caregivers can do little about this. 
The minors blame this requirement on the caregivers, which shows 
confusion in terms of their role and a lack of awareness of Dutch legal 
procedures. 
 
The lack of information provided to the minors leads to ‘one-way 
communication’. Minors are asked questions by the caregivers, but do 
not feel that they answer their questions. This leads to them feeling 
like an object of scrutiny: 
 
I tell you an instance: if you tell something to one mentor, she either writes it or tells 
it to her colleagues, even small things. In the complex where I live there is one mentor 
who keeps quiet and she is trustworthy. The others, if you tell them please do not 
tell, they would go straight and tell it: ‘Bum’. But we know them one by one, who 
lies who keeps secrets and who is trustworthy. We study them like they study us. We 
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know them very well. (B., interview with Al-Qasim, face-to-face, the 
Netherlands, 12 June 2017) 
 
The minors said that they often feel that the caregivers give fixed 
answers. The following quote is an example:  
 
There is one bad thing about this country. They all operate at the same level. They 
share the information and they all know everything about us, they sit in a meeting 
and they talk about you only. And they agree with certain issues and on what to 
reply to you or what not to reply. (B., interview with Al-Qasim, face-to-face, 
the Netherlands, 12 June 2017) 
 
B and his peers assume that the information that they give is used 
against them. They feel that there is no room to manoeuvre in a 
system where caregivers share information with each other and give 
fixed answers. Additionally, unaccompanied minors from Eritrea 
bring their prior experiences of being intimidated by security officials 
in Eritrea to their experiences in the Netherlands, which generates 
fear and mistrust of Dutch officials. The result of the feeling of being 
scrutinised is secrecy on the part of the minors.  
 
The guardians pointed out that trust is all about good communication. 
This begins with speaking the same language as well as cultural 
awareness. This was confirmed by the young respondents. The 
following quotes from two guardians clarified this: 
  
Sometimes we observe behaviour that we don't understand, also because of the 
environment they come from, Eritrea, is so different from the Netherlands, where I 
come from. So, what helps me is considering their behaviour and asking myself: why 
does she-he behave like that? For instance, I have felt like unaccompanied minors 
from Eritrea were rude while talking to me, later someone explains me that in 
Tigrinya there is a lack of words, therefore it is normal to express yourself like: “Do 
this! Do that!” This helps me all the time, I realise that this has nothing to do with 
me, but it is just their way of thinking or behaving. (Guardian, interview with 




Eating together or talking small talk in Tigrinya for instance ‘Kemey alleka’ – 
meaning how are you doing? ‘Kemey haderka’ – How was your night (did you sleep 
well) usually helps with getting close to each other. (Guardian, interview with 
Al-Qasim, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 11 May 2017) 
 
Cultural awareness is of the utmost importance in building trust (Van 
Reisen et al., 2018). Caregivers gave examples of the causal link 
between trust and cultural awareness. They pointed out that there is 
a need for “[…] injecting culture in every bit of our thinking from the 
top down” (Guardian, interview with Al-Qasim, face-to-face, the 
Netherlands, 11 May 2017) and that avoiding labelling Eritreans as 
mistrusting, negotiating and ‘followers’ is crucial in building trust. 
Resilience and aspirations: Strategic behaviour versus 
cooperation 
Kulu-Glasgow et al. (2018) point out that the majority of the 
unaccompanied minors envision a future in the Netherlands – no 
matter what the outcome of their asylum application is. This was also 
recognised by the researchers in this research; the minors did their 
best to integrate, participate and support each other where possible. 
Observations in the Netherlands, as well as in Ethiopia, showed how 
they support and care for each other in difficult situations. The 
minors help each other materially by lending each other money, but 
also psychologically during mourning rituals, by counselling each 
other and contributing financially in time of crisis when, for example, 
someone’s relative is the victim of human trafficking and ransom has 
to be paid. The respondents expressed hope and concern for their 
own and each other’s futures. One minor commented that:  
 
After a job interview, I realised that I have goals. I said to myself that I had to 
speak the language; that I cannot do without the language. Therefore, I took my 
schooling very seriously. I wanted to learn and be somebody. (A., interview with 
Al-Qasim, face-to-face, the Netherlands, 11 May 2017) 
  
The aspiration to take advantage of education opportunities to ensure 
success in the future was expressed by most minors. They were 
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concerned to be able to speak Dutch and English and had a sense of 
the need to prepare for future work and wellbeing in the host society.  
 
Some emphasised the need to keep some private issues strategically 
to themselves. Such behaviour may be a legacy of their experiences 
of the political and social situation in Eritrea, where choosing secrecy 
and silence is considered a safer strategy than talking and self-
revelation (Van Reisen et al., 2018). However, the minors justified 
their approach as a strategy to deal with a system in which they feel 
scrutinised. For instance, one said:  
 
When it comes to holding secrets, mentors and guardians do not keep them [laughs]. 
In fact, they are right, it is their job. They must write reports. Personally, I don’t 
talk or share some of my secrets with them. (F., interview with Al-Qasim, face-
to-face, the Netherlands, 9 August 2017) 
 
Furthermore, the one-way communication that was experienced by 
the minors led them to study and observe mentors and guardians 
themselves. This behaviour was the minors’ way to get the 
information they wanted. A guardian confirmed that minors did not 
want to share much with them:  
 
Sometimes their families are directly involved in the decisions they make here. 
Unaccompanied minors do not want to tell us the reasons for that, they don’t want 
to talk about their families. So, when we say let’s call the family together, they don’t 
want to do it. (M., interview, with Al-Qasim, face-to-face, the 
Netherlands, 25 May 2017) 
 
Whereas some minors decided to not share much with their 
caregivers, others created narratives in order to find ways around the 
system. Such narratives were not always lies in order to obtain what 
the minors wanted, but were narratives created by family members or 
themselves that they had started to believe over time. One guardian 
explained: 
 
First, those are not lies. Sometimes, children have been sent away with a particular 
story which, as time passes, ends up being real in their mind even though the truth is 
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different. I give you an example: Once, something bad happened to a boy. In one 
hour, we got phone calls from everywhere, Italy, Austria, [...] asking what happened 
to the guy. When the boy came with us [Nidos], he stated: 'I don't have family, I 
am alone, help me'. When a boy claims that he doesn't have a family, I doubt it as 
I know it might not be true. (W., interview with Al-Qasim, face-to-face, the 
Netherlands, 4 May 2017) 
 
Such stories demonstrate that the minors deploy a range of coping 
mechanism aimed at preserving a degree of dignity and wellbeing. 
When the objectives of officials, humanitarian organisations and 
caregivers corresponded with those of the minors, cooperation from 
both sides was the chosen strategy. When the objectives of the 
officials and caregivers did not correspond with those of the minors, 
other strategies were observed. The imposition of the objectives of 
the officials of humanitarian organisations and caregivers on the 
minors resulted in the use of strategies to find cracks in the system. 
Such behaviour included secrecy and self-crafted narratives.  
Conclusions  
The purpose of this research was to comparatively investigate the role 
of feelings in the development of trust in the personal relationships 
of unaccompanied minors from Eritrea in Ethiopia and the 
Netherlands by using the concept of feelings-as-information. It is 
important to remember that “There is nothing natural or automatic 
about trust. Trust grows and develops in every individual and is 
shaped by the environment in which a person interacts with other 
people” (Eisenhower & Blacher, 2006). Mutual understanding leads 
to connections between people (Jonas-Simpson, 2001). If people 
understand each other, feelings towards the other improve. Positive 
feelings lead to better judgements of life satisfaction (Schwarz, 2010). 
 
The relationship with social workers in Hitsats (Ethiopia) were 
harmonious and based on trust. These social workers lived in the 
same situations as the minors, as they were refugees themselves. 
Mistrust appeared between unaccompanied minors and officials of 
humanitarian organisations in Hitsats, especially if information was 
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unclear and the objectives of what the care workers were doing was 
unclear to them. Information was spread among the minors 
themselves and they generally did not understand the procedures of 
the refugee agencies. They wanted to reach out to higher officials, but 
they did not know how and what they should tell them. 
 
In the Netherlands, the minors, guardians and mentors were not all 
refugees themselves with the same rights and duties. The 
relationships of unaccompanied minors with Dutch caretakers in the 
Netherlands were more complex and mistrust between them was 
evident. Minors are not familiar with the roles of the caregivers in the 
Netherlands. Lack of understanding between them leads to feelings 
of frustration, being judged and disappointment – on both sides 
(Condon, 2010).  
 
The relationship between the officials, guardians and mentors in The 
Netherlands was structured through a clear division in roles. The large 
number of officials and carers who wanted something from the 
minors seems to be the opposite from what was observed in Ethiopia, 
where attention from high officials was hard to get. This high degree 
of attention from officials in the Netherlands triggered distrust and a 
feeling among unaccompanied minors of being objects of scrutiny.  
 
Distrust between officials of humanitarian organisations and minors, 
as well as between caregivers and the minors, was analysed through 
the theoretical lens of Schwarz (2010). Schwarz emphasises that the 
way information is received and processed is partly dependent on 
how someone feels. Hence, feelings are an important source of 
information. Negative feelings, caused by misunderstanding between 
different parties, was the main issue that emerged during the 
interviews with the minors and caregivers. Jonas-Simpson (2001) and 
Condon (2010) highlight that feeling misunderstood can lead to 
feelings of disappointment, betrayal or being judged. Feelings of 
being different and misunderstood were recognised among the 
minors, as well as among the caregivers. The way this information 
was subsequently processed led to mistrust among the minors and 
adults. This problem was greater in The Netherlands, then in Hitsats 
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(Ethiopia), where the cultural similarities were greater and where 
other refugees were involved as carers of unaccompanied minors. 
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Refugees’ Right to Family Unity in Belgium and the 
Netherlands: ‘Life is Nothing without Family’ 
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Introduction 
The difficulties experienced in 
family reunification are 
frustrating the integration of 
Eritrean refugees in Europe. 
In addition to traumatic 
experiences during the 
journey, family fragmentation 
is traumatic as well. It 
contributes to the vulnerability 
of refugees’ mental health and 
can, thus, pose a problem in 
the integration process 
(Berends, 2019). In her 
master’s thesis, Eva Berends 
(2019) investigated the impact 
of family reunification on 
Eritrean refugees in the 
Netherlands. One respondent 
shared: “Life without family is 
nothing”. These findings are 
confirmed by other evidence, 
including evidence collected by one of the authors in the following 
late night call: 
 
You remember me, Professor? I am a friend of your late uncle. I realise it is late and 
that you are really busy. But I am a support buddy to an Eritrean refugee who has 
Although refugees have a right to family 
reunification, less than a third of Eritrean 
applications are accepted in the 
Netherlands. Family reunification is 
largely inaccessible due to complex legal 
procedures and the inability of refugees to 
collect the documents required. This is 
compounded by the lack of diplomatic 
relations with Eritrea and the 
discretionary, and sometimes unjustified, 
practices of the authorities in both Europe 
and Eritrea. There is concern that the 
onerous legal requirements are causing the 
relatives of refugees to cross borders 
illegally and make payments for 
unobtainable documents, as well as 




received asylum here in the Netherlands. Professor, I don’t know what to do anymore. 
We have been trying everything to get his wife and children to the Netherlands. He 
is sick and worried. Now, his wife and children have been taken to prison in Eritrea. 
His eldest daughter has fled, and she has been abducted in Sudan. She is so young! 
They are asking for USD 2,000 in ransom. Professor! What should I advise him? 
I don’t know what to do anymore! (Anon., personal communication with 
Van Reisen, telephone, August 2017, translated and paraphrased from 
Dutch) 
 
It is impossible to overlook the emotional stress and frustration of 
the caller. And this situation is not an isolated case. While there are 
positive examples of families from Eritrea who have been able to 
reunite in Belgium and the Netherlands, there are also refugees for 
whom family reunification has failed or not yet materialised. Some 
lawyers complain of the large number of files of Eritrean refugees in 
which there has been no progress. When asked for an update on a 
certain case file, one lawyer shouted into the phone that it is “very, 
very difficult” (Anon., personal communication with Van Reisen, 
telephone, 6 March 2018). The family reunification files of Eritrean 
refugees appear to generate a lot of stress among all those involved.  
 
For those who fail to achieve family reunification, the lives of their 
relatives is of major concern: 
 
I told you one bad news, dear, my wife has been in prison now for one month and 
some days – in Adi Abeyeto. There is one person who has offered to help me to give 
USD 1,500 [a bribe]. […] Now they are asking for more money. Then I have to 
send some money for food for my children, EUR 200. [...] Yes, actually I don’t have 
money, but I ask some people for credit and some people if they help me, its ok, and 
I send it because the children are not ok now. (MT., personal communication 
with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, 2 July 2019) 
 
In the subsequent conversation, MT, who is in Europe, explains that 
his wife in Eritrea is being punished by association for his activity on 
social media, which is not to the liking of the People’s Front for 
Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), the ruling party in Eritrea, which 
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exercises control over the diaspora through intimidation and threats 
(Buysse, Van Reisen & Soomeren, 2017). 
 
Although family reunification is well enshrined in international law, it 
is clear that this right is not accessible for many refugees. In 
preliminary conversations conducted for this study, it was suggested 
by knowledgeable resource persons that family reunification was even 
more difficult to obtain for refugees of Eritrean origin than others. In 
view of the concerns raised, this research was conducted to 
understand the circumstances leading to delays in the granting of 
applications for family reunification and problems with its 
accessibility by refugees – from the point of view of the refugees.  
 
Living in the diaspora is inevitably a matter of living ‘here and there’ 
(Ong’ayo, 2019), with the added complexity that the cultures and 
political structures (what is required, allowed and possible) in both 
places seldom match. With this in mind, this chapter investigates the 
difficulties experienced by Eritrean refugees in Belgium and in the 
Netherlands in accessing the right to family reunification. The main 
research question is: Is the right to family unity actually available in practice, 
through the procedure for family reunification, to Eritrean refugees in Belgium and 
the Netherlands? In order to answer this question, this chapter looks at 
the legal requirements under international law, European law, and the 
national laws of the Netherlands and Belgium, before looking at how 
these requirements play out in practice (the constraints on family 
unification). Finally, some brief conclusions are draw and 
recommendations put forward to address the problem. 
The right to family reunification 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights defines the family as 
“the natural and fundamental group unit of society” and goes on to 
say that it “is entitled to protection by society and the State” (UN 
General Assembly, 1948). This right is also enshrined in many other 
European and international human rights instruments, including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, European 
452 
 
Convention on Human Rights, EU’s Qualification Directive, and 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
 
Right to family life is a human right and it could be argued that it 
should be guaranteed for refugees especially, as they cannot enjoy this 
right in their country of origin, due to the risks of persecution that 
the refugee status encompasses. It is well known that the separation 
of family members may have devastating consequences for peoples’ 
wellbeing. In this respect, Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that: 
 
Member states have a legal and moral obligation to ensure family reunification. 
International human rights standards require that people seeking protection can 
reunify with their families in an effective and timely manner. States must lift the 
many obstacles to family reunification and treat all people seeking protection equally. 
(Council of Europe, n.d.)  
 
Family reunification is the opportunity given to a foreign national – 
holding a valid residence permit – to be reunited with the members 
of his/her family, including a partner or spouse, minor children or 
the minor children of their partner or spouse. Family reunification is 
often the only way to guarantee respect for a refugee's right to family 
unity, after the separation caused by forced displacement and the 
inability of the refugee to return. 
 
However, depending on the family link between the child and 
sponsor and the procedures involved, the criteria may be difficult or 
impossible to fulfil. For instance, if a family reunification process with 
a non-biological child is initiated, a formal adoption procedure has to 
be done. As the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) 
report states:  
 
…as adoption is not a formal procedure in many countries, applicants are generally 
not able to support their file. This overlooks both cultural differences in family 
composition, as well as the context of forced migration where relatives may take 




According to the ECRE report, “long separation can also damage the 
family structure and cause conflict when the family is reunited” 
(ECRE, 2014, p. 5). This report highlights the positive effects of 
family reunification, notably for wellbeing, but also regarding 
professional and personal aspects; family reunification is often 
considered as “a precondition for rehabilitation and integration” 
(ECRE, 2014., p. 5). Despite this, the family reunification procedure 
is often complicated or blocked by local authorities in the host 
country, or the country of origin, with refugees having to overcome 
many hurdles from the beginning to the end of the process.  
 
While the rule of law requires that rights are equally available to all, 
the reality may differ. Hannah Arendt (1958) sets out how the 
implementation of a legal system depends on recognition of rights as 
rights. Stateless people or people who cannot rely on the protection 
of a state are particularly vulnerable in terms of their ability to access 
rights. However, from interactions with Eritrean refugees and lawyers 
in Belgium and the Netherlands, it is apparent that many status-
holders have suffered from delays in the family reunification process 
(Various lawyers, personal communication with the authors for this 
research, Belgium and the Netherlands, 2019).  
Research methodology 
This chapter looks at the procedures for family reunification, as 
experienced by Eritrean refugees in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
The chapter does not aim to provide a legal review, but rather to shine 
a light on the complexities involved in the way family reunification is 
applied and how this application affects refugees in practice. The 
chapter includes an analysis of the literature and laws to present an 
overview of family reunification internationally, in Europe, and in 
Belgium and the Netherlands. This overview serves as the 
background to present the findings on the experiences of refugees 
with regard to family reunification in practice. 
 
The analysis draws on an in-depth analysis of an extended case study 
conducted by the first and last authors. One of the researchers drew 
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up a detailed time-line of events based on all information obtained on 
this case (Stocker, 2018). The information included emails, 
documents, social media messages, pictures, transcripts and notes 
from phone calls and face-to-face meetings. This case study was 
carried out in order to investigate every aspect of the process. Data 
was collected from the family members trying to unite, the support 
persons for the refugee seeking family reunification, members of 
various administrative bodies, and officials of government bodies and 
embassies. The case study included a visit to Khartoum in Sudan and 
meetings with all involved, except family members in Eritrea, as it was 
not possible to communicate with them without endangering them. 
The case study and other testimonies presented in this chapter 
highlight the different interventions and proceedings for family 
reunification in the Netherlands and Belgium, and show how they 
shape the actions of refugees.  
 
In order to extend the experience from the case study to other 
situations, additional interviews were carried out with eight Eritrean 
refugees. The enquiry consisted of questions about the respondents’ 
expectations and prior knowledge of the family reunification process, 
the legal obligations they need to comply with and the immigration 
authorities. Special focus was given to the documents required, the 
respondents’ efforts and obstacles in complying with the 
requirements, the course of action and the information they received 
about the process, and the challenges and help they received from the 
authorities and other actors during the procedure, as well as their 
subjective assessment of the process and suggestions for 
improvement. The findings were compared with the research findings 
by Eva Berends, who interviewed 10 newly-arrived Eritrean refugees 
in the Netherlands on family fragmentation in 2019 (Berends, 2019). 
 
The testimonies were collected as part of a research project carried 
out by the Brussels-based research organisation Europe External 
Programme with Africa (EEPA). This project aims to inform 
policymakers in Europe and Africa by confronting policies with the 
experiences of refugees and migrants. Thanks to the testimonies and 
research work, the perspectives and realities of Eritrean refugees 
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seeking family reunification in the Netherlands and Belgium have 
been portrayed.  
 
As Eritrean refugees feel vulnerable, even in countries where they 
have come to seek protection, no voice recordings were made and 
only written notes taken during the interviews.61 The interviewees’ 
names have been changed in this chapter to protect their identities. 
The real names and identities are known to the authors.  
Legal background 
Family reunification is one of the main legal channels for migration 
to Europe, and Eurostat data shows that more than 440,000 first 
permits for family reasons were issued in the EU member states plus 
Norway in 2015 (European Migration Network, 2016). This right is 
protected under international refugee and human rights law, 
European law and the national laws of EU member states, which 
together make up the legal framework for family reunification. 
However, the processes in practice are different for each EU member 
state, adding to the complexity. 
International law 
Under international refugee law, although there is no direct reference 
to family rights in the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Final Act of the 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries (UN General Assembly, 1951) 
affirms that “the unity of the family [...] is an essential right of the 
refugee” and recommends that governments: 
 
[T]ake the necessary measures for the protection of the refugee’s family, especially 
with a view to: 1) ensuring that the unity of the family is maintained ... [and] 2) the 
protection of refugees who are minors, in particular unaccompanied children and girls, 




61 Many Eritreans fear the ‘long arm’ of the Eritrean regime, including repercussions 
for their family in Eritrea (ranging from denial of business permits to incarceration), 
which have been well documented including by Buysse et al. (2017) and Van Reisen 
& Estefanos (2017). 
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Under international human rights law, the family is recognised as the 
fundamental unit of society and entitled to protection and assistance 
under Article 16(3) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights; Article 23(1) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; and Article 10(1) of the 1966 International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The UN Human Rights 
Committee, confirmed, in the case of Ngambi and Nébol v. France, that 
Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
“guarantees the protection of family life including the interest in 
family reunification” (UN Human Rights Committee, 2004). 
European law 
Under European Law, the rights of a refugee’s family are regulated by 
Directive 2003/86/ EC of 22 September 2003 and protected under 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
affirms that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. (Council of the 
European Union, 2003) 
 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights also protects right to family 
life under Article 7. The EU Qualification Directive (European 
Union, 2011) maintains that family members of a person under 
international protection are entitled to claim the benefits of 
protection as well, and that member states “shall ensure that family 
unity can be maintained” (European Union, 2011, Article 23).  
 
Despite this apparently strong international legal framework, in the 
Netherlands, less than a third (32% in 2015, 27% in 2016 and 29% in 
2017) of Eritrean applications for family reunification are generally 
accepted (compared to an acceptance rate of 78% for Syrians in 2017) 
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(Sterckx & Fessehazion, 2018). This data is in apparent contradiction 
with EU Qualifications Directive Article 23 and the Directive 
2003/86/EC, which stresses the need to establish more favourable 
conditions for refugees, taking into account their reasons for fleeing:  
 
Special attention should be paid to the situation of refugees on account of the reasons 
which obliged them to flee their country and prevent them from leading a normal 
family life there. More favourable conditions should therefore be laid down for the 
exercise of their right to family reunification. (Council of the European Union, 
2003) 
 
Under the European framework, the national legislation of each 
member state sets out the conditions under which family reunification 
can take place, in accordance with the European Directive’s purpose, 
which is “the creation of socio-cultural stability that facilitates the 
integration of third-country nationals in the Member States, on the 
other hand allowing economic and social cohesion, a fundamental 
objective of the Community, to be promoted in the Treaty” (Council 
of the European Union, 2003; see also: European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, n.d.). According to the Directive, non-EU 
citizens who legally reside in EU member states can apply for family 
reunification for their spouses and underage children. Additionally, 
member states can allow applications for non-married partners. 
Article 4(1) of the Directive 2003/86/EC defines the obligation of 
member states and traces the applicability of the law to the various 
categories of family members: 
 
(a) the sponsor's spouse; (b) the minor children of the sponsor and of his/her spouse, 
including children adopted in accordance with a decision taken by the competent 
authority in the Member State concerned [...]; (c) the minor children including 
adopted children of the sponsor where the sponsor has custody and the children are 
dependent on him or her [...]; (d) the minor children including adopted children of 
the spouse where the spouse has custody and the children are dependent on him or her 




The Netherlands  
In the Netherlands, family reunification is governed by the Aliens Act 
2000 (Ministry of Justice and Security, 2000a), Aliens Decree 2000 
(Ministry of Justice and Security, 2000b), Aliens Regulation 2000 
(Ministry of Justice and Security, 2000c) and Aliens Act 
Implementation Guidelines 2000 (Ministry of Justice and Security, 
2006). Different procedures exist for refugees and non-refugees, 
under which there are more strict process requirements for non-
refugees. For refugees to benefit from the more lenient process, the 
applications for family reunification (‘nareis’) must be filed within 
three months after the refugee has received asylum, based on their 
classification as a refugee or beneficiary of subsidiary protection 
(Section 27, Aliens Act 2000). Either the refugee in the Netherlands 
(the sponsor), or his or her family member abroad, can file a visa 
application at the Dutch immigration office in the Netherlands or 
embassy abroad. The application should be filed within three months, 
even if the refugee is not currently in touch with their family 
members, in order to secure the more lenient nareis procedure. If the 
deadline is missed, the refugee has to apply for the regular and much 
stricter family reunification procedure. 
 
The family members of refugees in the Netherlands who are eligible 
for family reunification as part of the nareis procedure are: partners, 
underage children, adult children up to around the age of 25 who are 
part of the core family and are to a larger degree than usual dependent 
on their parent(s), and the parent(s) of refugees in the Netherlands 
who are unmarried and younger than 18. In all cases, the family 
relationship must have existed before the sponsor entered the 
Netherlands. The partner of a refugee in the Netherlands and his or 
her sponsor both need to be 18 years or older. They can either be 
married, civil partners, or unmarried, in which case they need to be in 
a durable and exclusive relationship. Only one partner can enter the 
Netherlands by means of family reunification (Article 3.14, Aliens Act 
2000). Underage, unaccompanied children can reunite with their 
parent(s) if they are part of the family and if they are biological, 
adopted or foster children (Article B7/3.6.4, Aliens Act 
Implementation Guidelines 2000; Ministry of Justice and Security, 
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2006). They can only reunite in the Netherlands if they have been part 
of the family before the sponsor entered the Netherlands (Article 
C2/4.1, Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines 2000; Ministry of 
Justice and Security, 2006). Parents of refugees over 18 are not eligible 
in principle, and have to show that non-reunification would disrupt 
the existing family structure. In all cases, the family relations have to 
be proven through official documents. DNA evidence can be used if 
official documents are not available.  
 
If the procedure is successful, the family members will receive 
permission to travel to the Netherlands. In order to pick up the visa 
and to arrange travel for family to the Netherlands, the family 
members have to report to the closest Dutch Embassy. The family 
members will receive an asylum residence permit in the Netherlands. 
 
If the application for family reunification is made later than 3 months, 
it is possible for a refugee to go through the regular procedure for 
family reunification for those who have not been granted asylum 
status. The demands under this procedure, however, can be much 
stricter. Firstly, the sponsor must have sufficient financial resources 
to support him/herself and his/her family members (Article 3.2, 
Aliens Act), which means a monthly and gross income of over EUR 
1,552. Adult children over 18 are in principle excluded from the 
procedure, unless it can be shown that children until around the age 
of 25 are dependent on the family life, for example if they have never 
lived independently. Through the normal family reunification 
procedure, the family member must have passed the civic integration 
examination, regarding a basic knowledge of the Dutch language and 
of Dutch society, introduced on 15 March 2006 (Ministry of Justice 
and Security, 2006a); however, for refugees, this condition does not 
have to be met as long as the refugee still has a temporary residence 
permit. Other conditions also apply, such as the need for legalisation 
of documents. Refugees can ask for an exception to these conditions, 




According to Belgian law (Aliens Act, Belgian government, 1980 - 
Articles 10, 10bis, 12bis and 13), family members of refugees must 
apply for a visa for family reunification (‘gezinshereniging’) at a Belgian 
embassy or consulate in the country in which they stay, within a year 
after their family member in Belgium has been granted asylum based 
on their classification as refugees or beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection. Unlike in the Netherlands, the procedure cannot be 
started by the refugee in Belgium. After one year, family reunification 
can still be applied for, but stricter conditions apply to all family 
members, except for underage unaccompanied refugees. Under these 
stricter conditions, the applicant must pay EUR 200, have adequate 
housing for their family, have a sustainable income, and wait at least 
12 months. They also need proof of health insurance for their family. 
In cases where applications for family reunification are filed within 12 
months of obtaining an international protection status, but do not 
have all documents required, the application still falls under the more 
lenient rules, but in practice this depends on the body processing the 
application (Myria, 2018). The family members of refugees in Belgium 
who can apply for family reunification are their partners, underage 
children, adult handicapped children and, where the refugee in 
Belgium is underage, his or her parents. Family relations must be 
proven with documentation (such as marriage certificate, birth 
certificate, etc.) or when not available, other evidence such as a DNA 
test.  
 
For married couples and partners in a partnership equivalent to a 
marriage62, applicants and their spouses must be over the age of 18 if 
their marriage predates the refugee’s arrival in Belgium or over the 
age of 21 if they get married after that. A second category for non-
married couples is ‘registered’ partners. This refers to couples who 
have legally registered their partnership abroad63 and can prove this 
by providing a ‘declaration of legal cohabitation’. Both partners must 
 
62 The Belgian authorities consider partnerships that have been registered in 
Denmark, Germany, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the UK, and Sweden as equivalent 
to marriage. 
63 However, only few countries have the possibility of registering partnerships. 
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be older than 21 unless they can prove that they cohabited for at least 
one year before the refugee’s arrival in Belgium. In order to prove 
that their relationship is ‘stable and durable’ the partners must prove 
that they legally lived together for at least one year predating the 
refugee’s arrival in Belgium or that they have known each other for 
at least two years, and that they had frequent contact by phone, post 
or other communication, and that they met at least three times for at 
least 45 days in a row within the 2 years before the application for 
family reunification. Alternatively, if they have a child together, this is 
also proof of a ‘stable and durable’ relationship. These partners are 
also required to live in the same house in Belgium. Belgium does not 
recognise polygamy, thus allowing family reunification with one 
partner. However, children from different partners can qualify for 
family reunification. If the spouses are only married religiously or 
traditionally, they can apply for family reunification, but the Belgian 
government will only issue a humanitarian visa, which is different 
from the visa for the regular family reunification. There may be 
requirements that need to be met in order to extend the residence 
permit, such as the requirement to have sufficient income to sustain 
oneself (Myria, 2018). 
 
Underage, unaccompanied children can join their parent(s) in 
Belgium on the condition that they will live with their parent(s) in the 
same house and that they are unmarried. If only one parent lives in 
Belgium, the child(ren) can join the parent if the parent can prove 
with a legal document that they have sole custody of the child. If one 
parent is abroad and the custody of the child is shared, the other 
spouse has to give written consent that the child may live in Belgium 
(Ministerial Circular, 2013).  
 
Parents can join their minor child(ren) in Belgium via the family 
reunification process. Parents of adult refugees in Belgium, can only 
join by applying for a humanitarian visa. Other family members 
cannot join their family in Belgium with a family reunification visa, 
unless a family member has entered Belgium with a family 
reunification visa and has family members entitled to family 
462 
 
reunification in a fresh family reunification procedure.64 Although 
other family members have the possibility to apply for a humanitarian 
visa, the requirements for a humanitarian visa are stricter than for 
family reunification and the issuing of the visa is at the Belgian 
immigration office’s discretion. Applicants need to provide a criminal 
record certificate, pay EUR 350 in administrative fees (except where 
the applicant is underage), and their sponsors must prove that they 
have sufficient living space to accommodate the applicant and that 
they have health insurance covering themselves and their family 
members who want to enter Belgium. The issuing of a humanitarian 
visa can take substantially longer than a visa for family reunification. 
 
Before being able to apply for family reunification, a family member 
who wishes to live in Belgium must sign a declaration stating that he 
or she accepts the values and norms of Belgian society and pledges to 
act in accordance with them. When the application for family reunion 
is done within the year, the refugee does not face additional 
conditions that normally apply, such as stable income, adequate 
housing and a 12-month waiting time. If the application is late, these 
conditions do apply. After arriving in Belgium, family members must 
also show that they are willing to integrate and participate in 
integration classes. Furthermore, the Belgian government only allows 
the entrance of family members who are not a danger to public health 
and public safety. 
Constraints on family reunification 
Although European and the national legislation of EU member states 
recognise the right to family reunification, it is clear that obstacles and 
irregularities persist. In addition, from the testimonies of refugees and 
from other evidence obtained, it is obvious that the process for family 
reunification for refugee or migrant families differs between member 
states.  
 
64 This is possible when an underage refugee in Belgium has reunited with their 
parent(s), who in turn can have their other children apply for family reunification. 
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The story of Haile and Sophia 
Haile’s case is a perfect illustration of the problems that may occur in 
a family reunification procedure. He was granted asylum three 
months after his arrival in the Netherlands (Haile, interview with 
Hagenberg, face-to-face, Netherlands, 16 November 2018). The 
Dutch immigration authorities had informed him about the legal 
possibility of family reunification during the interview for his asylum 
request and what documents to provide. Vluchtelingenwerk, a Dutch 
NGO, helped him during this long and slow process. He was asked 
to bring the official birth certificates of his children and a marriage 
certificate; however, he and his wife did not have any government-
issued documents in Eritrea. Instead, his wife sent a church marriage 
certificate and baptism certificates for the children. The Dutch 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service instructed Haile’s family to 
go to Ethiopia or Sudan in order to visit a Dutch embassy, because 
there is no Dutch embassy in Eritrea. However, the Eritrean border 
was closed at the time and it was illegal for Eritreans to leave the 
country without special permission from the government. 
Consequently, his wife and his three children tried to cross the border 
to Sudan, but were captured and imprisoned in Afabet by the Eritrean 
authorities (Haile, interview with Hagenberg, face-to-face, 
Netherlands, 16 November 2018).  
 
In prison, Haile’s wife was harshly treated and threatened that the 
consequences would be severe if she tried to flee again. Once she and 
the children were released, she informed Haile that she could not take 
the risk to leave the country again (Stocker, 2018). Haile’s 16-year-old 
daughter, Sophia, then decided to flee without her mother and two 
siblings. She reached Sudan, but was then captured and extorted for 
ransom. Haile was phoned by two men, who demanded payment of 
USD 5,000 for her release. Haile was severely stressed. He spoke to 
his daughter briefly on the phone and took down phone numbers of 
those phoning him with threats to pressure him to pay the ransom 
(photograph and communication available, Stocker, 2018). He tried 
three times to report the situation to the Dutch police, who refused 
to take his report on the grounds that the extortion was taking place 
in Sudan, disregarding the fact that it was the father, who was legally 
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residing in the Netherlands, who was being extorted. The police also 
disregarded information sent by Haile that the police had a legal 
obligation to accept the report of the extortion (as per Articles 163 
(6) and 165 (1) of the Dutch Criminal Code) (Stocker, 2018). 
 
Through friends, his Eritrean network in the Netherlands and 
Belgium, and through the church, Haile found assistance to pay the 
ransom. The ransom was paid into a Dutch bank account, and no 
police report was made of the transaction. In another 
communication, the police stated that they would connect him to the 
department of ‘human trafficking’, but no follow up communication 
was received (Stocker, 2018). 
 
Meanwhile, Sophia was first admitted to a hospital in Khartoum and 
then went underground, in fear of further abductions. She did not get 
access to the Dutch consulate in Khartoum. In the Netherlands, Haile 
requested family reunification for Sophia as she was now in Sudan, 
and his wife and other two children were too anxious to travel out of 
Eritrea. This was refused on the grounds that the earlier application 
involved the entire family and, therefore, the case of Sophia could not 
be processed without the entire group. Subsequently, a new request 
was made. It was then communicated that approval of the mother 
was needed, but she could not process a formal document with the 
required certification, as this certification could not be done in Eritrea 
and the mother was too fearful to leave Eritrea. So, Haile received 
formal notice that the family-reunification would not be approved 
(Stocker, 2018). 
 
Contact was taken up with the Embassy in Khartoum, to explain the 
impossibility of the proposed procedure. The authorities then 
decided that given the circumstance the approval of the mother 
would not be required and that the father could process the 
documents – and this just for Sophia. The family reunification for the 
mother and other two children was now formally refused. Sophia 




The authorities then suggested that proof was needed that Sophia was 
the biological daughter of the father (in the Netherlands). To this end, 
it was decided that a DNA test was needed, which proved Haile was 
indeed the father (Stocker, 2018). Sophia was cleared just after her 
18th birthday to come to the Netherlands, and granted a visa for family 
reunification, based on the application before her 18th birthday. She 
boarded a plane, with a stop in Dubai, where she was refused entry 
on the next plane to the Netherlands as authorities did not accept the 
papers she carried. For two nights, Sophia stayed at the airport 
without any money. Urgent interventions from by the Dutch embassy 
in Khartoum and officials in the Netherlands finally helped clear the 
situation. A day later, she finally arrived in the Netherlands where she 
now lives with Haile (Stocker, 2018).  
 
Since the moment of Sophia’s extortion for ransom, over a period of 
more than two years, a large range of actors invested their time and 
energy to move this single case forward. This included the exchange 
of dozens of emails, phone calls and other communication, involving 
Vluchtelingenwerk, the Dutch immigration authorities, local Dutch 
police, the Dutch embassy in Sudan, experts, lawyers and concerned 
individuals. Only through direct follow up with the embassy and 
extensive explanation could the case be moved forward. 
 
In relation to this case, the following main constraints were observed: 
lack of clear information on, and understanding of, the process; 
complex, dangerous and onerous requirements, which were not 
feasible within the actual situation; inability to collect documents; the 
absence of diplomatic relations and communication between the host 
and home country; and discretionary and unjustified practices, by 
host and home country authorities. These problems are investigated 
in the ensuing sections. 
Lack of understanding of the process 
In the context of the family reunification procedure, the first problem 
faced by refugees is lack of understanding of the procedures, 
including the importance of documents and deadlines, in the host 
country, and within the European Union (EU) in general. This is 
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compounded by the legislative and procedural divergence of EU 
member states in family reunification matters from the EU’s 
principles and treaties:  
 
Family law is the competence of EU countries, and EU rules apply only in cross-
border cases. [...] Although family law remains the competence of EU countries, the 
EU can legislate on family law if there are cross-border implications. A special 
legislative procedure is in place for such situations: all EU countries have to agree 
(unanimity) and the European Parliament must be consulted. (European 
Commission, n.d.) 
 
As well as lack of information, lack of understanding of family 
reunification procedures causes administrative problems that can 
prevent reunification. Refugees or migrants are largely unaware of 
European and national laws when they arrive. This unawareness may 
prejudice the refugee/migrant and his family, particularly if they miss 
the time limit for applications (which for the more lenient procedure 
is only three months after asylum status has been granted in the 
Netherlands). A smooth and timely procedure is, therefore, largely 
dependent on adequate support for the refugee, in the form of a 
knowledgeable lawyer, NGO, case worker or other individual. If such 
support is not sufficiently present, or communication between the 
support person and the refugee is not successful, it is practically 
impossible for a newly-arrived refugee to complete the procedure 
successfully. 
 
As part of this research, we asked respondents about their awareness 
of the family reunification procedure. The respondents (with the 
exception of Haile) all had no knowledge of the possibility of, and 
legal requirements for, family reunification in the host country. A 
lawyer explained that the common practice of issuing a leaflet in 
Tigrinya upon granting asylum seems to have stopped in the 
Netherlands as of 2015. This leaflet, issued pre-2015, contained 
information on the rights and obligations of the refugees. Three of 
the interviewees stated that their first priority had been their personal 
safety, one of whom had fled directly from prison. All of the refugees 
intended on seeing their families again, even though they did not 
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know how or when this would happen. Mebrahtu, an Eritrean 
refugee, said: “I primarily fled for my security. I wasn’t even thinking 
of my family when I fled. Only about my own security” (Mebrahtu, 
interview with Hagenberg, face-to-face, Amsterdam, 9 November 
2018).  
 
Fleeing Eritrea, which has a shoot-to-kill policy at the border and 
whose citizens cannot travel freely within the country or across the 
border, is a very dangerous task. It can also endanger family members 
left behind, who, by association are fined and sometimes punished 
for the flight of their relatives (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). The first 
concern for refugees is their own safety during the flight and how to 
cope with the consequences of flight. The idea of family reunification 
and family reunification policies is rarely, if ever, considered at that 
stage. For instance, respondent, Yohannes, said that he had no 
intention of going to Belgium specifically before leaving Eritrea. This 
statement is reflective of the general situation among Eritrean 
refugees (Yohannes, interview with Hagenberg, face-to-face, Gent, 
17 November 2018) (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). From the 
interviews of Berends (2019) in the Netherlands, the same conclusion 
emerged. For instance, one person responded the following to the 
question of whether the Netherlands was his intended destination:  
 
No, my plan to reach a safe country. Not good Italy. Some friends told me Italy is 
not good. Some friends told me is better in the Netherlands. From Libya, when we 
stayed there, they said, no, don’t stay in Italy. Go maybe France or Belgium or… 
other refugees told me. But I chose the Netherlands, I don’t know. (Participant 3, 
interview with Berends, face-to-face, Luttelgeest, 7 June 2019).  
 
The concern of refugees for family members left behind in Eritrea is 
agonising. Knowing the difficulties faced by family members left 
behind increases feelings of worry and guilt. Refugees continue to 
assist their families back home as well as they can, often facing severe 
difficulties and challenges, including the imprisonment of family 
members as punishment for their own flight (MT, personal 
communication with Van Reisen, WhatsApp, 2 July 2019). Every so 
often a picture of the family back home emerges in conversations 
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with Eritrean refugees and their body language expresses the 
emotional hardship they are going through. Not knowing how to 
adequately support their families and the uncertainty of the possibility 
to unite with them, can cause severe stress (Berends, 2019). This 
stress can contribute to feelings of depression, which can have a 
severe impact on the daily life and integration process of refugees. 
Examples of this can be found in the research of Berends (2019). One 
interviewee expressed:  
 
It is a worry, it is difficult to... I am here and in Eritrea they [family] are in National 
Service – over 18 years you are waiting for National Service. It is difficult and I 
think about my family a lot. I think a lot. Sometimes when I want to sleep I think 
a lot. (Participant 9, interview with Berends, face-to-face, Luttelgeest, 7 
June 2019) 
 
Another interviewee stated: ‘’I am depressed too much. I do not want 
to be with someone [alone]; I feel some loneliness’’. She indicates that 
because of this: ‘’I do not want to attend the class at all. Because I do 
not feel well. I do attend class, but just my body is present, but my 
mind absent’’ (Participant 7, interview with Berends, face-to-face 
Luttelgeest, 6 June 2019).  
 
More refugees experience this struggle:  
 
I worry too much. Sometimes I cannot sleep, it is getting a bit better every day. 
Sometimes when I am in Dutch class I do not understand what the teacher is saying, 
even when it is in English, there are just too many things in my head. Still I try very 
hard to learn Dutch. (Participant 10, interview with Berends, face-to-face, 
Luttelgeest, 7 June 2019) 
 
Another example is Haile, 34, who fled Eritrea in 2014 and now lives 
in the Netherlands.65 He left his wife and his three children behind in 
 
65 Haile’s story is presented above as the main case study in this research, for which 
interviews were conducted with him, his support person in the Netherlands, and 
with the people involved in the case in Sudan. The case study is further based on 
in-depth analysis of the email correspondence and other communications 
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Eritrea because he was concerned about his own safety after he had 
been forced to serve in the national army for 11 years. He did not 
plan to leave his family forever and hoped to find a way to be reunited 
with them. However, before fleeing, he had no idea that in the 
Netherlands he could apply for family reunification and how the 
whole process worked (Haile, interview with Hagenberg, face-to-face, 
Netherlands, 16 November 2018). A lawyer contacted for this 
research also indicated that Eritrean clients often did not realise that 
there would not be a second chance if they did not apply for family 
reunification in time.  
 
A report by the NGO network European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles (ECRE) states that support for family reunification or access 
to information on the process for family members abroad is almost 
non-existent. This is especially true in the case of Belgium, where 
family members have to apply at an embassy abroad. “The obligation 
to apply from abroad means that family members may not be able to 
access reliable information or find adequate support for the 
procedure. Often family members are in countries where such 
support simply does not exist” (ECRE, 2014, p. 22). This report also 
claims that diplomatic establishments (embassies and consulates) do 
not “have the competence or the resources to inform and assist 
applicants”. According to the report, basic information such as where 
an application can be made, the opening hours of the embassy or 
consulate, its contact details, and so forth are missing and “constitute 
barriers to accessing the procedure” (ECRE, 2014, p. 22). 
 
During the interviews, four respondents expected their families, i.e. 
their spouses and children, to be able to come to the host country 
rather easily, after being informed about the possibility of family 
reunification. Dan, a refugee living in Israel, had high hopes of 
moving to the Netherlands, to join his family (Dan, questionnaire 
administered by Hagenberg, 7 November 2018). Tedesse initially 
believed that the Belgian government would assist him to bring his 
 
concerning this case between the different actors involved, resulting in a detailed 
time-line of events, actions taken and analysis of actors involved (Stocker, 2018). 
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family to Belgium (Tedesse, interview with Hagenberg, face-to-face, 
Gent, Belgium, 17 November 2018). These initial hopes were 
replaced with frustration as the process seemed set up to fail. They all 
shared their deep disappointment in the family reunification 
processes in Europe. Some interviewees in the Netherlands expected 
that, once granted a status, their family could come immediately. It is 
expressed as top priority for most, but the details and amount of time 
the process takes are not known. For instance, an interviewee stated: 
“after a year I really want to go to my mother in Sudan. She can come 
to the Netherlands, my mother” (Participant 6, interview with 
Berends, face-to-face, Luttelgeest, 5 June 2019). 
Onerous family reunification requirements  
Family reunification is a long and tough process. Refugees often have 
to wait for years before seeing their families, even if they have been 
granted asylum seeker status. According to ECRE (2014), the family 
reunification process is difficult and strenuous. Theoretically, 
refugees and migrants benefit from international and European 
protection with regard to family reunification. However, they have to 
deal with member states’ laws and procedures, as the member states 
have a margin of freedom to apply European legislation on family 
reunification, especially in relation to what proof of family relations 
is required. The report of ECRE lists several national hindrances to 
family reunification: timing issues, lack of clear information and legal 
advice, and the financial implications of the process. Expenses 
include fees for translation and verification of documents, visa and 
embassy fees, and the cost of staying in the host/home country or a 
third country (ECRE, 2014). When regular documentation is not 
available, the procedure in both the Netherlands and Belgium is to 
offer a DNA test. In the Netherlands, the costs of this are covered if 
offered by the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service if the 
test results have confirmed the family relation, but in Belgium, the 
costs are carried by the refugees and are EUR 200 for every person 
that must be tested. As a result of such fees, family members can end 




Tedesse and Yohannes, two of the interviewees who took part in this 
research, stated that they had encountered high costs during the 
family reunification process in Belgium. They were both with their 
families in Sudan originally. They did not know that there was no 
Belgian embassy in Sudan, so when they learnt that the Belgian 
embassy was involved in the process, Yohannes sent his wife to 
Uganda, which cost him USD 800. After his request for family 
reunification was denied, he could not afford to pay EUR 1,000 for a 
private lawyer and his public lawyer failed to appeal the decision, 
making a formal mistake in the procedure (Yohannes, interview with 
Hagenberg, face-to-face, Gent, Belgium, 17 November 2018). 
Tedesse stated that he faced substantial financial constraints, as he 
had to pay EUR 180 for the processing fee at the Belgian embassy in 
Khartoum while he was unemployed and rent for his family in Sudan 
(Tedesse, interview with Hagenberg, face-to-face, Gent, Belgium, 17 
November 2018). 
 
Some official documents (like the visa) represent a significant cost for 
refugees and family members: for instance, the Belgian embassy 
requires EUR 180 per person for each visa application for family 
reunification (Myria, n.d.). In the Netherlands, translation costs for 
documents must be paid. If the application for family reunification is 
late, the costs for family reunification through the regular process 
increase, as the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service states 
that applicants “must pay the fees when [they] submit the application. 
If [they] do not pay the fees, the IND [Dutch Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service] will not process [the] application. [Applicants] 
will not be refunded your money if the application is turned down” 
(Immigration and Naturalisation Service, n.d.). 
 
Another problematic aspect is the difference between the European 
legislation and national legal systems. It is noted by ECRE that 
countries’ proceedings are “complex and not always adequate”, 





2014, p. 12). According to the report, the Belgian procedure is long 
and tedious: 
 
A decision on an application for a family reunification visa generally takes six 
months after submission of the file to the embassy. This is the legally fixed term 
within which a decision must be taken. This term can be prolonged twice by three 
months at a time if there is a need for DNA testing (which takes up to eight weeks), 
or a perceived need for investigating the authenticity of the marriage. The time needed 
to prepare the file prior to submission should also be considered (collection of 
documents, getting an appointment with the Embassy, reaching the Embassy, 
gathering the necessary funds, etc.). There is a different procedure for reunification 
with “other” family members, who must obtain a humanitarian visa for which there 
is no time limit on the decision. In addition, appeals against refusals may take several 
years. (ECRE, 2014, p. 12) 
 
In addition, the deadline for a government to make a decision on the 
procedure, normally nine months, can be extended under ‘exceptional 
circumstances’, such as in cases where the proving of family relations 
is more complex, which can cause undue delays (ECRE, 2014). This 
is especially true for Eritrean refugees, who often face trouble in 
obtaining official documents, as addressed in the next part of the 
chapter. 
 
Hence, it is clear that the complexity of the process, the lack of 
information, and the intricacies of free legal assistance can seriously 
obstruct the (timely) reunification of a family.  
Inability to collect documents  
Applicants for family reunification in Belgium and the Netherlands 
need to prove their status and family ties to the authorities, which in 
theory seems to be an easy task, but can be difficult in practice. Papers 
and documents from their home country have to be collected and 
handed over to the host country’s embassy. However, this process 
may be impossible, especially when the issuing of original documents 
or issuance of information required is dependent on an oppressive or 
uncooperative state, or when the EU member state is in conflict with 
the country of origin – or not represented diplomatically – or even 
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when an administrative delay arises. In the case of Eritrea, the 
necessary documents often have never been created or issued. In this 
case, documents have to be issued from scratch. Family members in 
Eritrea are often afraid of going to the authorities to request 
documents. These barriers diminish the chances of reuniting a family.  
 
The report by ECRE explains how difficult or even impossible it can 
be for refugees to obtain official documents from their national 
authorities, notably because of the political instability, fear of 
persecution, conflict or violence. The report states that:  
 
It is often difficult or even impossible for refugees and family members to obtain the 
necessary official documents from their national authorities. This may be due to the 
fear of persecution which has originally led the family to leave the country of origin. 
Family members may also already be in a third country when they apply, and 
therefore unable to go back to the country they fled because of ongoing conflict and 
violence. (ECRE, 2014, p. 17) 
 
Citizens of Eritrea often avoid dealing with the government out of 
fear of persecution. For example, a lawyer contacted for the research 
indicated that it was common knowledge for Eritrean girls to avoid 
getting an identity card, as they did not need it and it requires 
registration at the central government, which would result in 
recruitment into the indefinite National Service. For many other 
official documents, Eritreans also did not see the need to obtain them 
as they often served no purpose for them in Eritrea. As a result, the 
high level of importance placed on documents by the Dutch and 
Belgian governments can lead to misunderstandings with Eritrean 
refugees who are not used to this.  
 
ID cards or passports are documents that are often required, both for 
family reunification and for primary asylum claims. In the 
Netherlands, one case studied for this research showed that the 
Dutch government pointed to the legal requirement in Eritrea to 
possess an ID card. However, for reasons such as the one mentioned 
above, some people do not have one. In addition, in October 2014, 
Eritrea announced it would retire the old ID card and would 
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implement a new one; however, it seems that these ID cards are often 
not issued in practice. A document which can be used to prove the 
identity of an Eritrean refugee is the ‘family residence card’. On this 
document, the names of any children are mentioned with the personal 
ID card number of the parent following letters, such as ‘B’ or ‘C’, 
indicating that the child never possessed an individual ID card. This 
can be used by lawyers to prove that indeed, despite the official 
requirement to possess an ID card, especially young Eritreans may 
never have possessed one.  
Official documentation  
When asked about the family reunification’s application, all 
respondents said that the compiling of documents was a major 
obstacle. None of the interviewees knew which documents were 
required before entering the Netherlands or Belgium. As possessions 
are hard to protect during the journey, most individuals do not take 
anything with them; thus, documentation needs to come from within 
Eritrea. Both the marriage certificates for the spouses and the birth 
certificates for the children are problematic for immigration 
authorities, because they are issued by the Eritrean Church and not 
by the official Eritrean State.  
 
Eritrean law recognises customary law, which is described in great 
detail (see, for instance Hagos, 2014), as well as the Eritrean civil code. 
According to Hagos “Customary laws are deeply engraved and 
embedded in the mind and soul of the Eritrean people. The majority 
of the Eritrean society has been applying customary legal frameworks 
in daily life and in dispute resolution” (Hagos, 2014, p. 4). Customary 
law recognises the differences among different ethnic populations 
within Eritrea. In addition to customary law, the Civil Code is a 
recognised legal framework. Within the pluralistic legal system of 
Eritrea, a number of forms of marriage are recognised. The Civil 
Code stipulates that a marriage contract is valid once it is in written 
form and attested by two witnesses (guarantors) each for the bride 
and groom (Hagos, 2014, p. 121). However, according to Hagos, 
traditional or customary marriage is the most frequent type of 
marriage (Hagos, 2014, p. 139): 
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Every traditionally marriage must be solemnized through clergies, save the Nara and 
the Kunama ethnic groups practices. The traditional marriage is often accompanied 
under a temporarily made grass shelter. The groom, accompanied with friends, family 
members and kin, attend the wedding ceremony performed in the bride’s home or a 
permanent residence. The families of the bride and groom, seated facing each other, 
conduct the marriage ceremony that includes blessings, appointment of guarantor, 
settlement for account of expenses, dowry and finally, either a written or an oral 
marriage contract is performed. (Hagos, 2014, pp. 139–140, referring to the 
Customary Codes of the Sahel) 
 
Hagos adds that: “The Civil Code and customary codes expressly 
stipulate a contract of marriage may be concluded according to the 
prevailing tradition or custom” (Hagos, 2014, p. 140). In situations of 
distress or emergency the customary code also foresees a ‘silent 
marriage’ which is not written in official record (Hagos, 2014, pp. 
141–142). 
 
In relation to paternity, the Civil Code recognises maternal filiation 
from the sole fact of birth and paternal filiation based on the 
presumption that the father of a child conceived or born in wedlock 
is the husband of its mother (Hagos, 2014, p. 199). Other instances 
are described in detail by the Civil Code and under customary law. 
The provisions do not require a child to be registered at birth. 
 
Haile and Mebrahtu, both residing in the Netherlands, had initially 
left their families behind in Eritrea. Their relatives were asked to send 
their Eritrean marriage certificates and children’s birth registration 
and certificates to the Dutch authorities (in one case, official birth 
certificates, in the other a certificate of baptism) (Haile, interview with 
Hagenberg, face-to-face, Netherlands, 16 November 2018; 
Mebrahtu, interview with Hagenberg, face-to-face, Amsterdam, 
Netherlands, 9 November 2018). Most Eritreans do not register the 
birth of their child with the authorities, because they already have a 
baptism certificate. According to the respondents, the making of a 
baptism certificate is easier than the official national birth certificate: 
it is indeed signed by the parents (sometimes only by the mothers 
when fathers are conscripted) and the priest (Mebrahtu, interview 
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with Hagenberg, face-to-face, Amsterdam, 9 November 2018). 
However, Dutch and Belgian authorities demand official birth 
certificates. Concerning the certificates, one of the respondents said 
“the [Belgian] embassy cannot accept [the Church certificate], so I 
have to legalise it with the government of Eritrea” (Tedesse, interview 
with Hagenberg, face-to-face, Gent, Belgium, 17 November 2018). 
However, another option exists if a child was born in the hospital in 
Eritrea, where it would usually receive a ‘growth chart and vaccination 
booklet’ or ‘child health and growth promotion card’. This document 
essentially fulfils all requirements for a formal birth certificate, as it 
carries the name of the child, which includes the names of the father 
and grandfather due to the Eritrean naming system, and the name of 
the mother, as well as date and place of birth.  
 
The requirement of a certificate and other official documents from 
the Eritrean State puts undue pressure on applicants, especially given 
the repression by the State, which is the cause of refugees fleeing their 
country, and the role of Eritrea’s diplomatic missions in exercising 
control over the refugee communities abroad (Buysse, et al., 2017). 
The presumption that refugees will be assisted by diplomatic missions 
is, therefore, unreasonable and can be a cause of harm to the 
applicants (Buysse et al., 2017). 
 
Other procedural inconsistencies have been identified as causing 
delays or thwarting family reunification processes; for example, the 
wrong spelling or transposition/translation of a name can jeopardise 
the process. Dan, a family reunification sponsor living in Israel, only 
had a copy of his son’s baptism certificate and the date of birth of his 
son. However, the name given to his son did not match the 
information the Dutch authorities had. An erroneous date of birth 
could not be corrected and this was the end of his family reunification 
procedure (Dan, questionnaire prepared by Hagenberg, 7 November 
2018). 
Inconsistent requirements  
While there are a range of similar challenges faced by Eritrean 
applicants for family reunification in Belgium and the Netherlands, it 
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is interesting to note the differences in documents required by the 
two countries. Table 16.1 lists the documents required by the Dutch 
or Belgian authorities regarding family reunification, with the 
commonalities between the Belgium and the Dutch system indicated 
in bold font. 
 
Table 16.1. Comparison of documents required for family reunification in Belgium and 
the Netherlands 
 
Belgium The Netherlands 
Every family member has to 
provide the following main 
documents: 
 
- A valid travel document 
(national passport or 
equivalent) 
- The visa application form 
(duly completed and signed) 
and recent identity 
photographs 
- A birth certificate: For 
spouse, registered partner, 
minor children and children 
aged 18 or over with a 
disability 
- The marriage certificate or 
proof of partnership along 
with proof of a lasting 
relationship (such as pictures)  
- For minor children reuniting 
with one parent, a copy of 
judgment of sole custody is 
required, or declaration of 
consent of the other parent 
Documents must prove family ties 
and fulfil the admission 
requirements; in the case of a 
family reunification application 
within three months of obtaining 
status (nareis procedure); examples 
of evidence include: 
 
- A copy of passport of 
sponsor and those of the 
family member or relative 
- The marriage certificate or 
certificate of registered 
partnership  
- An unmarried status 
declaration for children 
between 15–25 years of age 
- Documents that demonstrate 
parental custody (in case of 
a divorce) or a declaration of 
consent from the parent 
remaining behind 
- A translated birth certificate 
(this is also necessary in order 
to register in the Municipal 
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for the child to travel to 
Belgium.  
- A copy of sponsor’s residence 
permit in Belgium and a copy 
of the decision granting 
refugee status or subsidiary 
protection status 
- A medical certificate no more 
than six months old, obtained 
from a physician designated 
by the Belgian embassy or 
consulate 
 
Other documents may be 
requested if the Belgian 
government requests them. This 
can include, for example, an extract 
proving the applicant does not 
have criminal record or an 
equivalent document (if you are 
aged 18 or over), which is normally 
not required in the case of refugees. 
Personal Records Database in 
the Netherlands) 
- A declaration from all family 
members over 15 that they do 
not have a criminal record 
Note: The highlighted text indicates the common requirements between 
the Netherlands and Belgium concerning the family reunification 
process. Requirements may differ in some circumstances. 
Source: For Belgium, see Myria (n.d.); for the Netherlands, see 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service (n.d.) 
 
This comparison of required documents not only shows the lack of 
consistency of procedures within Europe, more importantly, the 
differences undermine any logical justification for the need for one or 
other of the documents. The differences in systems seem to be 
arbitrary and it is argued that if it is impractical (or harmful) to prove 




Once the required documents are collected, the procedure is still not 
finished. The documents need to be legalised in the case of Belgium 
(that is, verified and signed) by the foreign government and the host 
country embassy. This step creates yet another hurdle for refugees in 
Belgium.  
 
There are a multitude of problems with the documents required for 
the procedure. Firstly, there appears to be a wide difference between 
what documents are needed in the context of the procedures in 
Belgium and the Netherlands. In addition, the documents required 
may not fit the actually circumstance in Eritrea: they may not be 
available due to the severe repression in the country and, if available, 
officials may have to be bribed to obtain them, which undermines the 
reliability and relevance of these documents to ascertain a situation. 
Hence, the procedures may be over-relying on documents that carry 
limited meaning for Eritreans, or may even have been dangerous to 
obtain in Eritrea. This is a serious problem, particularly when people 
need to come to an embassy outside Eritrea to verify documents, as 
such travel from Eritrea is not allowed and the border is heavily 
guarded. The need to obtain formal documents from embassies or 
consulates of the Eritrean government puts refugees fleeing Eritrea 
in further danger (Buysse et al., 2017). Eritrean embassies abroad 
furthermore require most Eritreans to sign a regret form and pay 2% 
of their income as tax in order to obtain consular services, as will be 
elaborated on later in the chapter (Buysse et al., 2017).  
Absence of diplomatic relations  
Sometimes, EU member states are not represented in the country of 
origin of the refugee or the refugee’s family. Because of war and 
conflict in certain regions of the world, especially in Africa, some 
countries have closed their embassy or consulate in certain countries. 
Where diplomatic services are not available, some embassies in 
neighbouring countries offer to deliver the visas, but refuse to initiate 
the application; others limit access to the embassy and forbid non-
nationals from entry; or others still only deal with people holding a 
visa or passport (ECRE, 2014). The absence of diplomatic 
representation between countries is a major obstacle. These technical 
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and administrative gaps in consular services have a direct impact on 
people and can hinder the start of the family reunification process.  
 
Yohannes and Tedesse explained the problems they had because that 
there is no Belgian or Dutch embassy in Eritrea and that their families 
had to go to another country to contact the Belgian or Dutch 
embassies (Yohannes and Tedesse, interview with Hagenberg, face-
to-face, Gent, 17 November 2018). In order to prove their family 
relationship, nationals have to obtain certificates from their country 
of origin and send them to the host country. However, as explained 
earlier, most Eritreans only have a baptismal certificate and no official 
birth certificate. One of the interviewees said: “You have to give [the 
baptismal certificate] to the [Eritrean] embassy in Khartoum and they 
can send it to Asmara or somewhere, I don’t know” (Tedesse, 
interview with Hagenberg, face-to-face, Gent, 17 November 2018). 
Others said they were given the choice to make use of consular 
services either in Egypt, Ethiopia or Uganda, but all of this carried 
considerable risks to their safety. 
 
In Haile’s case, the absence of a Dutch or Belgian embassy in Eritrea 
had two effects: First, Haile and his family were unable to retrieve the 
necessary certificates in their own country and the Dutch government 
services urged them to travel to a neighbouring country with a Dutch 
representative office in order to make an application. Second, by 
compelling them to go to Sudan or Ethiopia, the Dutch authorities 
inadvertently encouraged Haile’s family to cross the border illegally 
putting his wife and children, in a dangerous situation. In the end, 
Haile’s wife and children were imprisoned and threatened and Haile’s 
daughter Sophia (16) was abducted and extorted for ransom (Haile, 
interview Hagenberg, face-to-face, Netherlands, 16 November 2018; 
Case study, NS, 8 June 2018). Hence, it is clear that requirements 
concerning official documents pose are a real danger to refugees and 
their families. As families have to cross the border in order to make 
the application or to arrange the DNA test in case documentation 
does not suffice, returning to Eritrea for any missing documents is 




In Belgium, the process to start family reunification needs to be done 
by the family in the country in which they stay, which for Eritrean 
refugees means travelling to a third country. The need to be near an 
embassy may also extend the refugee’s time in a third country, which 
is expensive as well as potentially dangerous. This causes further 
stress to the applicant of family reunification in the host country, as 
they know the dangers present on the journey that the family face 
(Berends, 2019). In addition, issues concerning travel documents can 
present a problem for refugees and their families. The ECRE report 
states that: “Belgian authorities deliver a ‘laissez-passer’ to family 
members who are in a third country and cannot obtain a passport” 
(ECRE, 2014, p. 18). However, in order to obtain a laissez-passer, 
Eritreans have to already be in a third country, which means that they 
have to escape the country in order to travel onwards. Legal exit is 
not possible as all exits are dependent on government authorisation 
and are generally not available to families of people who have fled the 
country, as they are seen as traitors and defectors and their families 
punished by association (see also, Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). 
Discretionary or unjustified practices  
While asylum seekers or refugees may seek international protection 
in the EU, their family members still in the country of origin (in war 
zones, camps or other unsafe environments) often experience great 
insecurity. Indeed, the members of a family may be “exposed to 
retaliation from the authorities as a consequence of the refugee’s 
flight” (ECRE, 2014, p. 21). According to the report by ECRE and 
the testimonies of respondents to this study, family separation 
exposes relatives, in particular children, women or the elderly people, 
to great vulnerability. This is exacerbated by the fact that embassies 
or consulates have full authority to accept or refuse an application for 
family reunification: “Through recent restrictions in legislation EU 
Member States have shifted the administrative burden of family 
reunification procedures to family members abroad” (ECRE, 2014, 
p. 21). 
 
This quotation highlights that embassies and consulates have become 
the main place for family reunification proceedings, where the 
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presence of family members is required. Interviews with the 
authorities concerning the private life of married or unmarried 
people, DNA tests and official registration are performed by the 
embassies, with varying degrees of appropriateness and respect for 
privacy, according to the testimonies of the respondents. It is 
important to stress that both the applicant in the host country and 
family members residing abroad have to deal with embassy related 
issues in the host and home countries. 
 
Many of our respondents mentioned the fear instilled in them by the 
local authorities, especially by the Eritrean forces, when they tried to 
go to another country’s embassy. Mebrahtu, recounted that the 
Eritrean security forces visited his wife after he had escaped from 
prison, to ask her about her husband’s intentions:  
 
During my escape from 2013–2015 we talked on the phone, but she didn’t tell me 
she was being persecuted. We didn’t talk about her escape because we feared the 
Eritrean security service. When I left, they asked her many times where I was. 
(Mebrahtu, interview with Hagenberg, face-to-face, Amsterdam, 9 
November 2018) 
 
Moreover, our research shows that the Eritrean document release 
process is not comparable with the administrative process of a 
European member state. Mebrahtu and Tedesse stated that many 
Eritreans do not possess a passport and that the process of obtaining 
one is difficult, as covered in the previous section. However, 
Mebrahtu received an identity document because he had a good 
relationship with his superior in the army, who helped him to get a 
clearance that he had completed National Service. This allowed him 
to get a privileged access to official documents: 
 
I was able to obtain a clearance that I did my duties well, so I had gotten an ID. 
[…] Not everybody has a marriage certificate from the municipality. If you have a 
clearance that you fulfil your duties, you get that document. (Mebrahtu, interview 




As part of family reunification, Mebrahtu was told that his wife, who 
was still in Eritrea, was asked by the Eritrean embassy to pay money 
and sign a regret form – admitting guilt and accepting punishment for 
him leaving Eritrea without completing the National Service – in 
order to obtain official documents from the state.  
 
As the DSP-Groep Amsterdam and Tilburg University specified in 
its report, family members who are seeking to leave the country must 
obtain an ID card. To that end, they need to pay the 2% tax set up by 
the regime, even if they have a passport issued by the host country. 
An ID card is, therefore, only available if nationals sign a regret form, 
otherwise, they will not have access to administrative, legal or 
consular services (Buysse et al., 2017). The report states that: 
 
The 2% Tax is collected as a critical part of a system of surveillance, with specific 
references to coercion in view of mental and social pressure, extortion, intimidation, 
fraud and/or blackmail. The specific organisation and modalities relate specifically 
to the diaspora, but also involves family members by association. (Buysse et al., 
2017, p. 11) 
 
Tedesse’s wife started the four-to-five-month long process for a 
passport at the Eritrean embassy in Khartoum, and finally received 
an Eritrean passport for herself and her son, which the embassy of 
Khartoum rejected at first (Tedesse, interview with Hagenberg, face-
to-face, Gent, Belgium, 17 November 2018). Yohannes, another 
refugee dwelling in Belgium, applied for family reunification with his 
wife who initially also resided in Sudan. They had lived together and 
had gotten married in Sudan. However, he stated it was not possible 
to register their marriage with the Sudanese authorities (Yohannes, 
interview with Hagenberg, face-to-face, Gent, Belgium, 17 
November 2018). 
Lack of alternatives to documentation 
As already stated, host countries and embassies sometimes have 
problems adapting to the documents issued by the home country. 
Moreover, host administrations do not always recognise official 
documents that are considered to be legitimised by state institutions 
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(such as the Church for instance). ECRE (2014) stresses that the 
family reunification process is frequently threatened: 
 
The documents required (birth, marriage or fostering certificates) might be impossible 
to get either because the administrations in countries of origin do not provide such 
documents or because of the impossibility to return or even contact the relevant 
administration for safety reasons. Although Article 11 of the Directive stresses that 
Member States have the obligation to take “other” evidence into account when 
applicants are unable to provide official documents, in practice there are few 
procedural safeguards to ensure applications are not rejected on the basis of an absence 
of official documentation. (ECRE, 2014, p. 23) 
 
Indeed, Article 11, paragraph 2 of the EU Directive on family 
reunification states that if: 
 
[...] a refugee cannot provide official documentary evidence of the family relationship, 
the Member States shall take into account other evidence, to be assessed in accordance 
with national law, of the existence of such relationship. A decision rejecting an 
application may not be based solely on the fact that documentary evidence is lacking. 
(Council of the European Union, 2003) 
 
In a 2014 communication from the European Commission and 
European Parliament, the discretion of member states was further 
clarified (European Commission, 2014). It stated that, although right 
to family reunification must be respected, the member states were 
granted a margin of appreciation when applying the rules in their own 
justice system. 
 
They may decide to extend the right to family reunification to family members other 
than the spouse and minor children. MSs [member states] may make the exercise of 
the right to family reunification subject to compliance with certain requirements if the 
Directive allows this. They retain a certain margin of appreciation to verify whether 
requirements determined by the Directive are met and for weighing the competing 
interests of the individual and the community as a whole […], in each factual 




This clearly shows that the acceptance and admissibility of 
documents, pieces of evidence – and, therefore, the launch of the 
procedure – depends on the goodwill of states and their 
administrations, especially in absence of official documents. 
According to the testimonies, it is clear that family reunification can 
be thwarted by the services of the host country. Original marriage 
certificates of the country of origin can be rejected or not recognised 
by EU member states, so that the sponsor and his/her spouse have 
no chance of having their case heard, despite other evidence proving 
a marital relationship.  
 
National authorities of host countries, such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands, seem to ignore the Directive’s criteria. Hence, this 
unawareness leads to ineptitude, which often leads to misconduct. 
Indeed, this study found that consular services may ask intrusive 
questions and for private information from the sponsors and their 
family members. For instance, about the couple’s life or information 
concerning biological or non-biological children can be required: 
 
Consulates and embassies may impose certain requirements on family members that 
are neither compatible with the Directive nor with their own national legislation. 
Practitioners report discrepancies and a lack of transparency in how embassies and 
consulates interpret and apply the rules for family reunification. They also point to 
misinformation and requests for documents which are not in fact necessary in the 
context of the family reunification procedure. This can lead to significant delays and 
additional costs for family members or even rejections. (ECRE, 2014, p. 22) 
 
A March 2019 preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice 
underlines that a rejection of a decision based on absence of official 
documentation is not in line with the Directive (European Court of 
Justice, 2019). In this decision, the Court ruled on the rejection of 
family reunification in the case of an Eritrean aunt and alleged 
guardian of a minor residing in a third country. The rejection of family 
reunification by the Netherlands was based on the absence of official 
documentation. However, the Court stated that the absence of 
official documentation cannot be the sole reason for rejection of the 
application, as was done in this case, “without taking into 
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consideration the specific circumstances of the sponsor and the 
minor and the particular difficulties they have encountered, according 
to their testimony, before and after fleeing their country of origin” 
(European Court of Justice, 2019). 
 
In the case of Yohannes, it is apparent that the Belgian authorities 
(e.g., the police) exceeded the limits of discretion, by asking him about 
his wife, his sex life and to provide photographs of his wedding, 
which he refused to do. He said that the police in Gent made him feel 
uncomfortable. According to his statement, the police were 
investigating whether his marriage was a marriage of convenience or 
not and ultimately denied his request for family reunification. The 
interviews conducted for this study show that this also happened to 
three other Eritrean refugees (Yohannes, interview with Hagenberg, 
face-to-face, Gent, 17 November 2018). 
 
In accordance with the testimonies of refugees, authorities and 
embassies from Belgium and the Netherlands did not support them 
and did not understand their situation sufficiently. Haile said:  
 
They didn’t understand me, otherwise it would not have taken such a long time. My 
daughter wasn’t safe while she was kidnapped. Nobody understood me except my 
Dutch friend. They asked for too many documents that were impossible for me to get. 
(Haile, interview with Hagenberg, face-to-face, Netherlands, 16 
November 2018) 
 
This process was also complicated for Tedesse, who needed to find a 
house in Belgium, without any support from the authorities and 
without any money. He complained that the embassy failed to 
provide him with proper information and did not respond to his calls 
under the pretext they were busy. In several cases the person on the 
phone did not speak English, but answered when someone translated 
his requests into Dutch (Tedesse, interview with Hagenberg, face-to-
face, Gent, Belgium, 17 November 2018). 
 
As for Yohannes, whose pictures with his wife were rejected by the 
Belgian authorities, his social worker in Belgium told him that the 
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final decision for family reunification was made by the embassy in 
Uganda, advising him to contact the embassy online. However, the 
embassy was unable to help him with the process and assigned the 
responsibility to Brussels:  
 
I don’t know who decides. I asked the Belgian embassy of Uganda for the decision. 
So I travelled to Uganda to the embassy to ask and they said the decision has actually 
come from Brussels, and I don’t know how. (Yohannes, interview with 
Hagenberg, face-to-face, Gent, 17 November 2018) 
 
Concerning Haile, as the kidnappers held his daughter captive in 
Sudan and asked for USD 5,000 in ransom. He went to the police 
station giving all the evidence he had (contact, telephone number and 
photos) (Stocker, 2018). However, the police did not take any action, 
indicating that they could not register a report or a complaint because 
the legislation only applies to the Netherlands territory and/or to 
Dutch citizens, although, articles 163 (6) and 165 (1) of the Dutch 
Criminal Code states that the police are obliged to receive the report 
or complaint. Moreover, although Sophia was in Sudan, her father 
was being extorted in the Netherlands. The criterion of territoriality 
was, therefore, met, but not applied in practice (Stocker, 2018). 
Conclusion 
Those who flee Eritrea, often do so in extremely difficult 
circumstances and without consideration of what they may need later 
on. As they flee, the first objective is to reach safety. It is sometimes 
only after a long and arduous journey across the Mediterranean Sea 
that the refugees decide (voluntarily or not) to seek asylum in Europe. 
It is only then that the refugees turn their mind to the family 
reunification process.  
 
Although the right to family reunification is available de jure, the lack 
of understanding of the process by refugees and the inflexibility of 
the systems for reunification to accommodate the realities that dictate 
what is possible for refugees, make it very difficult for Eritrean 
refugees to realise this right. Indeed, this research found many 
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obstacles to family reunification: lack of clear information on, and 
understanding of, the process; complex and onerous requirements; 
inability to collect documents; the absence of diplomatic relations and 
communication between host and home countries; and discretionary 
and unjustified practices by host and home country authorities. These 
obstacles highlight the direct and indirect impact of state and 
government policies on refugees and their families. For the 
researchers, who are not legal experts, the requirements and 
procedures are often confusing. Refugees who come from traumatic 
situations and who do not speak the language, however, are expected 
to quickly understand what steps they need to take. This illustrates 
that successfully completing the process of family reunification is 
highly dependent on support available from lawyers, case workers and 
NGOs. This adds a strong element of arbitrariness to the process and 
undermines the sense of justice. The case of Haile and Sophia 
illustrates that the procedures may be inadequate for individual cases, 
which can cause such cases to become time-consuming processes 
involving multiple experts, support staff, and other individuals in the 
legal and diplomatic procedures. The rigid regulations, therefore, do 
not help to improve the legal processes, but undermine them. This is 
detrimental to the right of family unity. 
 
This regrettable state of affairs is not without consequence. This study 
confirms findings by Berends (2019) that family fragmentation causes 
stress and frustrates integration. This study found that the 
complications around family reunification further compound the 
stress of refugees. There is also reason for considerable concern that 
the requirements set by authorities are causing the relatives of 
refugees to undertake dangerous journeys, including crossings 
borders illegally, making payments for unobtainable documents and 
other actions, such as the signing of the regret form and payment of 
the 2% tax to seek the help of the Eritrean embassy to provide 
required documents. 
 
Improving access to, and communication with, the embassies of EU 
member states is vital and remains an essential point of reform. At 
the same time, EU member state authorities should provide 
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institutional support to refugees whose family members are at risk 
abroad. Access to the judicial system, as well as a psychological help, 
should be provided for refugees. The cooperation of the authorities 
with applicants for family reunification would facilitate understanding 
of the process and could prevent abuse and indifference on the part 
of reception services. 
 
Considering the cultural, political and bureaucratic contrast between 
‘here’ and ‘there’, it is clear that an inter-state homogenisation of 
procedures is impossible. However, immigration authorities should 
accept alternative forms of identification (such as Catholic or 
Orthodox baptismal certificates), as originally provided for in the 
2003 Directive, free of charge, or at least at a lower cost, given that 
the cost of travel (i.e., airfare, passport and visa) is very high for a 
refugee and their family members and refer to available in-depth 
written knowledge of legal procedures and customary law, such as for 
instance documented by Hagos (2014). Also, a reassessment of the 
information systems and pressure tactics used by the police or law 
enforcement agencies is recommended, in order to avoid situations 
that are particularly humiliating and degrading for applicants and their 
families. It is important not to confuse decency (i.e., defending 
privacy) with opposition and resistance to the authorities, meaning 
that a refugee's silence does not necessarily mean that he/she is 
unwilling to comply with requirements for family reunification. 
Instead, questions should be limited to non-invasive questions in 
order to ensure that the refugee's right to privacy and family life is 
respected.  
 
Finally, the legal and legislative framework for family reunification, as 
laid down in European law, should also be reviewed. In practice, the 
right to family unity is far from protected. As the European law on 
the issue is a Directive, member states are free to adapt and 
implement the objectives set out. Thus, member states have a 
considerable margin of discretion on certain essential provisions of 
the Directive, allowing them to interpret the conditions and 
implementation of family reunification as they see fit. Our research 
indicates that this discretion has been consistently used to establish 
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more restrictive conditions. In 2014, the implementation and 
harmonisation of the Directive was the subject of a specific 
communication from the Commission European Commission 
(Commission European Commission, 2014) and the recent ruling by 
the European Court of Justice (2019) illustrates that countries are 
obliged to rely on more than just official documents. But despite these 
efforts, the protection of the right to family unity is far from being 
coordinated between EU member states. The reform of the Directive, 
the removal of administrative obstacles, the curtailing of abuse of 
power by executive services, and the easing of conflicting relations 
between the administration and services from one country to another 
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The Representation of Human Trafficking in 
Documentaries: Vulnerable Victims 




“The victims of Sinai trafficking were men and women of all ages, including young 
children, babies (some born in captivity), and the elderly.” 
Van Reisen, Gerrima, Ghilazghy, Rijken, & Van Stam, 2017, p. 147 
Introduction 
This chapter investigates the contemporary framing of human 
trafficking by comparing five documentaries on the topic. The 
documentaries focus on 
trafficking from the Horn of 
Africa and portray the causes 
and outcomes of human 
trafficking, as well as the 
onward path of its survivors. 
By comparing the 
documentaries, this chapter 
aims to identify the different 
ways in which the problem of 
human trafficking is 
perceived and presented. 
This is highly relevant as the 
framing of the problem 
influences the emergence of 
possible solutions: “By 
rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to 
organize experience and guide action, whether individual or 
collective” (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 464). If 
many different frames exist, the understanding of a problem also 
varies and divergent views on a problem do not facilitate an easy 
How the problem of human trafficking 
for ransom is framed shapes how people 
and policymakers react to the issue, 
thereby impacting on the solutions 
employed. By looking at the framing of 
human trafficking for ransom in 
documentary films, this study found that 
there is no connected framing of the 
problem, making it difficult to put it on 
the policy making agenda in a 
consolidated way. A unified framing may 
facilitate the emergence of more successful 
policies to address the issue. 
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policy response. In such circumstances, it is difficult for public 
campaigns to have an impact on policymakers and politicians towards 
addressing the problem.  
 
The documentaries selected for this study deal with human trafficking 
from Eritrea and are made by documentary film makers from Israel, 
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. The interest of 
documentary film makers in human trafficking from Eritrea can be 
explained by the magnitude of the problem, both in terms of the 
number of victims from Eritrea in absolute terms and per capita 
(despite the small population of Eritrea) and the violence perpetrated 
against the victims. The oppressive conditions in Eritrea have caused 
an average of 5,000 refugees a month to flee the country over the last 
decade: 
 
Human rights organisations have increasingly pointed to the forced military 
conscription in Eritrea combined with severe conditions with regards to rule of law, 
human rights and governance as well as the lack of economic opportunities, rampant 
poverty and lack of freedom as a lethal cocktail which produces vast numbers of 
refugees. (Van Reisen & Rijken, 2014, p. 115) 
 
Many Eritreans have tried to escape to neighbouring countries, or 
even make their way to Europe, despite the risks: “If people flee 
Eritrea, they are likely to end up in refugee camps in neighbouring 
countries where they run the risk of being kidnapped, recruited or 
lured by smugglers or traffickers” (Van Reisen & Rijken, 2014, p. 
121). New forms of human trafficking have emerged, such as Sinai 
trafficking, also known as human trafficking for ransom, capitalising 
on the exodus of vulnerable Eritreans (Van Reisen & Rijken, 2014). 
Human trafficking for ransom involves the victims being held under 
inhumane conditions, tortured, raped, and even killed in order to 
extract a ransom from their relatives or friends, using mobile phones 
to show the victim being tortured (Van Reisen & Rijken, 2014, p. 
115). There is no legal divergence regarding the view that these 
constitute criminal acts. Yet, if there is such clarity regarding the 
illegality of the practice, why has this form of human trafficking not 
been rooted out? 
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As human trafficking for ransom is a relatively new phenomenon, 
which emerged only in 2009 (Van Reisen & Rijken, 2014, p. 113), it 
is understandable that many aspects of it still need to be identified 
and described. However, the diverse perceptions of it make finding a 
solution to the problem difficult. There is no clear solution or policy 
in place that would address the issue effectively and at the one time. 
Thus, the main research question asked in this chapter is: How is the 
problem of human trafficking for ransom framed in documentaries and how does 
this framing affect how we react to the problem? To answer this question, it 
looks at: how refugees are portrayed, how human traffickers and 
smugglers are portrayed, the genderised representation of victims of 
human trafficking, the representation of the trauma suffered by the 
victims of human trafficking and what agency is awarded to the actors 
in the context of human trafficking. 
 
The next section describes the methodology used for this 
comparative study, followed by the theoretical framework, which 
describes the concepts used to analyse the framing of human 
trafficking in the different documentaries. A detailed description of 
the five documentaries is then presented, followed by the findings 
(each section addressing one sub-question). Finally, a brief conclusion 
is presented. 
Methodology 
This chapter uses documentary analysis to investigate the framing of 
human trafficking. Documentaries are a great source of information 
on the topic for a number of reasons. First, documentaries collect 
expert opinions in the field. Some of the documentaries analysed in 
this chapter contain interviews with researchers, policymakers, and 
authorities, who share their first-hand experiences with the victims 
and perpetrators of human trafficking. Second, documentaries show 
real footage from the problematic setting, such as interviews with the 
survivors of human trafficking and footage of the phone calls made 
while the victims were being tortured to extract ransom. Thus, it 
makes them a highly credible and transparent source of information. 
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Finally, before the documentary is filmed, a lot of preparatory 
research takes place, which makes the information rich and valuable.  
 
The research was organised in five steps. The first step, was to 
conduct a literature review on the topic of human trafficking for 
ransom and the divergent problem frames used to explain it. The 
dominant themes of problem-sets running through the literature were 
identified. The second step was to select documentaries for analysis 
that focused on aspects of human trafficking for ransom. The 
documentaries selected have in common that they highlight this 
modus operandi in relation to mainly Eritrean refugees. Thirdly, the 
documentaries were each analysed based on five key areas of 
representation (the portrayal of the victims, the portrayal of 
traffickers and smugglers, the genderisation of victimhood, the 
representation of trauma and the representation of agency). The 
fourth step was to interview the film makers of the documentaries 
The Gatekeepers of Europe and The Hunt for the ‘General’ (Christian Jacob 
and Ali Fegan), as well as key persons appearing in the documentaries 
(Selam Kidane, Meron Estefanos and Mirjam Van Reisen). The 
interviews allowed verification of the content and background of the 
documentaries and revealed how the documentaries were produced. 
In the interviews, the resource persons explained the background to 
the documentaries and the motivation for the questions raised. Their 
perspectives gave a deeper understanding of the overall situation of 
human trafficking in Africa and the role of the European Union (EU) 
in border control. Finally, the fifth step was to compare the 
documentaries based on the problem frames identified in step two. 
Because of the nature of this research, making a comparison was 
necessary to identify the different problem frames emerging in the 
documentaries. 
Theoretical framework 
The representation of the victims and perpetrators of human 
trafficking is an important element in the framing of trafficking as a 
problem and ties in with the assignment of agency. This 
representation informs the policy agenda: “Media representations 
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inform public and practitioners as to the nature of HT [human 
trafficking]: they are seen and referenced by policymakers and 
therefore shape discourse on HT” (Gregoriou & Ras, 2018b, p. 3). 
Accordingly, this section looks at the various concepts that relate to 
the framing of human trafficking, its victims, survivors and 
perpetrators. 
Frame  
The term ‘frame’ (and framework) is borrowed from Goffman (1974, 
p. 21) and refers to a "schemata of interpretation" that enables 
individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within 
their life space and the world at large” (Snow et al., 1986, p. 464). One 
possible explanation for the different representations of a topic is the 
different kinds of framing of the topic that might take place. There 
are a number of tools that can be used to reconcile these framings. 
For example, frame bridging links “two or more ideologically 
congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular 
issue or problem” (Snow et al., 1986, p. 467) and frame extension is 
where a frame is extended “beyond its primary interests to include 
issues and concerns that are presumed to be of importance to 
potential adherents” (Snow et al., 1986, p. 625). Both of these tools 
help to describe the topic better and allow the connection of layered 
topics under one overarching theme.  
Problem definition 
The frame through which a topic is seen influences how a problem is 
defined. And, problem definition is an important part of shaping the 
agenda in public policy. In this case, how migrants and refugees are 
seen (framed) governs public policy on the issue (facilitating refugees 
to apply for asylum versus the introduction of border controls to stem 
the flow of ‘illegal’ migrants). Put simplistically, “public policy making 
can be considered to be a set of processes, including at least: 1) the 
setting of the agenda, 2) the specification of alternatives from which 
a choice is to be made, 3) an authoritative choice among those 
specified alternatives, as in a legislative vote or a presidential decision, 
and 4) the implementation of the decision” (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 2–
3). The agenda itself is “the list of subjects or problems to which 
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governmental officials, and people outside of government closely 
associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at 
any given time” (Kingdon, 2014, p.3). Agenda-setting is a process that 
starts with the definition of a problem, which is influenced by how 
the problem is framed. 
Push and pull theory 
A leading framework for defining the problem of human trafficking 
(and migration) is the ‘push-pull’ theory. This is the “intuitive and 
empirically grounded idea that structural forces shape migration 
processes” (Van Hear, Bakewell & Long, 2018, p. 928). In other 
words, it is the idea that people are ‘pushed’ out of their country of 
origin by things like conflict and poverty and ‘pulled’ towards the 
country of destination by economic opportunities and a better 
standard of living. Because “Twenty-five years ago, labor migration 
was a major component of immigration flows to industrial nations” 
(Boyd, 1989. p. 638), it is still believed that refugees are attracted to 
places of economic growth from disadvantaged zones. This view is, 
however, oversimplified. It ignores the much more complex socio-
cultural circumstances that motivate migration: “We see drivers as 
structural elements that enable and constrain the exercise of agency 
by social actors” (Van Hear et al., 2018, p. 1). Stereotypically, the ‘grass 
is greener’ and people are in search of better lives, as described by the 
push-pull theory of migration. This provides a dominant framing of 
the problem. But there are doubts as to whether the theory is relevant 
for understanding migration-related phenomena such as human 
trafficking (Kidane & Stokmans, 2018).  
Human trafficking and smuggling 
Human trafficking is “a crime against an individual and can be 
intranational” (Gregoriou & Ras, 2018b, p. 4); it can lead to 
prostitution, forced labour, slavery, organ removal and more. 
Smuggling, on the other hand, is a transportation-based crime 
“against the state and is, necessarily, transnational” (Gregoriou & Ras, 
2018b, p. 4). Human trafficking is based on exploitation, in which the 
victim has no consent. Smuggling is the facilitation and transportation 
of people abroad and is considered a violation of the laws of the state.  
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While the difference between human trafficking and smuggling in 
international law is clear, the reality may not always be so clear-cut 
(Gregoriou & Ras, 2018b, p. 4). Smuggling often leads to trafficking 
and victims can sometimes start out paying people who they think are 
smugglers to transport them across borders to only find out that they 
are traffickers, or linked to traffickers, who then exploit them or hold 
them for ransom (Van Reisen et al., 2017). Moreover, Gregoriou and 
Ras emphasise that the representation of human trafficking and 
smuggling often lacks clarity: “The difficulty in representing human 
trafficking accurately is illustrated by the misuse of labels such as 
‘trafficking’ and ‘smuggling’” (Gregoriou & Ras, 2018b, p. 4). They 
argue that victimhood is a key aspect of the representation of human 
trafficking: “victims are presented as having little agency” (Gregoriou 
& Ras, 2018a, p. 47). These authors go on to state that:  
 
Previous research on the representations of human trafficking shows that these 
narratives are often overly focused on only one form of human trafficking and one 
particular type of victim, with the highly damaging effect of ignoring or even 
criminalising (other) victims of other types of human trafficking. (Gregoriou & 
Ras, 2018b, p. 3) 
 
This raises an important question: “Are human smugglers inspired by 
anything other than greed and disregard for human life?” (Achilli, 
2018, p. 77). In most cases, “Contemporary mainstream narratives of 
migration tell us that smugglers are the most immoral people of our 
time, and that smuggling networks are mafia-like cartels of hardened 
and greedy criminals dedicated to the systematic deceiving and 
conning of migrants” (Achilli, 2018, p. 77). However, according to 
Gregoriou and Ras, this picture of smugglers is one dimensional, 
concealing a deeper understanding of the problem of human 
trafficking. In reality, the situation is more complex. Although, 
“Human smugglers certainly are responsible for many tragedies that 
we have witnessed in the Mediterranean and elsewhere” (Achilli, 
2018, p. 78), this can also be explained by the unstable situation in the 
host country. In addition, “for migrants, smugglers constitute a 
valuable resource, one that allows them to escape misery and extreme 
danger” (Achilli, 2018, p. 89).  
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Genderised victims and perpetrators 
In most cases, the victims of human trafficking are assumed to be 
women: “The stereotypical global victim of trafficking is a “young, 
naive woman who seeks a better life [...] then ends up a sex slave’’ 
(Gregoriou & Ras, 2018b, p. 6). As a result, these authors argue that 
“Human trafficking victims are idealised, with those not according to 
this ideal being criminalised” (Gregoriou & Ras, 2018b, p. 2). This 
creates a gender bias: “Men are seldom considered as victims, 
meaning that male victims are generally overlooked” (Gregoriou & 
Ras, 2018b, p. 7). This leads to a distorted understanding of human 
trafficking and, as argued by Gregoriou and Ras, “a particular version 
of the human trafficking story has become the new normal” (2018b, 
p. 4). The presentation of perpetrators is also genderised: “The 
trafficker […] is painted as ‘big and bad’, a shadowy, mysterious, 
powerful figure, often male” (Gregoriou & Ras, 2018b, p. 7). The 
great problem of genderised victimhood is that: “Male irregular 
migrants are generally presumed smuggled, thus presumed as having 
consented to their movement, whereas female irregular migrants are 
generally presumed trafficked, as not having consented to 
movement” (Gregoriou & Ras, 2018b, p. 5). This has a huge impact 
on the lives of victims. “As a result, the (male) smuggled migrant is 
criminalised, whilst the (female) trafficked migrant is assigned victim-
status” (Gregoriou & Ras, 2018b, p. 5).  
Trauma 
In the context of human trafficking, trauma comes up as an important 
issue that impacts on how problems are perceived (Kidane & Van 
Reisen, 2017, p. 317). Trauma is an emerging theme in scholarly 
approaches to human trafficking: “The impact [of trauma] on 
individual victims is catastrophic and particularly worrying given the 
limited opportunities for therapeutic intervention to allow victims to 
heal from their experiences” (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017, p. 317). 
Trauma is relevant to how problems are perceived by those who 
suffer from trauma. The research shows that “people attend to their 
momentary feelings as a source of information in forming 
judgements, essentially asking themselves, ‘How do I feel about 
this?’” (Schwarz, 2010, p. 290). The feelings-as-information theory 
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“provides a general framework for conceptualizing the role of these 
experiences in human judgement” (Schwarz, 2010, p. 289). 
 
Trauma is not only defined as individual trauma, but also as collective 
trauma, which can be understood as “when people who have a sense 
of belonging to one another feel that they have been subjected to 
fearful and painful events that have left a mark on their collective 
consciousness and memory” (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017, p. 318). 
Thus, the circle of people who are traumatised by critical situations 
increases and involves those who somehow participate in or hear 
about the unfortunate events. “It is argued that such events do not 
just affect individuals and their respective families, but whole 
communities, [...] society, [...] and even […] culture” (Kidane & Van 
Reisen, 2017, p. 317). Secondary trauma “occurs indirectly and is 
defined as: “Learning about unexpected or violent death, serious 
harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or 
other close associate” (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017, p. 320).  
 
The experience of trauma by all those involved in human trafficking 
related experiences and its meaning is difficult to represent and often 
does not receive adequate attention. Kidane (2018) argues that trauma 
should receive more attention as a problem: “It is important that 
refugee policy and practice developments make serious 
considerations of the impact of trauma on refugees and address these 
in order to provide better support and protection for refugees at the 
earliest possible opportunity”. 
Agency  
The representation of agency in victims, survivors and other actors in 
the context of human trafficking gives us an understanding of the 
nature of the involvement of actors in human trafficking. Agency is 
generally understood as “acts done intentionally” (Bandura, 2001). 
“Agency embodies the endowments, belief systems, self-regulatory 
capabilities and distributed structures and functions through which 
personal influence [is] exercised, rather than residing as a discrete 
entity in a particular place” (Bandura, 2001, p. 1). Thus, agency ties in 
with all the other concepts through which human trafficking is 
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framed as a problem and affects the representation of refugees, 
perpetrators, victims and their trauma. This is important because 
“The core features of agency enable people to play a part in their self-
development, adaptation, and self-renewal with changing times” 
(Bandura, 2001, p. 1). 
Five documentaries  
This section provides a short description of the five documentaries 
analysed in this chapter: It Will be Chaos (Luciano & Piscopo, 2018), 
which highlights the chaotic, dangerous and unstructured path that 
refugees and migrants take from Africa to Europe, the Sound of Torture 
(Shayo, Trabelsi & Cahlon, 2013), which shows how mobile phones 
are used to extract ransom from relatives of trafficking victims while 
they are being tortured, Under the Skin (Deloget & Allegra, 2015), 
which focuses on Sinai human trafficking and the trauma experienced 
by survivors, The Gatekeepers of Europe (Schäfer, Schlindwein, Jakob, 
& ARTE/ZDF, 2018), which explains the political participation of 
Europe in the crisis, and The Hunt for the General (Fegan, 2018), which 
looks at the investigation around the smuggler ‘the General’ and how 
the wrong man was accused.  
It Will be Chaos (2018)  
It Will be Chaos (Luciano & Piscopo, 2018) is a 93 minute German 
HBO documentary that follows a refugee from Eritrea and a Syrian 
refugee family on their journey to Europe. The documentary opens 
with the shocking image of the arrival of over three-hundred coffins 
in Lampedusa in 2013 carrying the corpses of the refugees who did 
not survive the journey. Directed by Lorena Luciano and Filippo 
Piscopo, the documentary follows the dangerous journey of the 
refugees. Through two life stories, viewers are shown the difficulties 
and dangerous situations the refugees have to overcome to reach a 
place of safety. The title It Will be Chaos describes the complicated and 
unorganised journey the migrants undertake on their way to Europe.  
Sound of Torture (2013) 
This documentary was produced in Israel in 2013 and directed by 
Keren Shayo (Shayo et al., 2013). It introduces a new form of human 
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trafficking for ransom that emerged in around 2009 and involved 
entire Eritrean families at home and in the diaspora. The name of the 
documentary gives the viewer a hint of what is going to be shown. 
The documentary opens with the actual sounds of torture, 
communicated by mobile phone. It shows the footage of the phone 
call between a relative and one of the victims to extract ransom. The 
film highlights the desperation of the situation and the horrific torture 
that the victims are subjected to. During the film, the viewers get to 
know the relatives of the victims of human trafficking, who feel 
powerless and desperate as they try to free their loved ones. The 
documentary follows Meron Estefanos, Swedish-Eritrean radio 
journalist and human rights activist, in her quest to help the victims 
of human trafficking.  
Under the Skin (2014) 
Under the Skin (Deloget & Allegra, 2015) is a documentary produced 
by French film makers Cécile Allegra and Delphine Deloget. It shows 
the consequences of human trafficking through the eyes of the 
survivors. Young men share their touching life stories, as well as what 
happened to them when they were captured by the traffickers. 
Through multiple interviews all around the world, starting in Sweden 
and ending in Egypt, the reality of being trafficked is revealed. The 
documentary starts by showing the scars of one of the survivors. The 
name of the documentary, Under the Skin, refers to the trauma that 
they carry under the skin in addition to their visible scars.  
The Gatekeepers of Europe (2018) 
The documentary The Gatekeepers of Europe (Schäfer et al., 2018) is 
produced by Franco-German free-to-air television network ARTE 
and German public-service television broadcaster Zweites Deutsches 
Fernsehen (ZDF). It deals with the border control policies of the 
African Union and the role of Europe in their facilitation and 
financial support. It represents the migration problem from a political 
perspective, as the result of the cooperation by two powerful actors. 
It shows how people become victims of this uneasy system. 
Describing the situation in detail, the producers clarify the political 
context as well as technological aspects, such as the development of 
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advanced devices to decrease and even stop migration flows. The 
territory surrounding the borders is physically impossible to secure 
with foot patrols. Thus, they do so using movement detectors in the 
most hard to reach areas, to supplement patrols by the border 
officials.  
The Hunt for the General (2016) 
This documentary The Hunt for the General (Fegan, 2018) is produced 
in Sweden and shows the prosecution of human trafficking. What 
happens when, in the search for the trafficking leaders, the wrong 
people are arrested and judged? The documentary presents the case 
of the arrest of one of the ‘boss’ smugglers, who was believed to have 
transported thousands of people to Europe. After a long and huge 
public celebration by the media and law enforcement bodies, it was 
claimed by the Eritrean community that they had arrested the wrong 
person. The narrative explains the identity mistake which led to the 
wrongful arrest of 29-year old Medhanie Tesfamariam Behre, who 
was mistaken for the real human trafficker, Medhanie Yehdego 
Mered, also known as ‘the General’. The Italian court has still not 
recognised this mistake and has kept what seems like the wrong man 
in prison since 2016, despite convincing evidence of his innocence. 
Portrayal of refugees  
The terminology used to define refugees and migrants is important in 
the way they are perceived and treated. Basically, they can be 
described as refugees entitled to protection under the Geneva 
Convention, or treated as economic migrants who have entered 
Europe illegally in search of a better standard of living. What they are 
called affects how they are perceived and treated, including their 






Figure 17.1. Mayor of Lampedusa defending the need for clarity of terminology when 
referring to refugees and migrants in ‘It Will be Chaos’  
Source: Luciano & Piscopo (2018) 
 
Two of the documentaries studied raise the definition of refugees 
explicitly (see Table 17.1). It Will be Chaos (Luciano & Piscopo, 2018) 
has two primary narratives. One of them tells the story of an Eritrean 
refugee called Aregai. After fleeing Eritrea, undergoing various 
hardships in his journey across the African continent, he nearly dies 
at sea trying to reach Europe via the Italian city of Lampedusa. The 
same chaotic lack of structure follows the Syrian family on their way 
from Turkey to Germany (Luciano & Piscopo, 17:45). Wael, the 
father of the family, tries to contact a smuggler, as it is the only option 
left to him and his family to cross the sea. But even when he does, he 
ends up putting his family and himself at risk. Both cases show us the 
chaotic situation in which the refugees find themselves. Refugees 
fleeing war and oppression are often driven towards illegal status as 
they seek international protection, finding themselves labelled ‘illegals 
migrants’. Table 17.1 shows which of the five films analysed in this 





Table 17.1. Documentaries dealing with the portrayal of refugees 
 
The representation of refugees and migrants takes place on multiple 
levels. In the documentary It Will be Chaos, the audience sees the 
chaotic system, which, instead of helping refugees, puts them in 
danger. The refugees face contradicting policies and demands 
wherever they are. Moreover, the documentary shows the refugees in 
Europe living in terrible poverty, dealing with asylum rejections, 
facing anti-refugee rhetoric and unwelcoming populations, and living 
in chaos and uncertainty, all the while dealing with the aftermath of 
trauma. All of this highlights the fact that the idea of ‘push-pull’ does 
not adequately explain the situation. 
 
This brings us to another problem, the differentiated nature of 
responses among the population in the countries through which the 
refugees travel, some of which believe that all newcomers are ‘illegal 
migrants’. In the documentary, we see people voice negative reactions 
and even stage protests against the refugees on behalf of a political 
candidate, who uses it as a chance to push his agenda. In some cases, 
refugees take action to voice their complaints in a forceful way. The 
documentary shows how, after being held in inhumane conditions in 
refugee camps for months, the refugees are tired and desperate to be 
heard. This is one more aspect of the chaos: trying to get a little 
attention, after you have lost everything.  
 
The documentary shows the chaos surrounding the transportation of 
the migrants to Europe. Because of the complexity of the legal 
mechanism for entering Europe, refugees have to look for indirect 
and unofficial ways to reach Europe. This puts their lives in danger. 
The Syrian family has to search for life jackets and they barely make 
Documentary Representation of refugees 
It Will be Chaos x 
Sound of Torture 
 
Under the Skin x 
The Gatekeepers of Europe 
 




it to the coast of Greece. Aregai loses two of his best friends and 
nearly his own life on the boat to Lampedusa. Once he arrives, he is 
arrested and accused of entering Italy illegally. He is treated as a 
criminal and implicated in a court case. The film shows him traveling 
on a bus with nine refugees escorted by eight policemen, with 
multiple cars to control them. One of the refugees in the documentary 
says: “We can’t understand if we are prisoners or refugees” (Luciano 
& Piscopo, 2018, 1:14:55). To avoid complications with the law in 
Italy, Aregai is pushed into making a fake ID to go to Sweden 
(Luciano & Piscopo, 1:17:09). On arrival in Europe, he receives no 
support. 
 
The documentary Under the Skin (Deloget & Allegra, 2015) makes the 
audience aware of the problem of human trafficking. It sheds light on 
the plight of its victims. The documentary shows the implications of 
the different policies on migration and how the victims of trafficking 
are received in various countries. Many refugees mention problems 
with applying for residence permits and documents. Refugees are 
generally not provided with enough social support, after everything 
they have been through in search of protection. Many refugees suffer 
from mental health problems, such as post-traumatic stress and 
depression.  
 
In order to apply for legal status, the survivors of human trafficking 
are required to tell their stories to the officials, who often do not belief 
them. In a moving shot, the documentary shows how the refugees are 
urged to show their skin as evidence of what they have been through. 
Even though they are not called ‘illegals’ in the film, we can see that 
the tension between the refugees and officials in Europe is intense.  
Portrayal of human traffickers and smugglers 
Almost every documentary mentions the role of human traffickers 
and smugglers in controlling the movement of refugees. Table 17.2 





Table 17.2. Documentaries dealing with the portrayal of human trafficking/smuggling 
 
Documentary Representation of human 
trafficking/smuggling 
It Will be Chaos x 
Sound of Torture x 
Under the Skin x 
The Gatekeepers of Europe x 
The Hunt for the General x 
 
In It Will be Chaos (Luciano & Piscopo, 2018), Wael, the father of the 
Syrian family, tries to contact a smuggler to help his family move from 
Turkey to Greece. After being scared off by police the first time, they 
try to repeat their escape the next day. As well as showing that 
smuggling is illegal, the film highlights the fact that the smuggler does 
not give any guarantees to the people who use his services. Wael and 
his family buy their own life vests before the journey. The viewers do 
not see the smugglers in the documentary. They are portrayed as 
mysterious people who only contact their clients by mobile phone. 
 
The documentary Sound of Torture (Shayo et al., 2013) deals with human 
traffickers. They are blamed for the situation of the victims. It is 
implied that the traffickers are men. They are described as hot-
tempered, cold-hearted, brutal and violent people, who harm their 
victims and demand ransom. They are also portrayed as mysterious, 
as no one can reach them in the documentary.  
  
In the documentary Under the Skin (Deloget & Allegra, 2015), the 
producers manage to get close to the Sinai traffickers. They interview 
one trafficker who explains his decisions in relation to the hostages 
in terms of agency. He talks about the economic side of the issue and 
how he decides to hire guards and allows them to ‘put pressure’ on a 
few people from the group. By showing the trafficker, the 
documentary challenges how they are usually portrayed. The 
trafficker is no longer a shady and mysterious figure with 
unimaginable power. This removes the cinematic rush around his 
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persona. On the contrary, the trafficker is portrayed as a simple man. 
He talks about his wife leaving him and explains that he is involved 
in trafficking to earn money in his economically-challenged country.  
 
Even though the person being interviewed gives a fake name, Abu 
Abdullah, and does not show his face, it is plain to see that he is just 
a simple man. He sits on the couch and talks about his hard life in the 
country and his wife, just like anyone else. The producers, thus, 
challenge the stereotypical norms used when portraying traffickers 
and they do so in the most truthful way possible, showing the reality 
of the situation.  
 
The film The Gatekeepers of Europe (Schäfer et al., 2018) looks at 
migration from a political perspective. The documentary shows in 
detail the EU’s external border management measures. It shows how 
many of the measures used to stem the flow of migrants are 
ineffective, despite the large amounts of money invested in these 
measures, as migration is caused by a “variety of factors, including 
deepening poverty, deteriorating living conditions, persistent 
unemployment, conflicts, human deprivation, and hopelessness 
[which have] fostered the environment for human trafficking to 
flourish in the region” (Adepoju, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 17.2. Border control in ‘The Gatekeepers of Europe’  
Source: Schäfer et al. (2018) 
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The Gatekeepers of Europe describes the political system from within. 
With the help of careful journalistic investigation, the migration issue 
is clarified for the viewers from a broad political perspective. 
According to the documentary, while the rhetoric of politicians 
sounds positive towards refugees, the reality is that billions of euros 
are being spent to prevent African refugees from entering Europe. 
The documentary tries to show how this situation provokes the 
development of and demand for illegal ways to cross borders. 
 
The documentary The Hunt for the General (Fegan, 2018) deals with the 
smuggling of migrants and refugees to Europe. It shows how the 
authorities arrested a man suspected of smuggling thousands of 
people to Europe, but that the evidence suggests that they arrested 
the wrong man, a refugee. The injustice of the refugee being tried for 
smuggling highlights the vulnerability of refugees in the judicial 
system in Europe. The documentary also sheds light on another 
element. The actual smuggler, ‘the General’, does not perceive 




Figure 17.3. Photographs of the suspect (left) and the real ‘General’ (right), in the 
documentary ‘The Hunt for the General’ 
Source: Fegan (2018) 
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The documentary shows the point of view of the smuggler. It also 
gives viewers a perspective on the scale of the crimes involved in 
transporting people from Africa to Europe. What is also highlighted 
in the film is the way that countries in the EU cooperate to fight 
smuggling in the region, resulting in the criminalisation of refugees. 
Genderisation of victimhood 
In relation to the genderisation of victimhood, two documentaries 
deal with the issue, both with different attitudes towards victimhood: 
Sound of Torture (Shayo et al., 2013) and Under the Skin (Deloget & 
Allegra, 2015). The documentary Sound of Torture reinforces the 
traditional image of victims as women, someone’s sisters or wives, 
who need to be taken care of. The film emphasises the fact that some 
of the women are pregnant, which plays on the viewers’ sympathy, as 
well as highlighting the victims’ vulnerability. Moreover, the victims 
are almost entirely absent from the documentary and only appear as 
mysterious people in the background of those trying to save them. As 
a result they are not shown with any agentic capacity. The film focuses 
on how the victims are kept and treated. It highlights the conditions 
in which the hostages are kept and how the ransom is extracted. Table 
17.3 shows which films deal with the portrayal of victims. 
 
Table 17.3. Documentaries dealing with the portrayal of victimhood 
 
Documentary Representation of victimhood  
It Will be Chaos  
 
Sound of Torture x 
Under the Skin x 
The Gatekeepers of Europe 
 
The Hunt for the General 
 
 
On the other hand, although Under the Skin also focuses on 
victimhood, it does not contain a strong gender bias. It shows 
predominantly male victims as survivors with agency. What is 
important about this documentary is that it challenges the 
stereotypical image of victims and traffickers in the media. It shows 
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that most hostages in the Sinai are male. And, most importantly, they 
have something to say about their days in the Sinai. Men do suffer 
from human trafficking and their stories deserve to be heard. They 
also have wounds and scars on their bodies. Men face specific types 
of torturing, such as ones involving the genitals (Deloget & Allegra, 
2015, 25:15). As Filmon says in the film, “What you went through 
will stay under your skin”. In the film, people call themselves 
‘survivors’. They show their wounds and they describe the torture 
they experienced in precise detail. The survivors are happy to be alive 
and ready to share their experiences. The agency of the survivors is 
apparent as they share their difficult life journeys with the audience. 
Trauma 
Three of the documentaries focus on trauma: It Will be Chaos (Luciano 
& Piscopo, 2018), Sound of Torture (Shayo et al., 2013), and Under the 
Skin (Deloget & Allegra, 2015). In these films, the viewer is 
introduced to the traumatic situations of the victims of human 
trafficking, but also their relatives and others who happen to become 
involved in the situation. Table 17.4 shows which films deal with the 
representation of trauma. 
  
Table 17.4. Documentaries dealing with the portrayal trauma 
 
Documentary Representation of trauma  
It Will be Chaos  x 
Sound of Torture x 
Under the Skin x 
The Gatekeepers of Europe 
 
The Hunt for the General 
 
 
It Will be Chaos shows the poor mental health of the father of the 
Syrian family, Wael, due to trauma. It is said that he does not interact 
with others much and suffers from depression (Luciano & Piscopo, 
2018, 1:30:05). This is a problem for many refugees, but it is not 
spoken about in broader society. Wael sees his house completely 
destroyed and shoulders the huge responsibility of taking care of five 
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people and himself on the way to another country. His wife says that 
the only way not to have a breakdown is to treat the situation with 
humour. In the film it is shown how Wael suffers from stress. Mental 
health support is not available in such cases. However, even if it was, 
we might still ask the question: is it possible to fully recover from 
what you have seen?  
 
This leads us to another aspect of trauma. Trauma not only concerns 
the lives of those who experience it directly, but also those around 
them. The film shows the situation of one of the sailors who helped 
rescue some of the refugees in the Lampedusa tragedy (Luciano & 
Piscopo, 2018, 12:24), who describes the trauma he experienced. 
Secondary trauma is also supported by technology such as mobile 
phones (which are used to show the torture of victims of human 
trafficking when demanding ransom) and social media (which can 




Figure 17.4. A sailor recalls his trauma after saving some of the refugees in 
Lampedusa in ‘It Will be Chaos’  
Source: Luciano & Piscopo (2018)  
 
The documentary Sound of Torture (Shayo et al., 2013) also deals with 
secondary trauma. The viewers can see how personally affected and 
involved Meron Estefanos is in the lives of the victims of trafficking 
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for ransom and their relatives. The relatives of the victims also 
experience secondary trauma. Since the connection is made via 
mobile phones and, thus, the actual sounds of torture are real and 
simultaneous, it leaves a mark on people who are related to the 
hostages, who experience the trauma personally. As Van Reisen 
emphasises, “ICTs have impacted on the forms and scope of human 
trafficking, with particular reference to their enabling of a new form 
of trafficking – human trafficking for ransom” (Van Reisen et al., 




Figure 17.5. Swedish-Eritrean radio presenter and human rights activist, Meron 
Estefanos in ‘Sound of Torture’  
Source: Shayo et al. (2013) 
 
What is also highlighted in the documentary, is the way the Eritrean 
community grieves for those who are still in captivity. They try to help 
each other and to figure out how to stop human trafficking. Their 
shock, as a community, also shows their collective trauma and the 
influence Sinai human trafficking has on their lives. 
 
The documentary Under the Skin (Deloget & Allegra, 2015) talks about 
the poor mental condition of survivors of human trafficking. It shows 
how they feel apathy, do not sleep at night, and keep replaying the 
memories of traumatic events in their heads. Clearly, they are dealing 
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with post-traumatic stress. The documentary shows the lack of 
support for survivors, support that could help them overcome the 
trauma and post-traumatic stress. The documentary deals primarily 
with the situation in which refugees find themselves when they reach 
their final destination. Their mental state is shown in the documentary 
from multiple perspectives and is one of the main focuses of the 
documentary.  
Agency 
The different documentaries show agency in different ways, as they 
depict the situations in which the refugees carry out their lives. Table 
17.5 shows which films deal with agency. 
 
Table 17.5. Documentaries dealing agency 
 
Documentary Representation of agency 
It Will be Chaos x 
Sound of Torture x 
Under the Skin x 
The Gatekeepers of Europe 
 
The Hunt for the General 
 
 
In the Sound of Torture (Shayo et al., 2013) we see the situation mostly 
through the eyes of Meron Estefanos, journalist and radio presenter 
for Radio Erena in Sweden. She experiences her agentic decisions, as 
she tries to fix the problem from Sweden, Israel and Egypt. One of 
the main messages of the documentary is the importance of personal 
help to the victims. The film portrays scepticism on the part of 
victims and Estefanos of the possibility of international organisations 
and law enforcement agencies stopping this form of human 
trafficking. We also see the relatives collecting money to save the 
hostages, as in the case of Amanuel and Hariti. Some do all they can 
and keep searching for their relatives, as shown in the case of Timmit 
and Dessale. The documentary also shows the lack of ability of the 
refugees and their families to improve the situation and the limited 






Figure 17.6. Eritrean community in Israel trying to decide what can be done about 
human trafficking for ransom in the ‘Sound of Torture’ 
Source: Shayo et al. (2013) 
 
Different narratives are used in the film as artistic tools to highlight 
specific problems. For example, the narrative about a brother 
searching for his sister allows the film makers to show the cruelty of 
the customs officers and police at the border in Israel and Egypt. The 
narrative about a husband and wife shows the emotional pressure 
exerted on relatives by the traffickers to extract ransom. Meron 
represents someone from the ‘outside’ and shows how such people 
have huge potential to help. Semhar’s story shows life after such 
experiences, full of grief and pain.  
 
All of these narratives show the lack of power of Eritrean refugees 
and those trying to help them. The people shown in the film, do not 
have the ability to investigate the situation themselves and are in 
desperate need of help from volunteers from outside the country and 
the situation. The documentary encourages viewers to help the 
refugees. The stereotypical representation of victimhood in this film 
is perhaps motivated by this goal and, in theory, is understandable, as 
the documentary was filmed when human trafficking in the Sinai was 
still prevalent (before 2015), but received little international attention. 
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In the film, Sinai trafficking is shown as involving a new modus 
operandi and the commoditisation of human beings, “which is 
particularly brutal and is characterised by abduction, displacement, 
captivity, extortion, torture, sexual violence and humiliation, serial 
selling and killing” (Van Reisen & Rijken, 2014; Van Reisen et al., 
2017, p. 117).  
 
The documentary Under the Skin (Deloget & Allegra, 2015) gives us a 
first-hand perspective on trafficking in terms of agency and context. 
Usually, “victims are presented as having little agency” (Gregoriou & 
Ras, 2018a, p. 47). In this film we see people who are oppressed and 
desperate, but still able to make decisions to survive and improve their 
lives. “People are not only agents of action but self-examiners of their 
own functioning” (Bandura, 2001, p. 5). People also exhibit agency 
when they commit suicide to stop the pain, as depicted in Under the 
Skin (Deloget & Allegra, 2015, 38:57). “Even though 
language/communication often proves problematic for victims, and 
legal consequences may arise when victims do away with their 
anonymity, the tendency is to silence them completely and regardless” 
(Gregoriou & Ras, 2018a, p. 53). The courage to speak and the 
bravery shown in the documentary is unimaginable for the audience. 
The sense of agency is enhanced through the experience of how some 
migrants and refugees rebel and resist the traffickers, as shown at the 
opening of the documentary (Deloget & Allegra, 2015, 02:27). 
Survivors talk about their families and their reaction when ransom 
was demanded. Some relatives ended up paying for the release of the 
survivors, but others stopped picking up the phone because of the 
pain they felt hearing their loved ones being tortured. The viewers 
were told that in some situations, those held captive could get 
themselves into a better position if they knew Arabic by helping the 
perpetrators in torturing and raping the other hostages. “There is 
much that people do designedly to exercise some measure of control 
over their self-development and life circumstances” (Bandura, 2001, 
p. 6). This is also agency, as some of those held captive choose to 




Showing the agency of victims challenges the general image of victims 
as “young, vulnerable, coerced, agentless, silenced, unrelatable, and 
offered merely for reflection” (Gregoriou & Ras, 2018a, p. 55). The 
agency of victims is also shown in the documentary It Will be Chaos 
(Luciano & Piscopo, 2018). Both Wael and Aregai have to make 
decisions in order to help their family and avoid criminal 
involvement. Their journeys were not safe. They tried to find ways to 
organise their journeys to their final destinations without being 
arrested or deported. They faced many complications on the way to, 
and in, Europe, but they managed to reach a safe place. 
Conclusion 
The perspectives shown in the documentaries studied in this chapter 
are diverse. The frames used vary widely and there is not yet a 
common frame through which human trafficking, its victims and 
perpetrators are viewed. This, in turn, impacts on the definition of 
the problem and how it is dealt with in public policy. In order to bring 
about social and policy change, these perspectives need to be looked 
at together through one frame, or a number of frames that are bridged 
or extended to give a cohesive understanding of the problem. This is 
the problem with representing real-life situations, which, 
unfortunately, explains the lack of understanding of human 
trafficking among the general public.  
 
In this study the following areas of representation were identified: 
how refugees are portrayed, how human trafficking and smuggling 
are portrayed, the (genderised) representation of victims/survivors, 
the representation of trauma as a result of human trafficking and the 
agency awarded to actors in the context of human trafficking. By 
analysing these in each documentary, it is possible to identify the 
different frames of the problem as presented.  
 
All of the documentaries, to a different extent and from different 
perspectives, deal with the perception of human 
trafficking/smuggling. To a lesser degree they highlight such topics 
as agency and trauma. The portrayal of refugees and genderised 
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victimhood are dealt with the least. The documentary that deals with 
all these areas is Under the Skin. The documentary films It Will be Chaos 
and Sound of Torture show almost all the perspectives. The Gatekeepers 
of Europe and The Hunt for the General, due to their specific focus, cover 
only a limited notion of human trafficking/smuggling. 
 
The word ‘chaos’, which is used in the title of one of the films, 
describes the dynamic situation in the documentaries well. However, 
as emerges from this analysis, there is not yet a unified frame for 
describing and understanding the problem of human trafficking. 
However, a few ‘chaotic’ elements emerge as common to all five 
documentaries: 
 
• The transportation of refugees to Europe: the dangerous trip 
in poor conditions with the huge risks involved, as proved by 
the Lampedusa tragedy. 
• The arrival of refugees in Europe: the lack of support and 
communication with the locals and political authorities. 
• Political confrontation and disinterestedness: the use of the 
situation by politicians to gain political power instead of 
actually solving the problem. 
• The image of migrants as ‘illegals’ instead of ‘refugees’: the 
treatment of refugees as criminals and as ‘others’ by the 
authorities, media and local population, instead of with 
understanding and respect. 
• Lack of social support: the fact that many refugees end up in 
refugee camps with strong police protection and sub-standard 
conditions. 
• Bureaucracy: the fact that it is highly problematic to get a 
residence permit or ID for a range of reasons, which pushes 
refugees towards illegality 
• The negativity in African-European relations: the disinterest 
in solving the problems mutually and the lack of mutual 
interest in preventing human tragedy and death in the context 
of human trafficking 
• The unavailability of post-traumatic rehabilitation: instead of 
getting treated, most refugees end up in disturbing mental 
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conditions experiencing complications due to depression and 
post-traumatic stress. 
 
The representation of the problem plays an important role in agenda-
setting. It shapes how people and policymakers react and deal with 
the issues. Therefore, the representation of the problem has serious 
and real-life consequences in terms of the policies that emerge in 
relation to migration and human trafficking. Unfortunately, a 
connected framing of the problem of human trafficking does not 
exist at present, as this analysis shows. Even among documentary film 
makers who are motivated to raise awareness of the problem of 
human trafficking, there are different ways in which the problem is 
described and understood. Due to the diversity of representation of 
the problem of human trafficking for ransom, it is difficult to put it 
on the policy making agenda in a consolidated way. A more solidified 
and cohesive framing of the problem is necessary in order for there 
to be room for agenda setting and to solicit more effective policy 
responses when the political momentum emerges. A better focus on 
the framing of the problem may broaden the problem frames. This 
may result in frame bridging or frame extension of the problem of 
human trafficking, which is otherwise seen through multiple frames. 
A unified framing of the problem of human trafficking may facilitate 
the emergence of more successful policies to address the issue. 
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Language Dominance in the Framing of Problems 
and Solutions: The Language of Mobility 
 
Munyaradzi Mawere, Mirjam Van Reisen & Gertjan Van Stam 
 
“Akanwa e Sano: e kupingulwa fyonse (Bemba) 
La bouche, c’est la cour du chef, c’est là que se règle toutes les affaires.” 
(Africa Museum, Tervuren, 2019) 
Introduction 
In his book, ‘C'est l'homme qui 
fait l'Homme’: Cul-de-Sac 
Ubuntu-ism in Cote d'Ivoire, 
Cameroonian academic 
Francis Nyamnjoh (2015) 
gives us an insight into a 
television series of the same 
name in the Ivory Coast. 
Analysing the series, 
Nyamnjoh paints a stark 
picture of the differences in 
perceptions of people 
travelling for work and those 
remaining ‘at home' in Africa. 
Nyamnjoh shows the 
complexity of the 
relationships between the 
diaspora and their friends and 
relatives at home, of course, 
dramatized for television. 
 
Nyamnjoh's study is unique as 
it looks at the discordance in 
communication between a remitting diaspora and those at home from 
Words explain the world, and on the 
basis of this understanding we act. 
Denying the reality that mobility has 
been a normal part of life on the African 
continent, the Western dominated 
narrative on mobility from Africa to 
Europe uses words with negative 
connotations. The term ‘illegal migration’ 
is used to describe the movement of 
refugees fleeing their country in search of 
protection. The term devalues their need 
to escape dangerous situations, while 
dehumanising their intentions. Terms 
such as ‘illegal’ and ‘irregular’ migrants 
criminalise Africans who move. Taking 
experiences out of context makes their 
lives look incoherent, inferior and cheap. 
As a result, loss of life on migratory 
trajectories is framed as collateral damage 
and seen largely as irrelevant losses. 
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the viewpoint of African sociology framed in ubuntu.66 The study, 
however, remains superficial (Nhemachena & Mawere, 2016), as it 
touches mostly on urban experiences, whereas many people on the 
move are from rural areas. Most studies on mobility in Africa are from 
Western perspectives and influenced by Western views on mobility, 
negating the diversity in perspectives on, and the language of, 
mobility. Therefore, in this chapter, we analyse words in their 
geographical and epistemological context, to try and determine what 
mobility means from an African perspective. Our interest is not in the 
conceptual significance of the words themselves, but their meaning 
beyond the limits of the linguist and his/her professional context. We 
endeavour to identify the systems of communication used in various 
parts of Africa and the metaphysics behind the words, thereby 
scrutinising the language of mobility that has been developed by 
professionals (politicians, academics) to frame the contentious issue 
of African mobility.  
Method 
This chapter is based on desk research carried out over a period of 
several years by the third author, who reviewed academic work on the 
subject, as well as articles in the media, and interacted with academic 
researchers working on migration. The authors used the method of 
living research, as described by Van Stam (2019), which involves 
immersion in the places and among the people being studied. In this 
case, this method involved living in Southern Africa full time (for two 
of the authors), travelling through other parts Africa, and numerous 
community interactions by the authors. 
 
We subscribe to the view that in each culture, informed positions can 
be developed with intellectual integrity. To understand travellers, or 
people on the move, in the various cultures in Africa and Europe, we 
 
66 The word ubuntu is derived from the Nguni languages. It is literally translated as 
“collective personhood and collective morality” (Mbiti, 1996). For a full discussion 
of ubuntu see Ubuntu/Unhu as Communal Love: Critical Reflections on the Sociology of 
Ubuntu and Communal Life in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016b). 
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seek to analyse meaning and meaning-making from different perspectives 
and epistemologies. 
Dominant Eurocentric formalisations 
In our approach to the study of the language of mobility, we were 
intrigued by how the African voice is seldom present, if not entirely 
absent, in narrations about mobility. A dominant, loud (and rather 
angry) Western voice dominates, framed in a Eurocentric 
philosophical base. This beg the question where is the diversity, as the 
field of language is inherently diverse. Where are African inputs and 
voices? In fact, there appears one skewed and very biased perspective 
– and one language – that dominates and defines the frame through 
which mobility is being viewed: a Eurocentric one. How can we 
recognise African expressions and do African voices justice when 
using a language that is formalised by a non-African culture? 
Undoubtedly, there are African experiences and African designations 
that are expressed without reference to a foreign language or culture. 
However, in the current discourse, it appears that only one voice 
seems to be represented – the Western one – while other voices from 
Africa are subalternised, to the extent of answering Spivak’s rhetorical 
question in the negative: “Can the Subaltern speak?” (Spivak, 1988). 
The absence of balanced literature, or even worse, of any 
consideration of the language of mobility from an African 
perspective, is a form of epistemic violence.  
 
In our research, the accounts of the families and communities of 
travellers, who speak from the same context as those who travel, 
make it clear that the language of mobility is a clash of histories and 
cultures. It is a clash of paradigms (Mawere & Van Stam, 2015). The 
language of mobility is a contested area, with dominant, polarising 
stories depicting ‘good’ (for instance, European policies) and ‘bad’ 
(for instance, migrants and smugglers who pursue profit-driven 
motives). These narratives negate the complexity of human 
relationships and people’s grounding in a shared culture, which 
encompasses moral sentiments, emotions and values, and shared 
norms and obligations, among other things. Nevertheless, many 
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people strive for shared frameworks of morality and language, and 
recognise the centrality of ethics in social networks (Achilli, 2018). 
Contrapuntal developments in the language of mobility 
The relationship between language and its meaning is deeply rooted 
in culture and embedded in localised philosophies and 
epistemologies. The shaping of meaning begins at birth, the very 
moment one is introduced to a language and culture. When we 
distinguish between a philosophy developed in Europe and 
philosophies from Africa, we notice distinct differences in their 
grounding and orientation. The differences in orientation, of course, 
result from variations in epistemologies and philosophies about life; 
these result in (and reflect) differences in the daily and cultural 
practices in Africa and Europe.  
 
The theologian Gert-Jan Roest (2016) recognised the basis of 
Western practices as being a self-consciousness that regards the 
individual (and, therefore, individualism) as a primary agent. 
Furthermore, in the Western context, Roest perceives the political 
pursuits of individuals to be driven by striving for human power and 
agency, freedom and fulfilment in self-sufficiency, self-reliance, 
autonomy, and immanent prosperity and security. In Africa, however, 
“every conceivable African political system had communities at its 
base” (Amadiume, 1997, p. 15). Numerous anthropological studies 
testify to the communitarian or communal character of African 
societies, where “the individual does not and cannot exist alone 
except corporately” (Mbiti, 1976, p. 141). Also, in many African 
places, the view of being human in a community is linked to views of 
morality, where “an individual's image will depend rather crucially 
upon the extent to which his or her actions benefit others than 
himself” (Wiredu, 1992, p. 200).  
 
Multiple narratives unfold separately, and in conjunction, at the same 
time. In Africa and Europe, these stories are contrapuntal, a musical 
term that refers to two or more separate tunes that are played at the 
same time (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). These narratives are situated 
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in different epistemologies (Table 18.1) and perspectives on the 
causes and effects of mobility (Table 18.2).  
 
Table 18.1. Comparative overview of dominant epistemic orientations in relation to 
mobility 
 







Ubuntu cultures Christian-Judean 
cultures 
Du Toit, 2009 
Conscientisation Age of 
Authenticity 
Nkrumah, 1964; Roest, 2016 
Oratio Literality Van Stam, 2013; Mawere & 
Van Stam, 2017 
Sharing economies Neo-liberalism Sheneberger & Van Stam, 
2011 
Polychronic time Linearity Bidwell et al., 2013 
Authority Power Du Toit, 2009; Grosfoguel, 
2008 
Communiversity University Mawere & Van Stam, 2019 
 
As mentioned, in the African setting, there is a close link between the 
individual and the community. The former belongs to the latter. 
Community is given primacy when prioritising between the two (the 
community and the individual). In African cultures, this deep 
connection between the individual and the community is summed up 
in the dictum: “I am because we are, we are therefore I am” (Mbiti, 
1976, p. 140), which embraces the idea that human beings cannot live 
in isolation. This statement reflects the fact that many Africans 
acknowledge the primacy of community over the individual, from the 
understanding that humanity depends on community, 
interconnectedness, conviviality and interdependence. Bishop 
Francis Loyo of South Sudan narrates a vivid story about his life, in 
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which he shows how an individual in an African place is understood 
as part of the whole:  
 
I was born premature, weak and almost dying. My mother was ill and without milk. 
This was the beginning of my journey to life. I was breastfed by different mothers in 
the village and so I believed I am their son. After one year my father died leaving me 
in the care of my mother and my elder sister. Six years later my mother also passed 
away. When my mother was dying she spoke to my sister who had just got married 
telling her: ‘Take him and care for him as your eldest child'. I became elder sister's 
first child and she took me to the village school. I was keen to learn and listened 
carefully since I knew my parents were not there anymore. I did not have much 
demands I only relied on goodwill mothers and fathers who were kind to me. What 
helped me was the African philosophy by Dr John Mbiti: "I am because we are and, 
since we are, therefore I am." We share and we are concerned for one another in times 
of hardships and happiness. (Loyo, 2015, np)  
 
This case, as with many others, clearly shows how relations and 
conviviality are valued in Africa. 
 
Although Eurocentrism thrives on the separation between individuals 
and forms of groupings, we do not wish to reify or subscribe to an 
orientalistic ‘othering’. We recognise great diversity of behaviour and 
culture in groupings and individuals. However, given the geo-
locations of meaning-making and views on development, in this study 
we indicate some of the documented observations about the varied 
and multiplicity of experience. Kwasi Wiredu (1998) argues that 
comparison is only methodologically possible when comparing equal 
with equal. Therefore, in the tables we analyse “contingent norms of 
life” (Wiredu, 1996, p. 30), which are, anthropologically, indications 
of the customs and norms of societies. These can include 
“…conventions, grammars, vocabularies…” (Wiredu, 1996, p. 28). 
We have selected materials – language to be specific – that are 
indicative of common attributes as a base for comparison. We derive 




When regarding the migration discourse, it becomes clear there are 
glaring misalignments in the use and meaning of words by people 
from different groups and cultures.  
 
Table 18.2. Simplified overview of common misalignments in the language of mobility 
 
Africa Europe 
Projected esteem on travellers 
reaching Europe 
Labelling of migrants as exploiting 
Expecting remittances from 
travellers 
Criminalisation of migration 
Depicting Europe as ‘resource 
abundant’ 
Depicting Africa as ‘poor and failing’ 
Source: Van Stam, 2016 
 
Even if a common language is used – English – in the practice of a 
large group of Africans travelling from Africa to Europe, the words 
used by both are incompatible. Table 18.3 gives some examples. 
 
Table 18.3. Examples of the different use of words in the discourse on mobility 
 
Issue An African view A European view 
Reason for 
travel 
Resource gathering in far-
away places for communal 
survival, or seeking refuge 
outside areas of conflict 
Profiting from European 
success and society 
Denomination Traveller from Africa to 
Europe (and back) 
Migrant from Africa to 
Europe (to stay) 
Sources: Ong’ayo, 2019; Van Stam, 2016 
A discussion model 
By definition, mobility involves travelling between different 
geographical areas and, thus, engaging with various epistemologies. 
An individual can purposively move about her/his environment 
(Rosso, Taylor, Tabb & Michael, 2013), including geographical and 
epistemic landscapes. In this section, we endeavour to deconstruct 
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the issues at play in the case of Africans travelling to Europe. 
Although there are many reasons for travelling and reaching the West, 
Africans commonly share any resources acquired from Europe with 




Figure 18.1. Simplified overview of epistemologies, issues and views 
 
In Figure 18.1, a simplified overview of the epistemologies, issues and 
views at play is presented. The figure shows two main issues: 
• The flow of people from Africa to Europe  
• The flow of resources, mostly financial resources, from 
Europe to Africa 
 
The views depicted in the Figure 18.1 are grounded in epistemologies 
that currently exist in the two geographical areas involved: African 
epistemologies set in African philosophies and meaning-making and 
European epistemologies located in Eurocentric thought. Our use of 
the term African in this chapter, like the term European, adheres to 
Thaddeus Metz's position that geographical labels refer to:  
 
…features that are salient in a locale, at least over a substantial amount of time. 
They pick out properties that have for a long while been recurrent in a place in a way 
Issue 1: African travellers 












they have tended not to be elsewhere. They denote fairly long-standing characteristics 
in a region that differentiate it from many other regions. (Metz, 2015, p. 1176) 
 
The figure depicts four views: 
View 1. On the purpose and practice of travelling from 
Africa to Europe, based on Africa-centric 
epistemologies 
View 2. On the purpose and practice of travelling from 
Africa to Europe, based on Eurocentric 
epistemologies 
View 3. On the resources from Europe being sent to Africa, 
from African epistemologies, separated into view 3a 
(embedded in indigenous African epistemology) and 
view 3b (embedded in neo-colonial thought) 
View 4. On resources from Europe to Africa, from a 
Eurocentric point of view 
 
The figure is greatly simplified; it omits many details, especially 
contextual issues, such as the significant net outflow of financial and 
other resources from Africa to Europe (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016a). 
It omits the diversity of African and European epistemologies. 
However, in this chapter, we wish to highlight the multiplicity, 
complexity and discordance of the languages involved, and, for that 
purpose, this simplified model suffices. 
Travels from periphery to the centre (view 1) 
In view 1, travelling is a dynamic and integrated activity, initiated from 
African experiences and stories of travellers. It is from this context 
that travel commences, from a situated understanding of what the 
pros and cons of travelling are. Therefore, view 1 starts off the 
travelling. The reasons for travelling are diverse and can be 
distinguished as being reactive (e.g., fleeing from violence or 
indefinite military service, as in Eritrea) or pro-active (e.g., in search 
of a better standard of living, as in Nigeria). 
 
Ubuntu implies an expanded view of community (Ramose, 2003; 
Mawere & Van Stam, 2016b). Any activity in the Horn of Africa links 
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in with community (‘being sent’ by elders in the community), religion 
(‘my share’, as per beliefs in the community), blessings, oaths (for 
instance, bounded by juju curses in West Africa67), or spirits. Mobility 
is facilitated by ‘travel agents’. Such agents are common and have 
been facilitating travel for decades, for instance, by helping people 
find work abroad (see Hoffmann, Meester, & Nabara, 2017 for an 
example set in Agadez, Niger). Responding to the circumstances and 
demands of travellers, the radius has been extended and travel has 
been made more difficult and dangerous due to suppression by 
official systems (see view 3b). In Europe, the vocabulary used by 
Africans talks of ‘blending in’ (Vermeulen, 2018). Woyo from Angola 
expresses this succinctly in the following quote: “An uprooted palm 
tree gets trampled”, which means that “someone without family or 
money is weak” (Prover Pot Lid, Africa Museum, 2019). 
Receiving travellers in Europe (view 2) 
View 2 is ideologically framed. Here, terms like ‘illegal migration’ are 
being positioned as an ideological straw man (Taylor, 2015; ICMPD, 
2017), that is to say they misrepresent what is happening to make it 
easier to attack (like a straw man). Upon their positioning, this 
intentionally misrepresentative terminology provides the foundation 
for political manoeuvring and the raising of barriers (Mbembe, 2018). 
Such writings and practices are positioned in a long history of what 
can be called ‘the Terrible Three’: orientalism, imperialism and 
colonialism (Van Stam, 2017a, pp. 117–126).  
 
In political writing, the ‘problem of migration’, as vaguely defined in 
Eurocentric language, is placed at the feet of Africa and Africans. 
Subsequently, these misrepresented problems are proposed to be 
solved in processes that build up barriers and impose restrictions on 
the movement of people. Through embedding the issue in processes 
(for instance, the Khartoum Process), questions like ‘why is this view 
being taken’ are overshadowed by narratives about a ‘crisis’. The 
dominant language, therefore, reifies practices. 
 
67 Juju refers to a multifaceted phenomenon covering a wide range of traditional and 
religious practices, reportedly used by perpetrators to subjugate victims of human 
trafficking (Van der Watt & Kruger, 2017). 
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These kinds of systems and reifying processes have been used before. 
The contemporary language of blaming and criminalising ‘African 
migrants’ serves a similar purpose: to set the stage for Europe to 
impose its anti-migration policies. 
Remittances and aid (view 3) 
View 3a is the contemporary view from an African epistemology. 
Here, the resources being remitted from Europe to Africa are seen as 
the result of seeking remunerated work in Europe (Van Stam, 2016). 
Francis Nyamnjoh (2015), who was cited in the introduction to this 
chapter, describes the dynamics of this ‘hunting’ for resources vividly. 
At the same time, and parallel to the dominant view from within 
Africa, view 3b exists in response to the language used in view 2. View 
3b interacts with the rather substantial resources that come out of the 
European policy decisions based on view 2. These are multilateral and 
bilateral funding streams from Europe to international non-
governmental organisations and African governments to ‘stop the 
migration streams’. View 3b, thus, is the result of geopolitical 
influence meant to disrupt or prevent issue 1, with definitions of 
outcomes set in a European epistemology. View 3b represents an 
ongoing neo/super-colonial meddling in Africa. A vivid example in 
popular language is: Europe is moving its borders south of the Sahara 
through a “remote control policy” (The Conversation, 2018; 
Väänänen, 2018). 
Super-colonialism (view 4) 
There is a distinct difference between travel and trade in humans. 
European slave ships transported an estimated 12.5 million enslaved 
African men, women and children to the Americas from the 16th 
Century through to the 19th Century, with the involvement of 
important European harbours, such as London, Amsterdam and 
Lisbon (Eltis & Richardson, 2010). New modern-day forms of slavery 
have emerged in the last decade, especially since the introduction of 
ICTs that facilitate human trafficking for ransom as a new form of 
slavery (Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015). Without exception, the 
abduction, extortion and selling of people as merchandise is regarded 
as a crime. The networks profiting from mobility are complex, 
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international hierarchical structures with links to governments (Van 
Reisen & Mawere, 2017). That this may include officials from 
European governments was illustrated by the involvement of a top 
politician in Belgium, who was arrested on suspicion of selling 
humanitarian visas to refugees (Pano, 2019). 
 
View 4 is a positioning set in a historically-shaped ideology. 
“Everything passes, except the past” is written on the wall of the 
newly reorganised Africa Museum in Tervuren, Belgium (2019). It is 
located in the old museum constructed by King Leopold II in 1897 
for the World Fair. King Leopold owned Congo as his personal 
property and was its sole ruler. The museum was funded by the 
Ministry of the Colonies and exhibited live Africans. It is now 
recognised that the museum “played an important role in the 
representation of Africa and Africans and in the glorification of the 
colony and its founders”. The museum also points out that “Some 
aspects of this imagery are still at work” (Africa Museum, 2019). 
 
An important element of the museum are the exhibits of this colonial 
portrayal of Africa by Matton (1873–1953) in the form of statutes, 
which are still protected. The museum explains: 
 
All statutes represent a colonial vision. Belgians are presented as benefactors and 
civilizers, as if they had committed no atrocities in Congo, and as if there had been 
no civilization there beforehand. Africans are represented as smaller than Europeans 
or reduced to the activities they practice. African women are sexualized. An Arabo-
Swahili trader tramples a Congolese who tries to protect his wife. It is clichéd colonial 
propaganda, but it still effective more than a century later. (Africa Museum, 
2019) 
 
This museum in Belgium gives a stark view of how travellers from 
the African continent were limited to stay in Africa or come to 
Belgium as servants, students or living exhibits.  
 
This colonial ideology is sustained by an oriental outlook on Africa, 
as a failing continent that had no history before colonialism and a 
continent that cannot stand on its own. In this ideology, Africa is 
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characterised as a continent suffering from persistent dismal 
economic performance, diseases (i.e., HIV/AIDS, Ebola), civil war, 
maladministration, corruption, poverty, dictatorship, human rights 
abuses, and starvation. Views on the broader context are being 
neglected, for instance, omitting the sizeable net inflow of resources 
and financial means from Africa to Europe (Sharples, Jones, & 
Martin, 2014; Mawere & Van Stam, 2016a). The devaluation and the 
dehumanisation of Africans, sustained through centuries of 
propaganda that has depicted Africans as lesser human beings to their 
‘superior’ European masters, sustains a colonial ideology and 
language in which African lives have inferior value. 
Confrontation: Exposing the ideological framings at play in 
views 2 and 4 
The undergirding of ideologies comes to the fore when changing the 
direction of the arrows in Figure 18.1. Doing so highlights the case of 




Figure 18.2. Simplified overview of mirrored issue and views 
 
Table 18.4 now looks as follows (compared to Table 18.3). 
Issue 1b: European 













Table 18.4. Examples of the different use of words in the discourse on mobility when the 
direction of the arrows is changed (with regards to Figure 18.2) 
 
Issue African view European view 
Reason for 
travel 
Visitor welcome as a 
common dweller in 
one humanity 
Saving Africa 





development and business 
skills through technical 
assistance 
 
When reviewing Figure 18.2, the dominant language focuses around 
the word ‘freedom’. In classical liberal thought, four freedoms are 
invoked: freedom of movement of capital, goods, services, and 
people. The contrast between the language used in the situations 
described in figures 18.1 and 18.2 is remarkable. We have observed 
the dismay of European travellers having to apply and pay for a visa 
to enter African countries, oblivious of the high barriers, expenses 
and efforts needed for Africans to legally enter Europe.  
Creation of a ‘straw man’ 
Referring back to Figure 18.1, in the political framing of view 2, straw 
men are being put in place. Their purpose is to caricaturise and 
dehumanise Africans travelling to Europe. Instrumental among these 
straw men is the container-term ‘irregular migration’. This term has 
been invented to allow holders of the European view to gain the 
political upper hand. In daily practice, the term ‘irregular migration’ is 
used interchangeably with ‘illegal migration’, making travelling 
synonymous with criminal behaviour.  
 
However, there is no clear or universally-accepted definition of 
irregular migration (IOM, 2018). The terminology is not grounded in 
international law and, therefore, evades regulation. The term also 
evades the distinctions set for refugees of war or travellers for health 
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and economic reasons. Such distinctions are guided by the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees, known as the Geneva 
Convention. 
 
Terminology like irregular migration (IOM, 2018) homogenises all 
travellers from Africa to Europe that follow unchartered travel paths. 
The language lumps all of these travellers together, regardless of their 
motive: whether they are refugees or seeking a living wage. The 
terminology is weaponised. Such language is used unscrupulously by 
some as a springboard to attach labels such as ‘rapist’, ‘scavenger’ and 
‘terrorist’ to broad swaths of people. 
 
Another container-word is ‘compact’, which is colloquial for 
‘comprehensive partnership’. This terminology also evades clear 
definition (Gammeltoft-Hansen, Guild, Moreno-Lax, Panizzon, & 
Roele, n.d.). This word is used to justify geopolitical meddling 
through the provision of technical assistance aimed at influencing 
processes to remove the reasons to travel. Here, the weapon of 
‘funding’ through ‘aid’ is used to strengthen neo-colonial processes 
and establish super-coloniality under the guise of international 
organisations that ‘help’ Africa. In practice, there is often little to 
show in terms of the outcomes of the interventions implemented by 
these organisations. The objective is ‘border outsourcing’, which has 
been done in deals between Europe and Turkey, and between Italy 
and Libya. 
 
Another example of non-defined terminology that is making its way 
into use through view 2 is ‘migration management’ (for border 
control). This qualitative language is subsequently turned into ‘body 
management’ or ‘people management’. Here, the descriptive language 
morphs into quantification, using the tool of numbers. The use of 
quantitative language results in datasets that are framed, categorised, 
set, and managed by those who control the language of the methods 
and definitions.  
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The criminalisation of migration 
The terminology in view 2 has hardened in recent years. The 
documentary It will be chaos (Luciano & Piscopo, 2018), which 
investigates the journeys of refugees, traces the battle over the 
negative framing of African migrants back to 3 October 2013, when 
a ship sank near the Italian island of Lampedusa, killing over 300 
Africans. The documentary opens with a stark image of the coffins 
being loaded using a crane. 
 
The film shows a dialogue between members of the media and the 
Mayor of Lampedusa, who bemoans the terminology used by the 
reporters who refer to the migrants as ‘illegal’. Before answering their 
questions, the Mayor insists on clarifying the language being used:  
 
They are refugees. We are talking about asylum seekers. Let’s make it clear. Those 
who land in Lampedusa aren’t illegals. [...] I know what your question was, but I 
have to correct you, otherwise you will report these are ‘illegals’. [...] well if you don’t 
get it, neither will your audience. Those who land on Lampedusa are not simply 
undocumented. These people are ‘refugees’. You know, words are important. 
(Luciano & Piscopo, 2018) 
 
The documentary shows how the disaster in Lampedusa opens a 
window of opportunity to frame the problem in a new light. And as 
the mayor is arguing for language that upholds the dignity of the 
people who died in sea and the survivors, she is doing this in the 
context of another language that is emerging. International and 
European officials visit the island to emphasise the need for a 
common policy and direction. In this context the Prime Minister of 
Italy Enrico Letto visits the island and is filmed in the documentary 
responding to a question by a journalist, next to the smiling President 
of the European Commission, Mr Barosso: 
 
Journalist: But the DA’s [District Attorney’s] Office has charged the survivors 




Prime Minister: The law is the law. But, of course, this is a terrible tragedy. 
(Luciano & Piscopo, 2018) 
 
The documentary shows the battle over terms, which lay the basis for 
policies. The Italian Minister of Migration, also shown in the 
documentary, tries to soften the impact by stating: “When they’ll start 
the asylum procedure, the charges may drop” (Luciano, & Piscopo, 
2018). 
 
The documentary then shows how one of the survivors, a refugee 
from Eritrea, is brought to court and accused of entering Europe 
illegally; he decides to continue his journey in search of protection 
and safety on his own, relying on relatives in Europe, forcing him 
towards illegality, as he is now trying to survive without any support 
from the host society. 
African versus European lenses 
Tables 18.1 and 18.2 provide evidence of the fact that the language 
and voice from the West is at variance with the language and voice 
from Africa. The language from the West represents a facility that 
allows for the colonial exporting of problems, issues and methods. 
This language is used politically, while being framed as an objective 
truth. Truth, Kwasi Wiredu (1980, p. 114) argues, is located in time 
and place and, therefore, an opinion, never an absolute. However, 
through a dominating language, ‘opinion’ is positioned as ‘truth’ to 
define who is or is not allowed to travel in the world today (Mbembe, 
2018). The contemporary language of mobility, therefore, is unjustly 
biased by, and for, Western (European) ideology.  
 
The African ways of talking about and, thus, culturally framing travel 
have not received just consideration. African ways of looking at reality 
have not received the necessary scholarly attention. The survey of 
realities in Africa through Eurocentric lenses, however, has received 
much attention and is being facilitated by large grants in Europe. This 
chasm is overshadowed by models ‘explaining’ migration patterns 
that are proffered by European powerhouses. These models continue 
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to flesh out Western premises, filtered through a colonial matrix of 
power and racial systems of socio-cultural classification (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2013). The adoption of Western models, therefore, boils 
down to a continuation of colonial behaviour based on supposed 
Western supremacy, while neglecting African voices. 
 
The dominance and export of Western language that reifies and 
defines is a means of analysing empirical material that is presumably 
derived from Africa. This practice is a continuation of colonial 
interference, which distorts African identities and misrepresents 
African realities (Van Stam, 2017b). This language, Achille Mbembe 
argues, is: 
 
…produced nearly always by Europeans or Euro-American men who are the only 
ones accepted as capable of reaching universality; they involve a particular 
anthropological knowledge, which is a process of knowing about Others – but a 
process that never fully acknowledges those Others as thinking and knowledge 
producing subjects. (Mbembe, 2015, p. 36).  
 
Colonialism has caused the involuntary intermixing of Western and 
African intellectual categories in the thinking of contemporary 
Africans (Wiredu, 2002, p. 54). The forces that require Africans to use 
the non-African based languages of the former colonisers – English, 
French, Italian, and Portuguese – are incognisant of the 
incompatibilities of those languages with local narratives and 
contexts. However, by accepting Western languages, African 
environments have little ammunition with which to withstand 
framings and models set in Western methods and classifications. Or, 
in the words of Kotze and Kellerman: “The role and status of the 
technocrat and technocratic approaches contribute not only to the 
devaluation of indigenous knowledge and experience but also to the 
side-tracking of the people's emotions and feelings in development” 
(Kotze & Kellerman, 1998, p. 34). 
 
The dominant language of mobility can be traced back to the imperial 
project, through which Europe sought to control ‘others’ in all 
respects – politically, economically, morally, culturally and religiously. 
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Already, by defining borders during the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in the 
19th Century, and through the colonial projects, European powers 
sought to limit the mobility of others, in order to control and 
dominate them. Contemporary language is a natural evolution of such 
thought, “turning the [African] continent into a massive carceral 
space and each [African] into a potential illegal migrant, unable to 
move except under increasingly punitive conditions” (Mbembe, 
2018). Research is needed to show the illegitimacy of these practices 
and propose alternative frameworks that are grounded in the realities 
of the travellers in their African home areas, for instance, by 
highlighting the role of traditional leaders, the custodians of culture 
and, thus, language. An example of alternative narrative is the 
denouncement of the juju-curses by spiritual leaders in Benin 
(Ebegbulem, 2018). 
 
Language is linked to local conditions and culture, with local 
languages framing meaning-making and responses to local 
issues/problems. Any proposal from ‘the outside’ must be aligned 
with, and, ideally, complementary to, local meaning-making 
(Mwesigire, 2016). Robert Chambers (1994) argues in his presentation 
Poverty and livelihoods: Whose reality counts? that in case of large power 
distances, the realities of the poor should be pre-eminent in any 
intervention. In line with this argument, it can be posited that the sole 
use of Western language exacerbates the plight of, and disempowers, 
African travellers and feeds narratives of victimhood. 
 
As the world is becoming increasingly global, for both Europe and 
Africa, there is a need for common, or at least complementary, 
understandings. In other words, we need to find a shared 
foundational semantics and understanding about the mobility of 
people. Cooperation toward this end can only be fruitful when one 
acknowledges the intercultural nature of philosophy and substantive 
universal rationality and sociality. It is partly for this reason that we 
endeavour in this chapter to provide a considered opinion, seeking 
cognitive elements in knowing, by applying a thoroughly intercultural, 




The sociologist, Oyèrónké Oyěwùmí, like many others, stands against 
Western dominance in African studies. She wrote on the necessity “to 
undertake a re-examination of the concepts underlying discourse in 
African studies, consciously taking into account African experiences” 
(Oyěwùmí, 1997, pp. x–xi). She notes that: “all concepts come with 
their own cultural and philosophical baggage, much of which 
becomes alien distortions when applied to cultures other than those 
from which they derive” (Oyěwùmí, 1997, pp. x–xi).  
 
Her studies on genderisation stand as an example. She found that 
gender discussions are being framed by the specific feature of an 
English-language culture to classify words as being either feminine or 
masculine grammatically. With the favouring of male pronouns, 
Western social history has regarded women as secondary beings 
(Oyěwùmí, 1997, p. 39). This gendering in the English language, 
Oyěwùmí argues, has led to colonialisation and misrepresentations 
that have applied genderisation where, in African languages, such a 
feature does not exist. 
 
Similarly, Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa Mubaya (2017) have 
asked why African studies, as a discipline, has always been 
spearheaded by Western academics and institutions. In the cover 
blurb for their work African Studies in the Academy: The Cornucopia of 
Theory, Praxis and Transformation in Africa, Mawere and Mubaya note 
with concern that: 
 
African Studies as a discipline have been spearheaded by academics and institutions 
in the Global North. This puts African Studies on the continent at a crossroads of 
making choices on whether such a discipline can be legitimately accepted as an 
epistemological discipline seeking objectivity and truth about Africa and the African 
peoples or a discipline meant to perpetuate the North’s hegemonic socio-economic, 
political and epistemic control over Africa. (Mawere & Mubaya, 2017) 
 
In line with Oyěwùmí and Mawere and Mubaya’s arguments, in this 
chapter we posit that the use of a specific language about mobility in 
Europe misrepresents African realities by imposing attributes to 
travellers that are assumed to be universal, for instance, wishing to 
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travel to Europe because it is somehow superior. This 
misrepresentation of African realities, however, has become the 
reification and source of social distinctions. 
 
Allowing certain words to act as frames in societies where such words 
do not exist or fit obscures the reality in such a society. Examples 
include the use of gender as a frame of analysis in Africa, whereas 
communities are genderless (Oyěwùmí, 1997; Nzegwu, 1998). Such a 
framing, for instance, obscures neuter roles. In an analogy to racial 
framings, Mbembe (2018) recognises that racial violence is encoded 
in the language of ‘border security’. In the area of mobility, the 
framing of words like ‘migration’ and ‘exploitation’ obscure the 
existence of moral behaviours playing out in complex roles and 
practices during travels, for instance, in the practice of ‘good’ 
smuggling (Achilli, 2018).  
 
Here, we argue, that an assessment of African realities, and thus 
language, is not possible when the assessment is set in pre-conceived 
ideas and encapsulated in one language and, therefore, one point of 
view. Western ideological reasoning appears to describe ‘migration’ in 
(neo-)liberal language only, evoking the image of a crisis and the 
ongoing ‘exploitation of Europe’ by Africans. Such politics could well 
become impotent if it allowed for the diverse interpretation of reality 
and for different stratifications in society, taking away popular 
stereotypes and, thus, undermining the ‘straw man’. In the current 
dispensation, however, the influence of internationalised Western 
culture appears pervasive. To counter this pervasiveness, there is a 
need to diversify the epistemological and methodological basis of 
understanding and interpreting realities and meaning-making.  
 
The absence of sensitivity and a broad knowledge of indigenous 
African ways of describing mobility, as well as the ongoing messaging 
using Eurocentric coding, could well lead to the reformulation of 
realities in Africa based upon this alien language of mobility. The 
practice of reframing can be recognised in the behaviour of the police 
in countries like Mali, who have accepted the narrative about the 
criminalisation of travelling and who are now penalising those making 
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journeys for work that were common over the past millennia 
(Hoffmann et al., 2017). What was previously normal behaviour (e.g., 
facilitating transport for seasonal labour) has been outlawed due to 
the influence of ‘foreign ways’ of looking at journeying (Chapter 9, 
The Plight of Refugees in Agadez in Niger: From Crossroad to Dead End, by 
Morgane Wirtz). 
 
The study of the drivers of the language of mobility might yield 
surprising results. For instance, African ways of discussing mobility 
could show that African languages imply inclusivity, in which ‘being 
human’ is the main ontology that links all of humanity (Mawere & 
Van Stam, 2016b). Travelling has happened in Africa throughout 
history. Mbembe argues that, in Africa, “the primordial principle of 
spatial organisation was continuous movement” (Mbembe, 2018). Or, 
the language could reveal various forms of membership that defy the 
racial classifications proposed by the Western scheme. African voices 
talk about the integration (of foreigners), of peoplehood (including 
the living, the dead, the unborn, humans and non-humans), and of 
nature (being part of the chain of beings).  
 
Wamba-dia-Wamba, in his work Africa in Search of a New Mode of Politics 
provides a list of ways to denounce dominant (political) language and 
ways of reconciliation. Among these, he proposes the following 
(Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1994, pp. 257–58): 
 
• limiting the notion of the ‘nation-state’ as the main 
denominator of one's identity  
• delinking ‘development’ from ‘development-policies’ set by 
powers not living in the area that progresses 
• deconstructing colonial legacies and notions like ‘traditional 
society’ or ‘fixed cultures’ 
• recognising local forms of economy, which then, from their 
‘right to exist’ can interact in the world economy 
• recognising the local way of ‘knowing’ as valuable and that 





This chapter has highlighted the variances in the use of language in 
mobility discourse. It argues that the existence of one dominant use 
of language is not useful in understanding the dynamics involved in 
travelling and ineffective in stemming migration flows. Moreover, it 
can potentially give rise to dangerous dynamics for both travellers and 
host countries. More particularly, the chapter shows the differences 
between African and European framings of mobility, and the benefits 
of, and problems, with these framings. 
 
This chapter shows that mobility is not static and changes over time, 
and that words are important, as they lay the basis for policies and 
practices. Words explain the world, and on the basis of this 
understanding we act. Words also influence the allocation of 
resources that allow practices to happen. In mobility, valuable 
resources are spent to support travelling and are flowing back once a 
destination has been reached. 
 
This chapter contends that the negative words used to describe 
mobility from Africa to Europe represents a revival of the colonial 
view and propaganda in an attempt to devalue and dehumanise 
Africans, making their lives inferior and cheap. The negative terms 
used to describe African travellers, such as ‘illegal’ and ‘irregular’ 
migrants, criminalises Africans who travel and denies the fact that 
travelling has always been part of the way of life in Africa. It also 
interprets travelling from an elite perspective, where Europeans can 
legally travel the world, but African attempts to do the same are 
framed as illegal and criminal.  
 
The human trafficking associated with the irregularised traveling of 
Africans is in essence little different from the slave trade, which 
characterised the colonial period, reducing Africans to commodities 
for exploitation and profit. It is a terrible shame for Europe to find 
that its current migration policies have enabled the commoditisation 
of human beings, which should have no place in the contemporary 
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world. The involvement of Europe in facilitating such 
commoditisation demonstrates that the colonial era is not yet over. 
 
A new search for understanding the language of travelling in the 
African continent is needed in order for Africans to recapture the 
agenda of mobility, which is so central to African culture, economy 
and way of living. This chapter has drawn on African scholars to show 
the value of African scholarship in discussing phenomena in words 
and language set in context and associated with African place and 
positionality, deconstructing colonial categories while strengthening 
African identities.  
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The Shaping of the EU’s Migration Policy: 
The Tragedy of Lampedusa as a Turning Point 
 
Klara Smits & Ioanna Karagianni 
 
Introduction 
By the end of 2017, the displacement of people had reached a record 
high: 68.5 million people were displaced globally, among whom 25.4 
million were refugees, 10 
million were stateless people 
and 3.1 million were asylum 
seekers awaiting a decision 
(UNHCR, 2018). Most 
displaced people, including 
refugees and migrants, 
remain close to home. 
Despite this fact, migration 
has dominated the political 
agenda in the European 
Union (EU) in recent years. 
From 2017–2018, the EU 
and its member states 
“intensified their efforts to 
prevent irregular entry and 
increased returns, including 
through policies that 
exposed migrants and those 
in need of protection to ill-
treatment, torture and other 
abuses in countries of transit 
and origin” (Amnesty International, 2018c). People on the move face 
many dangers, often falling victim to human smugglers and 
traffickers, whom they pay thousands of dollars in the hope of 
In 2013, 360 refugees drowned off the 
coast of Lampedusa in Italy. At that 
point in time a policy window opened to 
put the issue of refugees on the policy 
agenda in Europe. However, the issue 
was framed as a ‘migration crisis’ and 
one of ‘illegal immigrants’ instead of 
refugees. This language drove the 
response, and instead of implementing 
solutions focused on the protection of 
refugees, the EU externalised its borders 
and focused on stopping people entering 
its territory. Framed as a security issue, 
European policies have created a hostile 
environment for refugees fleeing inhumane 
and dangerous circumstances. Despite the 
large sums thrown at these policies, they 
are both unlikely to work and reflect 
badly on the EU’s human rights record. 
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reaching safety. Due to the lack of protection and legal pathways for 
migrants, many end up stuck in countries like Libya, where 
horrendous living conditions, human trafficking for ransom, and 
gross human rights violations have been reported (Global Initiative 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018). 
 
The so-called ‘mixed migration flows’ from Africa enter Europe 
through the Central Mediterranean route, via Italy and increasingly 
Spain. Many people travelling to Europe via this route are fleeing war, 
persecution and human rights abuses, while others are seeking a 
better life; both groups run a high risk of being trafficked and facing 
severe abuse. In 2018, Tunisians were the largest group of people to 
enter Europe via the Mediterranean Sea to Italy (22%), followed by 
Eritreans (14%) and Sudanese (7%) (IOM, 2018).  
 
Reaching a peak of a million people in 2015, the arrival of refugees 
and migrants in Europe has caused an overhaul of the way Europe 
deals with migration. The situation has become known as the 
‘migration crisis’ or ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe; not so much because 
of the death of, and danger for, migrants and refugees, but on account 
of the political problem that it has unleashed for Europe.  
 
The main research question in this chapter is: How has the ‘migration 
problem’ been defined in Europe, what are the origins of this definition, and how 
has this shaped the EU policy agenda on migration? In answering this 
question, the chapter looks at how the focus of the EU has shifted 
from the protection of human dignity to the reduction of migrant 
numbers, and how its migration policy has evolved in a debate 
increasingly dominated by right-wing movements, contributing 
considerably to phenomena like the Brexit-vote.  
 
The EU has put a lot of effort into dealing with the migration 
situation through new policy frameworks. Increasingly, the EU has 
focused on stopping migration outside of its own territory by making 
deals with North African countries and by protecting its external 
borders. This chapter examines the EU’s changing migration policy 
in the last five years and its failure to protect people and guarantee 
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them the rights agreed on in various international conventions, like 
the United Nations Convention on Refugees. The start of this chapter 
unfolds in Lampedusa, the Italian island where a ship with refugees 
sank in 2013 leading to the deaths of hundreds of people (BBC, 
2013c). It is argued that this was the critical moment that shaped the 
European migration and asylum policy of today. It is where the 
foundations of the framing of the migrant crisis were laid.  
Agenda setting 
This chapter’s theoretical basis is John Kingdon’s multiple streams 
framework, a theoretical framework that proposes that policy change 
occurs when agenda setting, policy choices and politics are aligned 
(Kingdon, 2014). A policy window is:  
 
…an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push for their pet solutions, or to push 
attention to their special problems... Sometimes the window opens quite predictably… 
At other times, it opens quite unpredictably. Policy entrepreneurs must be prepared, 
their pet proposal at the ready, their special problem well-documented, lest the 
opportunity pass them by. (Kingdon, 2014)  
 
Drawing inspiration from organisational development theory, the 
framework looks at the dynamics of the entire policy process from 
agenda setting to decision making to implementation and identifies 
three streams that determine the policy outcome. According to this 
theory, a policy window can open for change if: a problem is 
identified, a solution is available, and the political climate is ready for 
change. Especially relevant to this chapter is Kingdon’s discussion 
about how different issues are treated by policymakers, in other 
words, their classification as a condition or a problem:  
 
Conditions come to be defined as problems, and have a better chance of rising on the 
agenda, when we come to believe that we should do something to change them. People 
in and around government define conditions as problems in several ways. First, 
conditions that violate important values are transformed into problems. Second, 
conditions become problems by comparison with other countries or other relevant 
units. Third, classifying a condition into one category rather than another may define 
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it as one kind of a problem or another. The lack of public transportation for 
handicapped people, for instance, can be classified as a transportation problem or as 
a civil rights problem, and the treatment of the subject is dramatically affected by the 
category. (Kingdon, 2014) 
 
Kingdon’s theory is used in this chapter as the basis for understanding 
and analysing the unfolding of EU policies around the ‘migration 
problem’ inside and outside the EU. Analysis is conducted through 
research and the examination of EU policy papers, press releases, 
news articles, briefs and documentaries. Furthermore, a number of 
interviews were conducted with EU officials (i.e., the Directorate 
General for Development Cooperation, representatives from the 
European External Action Service, members of the European 
Parliament, and policymakers from the Commissioners’ Cabinets) in 
2018 in Brussels, Belgium.  
Lampedusa: The window opens 
For this analysis, one particular event which took place off the Italian 
island of Lampedusa is taken as a starting point. On 3 October 2013, 
a ship approaching the island carrying over 500 people, mainly from 
Eritrea, sank in the sea. The ship had sailed from Misrata, Libya. Over 
360 people were reportedly drowned, while around 155 were rescued. 
On 11 October 2013, a second shipwreck would follow, even closer 
to the Italian coast, though smaller in size (BBC, 2013b). These were 
not the first shipwrecks, nor the last, but the size and their relative 
closeness to the shores of Europe made the Lampedusa tragedy a key 
moment in the European migration debate. Through the images of 
bodies being brought to shore, Europeans saw the horrific tragedy of 
migration through the Central Mediterranean route.  
 
Europe was shocked. Then Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta wrote 
on Twitter that the Lampedusa shipwreck was “an immense tragedy”. 
The Italian government launched the rescue operation Mare Nostrum 
to help prevent further tragedies and they asked the European Union 
for help to save lives at sea (The Telegraph, 2013). Italian Deputy 
Prime Minister Angelino Alfano stressed that the incident showed 
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that European assistance was needed to deal with the continuing 
influx of refugees and characterised the incident as “a European 
tragedy, not just an Italian one” (The Telegraph, 2013). The European 
Union’s response to the boat tragedy was immediate: Cecilia 
Malmström, then European Commissioner for Home Affairs, called 
the EU to increase its Mediterranean-wide search and rescue patrols 
to intercept migrant boats, through the Frontex border agency (BBC, 
2013d). She said: “Let's make sure that what happened in Lampedusa 
will be a wakeup call to increase solidarity and mutual support and to 
prevent similar tragedies in the future” (European Commission, 
2013a). José Manuel Barroso, then President of the European 
Commission, travelled to Italy and said that “this image of hundreds 
of coffins will never come out of my mind. It’s something I think one 
cannot forget: coffins of babies, coffins with a mother and a child that 
was born just at that moment. This is something that profoundly 
shocked me” (BBC, 2013c). He further added that an additional 
funding of 30 million euros would be allocated to help refugees in 
Italy. Moreover, he had announced that the EU would work towards 
a common European asylum and migration policy, to have “much 
stronger mechanisms at [the] European level”. At first glance, it 
seemed that the tragedy had shaken up the European Union. A policy 
window had opened, as a condition had come to be defined as a 
problem, and there was political will and the momentum to address 
it. However, the way that the problem definition would evolve in the 
days following the tragedy would prove highly influential in the EU’s 
new migration policy framework. 
Framing ‘the problem’ following the shipwreck 
According to Kingdon’s theory, the way one frames the problem 
determines the solution. The crucial framing that would come to 
define the ‘migration crisis’ has its roots in the Lampedusa tragedy. 
The shock of the tragedy created a policy window, enabling the issue 
to be placed firmly on the public and political agenda and a solution 
to be developed, powered by the necessary political will. However, 
this chapter will show that the framing of the problem shaped the 




The initial political response to the Lampedusa tragedy was focused 
on the fact that a large number of people had passed away, but then 
the debate shifted to who the victims were. Unfortunately, the media 
and politicians categorised the people who had drowned as migrants 
(with a focus on their illegal crossing), not as refugees. This is 
characterised by the fact that the survivors of the Lampedusa 
shipwreck were charged with the crime of illegal migration. “The law 
is the law”, stated Prime Minister Enrico Letta (Luciano & Piscopo, 
2018). This key framing of the survivors not as refugees in need of 
international protection, but firstly as illegal migrants, has been key to 
the development of EU migration policy.  
 
The HBO documentary It Will be Chaos (Luciano & Piscopo, 2018) 
has documented the unfolding of the Lampedusa tragedy and the EU 
response in detail, including how people were categorised as migrants 
by the politicians from the very beginning. The documentary shows 
Guisi Nicolini, the Mayor of Lampedusa, stressing to the media from 
the beginning: “let’s make it clear. Those who land in Lampedusa 
aren’t ‘illegals’ [sic]. They are refugees. We are talking about asylum 
seekers [...] I have to correct you otherwise you will report that these 
are ‘illegals’ [sic]. Well, if you don’t get it, neither will your audience. 
Those who land in Lampedusa are not simply ‘undocumented’. These 
people are refugees. You know, words are important” (Luciano & 
Piscopo, 2018). This excerpt shows that the media had already begun 
to refer to the irregular status of those involved in the tragedy. William 
Swing from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) said 
that “clearly, for us and I think for you [referring to Nicolini], the top 
priority has to be to save lives, to save people from dying. We should 
take urgent actions and stronger international coordination” (Luciano 
& Piscopo, 2018). Nicolini then emphasised the duty the stakeholders 
had to receive the refugees with adequate and decent reception 
standards. She also said “our system was conceived to push them 
back, rather than receiving them. The ‘strength’ of Lampedusa is to 
witness what’s going on first hand” (Luciano & Piscopo, 2018). The 
documentary also depicts the solidarity between the refugees and the 
people of Lampedusa: a fisherman tells a refugee that there is no need 
to thank him as he was happy to have been there to help. Later, the 
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fisherman describes the shock he had experienced and that he could 
never go back in his boat again after the incident. 
 
The early pushback on terminology and the framing by individuals 
such as Nicolini did not last; the police escorted the Eritrean survivors 
of the shipwreck from Lampedusa to mainland Italy, where they were 
persecuted for illegally crossing into Italy – criminalising the refugees, 
who had just survived a major traumatic event. The documentary It 
Will be Chaos shows a meeting with the refugees, where the Mayor of 
Lampedusa said that she would provide “maximum support to the 
victims’ families”, and the documentary shows the refugees 
demanding that they at least see the corpses of their lost family 
members. In a press brief, then President of the European 
Commission, Manuel Barosso said that: “Today, Lampedusa and Italy 
are the focus of attention but let’s not forget that also other countries 
are facing strong migratory pressure – we the European Commission 
are doing everything we can to have much stronger mechanisms at 
European level” (Luciano & Piscopo, 2018). Moreover, then 
European Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom said that: “This is not 
the European Union that we want. We need to do everything we can 
to prevent tragedies such as this one [Lampedusa] to happen again” 
(Luciano & Piscopo, 2018). The tragedy was beginning to drive 
change in the European Union, beyond Italy.  
 
In December 2013, Task Force Mediterranean was set up by the 
European Commission in response to the Lampedusa Tragedy. This 
task force was mandated to prevent loss of human life, but with a 
focus to “prevent migrants from undertaking dangerous journeys” 
(European Commission, 2013c). The first point on a five-point list 
was cooperation with third countries to prevent migration. The other 
focal points were regional protection and legal pathways, the fighting 
of smuggling and trafficking, border surveillance and solidarity 
between member states. This shows that the main pillars of the EU’s 
migration policy were founded on the understanding of migration as 
the key underlying problem, with stopping migration seen as the main 




Through the focus on the legal status of the victims of the Lampedusa 
tragedy, the framing of migration as the overall problem and the focus 
on the number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea, the stage 
was set by the media, politicians, and people of Italy and Europe. This 
gradual categorisation of the situation as a ‘migrant crisis’ would 
persist and come to define the policy agenda.  
A numbers game 
Another driver of EU migration policy was the issue of solidarity, also 
shown in the Lampedusa tragedy. Following the boat disaster, Italian 
officials called for solidarity from the EU. Member states now had to 
face the challenge of how to manage the incoming population. The 
EU was not ready for the ‘migration crisis’, as Collett and Le Coz 
(2018) have argued. The 2015 and 2016 flows of migrants and 
refugees in Europe:  
 
…presented the European Union with a transnational (and existential) crisis in a 
policy area that had not been constructed to manage fast-paced change. Deep political 
dissent and complex divisions of power between EU institutions, as well as between 
Member States, further hampered the European Union’s ability to respond, 
exacerbating long-standing tensions that persist several years on. (Collett & Le 
Coz, 2018)  
 
Moreover, national machineries were inadequate for the number of 
arrivals in 2014 and 2015: 
 
…national reception systems nearly collapsed under the volume of newcomers, and 
disagreements deepened through Member States over how to share responsibility for 
processing and offering protection to those in need […] While this period has widely 
been described as a ‘migration crisis’, suggesting the disorder was the somewhat 
inevitable result of the sheer number of persons arriving, this might be more accurately 
termed a ‘systemic crisis’. The heightened arrivals revealed structural deficiencies 
within the design and implementation of national asylum systems and of the CEAS 
[Common European Asylum System]. The problem the crisis brought to light may 
have been greater in magnitude than had previously been seen, but they were not new 




This illustrates how internal, structural issues within the EU were 
externalised by politicians who were able to blame ‘uncontrollable 
migration’ as a convenient scapegoat for internal EU problems. The 
European Commission recognised the need for solidarity, proposing 
a mandatory relocation and resettlement scheme in 2015 to assist 
Greece and Italy, and to relocate refugees from third countries. 
However, strong resistance came from EU countries such as Hungary 
and Slovakia, and the idea of mandatory quotas was finally officially 
taken off the agenda in September 2018. The idea of Europe as a 
united entity which would tackle such problems together was shaken 
by the resistance, and further by the Brexit vote of June 2016, in 
which the migration debate played a large role. The definition of 
mixed migration flows as ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’ migrants has continued 
to lead to individualised policy making within the European Union, 
undermining solidarity and a human rights-based response.  
The policies: EU migration policy 
How did Kingdon’s second (policy – what can be done) and third 
(politics – the political climate) streams come together to change the 
EU’s migration policy? This was a process of formation and refining 
of policy proposals around the policy window. As Kingdon puts it, 
this includes “swings in the national mood”. It depends on the 
readiness of a nation – in this case a collection of nations, the 
European Union – to face a problem (Kingdon, 2014).  
 
Kingdon has said that “the proposal [i.e., for a new policy] must be 
worked beforehand, and must surface and be pushed when the 
window is open” (Kingdon, 2014). However, in the case of the EU, 
it must be stressed that neither the member states nor the European 
Union were ready beforehand to deal with the ‘migration crisis’ in a 
way that would be in line with the EU’s standards on human rights.  
 
Due to the urgency and the political push, the European Union 
institutions had to find immediate solutions, as the wave of reaction 
was strong enough to start shaking the EU at its roots. EU member 
states wanted to protect their sovereignty to decide over migration 
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issues, which was possible due to the framing of the problem as an 
irregular migration problem, rather than an international protection 
problem. 
 
The people of Lampedusa were taking to the streets saying that they 
had taken over the governments’ job to defend themselves – the 
people shouted lines such as: “we are the ones to assist the migrants. 
We all need a psychologist”, “This is a pressure cooker, sooner or 
later it will explode”, “More and more people will keep coming here, 
if we don’t help them, it will be a disaster – we need to act now, not 
just words, we need facts!” (Luciano & Piscopo, 2018). As the 
pressure on EU member states grew towards 2015, protests turned 
against refugees and migrants and became more violent, as refugees 
and migrants were linked in the public debate with violence, rape and 
terrorism. In an effort to formulate policy and control this outrage as 
much possible, the EU responded to the ‘crisis’ in multiple ways. 
European Agenda on Migration 
A key document in the EU’s migration strategy has been the 
European Agenda on Migration. It was formulated in May 2015 at 
the peak of refugee and migrant arrivals. Its objectives have guided 
and shaped the EU’s migration approach since then. At the top of the 
list is increasing border protection, as shown by the 2015 intention of 
tripling the capacity of Frontex, the EU’s border and coast guard 
agency. Other priority areas include the prosecution of traffickers and 
smugglers, the hotspot-approach to processing asylum seekers more 
quickly, and, further down the agenda, saving lives and improving 
legal migration. The immediate response, however, is aimed at 
protecting the EU’s borders first; the safety of refugees and migrants 
comes much later.  
 
Comparing the European Agenda on Migration from 2015 and its 
progress report released in 2018, an assessment can be made of what 
the EU has achieved – and what it has not. With this Agenda, the 
European Commission tried to “bring together the different steps the 
European Union should take now, and in the coming years, to build 
up a coherent and comprehensive approach to reap the benefits and 
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address the challenges deriving from migration” (European 
Commission, 2015a). The report from 2018 reads that “the response 
was immediate but insufficient” (European Commission, 2018a), as 
across Europe there were doubts that the migration policy was 
proportionate to the amount of pressure. Conflicts, such as the 
reluctance of member states to ‘share the burden’ of migration – for 
example, the refusal by some member states to agree to mandatory 
relocation quotas from Italy and Greece to other EU member states 
– frustrated coherence in the European Union institutions. Members 
of the European Parliament reported growing more frustrated by the 
European Council and Commission’s secrecy around its migration 
policy, especially in relation to its deals with third countries.  
 
The European Commission’s Agenda on Migration progress report 
of 2018 described the situation along the main migration routes as a 
continued challenge, even though there have been 28% fewer arrivals 
of people than in 2014; the situation remains fragile and “pressure on 
national migration systems, while decreasing, remains at a high level” 
(European Commission, 2018b). The First Vice-President of the 
European Commission Frans Timmermans described the report as a 
reflection of the EU’s joint efforts to manage migration in a 
comprehensive way. Stressing that migration remains a high priority, 
he called the EU to “maintain this momentum and work hard to take 
further steps forward, including finding agreement on the reformed 
asylum system. Some of these actions are very urgent, such as 
honouring the financial contributions Member States committed to” 
(European Commission, 2018b). 
 
More specifically, the report describes that, in 2017, more than 2,000 
smuggled migrants were saved in the desert. It states that the joint 
African Union-European Union-United Nations Taskforce has 
helped more than 15,000 to return from Libya to their home 
countries in cooperation with IOM (European Commission, 2018a). 
As for funding, the report reads that it continues to play an important 
role in addressing the bedrock of immigration, protecting migrants 
and refugees on the routes and countering smuggling and trafficking, 
“with now 147 programmes for a total of €2.5 billion approved across 
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the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North Africa” 
(European Commission, 2018b). However, the report claims that 
there is still need for more funding. 
 
The framing of successes in this report reflects the priorities of the 
EU: reducing the number of migrants equals a successful policy. 
However, the EU’s approach of external border management, which 
will be discussed later, negatively impacts on its human rights record.  
Frontex 
On October 2016, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
was officially launched as an extension of the mandate of Frontex and 
to effectively monitor the EU’s external borders. The European 
Council expressed the view that open internal borders (the Schengen 
area) will remain sustainable only if the external borders are secured 
and protected (European Council, 2016). The role and activities of 
Frontex have been significantly expanded to include helping in return 
operations (since 2017, there have been 135 such operations), among 
other things. In September 2018, President of the European 
Commission Jean Claude Juncker announced plans for an additional 
10,000 Frontex border guards (European Commission, 2018d). This 
means tighter control of Europe’s external borders. Moreover, apart 
from placing more guards in Frontex, the agency has also taken on a 
law enforcing role. Fabrice Leggeri, the agency’s chief, told the EU 
observer that “I would not object if you define us as a law 
enforcement agency at EU level” (Nielsen, 2018).  
 
Meanwhile, NGOs engaging in sea rescue operations face legal 
pressure, as they are seen as being associated with smugglers and 
traffickers. Facing pressure from Italy’s right-wing government, the 
rescue vessel Aquarius, for example, has been docked and its rescue 
missions ended under pressure (Schlein, 2018). Such repercussions 
for human rights defenders, in combination with increased reliance 
on border guards and coast guards of third countries such as Libya, 
means that the focus continues to shift away from saving lives at sea 
to stopping migration. IOM’s data shows that in response, smuggling 
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and trafficking networks are shifting to the more dangerous sea routes 
to Spain (IOM, 2018). 
 
Furthermore, serious doubts exist over Frontex’s commitment to 
fundamental rights. When in May 2018 the European Parliament 
hosted the Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights (the 
Parliament has a solely consultative role in this regard) to discuss the 
latter’s annual report on their activities and recommendations to 
Frontex, the members of the European Parliament responded with 
criticism (Karagianni, 2018b). The report describes the reluctance of 
the agency to adequately staff the Fundamental Rights Office, as well 
as its delays in adopting their Fundamental Rights Strategy. The 
members strongly criticised the reluctance of Frontex to implement 
human rights standards, as well as its denial of doing so. Member of 
Parliament Birgit Sippel (Socialists and Democrats party) said that:  
 
Sometimes we could get the impression that the Fundamental Rights Office is only a 
kind of an alibi for everything else that is happening in Frontex […] There is, not 
for the first time, an apparent reluctance of Frontex to adequately staff the 
Fundamental Rights Office and this is especially alarming as, in its current form, 
especially this office lacks the minimum capacity to carry out its role including the 
monitoring of Frontex fundamental rights obligations as mandated in the regulation. 
(Karagianni, 2018b) 
 
Member of Parliament Ana Gomes (Socialists and Democrats party) 
also commented sharply, saying that when it comes to Libya, the EU 
institutions and EU member states “are in denial”, “pretending that 
they are training local and armed forces” (Karagianni, 2018b) to help 
them deal with refugees and migrants, but actually “what we know is 
that these forces are indeed militia enabled to actually repress the 
people” (Karagianni, 2018b).  
Externalisation of borders 
After Lampedusa, the EU increasingly grouped refugees and migrants 
together under the heading ‘migrants’, often with the adjective 
‘irregular’ to emphasise their status. This shift in narrative places a 
reduced obligation on the EU to offer protection to anyone who has 
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not clearly been labelled as a refugee or asylum seeker. Another 
approach that the EU took is to move the burden of the EU’s 
problem externally, namely, to Turkey and Africa.  
 
Following the Lampedusa tragedy, the EU partnered with Africa on 
migration at the regional level through the Khartoum Process. The 
Khartoum Process aims at:  
 
…establishing a continuous dialogue for enhanced cooperation on migration and 
mobility, identifying and implementing concrete projects to address trafficking in 
human beings and the smuggling of migrants and giving a new impetus to the regional 
collaboration between countries of origin, transit and destination regarding the 
migration route between the Horn of Africa and Europe. (European Union, 
2015a)  
 
The full name of the Khartoum Process, the ‘EU-Horn of Africa 
Migration Route Initiative’, reveals that the main goal of the Process 
is to stop migration from the Horn of Africa. The Process focuses 
heavily on preventing trafficking and smuggling, and not so much on 
the possible legal pathways that refugees could take to reach Europe 
or other destinations safely. In addition, the Khartoum Process is set 
apart by the inclusion of governments that have been accused of 
severe human rights abuses in its steering committee, such as Sudan 
and Eritrea, which are treated as equal partners despite accusations 
about their involvement in trafficking and smuggling operations (Van 
Reisen & Mawere, 2017). The full steering committee is comprised of 
five African countries (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan) 
and five European countries (Italy, France, Germany, United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands), as well as the European Commission, 
European External Action Service and African Union Commission. 
The Khartoum Process forms a platform for dialogue and projects 
and implements action funded by the multi-billion EU Emergency 
Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa, which pays for, among other things, 
the Better Migration Management (BMM) regional project in the 





By naming the Khartoum Process after the capital of Sudan, the name 
gives legitimacy to the Government of Sudan as a key actor and 
partner in migration management, as well as situating the 
responsibility to keep refugees and migrants in Africa and not in 
Europe. Legitimacy is also given to Eritrea, one of the main refugee-
producing countries in Africa, which is set to chair the Khartoum 
Process in 2019 (Plaut, 2018). In its drive to stop migration, the EU 
is dependent on the help of the authorities of countries with poor 
human rights records as the only available partners.  
 
Arguably, this policy has started to erode the human rights 
foundations of the European Union. Critics have argued that 
initiatives such as the Khartoum Process have “exacerbated the 
regional situation and [put] more migrants in harm’s way 
(Woodnorth, 2017). Hala Al-Karib, Regional Director of the Strategic 
Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa pointed out that:  
 
Europe’s efforts on migration are too focused on to trying to stop people from moving. 
They treat illegal cross-border movement as an issue of law enforcement rather than 
as a symptom of deep-seated governance and extreme poverty problems, and fail to 
take into account people’s reasons for leaving, or their terrifying lack of choice. 
(Woodnorth, 2017) 
 
Dr Lutz Oette, Director of the Centre for Human Rights Law at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies in London has argued for the 
need to restructure the whole process: “I think one needs to go back 
to the drawing board in terms of policy making, get other actors 
involved and escape that instrumental, state-centric logic that has 
been pursued so far” (Woodnorth, 2017).  
 
In the Valletta Summit on Migration (European Union, 2015b), 
stakeholders adopted a political declaration on European migration 
issues and set up the EUTF for Africa to address the “root causes of 
irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa” (European 
Commission, 2015c). This fund has been created for the EU to 
deliver aid and deal with emergencies. Directly managed by the 
European Commission, it is designed to increase the EU’s global 
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visibility and deal with the risks created by political instability. The 
EUTF was adopted at the Valletta Summit in 2015.  
 
As the European Commission stated, with the creation of the EUTF, 
the EU sought to “address the disorganization and fragmentation of 
the response of the international community and […] create a new 
form of European assistance cooperation that will ensure […] swift 
delivery of concrete results on field” (European Commission, 2015b). 
However, as the refugee crisis unfolded, the fund’s focus shifted 
towards addressing the root causes of irregular migration in Africa by 
“promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security 
and development and addressing human rights abuses, in three vast 
and very different regions: the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and Lake 
Chad, and North Africa” (Herrero Cangas & Knoll, 2016). As trust 
funds fall outside of the EU budget, it is not bound by the same EU 
budgetary rules and there is less oversight (European Parliament, 
2018). Individuals in the European Commission welcome the fact 
that the fund has allowed them more freedom to spend beyond 
emergencies; however, the EUTF has also been criticised for its lack 
of transparency and use of development aid to stop migration. 
Notably, the European Parliament has been critical of the EUTF, 
noting in a 2016 resolution that the European Parliament: “is 
concerned that financing of the EUTF may be implemented to the 
detriment of other development objectives” and “condemns any use 
of EDF [European Development Funds] and ODA [overseas 
development assistance] funds for migration management and 
control of any other actions without development objectives” 
(European Parliament, 2016).  
 
Critics, including NGOs and think tanks, have also objected to the 
EUTF, its nature and intentions. For example, the European Centre 
for Development Policy Management pointed out that:  
 
…expectations need to be managed, with regards to what impact can be realistically 
achieved with a little extra cash. The programmes and activities funded by the Africa 
Trust Fund alone are rather unlikely to make a significant difference in accelerating 
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peace and prosperity in Africa, and quickly and effectively addressing the drivers of 
displacement and irregular migration. (Herrero Cangas & Knoll, 2016)  
 
The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) has also 
criticised the fund, stating that: “the program lacks checks and 
balances to guaranty [sic] the fund’s benefit for African countries. The 
focus on short-term EU interests might jeopardize long term interests 
for African partners” (ECRE, 2017). In addition, the NGO Oxfam 
has stressed that: 
 
[w]ithout sufficient investment in opening more safe and regular mobility pathways 
– both within Africa and towards Europe – the EUTF will not only fail to achieve 
its goals for development, but also its migration-related policy goals. Rather than 
leading to a reduction in migration, restricting irregular migration will simply force 
migrants to take more dangerous routes. (Oxfam, 2017) 
 
Andrea Stocchiero, expert in migration for the NGO Concord Italy, 
has also said that:  
 
EU Migration Compacts address only partially the drivers of forced migration, which 
requires a long-term, coherent and sustainable approach. They keep on focusing on 
‘quick fixes’ (border controls and returns) and this is the main reason for their 
failure. Projects deviate from migration flows towards alternative dangerous routes 
and indirectly contribute to inhumane conditions and endangering human rights. The 
EU needs to reform the Trust Fund, and more broadly its overall migration policy, 
and use these kinds of instruments as the main tool to increase community resilience. 
(Concord, 2018) 
 
Beyond the EUTF, since the Lampedusa tragedy, development 
funding by the EU has also increasingly been used to address 
migration. For example, in 2015, Neven Mimica, the EU 
Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, 
named migration as a key reason to resume development funding to 
Eritrea, even though previous development funding had shown little 
to no results on improving human rights or poverty in Eritrea. Such 
funding was even suspended after the Eritrean government refused 
to cooperate. However, when the EU relaunched the plans for 
576 
 
development aid to Eritrea in 2015, Mimica stated: “This would be a 
development contribution to the root causes of migration in Eritrea” 
(Blair, 2015). However, in 2018, the European Commission realised 
that the budgets for most of its programmes with Eritrea remained 
unspent due to lack of independent partners to implement the 
programmes with. In addition, Eritrea did not accept the terms of the 
spending agreements. In order to continue engagement with Eritrea, 
Commissioner Mimica paid a visit to Eritrean President Isaias 
Afwerki on 8 February 2019, and the men agreed on a new EUR 20 
million project for road construction between the Eritrean port of 
Massawa and the border with Ethiopia (European Commission, 
2019). The project, unlike the earlier development aid which fell 
under the framework of the European Development Fund, will be 
organised under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The 
details of the project have yet to be negotiated. 
Deals with third countries 
Another way that the European Union and individual member states 
have sought to externalise border control is through bilateral deals 
with third countries. The main example has been the EU-Turkey deal 
of March 2016, which saw Turkey agreeing to host and accept the 
return of refugees in exchange for EU funds and political gestures. 
The legality of the EU-Turkey deal and other such deals, which are 
masked as statements rather than treaties, but which have a more 
clearly-defined legal status, has been fiercely debated (Matusescu, 
2016). Despite criticism over its human rights implications, the EU-
Turkey deal has been hailed by the EU as “a game changer” 
(European Commission, 2018c). 
 
Other such controversial deals, including for funding to stop 
migration, have been made. In 2016, confidential EU documents 
were leaked showing the EU’s intention to engage with countries with 
dubious human rights record on migration: “to reduce onward 
movements to Europe” (ARTE/ZDF, 2018). The documents 
revealed the EU’s awareness of how such deals would look: “the EU 
should consider its high reputational risk associated with the 
engagement with Sudan exclusively focused on migration” 
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(ARTE/ZDF, 2018). In its cooperation on border management in 
Sudan particularly, the EU faces criticism for giving legitimacy to the 
Sudanese regime and supporting, indirectly, the Rapid Support Forces 
in Sudan, which have been implicated in war crimes. Although the 
EU denies cooperation with the Rapid Support Forces, the 
documentary ‘Türsteher Europas’ states that the these forces play a 
role in Sudanese border management. When Sudan/EU talks were 
ongoing, the Rapid Support Forces detained 700 refugees, stating: “I 
underline, the refugees pose no danger to us. These people are trying 
to reach Europe, so we are assisting Europe” (ARTE/ZDF, 2018). 
 
Deals with Libya (Aljazeera, 2017), including a controversial pact 
between Italy and Libya, have led to cooperation with the Libyan 
Coast Guard and the return of many migrants and refugees to Libya, 
where they face human traffickers and detention centres. The 
collaboration with Libya has attracted a lot of criticism from 
international organisations and civil society, as it has led to migrants 
and refugees becoming trapped in inhumane conditions (Karagianni, 
2018a). For instance, the UN Human Rights Commissioner Zeid 
Ra’ad al-Hussein has openly characterised the EU’s policy of helping 
Libyan authorities in detaining migrants as “inhuman”. In addition, 
the Libyan Coast Guard has been accused of using excessive force to 
remove refugees who were too afraid to set foot in Libya from ships 
that were intercepted (Hagenberg, 2018). Heba Morayef, Amnesty 
International’s Middle East and North Africa Director, has stated that 
“the EU is turning a blind eye to the suffering caused by its callous 
immigration policies that outsource border control to Libya” 
(Amnesty International, 2018a).  
 
In September 2018, the EU announced that it will reinforce the 
relationship with Egypt to decrease the movement of refugees and 
migrants towards Europe. The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) special envoy for the Central Mediterranean 
said that the EU “cannot ask other countries to do things they are not 
ready to do themselves” (Barrigazzi, 2018) and suggested that at the 
European level it is important to work on the internal dimension of 
processing and distributing refugees. Furthermore, a report by the 
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Global Detention Project reads that Egypt “has been criticized by 
rights groups and European policymakers because of the wider 
human rights landscape… Reporting suggests that Egypt has become 
a ‘dead-end’ for migrants as a result of cooperation with the EU since 
2015” (Global Detention Project, 2018). According to the same 
report: “the Egyptian criminal law provides grounds for prosecuting 
people for status-related violations” (Barrigazzi, 2018, p. 21). The 
report says that in the past sources have reported to the Global 
Detention Project that: “authorities frequently charged people for 
migration-related infractions. However, more recently observers 
report that authorities generally avoid criminal prosecution, instead 
holding migrants in detention through administrative orders from the 
Department of Passports, Immigration and Nationality” (Barrigazzi, 
2018, p. 7). Moreover, Africa Monitors has reported that Eritrean 
refugees in Egypt face “issues of protection, Refugee Status 
Determination, Resettlement, financial assistance and social services 
(education, health care and employment)” (Africa Monitors, 2018). 
Amnesty International posted an article on Egypt and its 
“unprecedented crackdown on freedom of expression”, arguing that: 
 
…since December 2017 Amnesty International has documented cases of at least 
111 individuals who have been detained by the National Security Services solely for 
criticizing the President and the human rights situation in Egypt. (Amnesty 
International, 2018b) 
 
In the documentary ‘Türsteher Europas’, the film makers show how 
border externalisation has impacted on smuggling and trafficking in 
Africa. Vincent Cochetel from UNHCR Europe stated that:  
 
The smugglers take much higher risks and there are more people being stranded in 
the desert. We now have more people dying in the desert, probably more than those 
drowning in the Mediterranean. (ARTE/ZDF, 2018)  
 
At the bilateral level, cooperation with African countries takes place 
within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement (African, Caribbean 
Pacific [ACP]-EU Partnership Agreement). With the Cotonou 
Agreement’s legal mandate due to end in 2020, the actors have started 
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discussing how to form a post-Cotonou Agreement. Migration is a 
major part of the discussion, as the EU is pressing the topic of 
migration to be a key part of the new relationship. However, African 
countries have pushed back against the EU on ideas for migration 
management, such as regional centres for processing asylum claims, 
called ‘disembarkation centres’.  
 
The deals with third countries, as well as the pushback at the 
European borders, contravene principles described in European and 
international law. For example, the Lisbon Treaty, the constitutional 
basis of the EU, states: 
 
The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and international law. (European Union, 2007, Lisbon 
Treaty, Article 21, para 1)  
 
The Cotonou Agreement includes references to fundamental 
elements, including in Article 9: 
 
Respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect for 
fundamental social rights, democracy based on the rule of law and transparent and 
accountable governance are an integral part of sustainable development. 
(European Union, 2000b, Cotonou Agreement, Article 9, para 1) 
 
The EU, by collaborating with countries like Libya, Sudan and Egypt, 
or supporting the pushing back of people arriving on European 
shores to their countries of origin or third countries such as Libya, 
without an explicit review of the reasons why the person is there, goes 
against the principle of non-refoulement. Article 33(1) of the Refugee 
Convention states that “no Contracting State shall expel or return 
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account 
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of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion” (United Nations, 1951).  
 
Apart from the UN Refugee Convention, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union also offers insights into 
how the EU has agreed to support migrants and refugees. Article 4 
of the Charter states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” and Article 6 
describes that “everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person”. Moreover, Article 19 (1) states that collective expulsions are 
prohibited and Article 19 (2) brings to attention the principle of non-
refoulement, saying that “no one may be removed, expelled or 
extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would 
be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment” (European Union, 2000a). 
Knowingly collaborating with actors and regimes that are themselves 
involved in human trafficking and human rights abuses, and assisting 
in the pushback of refugees and migrants to countries such as Libya, 
where horrific human rights abuses have been recorded, is not only 
against the EU’s own regulations, but it makes the European Union 
complicit.  
The political mood 
The third stream of Kingdon’s policy framework relates to politics or 
the political climate. This topic has permeated this chapter. The policy 
debate started out with a sense of European unity and managing the 
situation in accordance with human dignity. In the State of the Union 
address in 2015, European Commission President Juncker stated: 
 
The first priority today is and must be addressing the refugee crisis. […] The 
numbers are impressive. For some they are frightening. But now is not the time to 
take fright. It is time for bold, determined and concerted action by the European 
Union, by its institutions and by all its Member States. […] We Europeans should 
remember well that Europe is a continent where nearly everyone has at one time been 
a refugee. Our common history is marked by millions of Europeans fleeing from 
581 
 
religious or political persecution, from war, dictatorship, or oppression. (Juncker, 
2015)  
 
This sentiment was also symbolised in the statement that German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel would later attempt to take back: “wir 
schaffen das” (we will do it) (Delcker, 2016). She was referring to 
Germany’s commitment to receive refugees. In contrast, the 2018 
State of the Union address by Juncker focuses more on how much 
the European Union has been able to achieve with regards to 
reducing migration. One of the first direct references to migration in 
this speech reads: “Our efforts to manage migration have borne fruit: 
arrivals have been drastically reduced – down 97% in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and 80% in the Central Mediterranean. EU operations 
have helped rescue over 690,000 people at sea since 2015” (Juncker, 
2018). 
 
The political mood has changed within the EU, from a sense of 
tackling (albeit reluctantly) the issue together, to the individualisation 
of member state policies through the pressure of right-wing 
movements. Key issues, such as mandatory relocation quotas, have 
built momentum for resistance to the European Commission’s 
attempts to unite member states. When in 2015 a sense of panic broke 
out over the number of refugees and migrants arriving, which:  
 
…resulted in a gradual loss of confidence in the EU’s ability to protect its external 
borders, which led to a growing number of unilateral and uncoordinated actions by 
national authorities to suspend their implementation of binding EU agreements on 
internal borders and asylum-seekers. (Arditis, 2016) 
 
This, in turn, led to a focus on tackling the problem as it had been 
framed: an illegal migration problem. It meant that external border 
protection, which was not readily visible to the European public, such 
as strengthening Frontex and the Libyan Coast Guard, became the 





The first implication for asylum seekers stems from the Dublin 
Regulation (European Commission, 2013b). The purpose of this EU 
law is to: “assign one member state to one asylum seeker to ensure 
that individuals do not ask for asylum in multiple countries, and that 
governments do not outright ignore a person's asylum request” (Jesuit 
Refugee Service, n.d.). Both the UNHCR and ECRE have said that 
the Dublin Regulation impedes asylum seekers’ legal rights, along 
with their right to a fair examination of their asylum claims and, where 
recognised, to their effective protection (ECRE, 2009). ECRE, 
already in 2008, had characterised the Dublin Regulation as an 
anachronism, as it “does not promote harmonization of EU asylum 
systems, seriously impedes integration, and sows dissension among 
Member States. It simply does not work” (ECRE, 2008). 
Furthermore, the Dublin Regulation has imposed “untenable 
pressure on those States situated along Europe’s borders, gateway 
countries such as Poland, Spain, Italy and Greece” (Arimatsu, 
Samson, & Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011). The failing 
of mandatory quotas in the EU paired with the problems for both 
asylum seekers and countries bound by the Dublin Regulation means 
that political discord has grown between EU member states. 
 
Through the framing of people entering Europe in an irregular way 
as ‘illegal migrants’, refugees and migrants alike have become 
scapegoats for discontent in Europe. Combined with a series of 
terrorist attacks, which were sometimes, often falsely, blamed on 
migrants, the right-wing movements of Europe have used migration 
to gather momentum for their political agenda. Security and the 
protection of human rights are presented as trade-offs. Together with 
the problems created by the Dublin Regulation and the pressure 
placed on the EU border member states (i.e., Greece, Italy, Spain), 
nationalism and protectionism have grown. Some member states 
have started closing their borders: for instance, Poland has not and 
still does not accept any refugees. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, leader of 
Poland's ruling Law and Justice party, said in 2016 that “after recent 
events connected with acts of terror, [Poland] will not accept refugees 
because there is no mechanism that would ensure security” 
(Broomfield, 2016). Nationalistic tendencies have also grown in Italy. 
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When Mateo Salvini, Italian Minister of Interior, was elected in the 
general elections in 2018, he ordered that Malta accept refugees, 
saying that, Italy, having accepted refugees the last two years, would 
not accept anyone anymore (Durden, 2018). Furthermore, he drafted 
a decree which would “suspend the refugee application process of 
those who are considered ‘socially dangerous’ or who have been 
convicted of a crime” (Giuffrida, 2018).  
Conclusion 
Europe has gone from compassion to a focus on border control. 
According to Kingdon, when society faces a problem, a policy 
window can open for change if: the problem is identified, a solution 
is available, and the political climate is ready for change. According to 
Kingdon, a policy window opens when the three streams necessary 
for policy change – agenda-setting, policy and politics – are aligned.  
 
This chapter analyses how a policy window opened in Lampedusa in 
2013, when the problem was defined and both the political will and 
momentum were present. Unfortunately, the problem, despite the 
tragedy that occurred, was mainly defined as the illegal crossing of 
migrants into Europe. The problem was framed from the perspective 
of the rising concern among European citizens and overlooked the 
legitimate protection claim of the refugees and the global drivers of 
migration, as well as the lack of legal pathways for migration to 
Europe. The tragedy in Lampedusa simultaneously created pressure 
for change and the EU’s migration policy was shaped under this 
pressure. However, as the EU was not prepared to respond and 
because of the difficulty of coordinating the member states, the EU 
focused on stopping migration through the externalisation of its 
borders and increased border protection. Migration was framed as 
mainly an external problem that should be solved externally, rather 
than an internal EU issue.  
 
The changed narrative in the EU show the vast difference between 
2015, a peak year in terms of arrivals, but when EU policymakers tried 
to create a sense of togetherness and European identity (‘wir schaffen 
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das’) and the present. The commitment to human rights that was still 
on the agenda in 2015 has slowly been eroded. This chapter argues 
that this was inevitable, as the problem was framed from the outset 
as a problem of illegal migration – something external – rather than a 
problem of protection – something that the EU member states could 
tackle together.  
 
The policies that evolved addressed this framing of the problem. 
They focused on strengthening the EU border and coast guard agency 
Frontex, investing development funding into migration management, 
and making deals with third countries, even treating regimes involved 
in trafficking and human rights abuses, such as Eritrea and Sudan, as 
equals. In a strange turn of events, Eritrea will chair the Khartoum 
Process in 2019, despite being accused of ongoing human rights 
violations and being one of the main refugee-producing countries 
(Plaut, 2018). Now, the policy window for change has closed, locking 
in the current EU Agenda on Migration, and can now be 
characterised as a missed opportunity for policy change in line with 
the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and international law. 
 
From the very beginning after the Lampedusa tragedy, the 
stakeholders involved in EU policy making framed the problem in 
language that goes against international law. Refugees and migrants 
have different reasons for leaving their countries and, therefore, need 
different mechanisms of reception when they arrive in Europe. 
Refugees are entitled to protection and, until their claims can be 
examined, should be assumed to be legitimate. The EU is increasing 
border protection without providing adequate legal means for 
refugees and migrants to reach Europe. Moreover, the EU has placed 
the responsibility of dealing with migration on Africa and other third 
countries and has not made the necessary changes to the EU 
reception system. Due to the pressure to stop migration, it has come 
to dominate many of the discussions between the EU and its African 
partners, yet the political factors that cause migration have not been 
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Sudan and the EU: Uneasy Bedfellows 
 
Maddy Crowther & Martin Plaut 
 
Introduction 
Since this chapter was drafted, events in Sudan have brought 
considerable change to the country. In December 2018, protesters 
took to the streets 
demonstrating against the 
rising cost of living and 
calling for a change in regime. 
On 11 April 2019, former 
President Omar Al-Bashir, 
who had ruled Sudan for near 
30 years, was removed from 
power, and a coalition of 
security actors assumed 
leadership as a self-styled 
Transitional Military Council, 
entering into negotiations 
with democratic forces 
known as the Forces for 
Freedom and Change. After months of continued turbulence, the 
Forces for Freedom of Change and the Transitional Military Council 
formed a transitional government, the Sovereign Council, in August 
2019. The Sovereign Council will oversee a three-year transition to 
democracy. Second in command of the Transitional Military Council 
and part of the 11-member Sovereign Council is Mohammed 
Hamdan or ‘Hemetti’, leader of the Rapid Support Forces, whom we 
discuss in this chapter as assuming border control on behalf of the 
European Union.  
 
A convergence has developed between the 
aims of the EU and the (former) 
Sudanese leadership, making them 
uneasy bedfellows. Through the 
Khartoum Process, the EU seeks to 
reduce migration, while the Sudanese 
government sees migrants as useful pawns 
in their attempts to reduce international 
pressure for reform. Trapped between 
them are the refugees and migrants 
themselves, many of whom are desperate 
to find sanctuary.  
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The European Union’s (EU’s) relationship with Sudan has been 
shifting. Following the refugee ‘crisis’, European politicians have 
been keen to halt (or at least reduce) the influx of refugees and 
asylum-seekers arriving on their shores, and Sudan has been identified 
as a key country of transit for those coming from the Horn of Africa. 
At the same time, the Sudanese authorities have been desperate to 
break out of the isolation in which they have found themselves as a 
result of sanctions imposed by the international community, which 
were aimed at punishing systemic human rights abuses and 
promoting good governance, particularly following accusations of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in the Darfur 
region in the west of the country (International Criminal Court, n.d.).  
 
The EU and Sudan, therefore, have found themselves uneasy 
bedfellows and have for several years been quietly altering the terms 
of their relationship without the moral outrage, press attention or 
research that has accompanied deals struck with other countries like 
Libya or Turkey.  
 
For the EU, the reduction in the number of refugees coming to 
Europe has been a high priority in recent years. This agenda has been 
pursued despite the cost in terms of reputational damage to the EU 
and the suffering of those who have been prevented from finding 
sanctuary on European shores. It has been achieved to a considerable 
degree, with European nations deploying a number of tactics, 
including establishing direct links with African states via the 
Khartoum Process (Taylor, 2018), no matter how repressive these 
regimes might be. As the EU’s border agency, Frontex, reported in 
October 2018: 
 
The number of migrants arriving in Europe via the Central Mediterranean route 
[along which most refugees from Sudan travel] in September fell to about 900, down 
85% from September 2017. The total number of migrants detected on this route in 





At the same time, the Sudanese authorities have made considerable 
strides in escaping from the pariah status they found themselves in 
following the international outcry at the atrocities committed in 
Darfur. In 2004, President George Bush declared that the Sudanese 
regime’s behaviour in Darfur constituted genocide (International 
Justice Project, 2013). President Omar al-Bashir was referred to the 
International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity, including 
murder, rape and extermination (International Criminal Court, 2009). 
This placed the Sudanese government under intense scrutiny, which 
it had been attempting to reduce ever since.  
 
The Khartoum Process, initiated by the EU in November 2014, 
relieved pressure on the Bashir government (European Commission, 
2015). It provided the Sudanese authorities with direct access to 
senior European leaders, who treated its representatives as equals. 
The United States has moved in a similar direction. One of the first 
acts of the Trump administration was to lift some trade and economic 
sanctions against Sudan – a move welcomed by the authorities in 
Khartoum (Downie & Zaidan, 2018). What now remains is for the 
United States to lift Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, 
which will in turn give EU member states and members of the Paris 
Club the chance to offer debt relief. These developments helped the 
Bashir administration, whose primary objective was to secure its own 
survival: “Sudan’s national-security policy is driven by one overriding 
objective: to maintain the rule of the Islamist/National Congress 
Party (NCP) regime” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2018). The regime had existed in various guises since a coup in 1989 
(Cowell, 1989), but its lack of legitimacy required it to constantly 
resort to repressive measures to maintain control.68 
 
A convergence has, therefore, developed between the aims of the EU 
and the Sudanese regime: For the EU, the Khartoum Process is a 
 
68 This has been most notably the case during protests which started in December 
2018 and were continued throughout the first half of 2019 and lasted until after the 
ousting of Bashir in April 2019; during early 2019 live ammunition and tear gas 




means of reducing migration. For the Sudanese, migrants became 
useful pawns in their attempts to reduce international pressure for 
reform. Trapped between them are the refugees and migrants 
themselves, many of whom are desperate to find sanctuary. At the 
same time, the real political agenda pursued by European leaders 
came up against the EU’s public commitment to human rights and 
the protection of refugees, which it insists that it adheres to in all its 
activities (Council of the European Union, 2015). Hence, the 
question researched in this chapter is: To what extent has the EU kept its 
commitments under international law in relation to human rights and refugees in 
its cooperation with Sudan?69  
Sudanese security state 
The US State Department’s 2017 annual assessment of human rights 
provided a concise summary of the nature of the Sudanese state: 
“Sudan is a republic with power concentrated in the hands of 
authoritarian President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and his inner circle. 
The National Congress Party (NCP) continued 28 years of nearly 
absolute political authority” (US State Department, 2017). The 
authoritarian state is underpinned by the work of the Sudanese police, 
defence forces, and security forces, which collectively account for as 
much as three-quarters of all government expenditure (Baldo, 2016). 
Understanding the nature of Sudan’s security state is essential to 
obtaining an accurate picture of how EU interventions are 
implemented on the ground, as these are the partners the EU 
necessarily engages, emboldens, and even directly funds in its efforts 
to stem migration from, and through, the country. This is also the 
world into which a refugee steps upon entering Sudan. 
National Intelligence and Security Service 
One of the most powerful of Sudan’s security bodies is the National 
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). It is also often the most 
harmful and invasive, particularly for those living or working near its 
 
69 Considerable changes took place in Sudan during the period of writing and this 
chapter aims to provide a reflection of the EU’s policy with Sudan on migration in 
the period 2016–2019. 
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headquarters in the capital city, Khartoum. The NISS functions 
independent of any ministry and is ultimately responsible only to 
President al-Bashir.70 
 
Its mission is the strict maintenance of internal security and 
intelligence, which it interprets as keeping a tight grip on the public 
according to ‘red lines’ on issues it sees as posing a threat to regime 
longevity. Opposition politicians, students, human rights activists, or 
those simply from marginalised groups and conflict areas, are 
arrested. Journalists disappear and newspapers are regularly 
confiscated, or print runs confiscated to financially ruin publications 
(African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, 2018b). 
 
Those who are detained can expect to be held without charge, 
incommunicado, and to be beaten and tortured. Methods involve 
being held in inhumane conditions, for instance, in rooms crammed 
beyond capacity, being denied food, or sleep, and suffering beatings 
with electrical rods (Ahmed, 2017). Many are released only to be re-
detained after agreeing to become informants, in a ‘cat and mouse’ 
pattern. When detainees are released it is often on the condition of 
family guarantee or personal security, which obliges the individual not 
to engage in political activities or leave the country. It gives the police 
the right to detain them at any time. 
 
The NISS is effectively immune from scrutiny and prosecution. The 
2010 National Security Act gives it sweeping powers of arrest and 
detention without judicial oversight. Constitutional amendments 
passed in 2015 further weakened checks on the NISS’s power and 
grants officers immunity for abuse. According to civil society 
advocates, “it is like trying to fight an enemy with your hands tied 
behind your back” (Anon., human rights defender, interview, May 
2018). 
 
70 At the time of writing President al-Bashir was still in power. After his ousting in 
April 2019, the Military Council appointed a new intelligence chief, but structural 
reforms to the NISS or justice for violations committed by its officers have not yet 
manifested. Furthermore, the NISS was accused of playing a role in the violent 




Police forces report to the Ministry of Interior and are deployed 
throughout the country. The national police have a standard mandate 
of maintaining public order, but they are not free from controversy. 
For instance, in September 2013 they violently repressed protests in 
Khartoum that led to the death of hundreds of unarmed democracy 
protestors (Human Rights Watch, 2014b).71 
 
The police are often tasked with upholding Sudan’s more outdated 
and repressive laws. For example, a faction of the police called the 
Public Order Police is responsible for policing behaviour under the 
Public Order Laws, which unduly target women with stipulations on 
morality that might, for instance, prohibit the wearing of trousers, or 
types of informal economic work like selling tea (SIHA & Redress, 
2017). These laws also provide cover for the targeting of minorities 
with less strict or non-Islamic codes of conduct, such as migrants 
from Christian majority countries like Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
Armed forces 
The armed forces in Sudan include the regular army and the special 
forces, which function outside the army structure. Sudan has a long 
history of fracturing its military power and blurring command and 
control structures, so that it can claim plausible deniability in the face 
of investigations into human rights abuses. This was recognised at the 
height of the Darfur genocide, when the government armed local 
Arab groups to take up arms against non-Arab neighbours (Waal & 
Flint, 2005). This led to the formation of the notorious Janjaweed, 
which conducted acts of mass arson, sexual violence, shooting, and 
mutilation in Darfur. 
 
 
71 The British government had supported the police with a programme worth GBP 
850,000 aimed at improving police performance. The programme was discontinued 
following the abuse perpetrated by officers during the September 2013 protests. 
The programme was criticised by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact in 
their 2015 review for strengthening “capacity that might be misused, without a 




In 2013, the Janjaweed was disbanded and a large proportion of its 
fighters formed a new body, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) (African 
Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, 2018a).72 Although the RSF was 
initially incorporated under the NISS, in June 2016 responsibility for 
the NISS was transferred to the Sudanese Armed Forces, Sudan’s 
main army, where it remains to this day.73 However, responsibility-
sharing is far from clear, and both report directly, but separately, to 
the President. It is possible that the rebranding of the Janjaweed into 
the RSF and its subsequent incorporation into the Sudanese Armed 
Forces were exercises designed to avoid the implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1556 of 2004, which demanded that the 
Sudanese government disarm and disband the Janjaweed militia and 
bring their leaders to justice. The 2007 Sudan Armed Forces Act 
provides for this, and only the President was able to circumvent this 
immunity (African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, 2018a). 
 
The RSF continues to play a significant role in the campaigns against 
rebel movements, notably in Darfur, where it helped lead ‘Operation 
Decisive Summer’, which caused massive civilian displacement and 
was characterised by violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law (OHCHR, 2017). It also now plays at least a 
perceived role in border control and management, which is discussed 
further below. 
 
72 Colloquially, the RSF is still known as the Janjaweed to those living in Darfur. 
Another faction of its fighters splintered into the Border Guard Forces under the 
leadership of Musa Hilal. However, Hilal and many of his officers have recently 
been arrested and detained. In recent years Hilal had become more hostile to 
government policy, particularly to attempts to conduct a disarmament campaign 
affecting his operations, and spoke publicly about the government’s attempts to 
stoke ethnic violence in Darfur during the height of the genocide, mobilising 
widespread support for his political movement, the Revolutionary Awakening 
Council. At the time of writing, Hilal and six others are accused of undermining the 
constitutional system in Sudan and murder, in a military court, crimes that carry the 
death penalty (African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, 2018a).  
73 The UK has previously provided military training and assistance to the Sudanese 
Armed Forces, including officer training at Sandhurst and the Royal College of 
Defence Studies, which was discontinued following a legal challenge (Deighton 
Pierce Glynn, 2015). 
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Scale of the challenge 
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), there were nearly 1 million asylum-
seekers in Sudan in September 2017 (UNOCHA, 2018). Many are 
unregistered, and the Commission for Refugees estimates that the 
true figure may be as high as 2 million. The largest number crossed 
into Sudan from South Sudan to escape the civil war that is raging 
there, and will likely return if the fighting subsides. Eastern Sudan is 
host to some 155,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, many having fled 
from neighbouring Eritrea or Ethiopia. This is also the site of the 
Shagarab camp where you are meant to officially register as an asylum 
seeker in Sudan. Other refugees reach Sudan from Syria, Yemen, 
Chad, and the Central African Republic. 
 
The hospitality Sudan demonstrates towards different nationalities 
reflects its policies towards marginalised groups and those from 
conflict areas in the country, and also its perception of itself as an 
Arab Islamic country more generally. As such, predominantly 
Christian Eritrean and Ethiopian populations are forced to live below 
the radar and largely without state assistance, which they do in large 
numbers in the east of the country, as well as in Khartoum. Similarly, 
the ‘black African’ South Sudanese, formerly the targets of a civil war 
before the secession of South Sudan, have been demonised by 
officials, and accused of being sources of insecurity and disease (Al-
Araby TV, 2017). Meanwhile, Syrian refugees, who better suit Sudan’s 
self-perception as Arab and Islamic, have a visa waiver programme in 
place, the right to work and education without permits, and a 
citizenship track once they have been there for more than six months. 
There are accusations that Sudanese passports are for sale to this 
group as well (Suleiman & Van Dijken, 2018). 
 
In addition to these refugees, there is a huge population of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan. Many fled from Darfur, where 
government forces have been suppressing a rebellion and who have 
been unable to return home due to deliberate policies denying them 
land rights in favour of Arab settlers; others were driven from their 
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homes in the states that border South Sudan, for instance, South 
Kordofan, which have been subject to the indiscriminate and targeted 
bombing of civilian structures. OCHA summarises the situation as 
follows: “The impact of the conflict in Darfur, South Kordofan, and 
Blue Nile has been widespread displacement, with some 2 million 
IDPs” (UNOCHA, 2018). 
 
This helps explain why Sudan is not just a transit route, but also a 
significant source country for refugees, in fact the fifth largest globally 
(World Bank, n.d.). Despite this, those transiting Sudan on their way 
to Europe via Libya and the Mediterranean Sea have become the 
almost sole focus of the EU’s interventions in Sudan. 
European response 
In November 2015, European leaders met their African counterparts 
in the Maltese capital, Valletta, to try to arrive at a plan to stop African 
migrants reaching European shores. This was made clear in the 
accompanying EU press release: 
 
The number of migrants arriving to the European Union is unprecedented, and this 
increased flow is likely to continue. The EU, together with the member states, is 
taking a wide range of measures to address the challenges, and to establish an effective, 
humanitarian and safe European migration policy. (European Council, 2015) 
 
The summit led to the drafting of an Action Plan, which has guided 
the EU’s policy objectives on migration and mobility ever since 
(Council of the European Union, 2015). Some elements of the plan 
were welcome, including recognition that African states bear the 
greatest burden of refugees – only a minority of whom actually make 
the journey to Europe. There was also an understanding that the 
camps in which so many languish need to be upgraded. Security in 
the camps must be improved, education and entertainment needs are 
to be provided, so that young men and women are not simply left to 
rot. There are even suggestions that some – a small, educated minority 




The Action Plan did not end there. Other elements stood in stark 
contrast to the commitment in the press release quoted above to 
address the problem while “taking a wide range of measures to 
address the challenges, and to establish an effective, humanitarian and 
safe European migration policy” (European Council, 2015). 
Paragraph 4 of the Action Plan detailed how European institutions 
would co-operate with their African partners to fight “irregular 
migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings” 
(Council of the European Union, 2015, p. 12). Europe promised to 
offer training to “law enforcement and judicial authorities” in new 
methods of investigation and to assist “in setting up specialised anti-
trafficking and smuggling police units” (Council of the European 
Union, 2015, p. 12). These commitments are an explicit pledge to 
support and strengthen elements of the Sudanese state that are – as 
has been seen – directly involved in human rights abuses and the 
repression of human rights. Displaced people, whether Sudanese, 
Eritreans, or Ethiopians, now face a Sudanese security apparatus 
enhanced by the EU and working directly with European officials. 
 
The Action Plan was delivered under the EU-Horn of Africa 
Migration Initiative, known as the Khartoum Process, the name itself 
referring to Sudan’s capital city – something of a PR coup for 
Sudanese authorities. The Khartoum Process was launched in 
November 2014 as a forum for political dialogue and cooperation on 
migration between EU member states and several countries from the 
Horn and Eastern Africa. It is an initiative of the European 
Commission’s Directorate for Migration and Home Affairs and Italy, 
in a clear indication of how it was established to address domestic 
European concerns, rather than African political realities. Funds are 
provided in part by the Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and 
Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration in Africa. A 
smaller pot of money specifically targets smuggling and trafficking, 
and is known as the Better Migration Management project led by the 
German government’s aid agency, Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). These are both underwritten 
by substantial sums of money. The EU had provided just under EUR 
215 million to Sudan to curb migration by April 2017 (Shah, 2017). 
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The concrete projects and programmes implemented under the 
Khartoum Process are often hard to grasp, and have been far from 
transparent, but it is apparent that there is a divergence between the 
EU’s commitment to human rights and its explicit policy of working 
with the Sudanese state to restrict migration by almost any means. 
This has led to frustrations and tensions between policymakers, on 
the one hand, and civil society representatives and diaspora groups, 
on the other, among whom this approach has been the subject of 
intense scrutiny. 
 
Concerns spiked when minutes of a meeting of the ambassadors of 
the 28 EU member states on 23 March 2016 were leaked in the 
German magazine Der Spiegel (Dahlkamp & Popp, 2016). They 
contained this chilling warning: “Under no circumstances” should the 
public learn what was being discussed. The magazine said equipment 
would be sent to Sudan to assist in the control of its refugee 
population. “…Europe want to send cameras, scanners and servers 
for registering refugees to the Sudanese regime in addition to training 
their border police and assisting with the construction of two camps 
with detention rooms for migrants”. 
 
This precise level of engagement never materialised in the way 
described by Der Spiegel, but (as outlined below with the operation of 
the Regional Operational Centre) many elements of the policy were 
implemented. The leak provoked public disquiet. Concerns 
crystallised around the issue of the EU funding various security actors 
within Sudan, most notably the RSF. If found to be true this would 
violate various EU commitments, notably an arms embargo in place 
dating from the conflict in Darfur. It would also call into question the 
value of the EU’s Cotonou Agreement, which underpins the EU’s 
relationship with developing nations in the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) region, and membership of which is necessary before 
the EU can supply funds to state structures. Membership has been 
denied to Sudan because of the outstanding International Criminal 




Worries became most pronounced after the RSF, and its leader 
Mohamed Hamdan or ‘Hemetti’, starting making public statements 
about their role patrolling Sudan’s frontiers, and arresting or deterring 
refugees. “Once we dealt with the rebellion in South Kordofan and 
Blue Nile and Darfur, we immediately turned to the great Sahara 
desert, especially after the directives from the president of the 
republic to combat illegal migration”, Mohamed Hamdan, head of 
RSF, told Al Jazeera (Morgan, 2017). The tactics the RSF reportedly 
used reflected its historic practices when it was still known as the 
Janjaweed. Sometimes refugees were killed, sometimes they were 
forcibly returned to their countries of origin. In May 2016, more than 
1,000 Eritreans were rounded up in Khartoum and along the 
Sudanese-Libyan border and forced to go back to Eritrea. Similarly, 
more than 100 were returned in August and September 2017 
(Morgan, 2017). Such incidents provoked strong condemnation from 
the UN Refugee Agency (Radio Dabanga, 2017). 
 
However, funding of the RSF has turned out not to be exactly the 
smoking gun that was expected, although it continues to be a rallying 
cry for human rights activists and civil society organisations. The EU 
is often forced to deny any such involvement, for instance, stressing 
in a recent factsheet and in bold type, “The Rapid Support Forces of 
the Sudanese military do not benefit directly or indirectly from EU 
funding” (Alamin, 2018). 
 
It seems the EU may have struggled to convey this to the RSF itself, 
which continues to make statements to the effect that it deserves 
payment for the work already completed on Europe’s behalf. “We do 
the job instead of the EU”, Hemetti said in April 2018. The RSF also 
threaten to discontinue this work if they are not paid, effectively 
warning that they could ‘turn on the tap’ again by allowing refugees 
to proceed on their journeys to Europe. Hemetti continued, “That’s 
why they should recognize our efforts and support us as we lost a lot 
of men, efforts and money – otherwise we will change our minds 




Furthermore, it remains unclear how the EU ensures that the RSF 
has not and will not benefit from its funding, especially if they are 
relying on assurances to this effect given by government bodies, like 
the Ministry of Interior, and without stipulations about end-user 
accountability. Both the Sudanese Ministry of the Interior and the 
Eritrean Ministry of Foreign Affairs are designated as ‘political 
partners’ under the Better Migration Management project (EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, n.d.). Such ministries are not 
concerned to differentiate between security actors with, and without, 
egregious human rights backgrounds. It is apparent that as the 
Sudanese security services coordinate the RSF’s operations, assistance 
for one arm of the state inevitably assists another, especially in a 
country rife with corruption. Sudan ranks 175/180 in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2017, the joint-fifth 
worst global score (Transparency International, n.d.). In any case, 
what systems does the EU have in place to weed out individual 
members of the RSF who are assigned to tasks undertaken by the 
regular police or other parts of the security apparatus? 
 
Whether the EU has, or has not, funded the RSF directly or indirectly 
does not mean that EU support has not had a direct impact on the 
ground. It has certainly served to embolden security actors and caused 
them to adopt new objectives that have little to do with the protection 
of those migrating through their territory. Rather, it has been a means 
of curtailing the exodus of refugees, an end that is exactly what 
European leaders wished for. 
 
This is also seen in the capital, Khartoum, which has a substantial and 
long-standing migrant population, particularly from Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. Whereas before the Khartoum Process the security services 
largely turned a blind eye to migrant communities living in the city’s 
so-called ‘black belt’ of slum dwellings, the police are now 
emboldened by messages coming from Europe about the need to 
crack down on these communities. Some of those who have fled from 
Sudan more recently say that police harassment and fears for their 
personal safety, and the news stories of forcible deportations back to 
Eritrea or Ethiopia, were the reason for their onward travel (SIHA, 
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IRRI & SOAS, 2017). Previously Sudan was effectively functioning 
as a bulwark against migration and a container for populations that 
are unwanted in Europe. Ironically, now it frequently functions as the 
thoroughfare for repatriation that European leaders originally 
imagined it to be when drafting the Khartoum Process. 
EU-Sudan security cooperation 
There are also more direct plans to integrate Sudanese, European, and 
other Horn of African security actors. A Regional Operational Centre 
(ROCK) is being established in Khartoum (EU Emergency Trust 
Fund for Africa, n.d.). This is its role, as described by the EU: 
 
The primary focus of the Regional Operational Centre, which will be developed to 
support this cooperation, will be human trafficking and people smuggling. Greater 
cooperation between the countries of the region to gather, share and analyse 
information, in accordance with relevant international and regional principles and 
standards, will lead to better and more informed decisions on migration management. 
This will result in more effective joint approaches to prevent and fight transnational 
crime. It will also protect victims of trafficking and smuggling. This is in line with 
the declared aim of the AU-HoA Technical Working Group on Law Enforcement, 
whose mandate is to conceptualise and develop a mechanism for information exchange 
and sharing. (EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, n.d.) 
 
There is a clear coincidence of interests between the European 
leaders, who wish to reduce migration, and the Sudanese state, which 
wishes to increase the capacity of its security services. Trapped 
between them are the refugees and asylum seekers, with activists 
attempting to hold the EU to their explicit commitment to protect 
human rights, which seems to have been abandoned or ignored. The 
ROCK has become the site of some of the closest collaboration 
between the EU and Sudanese security officials. A lengthy New York 
Times article clarified the function of the Regional Operational 
Centre:  
 
The planned countertrafficking coordination center in Khartoum – staffed jointly by 
police officers from Sudan and several European countries, including Britain, France 
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and Italy – will partly rely on information sourced by NISS (National Intelligence), 
according to the head of the immigration police department, Gen. Awad Elneil Dhia. 
The regular police also get occasional support from the RSF on countertrafficking 
operations in border areas, General Dhia said. “They have their presence there and 
they can help,” General Dhia said. “The police is not everywhere, and we cannot 
cover everywhere”. (Kingsley, 2018) 
 
It is reported that the German police have reached an agreement with 
their Sudanese counterparts to provide technology and equipment to 
fight trafficking and illegal migration (Sudan Tribune, 2016b). The 
Sudanese Director General of Police, Lieutenant-General Hashim 
Osman al-Hussein, said the Germans had promised to provide his 
police-force with advanced crime-detection equipment and training. 
This is confirmed by the EU in its outline of the role of the ROCK. 
The document details what the ROCK is expected to achieve:  
 
Capacity building for the development of related political and legislative frameworks 
to allow structured information sharing and joint operations at regional level. This 
could involve the signature of relevant cooperation agreements between the Horn of 
Africa countries, defining the national focal points that are authorised to exchange 
information with the Regional Operational Centre, the process for this information 
sharing, the type of data to be collected and the governance arrangements and 
principles, with full respect of human rights and data protection protocols. (EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of 
Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa, 2016. p. 11) 
 
The document then spells out how the resources of the EU’s own 
border agency (Frontex) and the international police organisation 
(Interpol) will be put at the disposal of the ROCK and the African 
security agencies, including those of Sudan. The same document 
accepts that there is a risk of the “misuse or mishandling of data 
collection” and the “use of data for purposes beyond HT [human 
trafficking]/smuggling and serious organised crime” (EU Emergency 
Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular 




It remains to be seen how, for example, Britain’s security services, 
which will allegedly supply up to half of the technical advisor posts 
within the ROCK (British Embassy representative, personal 
communication, by email, 2018), will cooperate effectively with their 
Sudanese counterparts, and whether they can guarantee that 
information gathered under the aegis of ROCK is not used for 
repressive purposes. Simply relying on self-regulation within 
Sudanese forces is misguided at best. 
 
Evidence from Sudan’s first foray into providing information for 
their European partners in an attempt to crack down on smuggling 
networks shows that the process can end disastrously. In June 2016, 
following cooperation between Sudan and Britain’s National Crime 
Agency and the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters 
under Project Invigor, and the operations Tokhla and Glauco 2 led 
by Italy, an alleged smuggling kingpin, Mered Medhanie, was arrested. 
Serious doubts were cast about whether the man detained was actually 
the gentleman in question, with Mered’s own wife denying as much, 
and evidence that the real suspect is living the high life in Uganda 
(Tondo & Mwesigwa, 2018). Indeed, in July 2019, the judge acquitted 
the man detained and confirmed it was a case of mistaken identity 
(Tondo, 2019).  
 
Europe also announced plans to build a new detention centre in the 
Northern Sudanese town of Dongola (Chandler, 2018): “The 
proposal came from us, because we have nowhere to keep people”, 
the head of Sudan’s Ministry of Interior Passports and Civil Registry 
Authority told IRIN newsletter. “Every month we have to intercept 
almost 100 or sometimes 500 irregular migrants; we have to process 
their return and their protection – it gives us real challenges – where 
to keep them?” Martin Weiss, the Better Migration Management 
Programme project head in Germany, insists that the programme 
aims to protect migrants (Chandler, 2018). The “BMM [Better 
Migration Management Programme] is not about border surveillance, 
but about protecting refugees, facilitating migration, and improving 
conditions for people who are fleeing their homes”, he wrote in an 
email (Chandler, 2018). But the EU and its partners do not appear to 
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have a viable strategy to mitigate human rights abuses. In the case of 
the Better Migration Management Programme, the EU and GIZ 
claim that its steering committee, which is composed of the European 
Commission, Germany, UK, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, 
oversees human rights risks remotely from Brussels. 
Government complicity in human trafficking 
There is one further complication: evidence that the very Sudanese 
authorities with whom the EU are co-operating to end human 
trafficking are themselves engaged in this practice. Evidence of this 
emerged in the UN Monitoring Report to the UN Security Council 
on Somalia and Eritrea for 2011. This report pointed to General 
Teklai Kifle (‘Manjus’), commander of the Eritrean border forces as 
well as the western military zone, as being at the heart of this 
operation. The reports laid out the role General Manjus plays in 
smuggling arms across the border in violation of the UN sanctions, 
as well as his links with senior Sudanese officials. The experts then 
explained the General’s role in human trafficking (UN Security 
Council, 2011). 
 
Survivors of human trafficking interviewed by Professor Mirjam Van 
Reisen, Meron Estefanos and Professor Conny Rijken described how 
the Eritrean Border Surveillance Unit drove them out of Eritrea (Van 
Reisen & Mawere, 2017). They were hidden under covers in trucks 
and four-wheel drive vehicles so as to avoid border check points. 
Members of the Eritrean diaspora in Western countries reported 
paying USD 5,000–7,000 for a safe way to get a relative out of Eritrea. 
This means that if: “…you pay a high rank official, the relative doesn’t 
get checked at the checkpoints, the official will drive your family 
member all the way to Khartoum and that is where he receives the 
money”. Other researchers have corroborated this conclusion. A 
report by the Sahan Foundation and the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD) Security Sector Program described how 
Eritreans with sufficient money and connections pay for a 
comfortable four-wheel drive vehicle to take them to Khartoum and 
are simply put on a flight to a European capital (Sahan & IGAD, 
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2016). Given the tight security in both Sudan and Eritrea, none of 
this would be possible without the collaboration or collusion of 
government officials. 
 
Evidence from Sudan points to a similar conclusion. A report by 
Clingendael (Tubiana, Warin & Saeneen, 2018) contains a wealth of 
evidence showing the collusion of the RSF in smuggling, with 
testimonies describing RSF guards simply driving migrants back to 
Khartoum “from time to time … in order to show the authorities that 
we are doing the job”. A report by Human Rights Watch (2014a) 
found that in Eastern Sudan police and military officials had handed 
victims over to traffickers, and turned a blind eye at checkpoints, as 
well as routinely failing to identify and prosecute traffickers and 
corrupt officials, even when they clearly violate the Human 
Trafficking Act passed by Sudan’s Parliament in March 2014. This 
raises questions around the authorities’ willingness or capacity to 
uphold the rule of law. It would appear evident that the officials and 
governments with whom the EU is negotiating have very different 
objectives in relation to the migrants and refugees caught up in this 
process. For the Sudanese and Eritrean officials, these people are seen 
as ‘hostages’ from whom they can extract financial rewards, while at 
the same time using them to enhance their standing with their 
international partners. 
 
Hovil and Oette (2017) summarised the situation as follows:  
 
The involvement of Sudanese, Eritrean and Egyptian officials – both street level 
bureaucrats but also some officials of senior rank – in smuggling and trafficking has 
been documented. SIHA [the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa], 
for instance, argues that “the human trafficking and smugglers networks operating 
in Sudan, Eritrea and Egypt are led by top government and military officials in all 
three countries. These networks expand from these countries reaching to Europe and 
Asia. These smuggling and trafficking networks are strong, profitable, well 
established and protected. 
 
In the circumstances, the EU’s decision to focus only on the 
criminality of non-state actors, and to strengthen the capacity of 
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government bodies, is questionable at best. It means that European 
officials are almost certainly collaborating with the very people 
directly or indirectly involved in the human trafficking and smuggling 
that the programme is designed to eradicate. 
Blocking the Mediterranean crossing 
These developments are only one element of a much more complex 
response to the arrival of asylum seekers on European soil by the EU, 
and the construction of a system of what might be described as 
‘defences in depth’, from Europe far into Africa itself. This was 
outlined in the EU’s New Migration Partnership Framework of 7 
June 2016 (European Commission, 2016a). The Framework’s aim 
was explained as: 
 
Building on the European Agenda on Migration, the priorities are saving lives at 
sea, increasing returns, enabling migrants and refugees to stay closer to home and, in 
the long term, helping third countries' development in order to address root causes of 
irregular migration. 
 
The reality of this Framework soon became clear. For African 
migrants it means that the EU is working with the Libyan government 
to halt the flow of asylum seekers and migrants across the Central 
Mediterranean, preventing rescue attempts by international NGOs 
and supporting the Libyan government in its efforts to arrest, detain 
and return potential migrants to their countries of origin. As one 
report put it, this policy: “focuses largely on equipping the Libyan 
government with the means to prevent maritime departures, pull back 
boats that depart, and offer stranded migrants a one-way ticket home” 
(Collett, 2017). 
 
Amnesty International provided a detailed analysis of how this is 
operating and the consequences of what they term the ‘outsourcing’ 
or ‘externalising’ of the EU’s borders (Amnesty International, 2017). 
The report says that some 10,000 Africans were being held in Libyan 
detention centres, in appalling conditions. A small number (around 
2,000 as of August 2019) have been freed and flown to Niger from 
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where they await re-location to third countries, but the majority 
remain imprisoned (Elumami & Lewis, 2018). Their appalling 
treatment, including slavery, torture and rape, has not deterred 
European politicians from dealing with Libya: 
 
EU member states have entered into a string of co-operation agreements with Libyan 
authorities responsible for grave human rights violations, in particular the Libyan 
Coast Guard (LCG) and the General Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration 
(DCIM) within the Ministry of Interior, with the aim of increasing their capacity to 
tackle smugglers, carry out search and rescue operations, and prevent irregular 
departures. The policy has been successful: the number of arrivals in Italy has fallen 
by 67% between July and November 2017, compared with the same period in the 
previous year, and deaths at sea have reduced commensurately. But EU countries 
should not feign shock or outrage when the human cost of these deals is laid bare. 
(Elumami & Lewis, 2018). 
 
The crux of the EU’s policy is, therefore, to work as closely as 
possible with African governments, including notoriously abusive 
regimes like Sudan and Eritrea. The opening of the ROCK in 
Khartoum is an example of this intention. Similar pacts have been 
signed with other Sahel nations, including Niger, an important transit-
route to the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2016b). This was 
strengthened in April 2017 when the Italian government signed 
agreements with tribes in southern Libya to halt the inflow of 
Africans (Grignetti, 2017). These initiatives are designed to keep 
migrants as close to their country of origin and well away from the 
states in northern Africa that border the Mediterranean Sea, and Libya 
in particular. The second element is designed to halt attempts to cross 
the Mediterranean Sea by preventing marine rescues by organisations 
like Medicines Sans Frontiers or Open Migration, or equipping the 
Libyan security services with the ability to close down the smuggling 
operations (Petrillo & Bagnoli, 2018). 
 
Most recently, EU leaders have agreed to establish ‘migrant centres’ 
around the Mediterranean Sea to allow for the speedy assessment of 
those that who disembark from boats on the northern side of the sea 
and for their return to African centres on its southern edge 
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(Baczynska, 2018). The EU decided at a summit in June 2018 to 
explore what it termed ‘regional disembarkation centres’ as a key 
objective (ECRE, 2018). This is the clearest example yet of the EU’s 
policy of border externalisation, which reimagines northern Africa as 
Europe’s southern periphery. It comes at a time when there has been 
a massive reduction in those making this perilous journey, which 
seems to be the only indicator Europe uses in assessing the success 
or value of migration partnerships like the Khartoum Process. 
Right to asylum or forcible repatriation? 
While the EU has given priority to halting migration, the question 
remains, what to do with those who have successfully made it to 
Europe and claimed asylum? What we are seeing across Europe is an 
attack on the arguments Sudanese asylum-seekers use to verify their 
claims, as well as practical steps to identify and return those whose 
claims are rejected as a result. The denial of the right to asylum of 
Sudanese nationals is built into the very core of the Khartoum 
Process, which imagines Sudan as purely a country of transit, not 
origin, for substantial numbers of asylum seekers. However, Sudanese 
are in fact one of the largest asylum-seeking groups (World Bank, 
n.d.). In a key example of how Sudanese were at the forefront of the 
so-called ‘refugee crisis’, they formed up to half of the residents in the 
‘Jungle’ camp in Calais before it was demolished (Patterson & 
Jackson, 2017). 
 
There has been a similar change in attitude among UN bodies, which 
regularly report on the improved security situation in Sudan, despite 
human rights activists casting doubts on any rose-tinted 
interpretations of recent developments. A key example is the African 
Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), 
which is negotiating its own exit from the country, partly due to 
budgetary concerns imposed by the United States, but employing the 
logic of improvements on the ground. 
 
This has emboldened home ministries across Europe to start 
amending asylum guidance and make decisions along similar lines, 
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arguing that Sudan is now safe, or at the very least that relocating 
outside of the conflict areas, such as Khartoum, is a viable option. 
There are also attempts to downplay the palpable risks to physical 
security that individuals face upon return to the country, particularly 
as an asylum seeker. The most egregious example of this is Country 
Guidance (case law) in the UK, which states that because of “the 
extremely common phenomenon of arrest and detention”: 
 
The evidence draws a clear distinction between those who are arrested, detained for a 
short period, questioned, probably intimidated, possibly rough handled without 
having suffered (or being at risk of suffering) serious harm and those who face the 
much graver risk of serious harm. (UK Upper Tribunal, Immigration and 
Asylum Chamber, 2016) 
 
An exact definition of ‘rough handling’ and its legal differentiation 
from the legal term assault or from torture, which is prohibited by the 
Refugee Convention, is not provided. As a result, in the UK and 
around Europe it is increasingly difficult for Sudanese to claim asylum 
(European Commission, 2018). 
 
The increased security cooperation under the aegis of the Khartoum 
Process has provided a model for bilateral agreements between Sudan 
and various member states. These are outlined by country below, but 
all involve the use of Sudanese officials to interview and adjudicate 
on individual claims. On the one hand, the EU is externalising 
borders into Africa, on the other hand, it is allowing the long arm of 
the continent’s security services to reach deep into Europe in an 
attempt to weed out those with allegedly baseless claims. This risks 
violating the principle of non-refoulement. 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands has had a memorandum of understanding with 
Sudan since 2011, which provides for cooperation for the voluntary 
or forced repatriation of Sudanese nationals and the issuing of 
‘laissez-passers’ by the Sudanese diplomatic representation 
(Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). The domestic 
branch of Amnesty has since documented at least one case where a 
615 
 
man was subjected to a 13-day ordeal involving torture, following his 
return to Sudan on 6 December 2017 (Amnesty International, 2019).  
Italy 
Italy was one of the first European governments to put in place a 
formal bilateral agreement on returns and readmission. It signed a 
memorandum of understanding in August 2016 aimed at increasing 
police cooperation in the fight against transnational organised crime 
and especially irregular immigration (Borletto et al., 2017).74 It 
included provisions for missions of officials from the respective 
territories to help investigate details to facilitate returns, for instance, 
the ability to conduct identification interviews in consular offices, but 
also in ports, police stations, and detention centres, and the 
subsequent production of documentation for removal (laissez-
passers). The agreement allows Sudanese officials to be based in Italy 
and embedded in the Italian immigration process. Press statements at 
the time made explicit links to the framework of the Khartoum 
Process (Sudan Tribune, 2016a).  
 
This cooperation led to the forcible return of at least 40 individuals 
(estimates are as high as 48) who were arrested in Ventimiglia while 
attempting to cross into France, on a charter flight to Sudan in August 
2016, after Sudanese officials were allowed to interview them for 
repatriation. Testimonies received by NGOs confirm accounts of 
detention and interrogation on arrival, with some individuals 
witnessing beatings, as documented by Amnesty International 
(Amnesty International, 2016). The human rights monitoring group 
Huqooq also provided the testimony of a gentleman nicknamed 
‘Barakat’ in 2016 (Huqooq, 2016). Barakat claims he was beaten by 
the NISS while the returnees were detained and has since gone into 
hiding. Other testimonies suggest that the deportees now live in fear 
for their physical security, as well as that of their families, and that 
they believe they are being monitored by the NISS, including via their 
mobile phones. Five of the returnees lodged an application before the 
European Court of Human Rights claiming they had been forcefully 
 
74 The same organisation (Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione) 
believes Italy has signed similar agreements with Tunisia and Libya. 
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repatriated in violation of the prohibition of torture, prohibition of 
collective removal of foreigners, right to an effective remedy, and 
prohibition of discrimination (ANSA, 2018).  
Belgium 
In December 2017 it was reported that several individuals deported 
to Sudan from Belgium alleged being tortured. The decision to deport 
them was made by the Federal Secretary of State responsible for 
Asylum and Migration, Theo Francken. This followed Francken 
inviting Sudanese officials on an identification mission to assess 
Sudanese migrants, some of whom had been arrested in a raid on a 
makeshift camp in Brussels’ Maximillian Park (Crisp, 2017). The 
delegation was widely believed to have been from Sudan’s NISS. They 
were allowed to question Sudanese without Belgian officials present. 
 
In total, the testimonies refer to nine Sudanese who were sent home. 
All describe a period of detention on arrival at the airport and 
interrogation lasting several days, then being released subject to a 
family guarantee/personal security, as described earlier in this 
chapter. A few describe physical torture (being beaten with a stick) or 
emotional torture. 
 
As it stands, the Belgian Commission that independently handles 
asylum claims (Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and 
Stateless Persons) has reported that on balance it did not find the 
testimonies credible, although doubts do remain (Commissioner 
General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, 2018). In the meantime, 
Sudanese identification missions will continue, although with greater 
oversight by Belgian officials. 
France 
There are rumours that bilateral discussions have been held between 
the French and Sudanese governments to arrange for the return and 
repatriation of Sudanese living in France from as early as 2014. 
Internal memos of the Sudanese Embassy, seen by Street Press 
journalist Tomas Statius, show there were regular discussions 
between Embassy staff and the French police about identifying 
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rejected asylum applicants or other Sudanese migrants, also 
mentioning plans for an identification mission including NISS 
officials (Statius, 2017). This contributed to 205 forcible expulsions 
of Sudanese nationals from 2014–2016. 
 
Then Street Press found that in early 2017 an identification mission 
had been allowed to visit at least three removal centres, and also 
misrepresented themselves as NGO staff (Statius, 2017). The mission 
delegates seemed to show particular interest in those individuals who 
had been formerly imprisoned in Sudan. Mr Statius suggests this may 
be because the security services are able to verify their presence and 
activity in the country through fingerprint technology implemented 
in 2012. Mr Statius has identified four people deported to Sudan 
following a Sudanese delegation visit. He said that he encountered 
difficulties when trying to monitor those returnees and report on their 
wellbeing post-return (Statius, 2017). 
 
In addition, documents produced by Sudan’s Foreign Ministry have 
come to light that mention Sudanese concerns about a particular 
community in a Paris suburb that Sudanese authorities wanted to see 
returned to Sudan, and a request for France to share a contact 
database (it is unclear if this was agreed to). This letter indicates 
Sudan’s clear interest in the behaviour and members of its diaspora, 
particularly as Paris is a hub for opposition activity (Statius, 2017). 
United Kingdom 
Having historically been a ‘critical friend’ to Sudan, as its former 
colonial power, the UK changed the nature of its relationship with 
the country in 2016 to one of ‘phased engagement’, launching a UK-
Sudan Strategic Dialogue. Meetings are held biannually to discuss 
areas of mutual concern, among which migration has remained 
topmost, especially given the predominance of Horn of Africa 
asylum-seekers and migrants among the total number reaching the 
UK (Sudan has consistently remained in the top five countries of 
origin for asylum seekers in Britain) (Gov.UK, 2019). Returns and 
readmission procedure is an active area of interest for strategic 
dialogue delegations, whereas the creation of safe, legal migration 
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pathways is not. It remains to be seen what form this will take, but 
domestic NGOs like Waging Peace75 have warned about 
inappropriate procedures, including the disclosure of confidential 
information (for instance, about region of origin or family 
background) to Sudanese officials, which could then easily be 
forwarded to the NISS, and that individuals were threatened, or even 
bribed, without Home Office or independent interpreters present. 
 
Although these interviews did not lead to forced removals, Waging 
Peace and others have documented dozens of instances where 
individuals were ill-treated, or even tortured, upon after arrival in 
Sudan after having travelled from the UK. These testimonies also 
evidence the fact it is sometimes an individual’s ‘sur place’ activity 
abroad that provides the basis for their asylum claim, as Sudanese 
intelligence officials operating in the UK take an active interest in 
diaspora activities, readily (and often rightly) assumed to be anti-
regime. 
 
It is surprising then that the UK officially states that it knows of no 
substantiated cases of returnees being mistreated on return, as does 
other EU member states (UK Home Office, 2018). The information 
gap here is the lack of appropriate post-return monitoring systems, as 
under refugee law it is presumed that once an adverse decision is 
made regarding an individual’s asylum claim then it has been 
determined that they do not need to avail themselves of the 
protection of another state and can be returned without incident. 
Worse still, there are few organisations able or willing to monitor the 
fate of those returned.76 
 
That those who return to Sudan are not safe is amply demonstrated 
by the above. Thus, the presence of Sudanese officials in European 
capitals places asylum seekers and migrants from Sudan doubly at 
risk. It increases the reach of the Sudanese intelligence, while 
minimising the checks and balances in place to guard against 
 
75 One of the authors, Maddy Crowther, is Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace. 
76 Waging Peace is in fact listed as the only viable option for monitoring returnees 
on several public forums, despite admittedly having few options open to it. 
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inadvertent or intentioned refoulement. The fate of those who are 
returned to Sudan is neither known nor particularly cared about. 
 
However, the weight of evidence is becoming difficult for home 
ministries to ignore in domestic asylum cases and case law. Most 
notably, in June 2018, a man named Bishara Hassan Jameel Allah 
managed to film himself being detained and tortured on arrival at 
Khartoum International Airport. The Sudanese officials focused their 
physical abuse at his chest after he explained that he had only recently 
undergone surgery in that area. There are also rumours that a 
companion travelling with him was killed (see Arends, 2018 and, for 
a version with English subtitles, Apache.be, 2018). This is good 
evidence of what happens to a returnee to Sudan, and the possible 
circumstances of those forcibly removed to Sudan, whose fates are 
currently unknown. 
Conclusion 
The European Union’s relationship with the Sudanese government 
(and the wider Sudanese security state) is worrying. The Khartoum 
Process has cemented formal ties between the EU and Sudanese 
authorities. This has taken place despite the well documented and 
internationally-acknowledged human rights abuses carried out by the 
Sudanese government, led by President Omar al-Bashir, himself 
indicted by the International Criminal Court. It is difficult to square 
this with the oft-repeated assurances of European officials that 
human rights are integral to EU activities. There is evidence that 
strengthening the capacity of the Sudanese and Eritrean state has 
meant collaborating with officials and bodies implicated in the human 
trafficking the EU says it is attempting to end. 
 
Reciprocally, the EU has even allowed these security actors direct and 
deep access to European states, either because of bilateral deals 
relating to the forcible deportation of rejected asylum-seekers, or 
under formal bodies like Regional Operational Centre in Khartoum 
(ROCK). All of this exists in the context of the EU’s ‘defences in 
depth’ approach to deterring migration. Every avenue has been 
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explored – whether it is preventing aid agencies from rescuing 
drowning refugees from the waters of the Mediterranean, to the 
construction of detention centres in Sudan. One is forced to conclude 
that there is an overt European policy that respects human rights, 
while simultaneously a covert policy that accepts that these niceties 
must be ditched if targets to reduce migration are to be met. 
 
The unilateral assumption of power by the Transitional Military 
Council in the spring of 2019 continued to face opposition on the 
streets of Khartoum, with protesters congregating in a square in front 
of the army headquarters, staying there for weeks, and taking part in 
creative forms of solidarity and resistance. On 3 June 2019 the 
Transitional Military Council, led by Hemetti’s RSF forces, stormed 
the square, killing over 120 individuals, raping over 70, and prompting 
international condemnation.  
 
Largely in response to this outcry, the EU has put on hold the more 
controversial aspects of their migration and human trafficking control 
programmes, namely any aspects of the Better Migration 
Management programme that involve contact with the Sudanese 
Ministry of Interior, as well as the ROCK, both of which are 
challenged in this chapter.  
 
At the time of writing (August 2019) two things remain unclear: what 
the EU is planning to do to reconsider its approach to tackling 
migration in the region considering this drastic turn of events in 
Sudan and how, and if, Sudan itself will develop governance 
structures that better respect human rights, equal citizenship, and 
peace now that the Transitional Military Council and Forces for 
Freedom and Change have reached a tentative agreement and formed 
a transitional government.  
 
We urge readers to be part of efforts to monitor what happens in 
Sudan, with respect for the wishes of the Sudanese people, and those 
who live in or pass through its territory. Among the victims are the 
many migrants and refugees. The circumstances that forced these 
vulnerable men, women and children to flee from their countries have 
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not altered, particularly in Sudan and Eritrea. The question, therefore, 
remains: Where can these vulnerable populations seek shelter, and 
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Any international organisation working in Eritrea must safeguard 
against operating as an extension of the government, which has been 
accused of ongoing crimes 
against humanity (UN 
Human Rights Council, 
2016) and appears to have no 
intention of revising its 
policies to address human 
rights issues (UN Human 
Right Council, 2018; 
Keetharuth, 2018; UN 
Human Rights Council, 
2019). The Government of 
Eritrea’s attitude towards 
independent civil society 
organisations – including 
national and international 
non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs and 
INGOs), national religious 
organisations, community-
based organisations, and 
international bilateral and 
international donors – is 
marked by suspicion and antagonism. This was clearly expressed by 
Dr Nerayo Teklemichael, head of the Eritrean Relief and 
Rehabilitation Agency, the government agency set up to supervise the 
activities of NGOs: “it is naïve to believe that NGOs always carry out 
INGOs in Eritrea operate in a highly 
restricted space under the direct 
supervision and control of the government. 
Three NGOs still work in Eritrea in the 
development sector, including in 
education. As the legal basis for their 
work is uncertain, they depend on the 
personal favour of key persons in power.  
As the government has integrated 
education with the Warsay Yikaalo 
National Development Programme and 
indefinite National Service, which 
involves forced labour, these NGOs are 
propping up a system that uses slave 
labour and a government that oppresses 
its people and has been accused by the 
Commission of Inquiry on Human 




their activities with integrity. Some have a hidden agenda and engage 
in activities which the government and the people do not want” 
(Adgoi, 1994). According to the Eritrean government, all civil society 
organisations must be mobilised and organised by the government 
and aligned with national priorities and strategies (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2018). 
 
This centralised approach started during the liberation struggle in the 
1970s. At that time, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), 
now in government as the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice 
(PFDJ), mobilised the population to support the struggle. The mass 
mobilisation strategy was in line with Leninist thinking that 
revolutions cannot be expected to happen spontaneously, they must 
be planned and have a theoretical framework, and that it is the role 
of the elites to plan and implement such revolutions (Lenin, 1987). In 
the case of Eritrea, the EPLF, and subsequently the PFDJ, assumed 
the role of planning and implementing the revolution, based on the 
assumption that the party works in the interest of the people. 
 
Post liberation (1991), the Government of Eritrea has continued with 
the control of mass organisations. Therefore:  
 
… [Associations] and interest groups acting independently of the PFDJ are 
prohibited. The party claims that the Eritrean people are a single mass sharing the 
same interest and that it’s the only organisation representing the interest of all social 
groups… (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018) 
 
Therefore, the only types of civil society organisations that are 
acceptable in Eritrea are the mass movement organisations 
established by the PFDJ, such as the National Confederation of 
Eritrean Workers (NCEW); National Union of Eritrean Women 
(NUEW); and National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students 
(NUEYS). Operating as extensions of the government, these groups 
implement government priorities in their sectors, as opposed to 





This policy of the government has led to the severe restriction of civil 
society organisations and a cycle of expulsion of INGOs, which 
started as early as 1992, with the expulsion of SOS Sweden Children’s 
Village, and culminated in 2011, when Oxfam GB, Vita, Lutheran 
World Federation, and Norwegian Church Aid were asked to close 
their programmes. Currently, there are three INGOs working in 
Eritrea: Finn Church Aid (FCA), the Norwegian Refugee Council 
(NRC) and Vita. These INGOs are working in education, livelihoods 
and capacity building. They operate in a context where the 
Government of Eritrea keeps strict control over all aspects of life, 
severely constraining all political and civil rights, and where serious 
human rights abuses are taking place, including ongoing crimes 
against humanity (UN Human Rights Council, 2016).  
 
According to Van Reisen and Estefanos (2017), such policies are 
guided by the deliberate impoverishment of the people, as a strategy 
to curb any potential opposition. This strategy juxtaposes the state 
against the people of Eritrea, raising questions about the assumption 
that the civil space is organised by the PFDJ for the wellbeing of the 
Eritrean people. The question then is, are the three INGOs working 
in Eritrea entrenching authoritarian rule? Specifically, how do the 
INGOs in Eritrea understand their accountability in the restricted 
context of Eritrea? Is it possible to be accountable to both the 
Eritrean government and its people? How is the responsibility to ‘do 
no harm’ to the people of Eritrea upheld? And, finally, what is the 
legitimacy of the INGOs in working with the Government of Eritrea, 
if this government is a threat to the wellbeing of the Eritrean people?  
 
The accountability of INGOs is governed by the interaction of moral 
and ethical responsibilities and national and international frameworks 
for human rights and humanitarian law (ICRC, 2004), as well as codes 
of conduct and guidelines such as the Humanitarian Charter 
(OHCHR & UNDP, 2004; Sphere Project, 2018; see also OHCHR, 
n.d.). As INGOs are guided by their own mission and principles, 
which explicitly state accountability towards the people served by 
their actions, the dilemma is stark. If the Government of Eritrea is 
unable or unwilling to serve the interests of the Eritrean people, what 
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is the raison d’être for the three INGOs to be present in the country 
and can they escape government control to serve the interests of the 
Eritrean people? The main research question investigated in this 
chapter is, therefore: Are the three INGOs currently working in Eritrea able 
to uphold their duty to the people of Eritrea to ‘do no harm’?  
Theoretical framework 
This chapter analyses the ethical/human rights accountability of 
INGOs working in Eritrea through the deontological lens of human 
rights duty bearers (Breakey, 2015), who are required to ‘do no harm’ 
(Anderson, 1999a). The accountability model applied (Breakey 2015), 
states that human rights duties arise as a result of:  
  
• A duty bearer’s specificity: A duty bearer’s responsibility 
covers a specific time and is specific to the particular duty 
bearer. 
• Relationship tracking: This links the duty bearer’s 
responsibility to a given situation or relationship. When a duty 
bearer has caused a situation, especially any sort of harm, the 
duty bearer is morally responsible for the outcome. When the 
duty bearer has an existing relationship with one of the right 
holders, it is even more appropriate for the duty bearer to bear 
rights-based duties (Breakey, 2015). 
 
The Humanitarian Charter was developed as a result of the efforts of 
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
(IFRCRC) and various NGOs to improve the quality of their 
response during emergencies, as well as their accountability to the 
people they serve. It incorporates both human rights and 
humanitarian law (i.e., its scope is not limited to conflict). The charter 
requires NGOs to act:  
 
… in accordance with the principles of humanitarian action set out in this Charter 
and with the specific guidance in the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in 
Disaster Relief. (Sphere Project, 2018, p. 31) 
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The IFRCRC’s code of conduct, which is part of the Humanitarian 
Charter, requires NGOs to work impartially and independently from 
governments and not to become, either knowingly or through 
negligence, tools and extensions of governments (IFRCRC, 2002). 
 
The key principles of the Charter (Sphere Project, 2018; OCHA, 
2012) are:  
 
• Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it 
is found. 
• Neutrality: Those who provide aid must not take sides in 
conflicts or engage in hostilities of a political, racial, religious 
or ideological nature. 
• Impartiality: Aid is to be provided on the basis of need 
alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases, irrespective of 
nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political 
opinion. 
• Independence: Those who provide aid must be autonomous 
from the political, economic, military or other objectives with 
regard to areas where assistance is being provided. 
 
Both the FCA and NRC are signatories to the IFRCRC code of 
conduct, which is now part of the Humanitarian Charter (Sphere 
Project, 2018) In addition, for FCA, the ACT Alliance Code of 
Conduct incorporates the spirit of the Charter through the following 
provisions:  
 
• Acting in ways that respect, empower and protect the dignity, uniqueness, and 
the intrinsic worth and human rights of every woman, man, girl and boy; 
• Working with communities and individuals on the basis of need and human 
rights without any form of discrimination, ensuring that the capacities and 
capabilities of communities are considered at all times, and especially targeting 
those who are discriminated against and those who are most vulnerable; 
• Speaking out and acting against those conditions, structures and systems which 
increase vulnerability and perpetuate poverty, injustice, humanitarian rights 
violations and the destruction of the environment; 
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• Working in ways that respect, strengthen and enable local and national-level 
capacity;  
• Not using humanitarian or development assistance to further a particular 
religious or political partisan standpoint; 
• Upholding the highest professional, ethical and moral standards of 
accountability, recognizing our accountability to those with whom we work, to 
those who support us, to each other, and ultimately to God; 
• Meeting the highest standards of truthfulness and integrity in all of our work; 
and  
• Endeavouring not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.  
(ACT Alliance, 2011) 
 
Although Vita is not a signatory to the Humanitarian Charter, from 
its reports and its mission statement it is clear that Vita aspires to the 
same principles (Vita, 2017). And, given that, in addition to being a 
statement of shared beliefs, the Humanitarian Charter is as statement 
of recognition of established legal rights – i.e., human rights and 
humanitarian law (Sphere Project, 2018) – despite the fact that Vita is 
not a signatory, the Charter provides a basis for measuring the ethical 
and human rights duty of the organisation.  
 
According to Breakey’s (2015) accountability model, the three 
INGOs, presently working in Eritrea have an overarching duty based 
on ethical and human rights standards to the people of Eritrea, and 
specifically to their beneficiaries, to ‘do no harm’. They have a duty 
to ensure that their actions do not cause harm, for example, by 
strengthening the restrictive environment by entrenching 
authoritarian rule, which is preventing the people of Eritrea from 
exercising choice and restricting their freedom and opportunities, 
where opportunities are understood as contributing to the 
development of capabilities (i.e., what a person can do by accessing 
the means available to them) (Sen, 2004).  
Methodology 
The study was conducted as a desk review of available data and 
information (such as documentaries, documents, and codes of 
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conduct for INGOs), including the author’s direct observations and 
experience in governance in Eritrea. For reasons of security, the 
author has published this chapter under a pseudonym.  
Policy framework for government control  
President Isaias Afwerki has been in power since 1991 and has never 
been endorsed by elections. The Government of Eritrea has no 
democratic institutions. The National Assembly has not met since 
2002 and, hence, there is no parliamentary oversight. In addition, the 
President is not subject to any inner party (i.e., PFDJ) review or 
elections – the last PFDJ congress was in 1994 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2018). National budgets are not published and there is no rule of law 
or independent judiciary. Political parties are banned and the 1997 
Constitution remains unimplemented. Government institutions 
report directly to the President and a group of trusted PFDJ senior 
officials appointed by the President, who report directly to him 
(Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018). 
 
It was hoped that the peace process with Ethiopia would mean a 
change in the current situation, especially government control over 
the countries’ labour force. However, since the Government of 
Eritrea signed the peace agreement in June 2018, there has been no 
indication that it intends to reform its development model and 
associated policies, or restart the democratisation process and re-
open political, social, and economic space. Despite this fact, the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia border posts of Om Hajer (The Citizen, 2019), 
Zalembessa and Burre have been opened (Shabait.com, 2018). 
Restrictions on international cooperation 
Soon after independence from Ethiopia in 1991 the then Provisional 
Government of Eritrea started restricting political and civil society 
space through the following actions: the banning of political parties; 
closure of existing civil society organisations; introduction of 
Proclamation No. 60 of 1994 (Schröeder, 2004); introduction of a 
Proclamation for the Administration of NGOs; and constraints on 
religious bodies through Proclamation No. 73 of 1995, A 
Proclamation to Legally Standardise and Articulate Religious 
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Institutions (Schröeder, 2004; UN Human Rights Council, 2015, 
Annex 3), which requires religious groups to register with the 
government and limits them to pastoral work. (Human Rights 
Concern Eritrea, 2018). 
 
The NGO Proclamation No. 60 of 1994 governs the administration 
of NGOs and was a precursor to Proclamation No. 145 of 2005, A 
Proclamation to Determine the Administration of Non-
Governmental Organisations (UN Human Rights Council, 2015, 
Annex 3). Prior to the enactment of the 1994 Proclamation, the 
Eritrean government had already started to impose restrictions on 
civil society organisations that were not mass movement 
organisations (i.e., the NCEW, NUEW or NUEYS). 
 
In 1994, following the enactment of Proclamation No 60/1994, Dr 
Nerayo Teklemichael, who was at the time the head of the 
government’s Eritrea Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (which later 
became Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Commission), introduced 
the 1994 NGO Proclamation. He explained that the purpose of the 
proclamation was to restrict the activities of NGOs and ensure the 
government’s control of the sector. According to Dr Nerayo: 
 
…. [the proclamation] is mainly designed to make NGOs, be they international or 
local, realise that ERRA [Eritrea Relief and Rehabilitation Agency] is there to 
supervise their work. … [Supervising the work] of NGOs is important because 
NGO activities anywhere, without outside control might create a situation where the 
inhabitants of a certain village or province secure relief aid while those in other 
localities get none. … [I]n some countries NGOs perform tasks which under normal 
circumstances, should be undertaken by national governments like the 
implementation of health, educational, agricultural and other projects. (Adgoi, 
1994) 
 
By 1997, despite the fact that Eritrea was a newly-formed state with 
many humanitarian and post-conflict needs, local NGOs were closed, 
and INGOs either left the country or were expelled. All NGO 
property was confiscated. National organisations closed included 
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national religious organisations and churches, such as Kalehiwet 
Church of Eritrea (Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018). 
 
The government’s view that civil society has no role to play in the 
development of the country, except as an extension of the 
government, was confirmed during a joint evaluation of Swedish, 
Norwegian and Danish projects:  
 
Regarding NGOs (both foreign and local) the GoE [Government of Eritrea] does 
not see a major role for NGOs in Eritrea’s development efforts in its aid policy. 
Increasing bilateral donor support through NGOs and their subsequent increase in 
numbers has played an important role in restricting NGOs activities in 2005 by the 
GoE. (Michael, Ooichen, Slob & Jerve, 2008) 
 
As a result of government policies, both local NGOs and INGOs 
experience difficulties in terms of their operations in Eritrea. 
Humanitarian assistance 
Following the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war (1998–2000), more than 
one million Eritreans (i.e., approximately one-third of the population) 
were internally displaced (State of Eritrea, 2004). Humanitarian 
assistance was needed, and the government welcomed international 
and independent NGOs. 
 
National and international NGOs, the UN and other agencies 
contributed to a swift emergency response, not only during the post-
border war emergency, but also during the drought that followed in 
2002 and 2005. All of this received very little recognition from the 
government, which portrayed itself in the local media as the only actor 
responsible for the response.  
 
The hope was that this pragmatic opening of space for civil society 
actors would herald a new approach not only towards civil society, 
but also in the area of human, civil and political rights. It was hoped 
that the 1997 Constitution would be implemented, political parties 
established, electoral laws enacted, and, finally, at the end of 2001, 
that there would be a general election, which never happened.  
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2001 crackdown and international response 
In 2000 and 2001, there was public demand for accountability and 
more open public participation and consultation on how the country 
should be managed (Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018). In 2001, 
these demands were championed by Cabinet members (now referred 
to as the G15) as well as students. However, these ‘dissenters’ were 
arrested by the government. More than 5,000 university students were 
arrested and taken to Wi’a and Gelalo, two notorious military prisons, 
where they were tortured and made to do forced labour, leading to 
the death of many (Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017). 
  
The draconian action taken by the Eritrean government in response 
to dissent by the students and members of the G15 resulted in a 
formal protest by the European Union (EU). Subsequently, in 2001, 
the Italian Ambassador, Mr Antonio Bandini, who was the EU Senior 
Ambassador to Eritrea, was expelled from Eritrea. EU countries 
responded by withdrawing their ambassadors and expelling the 
Eritrean Ambassador to Italy. According to the EU, relations with 
Eritrea had been seriously undermined by the Eritrean government’s 
actions and normalisation of EU-Eritrea relations would require 
Eritrea to improve its human rights situation (Plaut, 2016, p. 87). For 
some donors: “The deterioration of the political, social and economic 
environment of Eritrea, which started in 2001, had set the stage for 
scaling down or outright discontinuation of overall bilateral aid to 
Eritrea” (Michael et al., 2008). 
 
The 2001 government crackdown against political dissidents, the 
closure of the independent press and the expulsion of the Italian 
Ambassador to Eritrea provoked a tense relationship between the 
Eritrean government and the international diplomatic community 
(i.e., donors) (Michael et al., 2008). Unfortunately, although there has 
been no improvement of the human rights situation in Eritrea, since 
2001, many EU countries have normalised diplomatic relations with 
the country (Plaut, 2016).  
 
From 2002, the Government of Eritrea has pursued a policy of 
shrinking civil space through the expulsion, de-registration and 
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restriction of the movement of NGOs. The latter is achieved through 
intense National Service roundups; the enforcement of the 
requirement for travel permits not only for nationals, but also for 
internationals; checkpoints; and the denial of fuel, even if fuel is 
allocated through fuel coupons (author’s observation and 
experience).  
 
In the US State Department’s Country Report on Human Right Practices – 
Eritrea, the Department states that: “In May the government cut off 
fuel supplies to international NGOs. Similar restrictions were placed 
on UN agencies in April. These restrictions have prevented NGOs 
from visiting project sites, implementing new projects or carrying out 
resettlements” (US Department of State, 2008). The movement of 
staff of NGOs and INGOs was also restricted, which impeded the 
monitoring of projects, and entry and exit visas were denied for key 
staff. In addition, offices were raided by the military and key staff 
members were harassed and arrested. Finally, in 2011, the remaining 
INGOs were asked to close their projects by end of 2011, forcing a 
closure of operations. Lutheran World Federation, Norwegian 
Church Aid and Oxfam GB closed their operations and had their 
assets confiscated (US Department of State, 2011). 
 
In addition, in 2002/2003, Danish Church Aid/Demining Group and 
Halo Trust were expelled, and, by 2005, the World Food 
Programme’s operations were closed following a programming 
dispute regarding the shift from food aid to cash for work, and the 
government confiscated the World Food Programme’s warehouses 
and food supplies from the European Commission and Mercy Corps 
(Plaut, 2006). These actions were followed by the confiscation of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
warehouses and 44 UN vehicles that had been assigned to various 
projects with the government, as well as NGOs (36 of the vehicles 
had been assigned to the United Nations Development Programme 
[UNDP]-funded Mine Action Capacity Building project, as observed 




In 2002, the UN Secretary General and UNDP Eritrea attempted to 
stop or delay the expulsion of mine clearers from Eritrea, but their 
requests were ignored (Africa Intelligence, 2002). A delegation 
headed by the UNDP Resident Representative and Humanitarian 
Coordinator in Eritrea and the Head of the UN Mine Action Service 
met with President Afwerki in his Asmara office. They asked the 
President to give the mine clearance experts more time to hand over 
their activities to Eritrean counterparts, but the President refused. 
Following the expulsion of Danish Church Aid/Demining Group, 
the Danish government closed its embassy and terminated its bilateral 
relationship with Eritrea, which had been in place since 1993 (Michael 
et al., 2008). 
 
At the time, of the closure of the World Food Programme’s 
operations in Eritrea, according to WikiLeaks, the total amount of 
food aid confiscated by the Eritrean government was 90,000 tonnes. 
Some of it was supplied to the army, but the bulk expired in a 
warehouse: 
  
The GSE [Government of the State of Eritrea] extended its control over the economy 
by recently confiscating grain from many private wholesalers and traders, although 
grain was seized, much of it disappeared into the black market. The GSE has also 
forced farmers to sell their harvest to government traders at deeply discounted prices. 
Again, government policy forced much food supply into the black market. 
(WikiLeaks, 2008) 
 
An attempt to distribute expired corn-soya blend in 2006 was 
protested against by health personnel. Regardless of their protest, 
expired material was distributed under duress and many children were 
poisoned and had severe diarrhoea (Hagdu, 2009). 
 
By July 2005, the Government of Eritrea requested the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) to terminate its 
development programme in Eritrea. USAID said that this was: 
 
…at a time when it was estimated that due to the ongoing drought and the impact 
of the recent border war, there were a 2 million Eritreans (population estimate 3.5 
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million) at risk of food insecurity and requiring an 352,900 metric tons of food aid. 
(USAID, 2005a) 
 
No reason was given for the request. At the time, US Ambassador, 
Scott De Lisi, stated that: “The government has told us they are 
uncomfortable with the activities of USAID” (BBC, 2005). 
Continued closing of space for INGOs 
Following the enactment of Proclamation No. 145/2005 on the 
administration of NGOs (UN Human Right Council, 2015) 
restrictions escalated. Independent, national NGOs that had been 
established since 2000 were deregistered. Although some, such as 
Haben, appealed their deregistration, their appeals were not 
successful. At this time, some of the INGOs that objected to the 
operational restrictions imposed by Proclamation No. 145/2005 left 
Eritrea. Others applied for registration, but were rejected. A total of 
two-thirds of the NGOs working in Eritrea ceased operations; of the 
37 NGOs present in the country at that time, only 13 remained (Hoa-
politicalscene.com, 2007). By 2006, a further 9 INGOs (6 Italian and 
3 from other countries) were denied registration and expelled. Their 
equipment and supplies were confiscated (Hagdu, 2009; Sudan 
Tribune, 2006).77 
 
The remaining four INGOs – Lutheran World Federation, 
Norwegian Church Aid, Oxfam GB, and Vita (Hoa-
politicalscene.com, 2007) – adapted, hoping that they could continue 
to work in the country (author’s observation and experience). 
Irrespective of the provisions of Proclamation No. 145/2005 
restricting the work of NGOs to humanitarian work, with the tacit 
consent of the government, the remaining INGOs started carrying 
out development work on water and sanitation, nutrition, food 
 
77 Some were not able to renew their NGO registration, others were asked to leave 
and others still were asked to complete their projects by a specific time, irrespective 
of the status of the project (US Department of State, 2008). During the year the 
government demanded that departing NGOs hand over paperwork and documents 
to government officials. After the forced closure of several NGOs in 2005 and 
2006, the government required that all NGO property be turned over to it, 
including such items as computers, printers and vehicles. 
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security and livelihoods. The projects implemented retained elements 
of humanitarian response, but were increasingly focused on 
development. 
 
Despite these efforts, in 2011, the Eritrean Ministry of Labour and 
Human Welfare, requested that the four INGOs complete all projects 
by 31 December 2011. This directive was irrespective of the fact that 
Lutheran World Federation, Norwegian Church Aid, Oxfam GB, and 
Vita were implementing multi-year projects and that there were also 
a number of multi-year projects in the pipeline awaiting final approval 
(US State Department, 2011; author’s observation and experience). 
 
The government’s decision to close INGO projects by 31 December 
2011 was made without consulting the relevant line ministries or the 
NGOs – it was a clear ‘get out notice’. Consequently, during 2011, 
Lutheran World Federation, Norwegian Church Aid and Oxfam GB 
closed their operations in Eritrea. However, Vita remained and 
struggled with the uncertainty till 2013. At this time, Vita signed a 
tripartite agreement with the Irish Agriculture Research Agency, 
Teagasc, and the National Agricultural Research Institute, an agency 
within the Ministry of Agriculture of Eritrea. At the end of 2011, Vita 
was the only INGO operating in Eritrea.  
 
Vita did not close its operations. The Vita audit reports of 2010 and 
2011, contrary to their claims regarding transparency (Vita, 2014), do 
not mention the request by the Ministry of Labour and Human 
Welfare for INGOs to close all projects by the end of 2011, nor do 
they mention the closure of Lutheran World Federation, Norwegian 
Church Aid and Oxfam GB (Vita, 2010; 2011). In the 2010 annual 
audit report, Vita mentions that in response to regulatory changes in 
both Eritrea and Ethiopia they implemented administrative changes 
(i.e., the appointment of National Directors). In the report, Vita also 
refers to the impact of the Eritrean government’s control on projects: 
 
… [The government’s stringent] control on NGO work has impacted Refugee Trust 
Ireland (RTI now Vita) Limited’s ability to deliver change on the ground and in 
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2011 Vita (RTI) Limited will have to be flexible to changing circumstances and 
possible risk… (Vita, 2010) 
 
The process of restricting and closing the space for all independent 
national civil society organisations, including for national religious 
organisations, continues to this day. The government has closed the 
Catholic School, Medhanie Alem Minor Theology School, the 
Orthodox School at Enda Mariam, and the primary health care 
centres operated by the Catholic Church. It has also attempted to 
close Al Diia Muslim School. All of these actions have been 
accompanied by threats and acts of intimidation, including arrests and 
disappearances, and has led to the death of school leaders (UN 
Human Rights Council, 2018; Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2019). 
Ongoing crimes against humanity 
There is no freedom of speech in Eritrea, with the government 
silencing and imprisoning its opponents. For example, in early 
September 2018, former Minister of Finance Berhane Abrehe, in a 
recorded message to the Eritrean people, emphasised the fact that the 
National Assembly (i.e., parliament) has not met since 2002 (Abrehe, 
2018; Tefala, 2018). He reminded President Isaias Afwerki that 
although many of the members of the National Assembly are in exile, 
have been arrested and are even dead, it is still the legitimate legislative 
body of the country and must be called into session. In addition, he 
challenged the President to a national televised debate as to the status 
of the country, pointing out that for Eritrea to move forward it is 
necessary for President Isaias to resign.  
 
The Eritrean government’s response was to arrest the former 
Minister on 17 September 2018 and, like so many others before him, 
his whereabouts are currently unknown (Keetharuth, 2018). This is a 
clear message that in 2018, just like in 2001, there is no freedom of 
speech in Eritrea and no capacity or willingness on the part of the 
government to engage constructively with dissent or to discontinue 
the one-party, one-man rule. The situation of the country is well 
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summarised by Ms Sheila Keetharuth in the latest UN Human Rights 
Council press release: 
 
… [During] the past 17 years, the Government of Eritrea has maintained tight 
control over the country, stifling any form of public debate and participation. I have 
received reports that the former Minister of Finance, who recently wrote two books 
on the current state of affairs in the country, including the rule of law, has been 
arrested in Asmara during the morning of 17 September 2018. If confirmed, this 
arrest on the eve of the anniversary of the 2001 clampdown would add to the 
apprehension that improvements in Eritrea’s external relations are not mirrored 
inside, especially regarding respect for fundamental rights and freedoms…. 
[Comprehensive] reforms at the domestic level are required on the path towards a 
free, just and democratic society, with citizens enjoying all their human rights… 
(Keetharuth, 2018)  
 
Therefore, the conditions that have given rise to human rights 
violations in Eritrea and that are linked to the impoverishment of the 
population (Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017), through a process of 
reduction of opportunity and of choice, as well as means (i.e., 
capabilities), remain. It is argued, therefore, that FCA, NRC and Vita 
– which are currently operating in Eritrea under such conditions are 
not able to maintain a position of impartiality and independence from 
the Government of Eritrea (The Sphere Project, 2018). 
INGO engagement in Eritrea  
Any INGO working in Eritrea must safeguard against operating as an 
extension of the Government, which has been accused of crimes 
against humanity (UN Human Right Council, 2018; Keetharuth, 
2018; UN Human Rights Council, 2019). However, presently, there 
is no evidence that FCA, NRC and Vita can function independently 
in Eritrea, due to the legal framework for NGOs in Eritrea and the 
practices of the Eritrean government. This section presents the 
findings of this study in terms of the ability of the three remaining 
INGOs operating in Eritrea to do so independently, for the benefit 




Article 7 (1) of Proclamation No. 145/2005 (Government of State of 
Eritrea, 2005) restricts the work of NGOs in Eritrea to humanitarian 
responses: “The activities of every NGO shall be limited to relief and 
rehabilitation work”. However, as already stated, FCA, NRC, and 
Vita are working in education and sustainable livelihoods, which are 
development areas. Although Article 7 (2) allows NGOs to apply to 
the Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare in writing for a change 
in programme, there is no evidence that FAC, NRC, and Vita have 
actually been provided with any formal authorisation to work in 
development-oriented programmes. However, this is overlooked by 
the government. There seems to be a state of ambiguity that 
everybody is willing to live with. 
 
Article 7 (4) goes on to provide that NGOs wishing to engage in 
development need the support of the relevant line ministry. However, 
this is subject to approval by the Ministry of Labour and Human 
Welfare and, the line ministries are not consulted by the government 
(i.e., the President) when decisions, such as the one taken in 2011 that 
led to the closure of the Lutheran World Federation, Norwegian 
Church Aid and Oxfam GB programmes, are taken.  
 
Post 2004, the government shifted its focus from recovery and 
reconstruction and reintegration to development (State of Eritrea, 
2004), therefore, also shifting the focus of the work of the remaining 
INGOs, but without amending Proclamation 145/2005, thereby 
establishing a shadowy system for the sector and ensuring that 
ongoing NGO operations are dependent on the good will of the 
government and not the rule of law. This system also allows the 
government to expel organisations at will, as it has done in 1997, 
2002, 2003, 2005, and more recently in 2011. As nothing has changed, 
any INGO working in development must do so under the supervision 
of the government and their programmes are subject to the 
benevolence of the top leadership of the government, which has 
historically been whimsical and arbitrary, therefore undermining the 
independence of these INGOs (Hagdu, 2009; US Department of 
State, 2005; 2011). In addition, by having to partner with the 
government to implement development programmes, the INGOs 
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operating in Eritrea severely compromise their independence and risk 
working only to the governments’ objectives (US Department of 
State, 2011). 
 
According to Proclamation No. 145/2005, NGOs in Eritrea are 
obliged to work with the concerned government entitles (Article 6) 
and INGOs must have a component for institutional capacity 
building and training (Article 9). In this way, the three NGOs working 
in Eritrea are enhancing the capacity of the Government of Eritrea, a 
one-man, one-party government charged with ongoing crimes against 
humanity (UN Human Rights Council, 2016). There is no evidence 
that the three NGOs have considered the possibility that their work 
in Eritrea is sustaining the continuation of such human rights abuses. 
Nor is there any evidence that they have taken precautions to avoid 
harming the Eritrean people.  
 
As well as strengthening the government’s capacity, the three INGOs 
operating in Eritrea also strengthen the government economically. 
NGOs are required to open foreign currency and nakfa accounts for 
their projects and transfer funds from the foreign account to the 
nakfa account as the project progresses. Such transfers are made at 
the government-controlled rate, which does not reflect the economic 
reality of the country. The Foreign Currency Oversight Board, which 
is charged with the management of foreign currency accounts, is 
comprised of the Ministry of Finance, Bank of Eritrea, Commercial 
Bank of Eritrea, and PFDJ Economic Affairs Department. However, 
the Board has not met since 2009 (UN Security Council, 2011). 
Instead, the management and oversight of foreign currencies in 
Eritrea is carried out by the PFDJ Economic Affairs Director, Hagos 
Gebrehiwot (also known as Kisha), including funds deposited by 
INGOs into foreign currency accounts: 
 
According to several former Eritrean Government officials involved in finance and 
intelligence operations, Mr. Gebrehiwot is the overall financial coordinator of all hard 
currency operations relating to Eritrea’s procurement activities, including support to 




The PFDJ’s control of economic space in Eritrea involves a much 
higher proportion of hard currency transactions than the formal 
sector. Hard currency transactions are almost all entirely managed off 
shore through the PFDJ’s network of companies, individuals and 
bank accounts. In many cases, affiliation with the PFDJ or Eritrea is 
not made known. The impact of this is to render both the Ministry of 
Finance and the Central Bank of Eritrea (i.e., the Treasury), two 
essential state institutions, irrelevant to the economy of the country 
(Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018).  
 
It can be concluded from this that the INGOs working in Eritrea are 
indirectly funding illicit and illegal activities. In such a situation, FCA, 
NRC and Vita cannot guarantee that their presence and their work 
avoids complicity with crimes against humanity by increasing the 
power of the PFDJ, which is in full and sole control of the policies 
perpetuating these crimes. 
Requirement to work only with government  
FCA claims that it is a rights-based organisation guided by 
international humanitarian standards and principles and that it 
actively: “defends [the] space that civil society actors need for their 
work and supports actors in strengthening their capacities” (FCA, 
2017b; see also FCA, n.d.). Vita (n.d.) recognises that Eritrea is a 
country where it is not able to engage the government on issues of 
governance and human rights. Accordingly, Vita undertakes that it:  
 
… will take cognisance of in-country human rights issues in programme countries 
and will take appropriate precautions and mitigating actions where external factors 
relating to human rights and governance impose critical risks to programme delivery, 
staff safety, impact and sustainability. (Vita, 2016) 
 
NRC, like FCA, is committed to the international humanitarian 
standards and principles (NRC, n.d.) and simply states that: “The 
Norwegian Refugee Council is an independent humanitarian 
organisation helping people forced to flee”. However, how this 
independence is realised is unclear, because in Eritrea the government 
has ordered that any INGO working in the country can only work 
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with government entities (see Proclamation No145/2005, State of 
Eritrea, 2005) 
 
In Eritrea, the government is not just developing key policies that 
must be considered, nor is it a simple regulator, it demands that it be 
the main partner and intermediary between NGOs and the Eritrean 
people (State of Eritrea, 2005; author’s observation and experience). 
In addition, the ability of NGOs to conduct wide and independent 
assessments to develop their own strategies and priorities is severely 
limited by travel restrictions, as well as the fact that it is not possible 
to conduct such assessments independently. Finally, as already 
mentioned in this chapter, the government is historically suspicious 
of autonomous NGOs, considering them tools of foreign domination 
and undercover spy operations that need to be brought under its 
control. 
 
FCA, NRC and Vita have accepted these restrictions in their bid to 
work in Eritrea. Consequently, like the mass movement organisations 
(NCEW, NUEW, and NUEYS), they are operating as extensions of 
the Government of Eritrea. This undermines any claims they may 
have of benefiting the people of Eritrea or ‘doing no harm’. 
Complicity with forced labour  
According to FCA, the objective of its programme is to improve the 
facilities at Mai Nefhi Technical College and Hamemalo Agricultural 
College (TesfaNews, 2015; Madote, 2016). Such efforts directly link 
the FCA’s programme to Eritrea’s militarised education system, 
which is designed to develop human resources for deployment to the 
National Service/Warsay Yikaalo National Development 
Programme, as recently confirmed by the Minister of Local 
Government (Eritrea Profile, 2019). This programme has been 
labelled by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in 
Eritrea as forced labour tantamount to slavery (UN Human Rights 
Council, 2015). This is also confirmed by Eritrean students, 
interviewed by the author, who have laboured under this system, who 
consistently say that the situation in Eritrea is modern-day slavery 
(NTN various interviews with author, face-to-face, Kenya, 24 May–
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10 June 2018). Hence, through its programme, the FCA can be said 
to be maintaining, and perhaps even contributing to, the system of 
forced labour and slavery in Eritrea. 
Putting local staff in danger  
The extensive network of spies and informants of the PFDJ means 
that there are people who inform and report on activities of 
international organisations and their employees. This way of 
controlling NGOs is well a documented practice in Eritrea, as 
reported by the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea: 
“The Commission collected a body of testimony that indicates the 
existence of a complex and multi-layered system to conduct 
surveillance of and spying on the Eritrean population, both within 
and outside the country” (UN Human Rights Council, 2015, para. 
340)  
 
Eritrean citizens, particularly those working for international 
organisations, are subjected to comprehensive surveillance that is 
based on a distributed intelligence system up to a neighbourhood 
level, with informants reporting to the power structure of the regime, 
the PFDJ. A former NGO worker told the Commission that NGOs 
are under constant surveillance. He said:  
 
[The] Government was spying on what we do. The executive committee usually has 
meetings with them. One of the university students, he was part of the national 
security, he sometimes came to the association […] I was under their surveillance. 
When we had the general assembly, we reported to them, if they had questions, we 
answered them professionally. They knew in detail what projects we were doing. I 
usually did not mention any political opinion. I even tried to act as if I was 
sympathetic of the Government because everywhere there are spies. […] Everywhere 
there are spies. In Eritrea you do not really trust anyone next to you. (UN Human 





Foreigners, including diplomats and journalists, are also under a high 
level of scrutiny. A former UN staff member recalled: 
 
[At] a sensitive meeting with a certain diplomat, I was told that we should meet on 
the terrace as the office security may be compromised. The diplomat informed me that 
he had just attended a meeting with the Government where certain things he had said 
confidentially and in the privacy of his office to other diplomatic members of his office, 
had been repeated to him precisely. (Anon., personal communication with 
author, Asmara, 2005) 
 
The government’s prevailing attitude is that NGOs have hidden 
agendas, therefore, Eritreans working for NGOs and other 
international organisations are working as spies for foreigners. 
(Adgoi, 1994). For this reason, the activities of INGOs attract 
scrutiny and their Eritrean employees become the target of attention 
from the national security apparatus.  
 
Consequently, NGO staff are harassed, threatened and routinely 
arrested. Such arrests often happen when they are on leave or 
immediately after an NGO had been asked to leave the country or 
has left. This process is designed to instil fear in local staff. Exposing 
national staff to such risks is contrary to the principle of ‘do no harm’ 
(Hagdu, 2009; US Department of State, 2008). 
 
Government suspicion extends to national staff working with 
embassies and the UN. From 2001 to 2010, the Eritrean Government 
arrested 48 employees of the US Embassy. Some have never been 
released, others were detained in horrible conditions for years or 
months and then released. No charges have been brought against 
them. Ali Alamin and Kiflom Gebremichael (both translators), Fitwi 
Gezae (webmaster), and Biniam Girmay (facility management 
assistant) were all arrested in 2001 and are still held to date without 
charges (Awate, 2018).  
 
The arrest of US Embassy staff in 2001, at the height of the then 
political crisis, served as a warning to all Eritreans employed by 
international organisations, including the UN and other embassies, 
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that they were on a watch list and targets of the national security 
apparatus. There is no evidence that FCA, NRC, and Vita have 
considered such issues or that they have conducted any due diligence 
assessment to ensure that they are able to protect their local staff from 
such risks (Anderson, 1999a; 1999b). 
Promoting the government’s agenda  
The three INGOs working in Eritrea have unwittingly become 
promoters of the Eritrean government’s political agenda. FCA’s 
development project is in higher education and it has signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the National Commission of 
Higher Education, an entity established in 2006 (now known as the 
National Higher Education Research Institute) to manage and 
coordinate the higher education sector, which reports directly to the 
Office of the President.  
 
The highly-political nature of the relationship that the FCA has 
entered into with the government is highlighted by the fact that under 
present arrangements, it reports to the head of the PFDJ’s Political 
Affairs, Yemane Gebreab (observed by the author in Asmara, August 
2016) and Dr Haile Mihtsun, head of the Medical Board, which is 
responsible for approving Eritrean citizens travel for medical 
treatment, and head of the National Higher Education Research 
Institute, which is responsible for coordination of the higher 
education sector. According to information received, Dr Mihtsun, 
despite the availability of funds, halted the Italian-funded programme 
that facilitated the hiring of international qualified staff (i.e., including 
diaspora Eritreans) by colleges of higher education (GF, personal 
communication, Facebook Messenger, 14 June 2018), a clear 
indication that their relationship depends on the benevolence of the 
government elites and that there is no interest on the part of the 
government in developing an open and transparent higher education 
sector. Both Yemane Gebreab and Dr Haile Mihtsun are trusted 
political fixers for President Isaias Afwerki. In the case of Dr 
Mihtsun, he has recently been identified by witnesses as the doctor 
responsible for visiting political prisoners (i.e., G15). Therefore, he is 
closely connected with the ongoing detention of political dissidents 
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without trial and the associated human rights violations (Human 
Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018). 
 
Hence, it can be concluded that FCA is operating directly under the 
instruction and supervision of the Office of the President and the 
President’s inner circle, for whom the key nation building project is 
the horizontal integration of National Service with the Warsay 
Yikaalo National Development Programme and education, a policy 
directly responsible for the indefinite National Service and the 
institutionalisation of forced labour in Eritrea. 
 
The 2003 education reform replaced Asmara University with 
unaccredited colleges in various parts of the country that were not 
ready to receive students, as their physical infrastructure and academic 
resources were inadequate (Riggan, 2016). The reform integrated 
education with National Service and the Warsay Yikaalo 
Development Programme – all policies that are directly responsible 
for the indefinite National Service by Eritrean youth. The formation 
of the National Higher Education Research Institute was not part of 
the 2003 education reform strategy. Much like the Warsay Yikaalo 
National Development Programme, it is an initiative of President 
Isaias Afwerki, who has centralised all aspects of the governance of 
Eritrea within his office, bypassing all government institutions. In 
education, as in other sectors (i.e., finance), the President operates 
parallel systems (Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017; UN Security 
Council, 2011). 
 
The NRC is implementing a vocational training programme targeting 
students who for various reasons, including the government’s policy 
of not re-admitting students who have dropped out, are not in school. 
According to the NRC, graduates from the vocational training project 
are assisted to establish cooperatives and find employment within the 
private sector (NRC, 2017). However, this strategy of the NRC 
overlooks the fact that there is no legal framework in Eritrea to 
establish cooperatives and that to establish a business Eritreans are 
required to have a licence, which is only available to those who have 
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completed National Service. Therefore, graduates will have the 
following options:  
 
• join the National Service, which could be indefinite  
• pay an official or other person to obtain a licence irrespective 
of the fact that they have not completed National Service 
• join the informal economy 
 
The higher education programme presently implemented by the 
Eritrean government, which starts from grade 12, is designed to 
ensure that there are a large number of youth available for National 
Service and the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme, 
and to contain and destroy any independent student movement in 
Eritrea, as evidenced by the closure of Asmara University (Kibreab, 
2014). Therefore, collaboration with the education system promotes 
the government’s political agenda. Specifically, it serves to obscure 
the terrible state of education in the country, without any way of 
improving it and the fact that the whole system is providing labour 
for National Service and the Warsay Yikaalo National Development 
Programme. It is important to note that, at this stage, despite the 
peace process with Ethiopia, there is no plan to delink the education 
system from National Service and the Warsay Yikaalo National 
Development Programme (Chapter 5, ‘Sons of Isaias’: Slavery and 
Indefinite National Service in Eritrea, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Makeda Saba 
& Klara Smits). 
Legitimising the government  
As NGOs, FCA, Vita and NRC are ethically required ‘to do no harm’. 
International norms and their own codes of conduct also require that 
they work independently of the government and in the interest of the 
people. However, they are working within a context that does not 
tolerate such independence, legally or in practice (see Proclamation 
No.145/2005, State of Eritrea, 2005). Therefore, like the Eritrean 
mass movement organisations (NCEW, NUEW, and NUEYS), they 




Vita, in particular, has given the government a political platform in 
the EU, as explained in this blog post on Shedelli: 
 
It seems that Vita has given Isaias Afewerki the pleasure of acquiring his own 
diplomatic Trojan horse. Far from its mission of helping poor farmers improve their 
livelihoods, it is actually endangering their lives. By playing the role of lobby group 
and enabling one of the top advisers of the criminal regime to appear at a conference 
at the EU, it is helping the regime gain diplomatic ground that will allow it to 
continue to commit more crimes against its own people. (Yohannes, 2016) 
 
The education system that these three INGOs are supporting has 
become a major mechanism for the recruitment of Eritreans into the 
National Service and Warsay Yikaalo National Development 
Programme (Kibreab, 2014). It is also the education system that in 
2017 was the principle source of public protest, as a result of the 
government’s efforts to implement restrictions on religious bodies 
and bring faith-based schools directly under government control. 
Journalist Brummelman reported last year on the protests associated 
with the education reform: 
 
However, it is not just Muslims, but also Christians that participate in the protest. 
“Muslims and Christians are united. They want the government to stop meddling in 
their education. That is why people took to the streets,” according to the spokesperson 
in Asmara, who himself is not a Muslim. And, he adds, it is not just about the 
restriction of religious freedom. “This regime restricts all possible freedom of its 
citizens. That is why so many people flee Eritrea. This has to stop. That is why we 
pray for this government to disappear.”  
 
The banned Eritrean opposition, which is operating without any political space and 
with great fear for their life, has asked the international community to pay attention 
to the repression in Eritrea. “Foreign countries must send observers to find out what 
is happening here,” according to an opposition member speaking over the phone from 
the Eritrean capital of Asmara to a journalist. (Brummelman, 2017a). 
 
Although this unrest has died down, resistance is likely to continue. 




Of course, I am afraid. So many people are afraid. We are under great risk. 
However, new protests will emerge. Maybe they will be small in the beginning, in 
different places. And maybe they will grow into something big. That is why it is so 
important for the world to know what is going on here (Brummelman, 2017b). 
 
Vita is one of the International NGOs that was asked to close its 
programme by the end of 2011. However, Vita found a way to stay, 
building an alliance with Irish research and marketing institutes for 
potato farming, and signing a memorandum of understanding with 
the National Agricultural Research Institute of Eritrea (Vita, 2012).  
 
Vita has established a strong link with the Irish government (one of 
its main donors) and Irish potato farming institutions. Such links are 
instrumental in the initiative taken by Member of the European 
Parliament, Brian Hayes, to organise an event on the ‘Future 
development of Eritrea’, at the time of the Irish Presidency of the 
EU, in 2016. The conference provided the Eritrean government with 
a valuable platform in the EU Parliament for political messaging 
(Yohannes, 2018; Chyrum, 2016). The EU meeting was attended by 
high-level political representatives of President Isaias Afwerki, 
Yemane Gebremeskel (Minister of Information) and Saleh Osman 
(Minister of Foreign Affairs). Prior to the conference and to his visit 
to the Vita project in Eritrea, in March 2016, Member of the 
European Parliament Hayes stated in a YouTube video that: “[We] 
need to ensure that human rights are defended in the circumstances 
where there is such corruption in Eritrea ... [there] must be 
conditionality ... [in] terms of human rights” (Hayes, 2016b, 
transcribed by author). 
 
No such conditionality or defence of human rights in Eritrea was in 
evidence at the conference on the ‘Future development of Eritrea’. 
At the conference, there was no engagement with Eritrea on human 
rights or on its National Service or the Warsay Yikaalo National 
Development Programme. The meeting provided the Eritrean 
government with an international platform to assert, with no 
challenge, that thanks to the policies it is implementing, Eritrea is 
progressing, therefore, standing in contradiction to the findings of the 
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UN Special Inquiry on Eritrea and the UN Commission for Human 
Rights (Hayes, 2016a).  
 
In addition, during the 37th session of the Human Rights Council in 
March 2018, the Eritrean government hosted a side event with the 
participation of representatives from Nevsun Resources Ltd, a 
Canadian mining company, and Danakali Ltd, an Australian mining 
company. The objective of the event was to dispel the findings of the 
UN Commission that the mining sector in Eritrea, in contravention 
of international law, is using forced labour (Eritrea Profile, 2018; 
TesfaNews, 2018).  
 
Vita’s Chief Executive Officer, John Weakliam, was at the meeting as 
part of the government and mining industry-led panel, legitimising 
the position of the Government of Eritrea that mining companies 
have not used, and do not use, forced labour (TesfaNews, 2018). 
However, it is common knowledge that mining companies contract 
national construction companies, which are owned by different 
sectors of the government (such as the PFDJ and military) and they 
all use National Service personnel and, therefore, forced labour. 
(Eritrea Focus, 2018; UN Human Rights Council, 2015; 2016; UN 
Security Council, 2011; 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2013).  
 
Commenting on the event, the Director of Legal Advocacy at the 
Australian Human Rights Law Centre, Keren Adams, was of the view 
that, given the Eritrean government’s poor human rights record, the 
promotion of its record by the Australian company (Danakali Pty Ltd) 
was deeply concerning:  
 
Eritrea’s record has come under consistent criticism at the United Nations… [An] 
estimated 5,000 refugees flee the country’s repressive policies every month. In these 
circumstances, for an Australian company to participate in a staged public relation 
exercised for the Eritrean Government is staggering. (Human Rights Law 
Centre, 2019) 
 
If the participation of Danakali Pty Ltd in such event was ‘staggering’, 
how much worse is the participation of Vita, which, as an INGO, is 
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supposed to ‘do no harm’ and maintain a position of: humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality and independence? Vita’s actions have 
legitimised the Government of Eritrea and helped it to restore its 
reputation abroad. 
 
To assist with public relations exercises that present the Eritrean 
totalitarian government in the best possible light, Nevsun has hired 
Ruby Sandhu, a former partner of Brooks Consultancy LLP;78 
founder of RS Collaboration;79 and Bronwyn Bruton, Deputy 
Director of the Africa Centre at the Atlantic Council (Christophe, 
2017; Vincent & Plaut, 2019). Ms Sandhu was initially hired as 
Nevsun’s Business and Human Rights Consultant (Nevsun, 2015) 
and has since repeatedly intervened, through social media, to ridicule 
and diminish the findings of the UN Commission of Inquiry as to 
Human Rights in Eritrea. The most recent effort is a Twitter post of 
16 March 2019 in support of the Eritrean government’s denial of any 
human right crisis in Eritrea during the UN Human Right Councils 
Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Eritrea (Sandhu, 2019; UN Human Right Council, 2019). Similarly, 
Ms Bronwyn Bruton, through her articles (Bruton, 2016), interviews 
(Castiel, 2015; Saba, 2019), workshops and representations to the US 
government (Christophe, 2017; House Foreign Affairs Committee 
Republicans, 2016), has also worked to present the Government of 
Eritrea in a positive light. In each case, Ms Bruton accepts that there 
are human right abuses and then proceeds to defend the status quo. 
This defence overlooks the fact that there is no independent 
economic sector, due to the policies that the government has 
implemented as well as its efforts to control the economic sector 
through its policy of indefinite National Service (Human Rights 
Concern Eritrea, 2018; UN Security Council, 2011). 
 
Irrespective of these efforts, the issue of the use of forced labour by 
Nevsun Resources Limited is presently a matter of dispute in the 






Geoffrey, 2018; Kassam, 2017; Plaut, 2018, 2019). The presentation 
of a rosy picture of Eritrea overlooks the concerns of the World Bank 
and the EU that Nevsun mislead investors, that the government has 
a history of taking over profitable businesses and that the potential: 
“…environmental impact and the effect of mining on the local 
communities will be significant” (Mines and Communities, 2012). 
This picture also overlooks the fact that as there is no published 
budget for the country, there is no transparency or accountability of 
the government, and revenue from the mining sector is not accounted 
for (UN Security Council, 2015). 
Conclusion  
The three remaining INGOs working in Eritrea, FCA, NRC and Vita, 
are working in a country run by a totalitarian regime, headed by 
President Isaias Afwerki. This regime has been found by the UN 
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea to have 
committed crimes against humanity, which are ongoing (Keetharuth, 
2018; UN Human Rights Council, 2015, 2016). As a result of this, and 
the government’s policy of indefinite National Service, Eritrea has 
become the ninth largest producer of refugees (UNHCR, 2017).  
 
FCA, NRC and Vita, through their interventions in agriculture, 
vocational training and education, state that they intend to prevent 
the exodus of Eritreans. But, in reality such interventions are not 
addressing the Government’s human rights record and policy 
framework responsible for the impoverishment of Eritreans, as well 
as the exodus resulting from indefinite National Service and forced 
labour (Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017; Melicherová, 2019). 
 
The presence of INGOs in Eritrea is currently merely a political 
expedient. Although, FCA, NRC and Vita may have good intentions, 
given the restrictive context of the country, its history of contempt 
for civil, political, and religious freedom, and the finding of crimes 
against humanity by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights in Eritrea (UN Human Rights Council, 2016) it is argued that 
their presence in the country is misguided, harmful and contrary to 
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the principle of ‘do no harm’ and the Humanitarian Charter (Sphere 
Project, 2018). It is also contrary to human rights and humanitarian 
law, as well as the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Code of Conduct and these INGOs’ own codes of conduct 
and guidelines (FCA, 2017a; IFRCRC, 2002; Act Alliance, 2011). 
 
Since the start of the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process in June 2018, 
Eritrea has restored regional diplomatic relationships. Despite the 
Eritrean government’s human rights record and the mass exodus of 
refugees, border posts have been reopened. However, there has been 
no indication that the military will be demobilised, National Service 
will be limited to the statutory 18 months, the constitutional 
government will be restored, the government’s policy of integrating 
of National Service, the Warsay Yikaalo National Development 
Programme and education will be rescinded, the ban on opposition 
political parties will be lifted, or political and religious prisoners will 
be released. Nor has there been any indication that the PFDJ will hold 
a National Congress, internal elections, or a review of the state of the 
nation, as well as of PFDJ.  
 
The presence of INGOs in Eritrea is politically convenient, as it 
creates an image of engagement and openness and promotes the 
government’s political goals. However, tight constraints on INGOs 
remain and there is no indication of an opening of space for national 
NGOs.80 The three INGOs operating in Eritrea are overlooking these 
restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly and association, the 
banning of any national civil society that is not directly controlled by 
the government, and the repeated expulsion of INGOs. Their 
presence legitimises the Government of Eritrea and its restrictions on 
civil society.  
 
By providing legitimacy by acting as ‘civil society’ and ‘independent 
donors’, while in reality working under direct instructions of the 
government, FCA, Vita and NRC are reducing the scope for national 
 
80 According to Eritrean Ambassador to the UN, Mr Gerhartu, the Eritrean 
government is busy creating a proliferation of mass movement like organisation 
(Gerhartu, personal communication, Geneva, 2017).  
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civil society to fight for space in Eritrea and ignoring the call by 
Eritrean citizens for international observers to monitor the human 
rights situation in the country (Plaut, 2017). FCA, Vita and NRC have 
failed to take into consideration the risk to Eritrean citizens as a result 
of their presence and the implementation of their projects. In this 
totalitarian environment, FCA, Vita and to a lesser extent NRC, in 
addition to acting as an extension of the government whose 
legitimacy is questionable, are providing it with legitimacy and an 
international platform for its political messages. Hence, it is 
concluded that these INGOs are entrenching the authoritarian 
regime in Eritrea and enabling it to pursue its policy of forced labour, 
creating complicity in relation to crimes against humanity. 
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Complicity in Torture: The Accountability of the EU 
for Human Rights Abuses against Refugees and 
Migrants in Libya 
 
Wegi Sereke & Daniel Mekonnen 
 
Introduction  
This chapter addresses serious allegations about the complicity of 
European governments and state actors, in particular Italy and the 
European Union (EU), in the 
abuse of African refugees 
and migrants in Libya. The 
analysis is based on the prima 
facie findings – accepted as 
correct until proven 
otherwise – of a ground-
breaking report by Amnesty 
International, published in 
December 2017 (Amnesty 
International, 2017). 
Building on the main 
findings of Amnesty 
International, this chapter 
raises additional critical 
questions about 
accountability that are not 
adequately addressed in the 
report. This will be done in a 
way that charts out possible 
mechanisms of not only legal 
accountability, but also moral and political accountability, for the 
alleged complicity of European governments in the serious violation 
of international human rights law being committed in Libya. The 
Amnesty International estimates that 
there are 20,000 refugees and migrants 
detained in horrific conditions in different 
Libyan detention centres administered by 
the country’s General Directorate for 
Combating Illegal Migration, a 
government entity that receives support 
from Italy and the EU. In addition, 
horrendous violations are committed 
against African refugees and migrants by 
the Libyan Coast Guard, another 
government entity receiving enormous 
amounts of support from Italy and the 
EU. The EU and EU governments 
carry responsibility for the situation of 
refugees in Libya and they need to be held 
accountable for their complicity in the 
human rights abuses taking place.  
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chapter will also look at the obstacles that lie ahead of any 
accountability measures related to the alleged complicity of European 
governments. 
 
We start by making some key assertions about contemporary global 
challenges, one of which is the so-called ‘migration crisis’ in Europe. 
With the advent of the Internet and other recent technological 
advancements, the world has become increasingly smaller and 
interdependent – benefiting immensely from the fruits of 
globalisation. At the same time, the world is also “becoming a more 
troubled place today than it was many years back” (BBC, 2018). Most 
recently, the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Anna, had the 
following to say: “The world is particularly messy today when we look 
at what is happening in the Middle East, what is happening in some 
parts of Africa, some parts of Asia, and the fact that I don’t see strong 
leaders around” (BBC, 2018).  
 
Our world is currently experiencing multiple crises, ranging from the 
catastrophic consequences of climate change, to rising levels of 
inequality, a retreat from universal commitments about the protection 
and promotion of human rights, the rise of populist political parties 
and leaders, and the unprecedented number of victims of forced 
displacement, to mention a few examples. This chapter focuses on 
the latter challenge, the growing number of refugees at the global 
level, particularly in Europe, and how this problem is shaping policy 
and practice in European decision-making processes, including its 
far-reaching influence on Europe’s long-standing commitment to the 
protection and promotion of human rights, as well as adherence to 
the obligations emanating from international refugee law and 
international human rights law. The chapter will pay particular 
attention to the emerging discourse on the complicity of European 
governments in the suffering of African refugees and migrants 
stranded in third countries, most notably Libya.  
 
The main question looked at in the chapter is: Are the EU and EU 
governments complicit in the human rights abuses of refugees and migrants in 
Libya and, if so, can they be held accountable and by what mechanism? The 
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chapter is organised as follows. Following this general introduction, a 
brief account is given of the horrendous abuse suffered by African 
refugees and migrants in Libya. This is followed by an analysis of the 
legal grounds for the alleged complicity of Italy and the EU, as well 
as the gravity of this alleged complicity. The section that follows sets 
out the accountability options, including prosecutorial measures and 
non-prosecutorial measures, as well as the reparation of the rights of 
victims and relatives of victims. This discussion takes into account 
the EU and international legal framework applicable to accountably 
measures for complicity in atrocity crimes. Looking beyond legal 
accountability, the next section proposes what are considered to be 
long-term and sustainable solutions to the so-called ‘migration crisis’ 
in Europe. This will be done by emphasising the need to contextualise 
European migration debates in light of the unfolding global migration 
crisis, the effects of which are not limited to Europe. This is followed 
by re-visiting the alleged complicity of Italy and the EU in human 
rights abuses and the need to look at this problem as an early sign of 
the emergence of recalcitrant government behaviour in Europe – a 
problem that requires the proactive engagement of sensible and 
responsible European citizens. The final section summaries the main 
findings of the chapter and draws some conclusions. 
The abuse of refugees and migrants in Libya 
Due to its geographical proximity to Europe, Libya is the most 
important and highly-populated transit country for refugees and 
migrants coming to Europe. Since the downfall of the previous 
regime of Muammar Gaddafi, the country has been in chaos, in which 
context numerous serious human rights violations are being 
committed with impunity. Violations against African refugees and 
migrants are the norm, not the exception. 
 
In the interest of clarity, it is important to briefly explain here the 
difference between the two seemingly similar, but different, terms: 
‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’. The latter is a person who moves from one 
place/country to another in order to find work or better living 
conditions. The reason for his/her movement is usually economic. 
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Any violation that such a person may suffer is addressed by the 
corpus of what is generally known as international human rights law. 
In the case of migrant workers, a thematic treaty was adopted in 1990 
known as the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (UN 
General Assembly, 1990). 
 
A refugee, on the other hand, is a person who has been forced to flee 
their country of origin due to one of several grounds of forced 
displacement, such as war, natural calamity or gross human rights 
violation. Persecution or grave danger to one’s own personal security 
is the most important element in defining a person as a refugee. The 
conditions under which a person may be defined as a refugee are 
stipulated in Article 1 of the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees. 
Unlike a migrant, a refugee is literally forced to flee his or her country 
of origin by one of the grounds listed in this convention. 
 
Therefore, in terms of meaning, there is a huge difference between a 
migrant and a refugee, although these terms are often used 
interchangeably, in particular by mainstream media. Relatively 
speaking, refugees are more vulnerable to abuse. The focus in this 
chapter is on refugees, but cursory reference will also be made to 
migrants due to the fact that the main focus country of this research 
(Libya) is host to a large number of African refugees and migrants. 
According to the statistical data of the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), up to September 2017, there were around 416,000 
migrants and more than 44,000 people recognised by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as refugees in 
Libya (IOM, 2017). Amnesty International (2017, p. 22) cautions that 
“the actual number of such individuals is again likely to be much 
higher, given UNHCR’s limited mandate in the country”.  
 
In terms of the various categories of population movements involved, 
the experience in Libya fits well with a situation of mixed migration. 
Organisations working on the broader topic of migration, such as 
IOM and UNHCR, understand the phenomenon of mixed migration 
as the complex movement of people, including refugees, asylum 
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seekers, economic migrants, environmental migrants and other 
migrants, as well as unaccompanied minors, smuggled persons, 
victims of trafficking and stranded migrants (Mixed Migration Hub, 
2018). 
 
Amnesty International estimates that there are 20,000 refugees and 
migrants detained in horrific conditions in different Libyan detention 
centres administered by the country’s General Directorate for 
Combating Illegal Migration, a government entity which receives all 
sorts of support from Italy and the EU – this being one of the most 
important links in establishing European complicity in the ongoing 
suffering of African refugees and migrants in Libya. This is in addition 
to other horrendous violations committed against African refugees 
and migrants by the Libyan Coast Guard, another government entity 
receiving enormous amounts of support from Italy and the EU 
(Amnesty International, 2017, pp. 26–40). The alleged complicity of 
Europe in the ongoing abuse of African refugees and migrants needs 
to be seen in this context, as will be elaborated in some detail in the 
next section. 
Alleged European complicity 
The December 2017 report by Amnesty International makes serious 
accusations against European state actors, alleging complicity in the 
continued abuse of African refugees and migrants in Libya. Based on 
a thorough analysis of the jurisprudence of international courts and 
tribunals, regional and international human rights bodies, as well the 
opinion of eminent publicists, scholars and practitioners of 
international law, Amnesty International concludes that Italy and the 
EU have knowingly aided and abetted in the perpetration of grave 
violations of international human rights law and international refugee 
law in Libya. One of the most common abuses committed against 
African refugees and migrants is the crime of torture (Amnesty 
International, 2017).  
 
Among the many intriguing arguments Amnesty International puts 
forward to substantiate its conclusions is the one based on the 
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interpretation of the scope of the UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(UN General Assembly, 1984). Citing General Comment No. 2 of the 
UN Committee Against Torture (2008), Amnesty International 
argues that obligations emanating from the Convention against 
Torture are binding even when the torture in question is committed 
in a geographic location far from the national boundaries of a given 
European country.  
 
Based on the definition of the scope of the UN Convention against 
Torture, provided by the UN Committee against Torture, a country 
may be held accountable for the crime of torture when the crime is 
committed in a situation in which the country in question “exercises, 
directly or indirectly, de facto or de jure control over persons in 
detention” (Committee Against Torture, 2008, p. 56). Similar 
guidance is found in the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights 
Committee. In one of its landmark decisions (UN Human Rights 
Committee, 2006), involving the interpretation of the scope of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN General 
Assembly, 1966), the Committee concluded:  
 
A State party may be responsible for extraterritorial violations of the Covenant, if 
[there] is a link in the causal chain that would make possible violations in another 
jurisdiction. Thus, the risk of an extraterritorial violation must be a necessary and 
foreseeable consequence and must be judged on the knowledge the State party had at 
the time. (UN Human Rights Committee, 2006)81 
 
The above arguments need to be understood in the context of the 
overall political situation in Libya, not only as a major transit country 
for African refugees and migrants to Europe, but also as a country in 
complete chaos. Since the downfall of the regime of Muammar 
Gadhafi, Libya is suffering from a breakdown of the rule law and has 
seen the continued enfeeblement of the central government and the 
proliferation of several armed groups, criminal gangs, and militias, all 
 
81 In support of its conclusion, the Committee cites A.R.J. v. Australia (UN Human 
Rights Committee, 1996), Judge v. Canada (UN Human Rights Committee, 1998), 
and Alzery v. Sweden (UN Human Rights Committee, 2005). 
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of which are wantonly committing human rights abuses against 
African refugees and migrants. There is a plethora of academic and 
non-academic literature chronicling in great detail the overall political 
situation in Libya, particularly the abuses suffered by African 
refugees. This includes a well-established pattern of documentation 
and reporting by Europe External Policy Advisors (EEPA) and its 
partners, including Tilburg University (Van Reisen, Estefanos & 
Rijken, 2014; Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015; Van Reisen & Mawere, 
2017; Mekonnen, 2015; Mekonnen, 2016; Sereke, 2018; Sereke, 2016). 
 
One of the most shocking accounts of abuses against African 
refugees and migrants is that by CNN, published in November 2017, 
which showed how African refugees are being auctioned in Libya in 
open markets, in a practice reminiscent of the dark age of slavery 
(CNN, 2017). Similarly, on 25 January 2018, CNN released additional 
disturbing video clips in which five Sudanese men are shown being 
whipped by their kidnappers. As done previously in relation to the 
well-documented Sinai trafficking (also researched by EEPA, see Van 
Reisen, Estefanos & Rijken, 2014; Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015; Van 
Reisen & Mawere, 2017), the videos were sent to the relatives of 
victims in order to extract ransom (CNN, 2018). 
 
There is a huge amount of evidence showing the prior knowledge of 
European governments about the abuses suffered by African refugees 
and migrants in Libya, making their continued cooperation with 
Libyan actors even more problematic. The best example, among 
many others, is a letter sent from the Office of the Prime Minister of 
Italy to Amnesty International, dated 3 November 2017, in which the 
Italian government is quoted to have said: “We are on the front line 
for the improvement of living conditions in the reception centres for 
migrants in Libya – whose problems have been well known to us for 
a long time – in co-operation with the main actors and international 
agencies” (Amnesty International, 2017, p. 58). Additional statements 
cited by Amnesty International (2017, pp. 58–59) include a comment 
dated 6 August 2017 and attributed to the Italian Deputy Minister for 
Foreign Affairs; a statement given in March 2017, attributed to UK 
Independent Commission for Aid Impact; a leaked report of the EU 
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Border Assistance Mission to Libya (EUBAM), dated 25 January 
2017; extracts from an internal report by the German Embassy in 
Niger to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, titled Return from 
Hell, leaked by the German newspaper Die Welt in January 2017; and 
several resolutions of the EU Parliament.  
 
These statements show that that Italy and other European countries 
are pursuing the agenda of outsourcing border control functions to 
the Libyan authorities regardless of the tremendous level of abuse 
(torture and other ill-treatment) African refugees and migrants are 
suffering at the hands of Libyan authorities. With regard to specific 
co-operation measures aimed at interceptions at sea, the actions of 
European governments are described by Amnesty International as 
that of:  
 
… proactively contributing to violations and abuses, in particular by providing funds, 
training, equipment and other forms of assistance to enhance the capacity of Libyan 
security agencies to intercept and detain refugees and migrants, which has led to the 
arbitrary detention and ill-treatment of women, men, and children. Italy and other 
European governments have also failed to take any reasonable measure to prevent 
and end violations and abuses and to require Libyan counterparts to take adequate 
steps towards ending such violations and abuses as a condition underpinning the 
implementation of any co-operation measure. (Amnesty International, 2017, p. 
59) 
 
Another study, which resonates deeply with the findings of Amnesty 
International (2017), is that of Davitti and Fries (2017). The authors 
contend that Italy’s actions in financing and ensuring the 
effectiveness of the Libyan Coast Guard (an entity accused of alleged 
cooperation with human smugglers, see Amnesty International, 2017) 
are part of a concerted effort by the EU to externalise migration 
management, in which Italy plays a key role. Thus, according to the 
same authors, these actions constitute a violation of Article 16 of the 
International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for 




Following this line of argument, it can be concluded that it is difficult 
for both Italy and the EU to distance themselves from wrongful acts 
committed in Libya in the context of their ongoing migration-related 
dealings with the Libyan authorities. In conclusion, we believe that 
the argument made by Davitti and Fries (2017),82 in the context of a 
hypothetical violation that took place in Niger and involving Italian 
complicity, applies in the same fashion in the context of the ongoing 
violations taking place in Libya. Based on this understanding, it can 
be concluded that Italy and the EU are in violation of Article 3 
(prohibition of torture), Article 5 (right to liberty and security) and 
Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 1950) for their active 
involvement in the financing, setting up and monitoring of the 
effectiveness of the offshoring mechanism in Libya for dealing with 
migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. 
Possible accountability options 
Many of the violations that are currently taking place in Libya, with 
the alleged complicity of Italy and the EU, involve flagrant breaches 
of fundamental rights and freedoms protected by international 
human rights law, international refugee law, and European human 
rights law, not to mention African human rights law. There is no 
doubt that many of these violations are of serious concern to the 
international community as a whole. Thus, according to Article 5 of 
the Rome Statute (International Criminal Court, 1998), they have the 
characteristic features of atrocity crimes that can possibly be 
prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), if other 
accountability measures are not taken by the countries concerned, in 
particular Libya, Italy and other EU member states.  
 
 
82 Davitti and Fries (2017) cite the following case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights in support of their argument: ND and NT v. Spain (European Court 
of Human Rights, 2017); Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (European Court of Human 
Rights, 2012a); MSS v. Belgium and Greece (European Court of Human Rights, 2011); 
EL-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (European Court of Human 
Rights, 2012b); Case of Al-Nashiri v. Poland (European Court of Human Rights, 
2014); Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (European Court of Human Rights, 2016). 
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One of the four categories of atrocity crimes punishable by the ICC, 
as per Articles 5 and 7 of the ICC, is the crime of torture, when 
committed as a crime against humanity. In order to reach the 
threshold of a crime against humanity, torture must be committed in 
a systematic or widespread manner, and must be directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. There is hardly any 
doubt that the situation of torture in Libya fits well with the definition 
of crimes against humanity, at least based on the detailed findings 
made by Amnesty International (2017).  
 
However, as is generally known, prosecution by the ICC takes place 
only when the authorities in a given situation are unwilling or unable 
to take necessary legal action with regard to the violations in question. 
While this may be the case in Libya, the same cannot be said with 
regard to Italy and other EU member states. Be it as it may, the 
authors are cognisant of the fact that at this level the possibility of 
initiating prosecutorial measures targeting European actors at the ICC 
level is undoubtedly not a priority in the near future for a number of 
practical and procedural reasons, which are not the direct focus of 
this chapter. This calls for consideration of other accountability 
options under national or regional mechanisms. 
 
The possibility of pursuing accountability for these violations is by far 
better in Europe than in Africa, for the simple reason that most 
European countries, including Italy, happen to have advanced 
prosecutorial infrastructure. This is in addition to complementary 
accountability options that can be pursued at the level of the 
European Court of Human Rights or the ICC at a later stage, should 
the situation demand. The relevance of the latter option needs to be 
seen in the context of the complete breakdown of the rule of law in 
Libya. 
 
However, as a matter related to one of the most controversial issues 
of public policy in Europe, prosecutorial accountability measures are 
not going to be that easy, even in European courts. This issue involves 
a potential process of criminal accountability, targeting high-ranking 
government officials sitting at the helm of the uppermost structures 
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of political power in several European capital cities, including at the 
level of the EU – in other words sitting heads of state. Apparently, 
before reaching the doorsteps of major judicial forums in Europe, 
such a daring exercise of prosecutorial accountability can be 
frustrated by a tremendous amount of pressure emanating from 
European capital cities. 
 
Therefore, without discounting the possibility of pursuing 
prosecutorial accountability in the future, it may also be helpful to 
look at other accountability options that can be pursued in a less 
confrontational way and by way of encouraging significant departure 
on the part of EU policymakers from their ill-suited migration 
policies, which are causing immense human suffering on the part of 
African refugees and migrants in transit countries such as Libya. This 
also takes into consideration another concern, which is related to the 
possibility of any prosecutorial accountability being stifled by delay 
tactics by the EU. 
 
Moreover, as an enormous institution of regional governance, with 
untapped resources at its disposal, securing a successful prosecutorial 
strategy against high-ranking EU politicians cannot be achieved 
without tremendous challenges and a prolonged legal battle. For 
victims and their relatives, who are in dire need of swift reparatory 
measures, other options that can provide timely remedial answers are 
more important than prosecutorial options, the success of which is 
subject to a great deal of uncertainty. This makes it imperative to look 
for other accountability options, in particular moral, political and 
compensatory ones.  
 
Such options can consist of a mix of remedial measures, which 
include an official apology on the part of the EU and other countries, 
such as Italy, which are accused of complicity in the abuses 
perpetrated against African refugees and migrants through their 
provision of direct and indirect help to state and non-state armed 
groups in Libya (Amnesty International, 2017, p. 49), whose record 
on the ill-treatment of refugees is worse than any other in 
contemporary world history. Public acknowledgment of harm to the 
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victims of abuse and their relatives should be seen as a crucial 
component of such a public apology. Common sense also dictates 
that any official act of remorse with regard to the abuses under 
discussion would be incomplete if not supplemented by moral and 
financial reparation to the victims and their relatives. In the interest 
of long-term and sustainable solutions, there are additional steps that 
need to be taken by European countries. These steps require a much 
broader understanding of the migration crisis in Europe, as discussed 
in the next section. 
Long-term and sustainable solutions 
One important aspects of the European ‘migration crisis’ that is often 
inadequately debated in major policy circles across Europe is the 
following question: is Europe really experiencing a big problem of 
refugees compared to other regions of the world, which are hosting a 
much higher number of refugees or victims of forced displacement? 
The answer is no, especially compared to the enormous amount of 
resources Europe has at its disposal, which makes it possible for 
European leaders (with the requisite political will) to come up with 
solutions that are mutually beneficial both to Europeans and the rest 
of the world, in particular the refugee-producing countries of the 
developing world. 
 
On the other hand, it is important to note that this question does not 
in any way dispute the fact that Europe is indeed flooded by a growing 
number of refugees, at a level not experienced since the end of World 
War II, as also corroborated by UNHCR (2017). The truth of the 
matter is that this problem is not unique to Europe, but rather global. 
As such, it is not helpful to frame the issue as a Eurocentric problem 
that can only be solved by employing Eurocentric solutions. Before 
proposing some ideas for a long-term and sustainable solution, we 
need to have a closer look at some basic facts and statistics by way of 





We do this by citing comparable observations from different sources, 
starting from the following remarks made in October 2016 by one of 
the most popular TV channels, Al-Jazeera’s Reality Check: 
 
As hundreds of thousands of refugees continue to make their way into the European 
Union – already the home of 1.3 million – many governments have begun passing 
anti-immigration laws in response. However, while the ‘wealthier’ Europe panics 
over the influx of asylum seekers, the numbers are much higher in Africa. (Hasan, 
2016). 
 
From a staggering global figure of 21.3 million refugees in 2016, in 
Sub-Saharan Africa alone, there were 4 million refugees. In addition 
to this, again in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are 19.5 million people, 
who are of concern to the UN refugee agency, UNHCR. The largest 
refugee camp in the world for many years, Dadaab Refugee Camp, is 
located in the African country of Kenya. Apparently, compared to 
Europe, Africa shoulders much of the burden caused by the growing 
number of refugees (Hasan, 2016).  
 
In spite of such realities, the focus of the debate in major policy circles 
across Europe is mostly on the “huge economic burden” refugees 
bring to European host countries (Hasan, 2016). Forgotten in this 
shallow debate, and pushed aside mostly by the narrow self-interest 
of European governments, are other issues of major concern to the 
world at large. Perhaps, it is based on this understanding that the 
presenter of Al-Jazeera’s Reality Check, Mehdi Hasan, after reminding 
European governments “to stop navel-gazing”, asks at the end of his 
short account: “is a crisis a crisis only when it washes upon the shores 
of Europe?” (Hasan, 2016). 
 
The view of African actors is also important in promoting a broader 
understanding of the issue of at hand. There are two recent 
observations made by two different African leaders on separate 
occasions that we believe are helpful in advancing our argument. 
These are the observations made by the presidents of Ghana and 
Kenya. The observation made by the Ghanaian President Nana 
Akufo-Addo during the first official visit to Africa by the current 
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President of France Emmanuel Macron offers a two-dimensional 
approach to addressing the global challenge of migration. On the one 
hand, Akufo-Addo reminds African citizens and politicians that it is 
their responsibility to make the continent attractive to its own young 
people, who are migrating in huge droves, risking death and other 
forms of abuses, to Europe. In his view, this can be done, among 
other things, by: liberating Africa from the mentality of aid 
dependency, building institutions that work according to the dictates 
of good governance, making leaders accountable, and making “sure 
that the monies that are placed at the disposal of leaders are used for 
the interest of the state and not for those of the leaders” (YouTube, 
2017). Arguing that Africans are migrating to Europe not because 
they want to, but primarily because they do not believe they have 
opportunities in their own countries, Akufo-Addo makes it clear that 
it is incumbent on African leaders to get their countries to work, so 
that they can create conditions that would allow young Africans to 
forgo the hazardous journey to Europe. He wants to see the level of 
resilience and ingenuity African refugees and migrants are showing in 
“crossing the Sahara, finding ways to go across with rickety boats, 
across the Mediterranean”, invested back in Africa, in realising the 
continent’s prosperity (YouTube, 2017). 
 
On the other hand, by invoking the lessons of 19th Century European 
history, in particular the mass exodus of Irish and Italian migrants to 
the American paradise in the latter part of that century, Akufo-Addo 
reminds Europe that migration and the movement of people does not 
need to be presented in a manner that suggests this is a new 
phenomenon. He focuses on the core message, that these problems 
can only be resolved sustainably by providing people with adequate 
opportunities in their own home countries. As a continent, with at 
least 30% of the most important minerals of the world, he points out 
that with proper political leadership Africa should be giving money 
to other places (YouTube, 2017). 
 
The second observation is that of the Kenyan President Uhuru 
Kenyata. Although his observation was made in specific reference to 
the growing anti-refugee sentiment in the United States, a problem 
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exacerbated after the election of the President Trump, we believe that 
Kenyata’s observation also addresses some of the key issues raised in 
the migration debate in Europe. Kenyata argues that it is troubling to 
see that countries, which were built and developed on the basis of 
migration – and possibly also on the basis of the twin sisters of slavery 
and colonialism – are harbouring anti-refugee tendencies, gravitating 
towards isolationism and moving away from the dictates of 
globalisation. Global processes, such as migration, he argues, which 
were once used as the main drivers of economic progress by some 
developed countries, are now seen as a misfortune when it comes to 
the migration of Africans to Europe (CNN, 2018).  
 
The kind of approach currently propagated by European leaders 
perpetuates a long-standing accusation against the Western world: 
that it deals with any matter related to Africa on the basis of self-
serving Western double standards. This mode of thinking misses a 
very essential component of the equation: challenges of a global 
nature, such as migration, can only be solved sustainably on the basis 
of meaningful partnerships and a mutual understanding, not by 
putting up a wall of isolationism or shutting people out (CNN, 2018). 
This problem also requires the ability to look deeply into emerging 
trends of recalcitrant government behaviour throughout Europe, as 
will be articulated in the next section. 
The end justifies the means 
Before concluding our chapter, we need to return to the core theme 
of our analysis, which is Italy and the European Union’s alleged 
complicity in the violation of human rights of African refugees and 
migrants in Libya. In our view, this situation is a dark blot on modern 
European history, and negates some of the most important lessons 
of 20th Century European history, in particular that of World War II. 
 
Modern human history is replete with unforgettable lessons regarding 
the initial warning signs of recalcitrant government behaviour – be it 
in matters of domestic policy or those of external affairs – which can 
easily morph into a more complex crisis of governance unless 
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addressed at an early stage. In most cases, such tendencies start by 
attacking the rights of minority groups or underprivileged societal 
segments, while the remaining, more privileged members of society 
watch in silence. Often it does not take long for such traits to 
degenerate into the worst form of governance problems, at which 
time it is too late to ‘put the genie back into the bottle’.  
 
Some of the disturbing traits of bad governance under discussion are 
now observable, more glaringly in Hungary and Poland, whose 
governments do not shy away from using highly charged anti-refugee 
rhetoric – not to mention the fact that these two countries are now at 
loggerheads with the EU for refusing to accept refugee quotas. With 
regard to these peculiar challenges, a scholar from Oxford University, 
writing for The Guardian, warns as the follows: 
 
It is the recipe for domestic repression, crony capitalism, massive corruption, implosion 
of the rule of law, the rise of racism and international conflict. The values that 
underpinned the postwar liberal order that conferred peace, tolerance and prosperity 
are being torched before our eyes. It is time to take a stand. (Hutton, 2018) 
 
This problem is unfolding itself at a time when Europe seems to be 
falling into the grip of, what Hutton (2018) calls “an anti-
Enlightenment populist right”. Europe is indeed gradually 
“reacquainting itself with its darkest demons” (Hutton, 2018). When 
it comes to the burning issue of refugees originating from Africa and 
the Middle East, there is another message that needs to be 
underscored. Current anti-refugee discourse in Europe flies in the 
face of historical accounts that show that during World War II there 
was actually a huge influx of European refugees to Africa and the 
Middle East, the two major sources of refugees in contemporary 
Europe. For example, Poland, one of the leading European countries 
adamantly refusing to accept the refugee quotas stipulated by the EU, 
is said to have had an estimated 35,000 of its refugees hosted in 
Eastern and South Africa (notably in Uganda) for more than a decade 




If history has any hints to offer, Europe only needs to go back to 
World War II83 (a recent history of only 75 years ago) to find its own 
lessons. The most important lesson to be drawn from this is related 
to untamed and recalcitrant government behaviour, which can morph 
into a wider social problem. It is summed up in the often-cited 
observation of a German protestant priest, Martin Niemöller, who is 
cited as saying: 
 
First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak out – 
Because I was not a Socialist. 
 
Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak out –  
Because I was not a Trade Unionist. 
 
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out –  
Because I was not a Jew. 
 
Then they came for me – and there was no one left to speak for me.  
(United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2018) 
 
Equally troubling is the tendency of some European countries to 
forget, to gloss over the favours done for them by the developing 
world during their most difficult times. That is why contemporary 
European discourse on migration is sometimes seen by outsiders as 
self-deception, at best, and chicanery, at worst, propelled by the 
narrow self-interest of European politicians. Sensible and responsible 
Europeans, presumably making up the greater majority of the 
European citizenry, need to do something about this before it is too 
late. There are already clear signs of recalcitrant government 
behaviour throughout Europe, threatening the continent’s long-
standing commitment to human rights, including refugee rights. 
These disturbing trends need to be tamed by the proactive 
engagement of responsible citizens. 
 
83 It is interesting to note that the two major world wars (World War I and World 
War II), although fought primarily between European governments, are dubbed 




Looking into the most recent statistics published by the UNHCR 
(2017), it appears that more than in any other period of modern 
human history, since 2016 the world is experiencing the largest 
number of victims of forced displacement. Some of the most 
common drivers of forced displacement are wars and natural 
calamities. Side-by-side, there are also people who move from place-
to-place in search of better opportunities. These two groups of 
‘people on the move’ are differentiated as refugees and migrants. In 
relative terms, the plight of the former group is the subject of a heated 
debate in European migration circles. 
 
The so-called European ‘migration crisis’ is an incomplete picture 
when seen in isolation from the context of rising global figures on 
refugees. While the pressure European countries are feeling as a result 
of the increasing number of refugees is understandable in some ways, 
it does not justify their complicity in the gross human rights violations 
that are currently taking place in Libya. 
 
In terms of scale and gravity, the level of abuse suffered by African 
refugees and migrants in Libya has no parallels in recent human 
history. This is why the alleged complicity of some European 
countries and the EU becomes problematic. No doubt the violations 
discussed in this chapter could give rise to prosecutorial 
accountability measures at national, regional or international levels, 
including those targeting high-ranking European government 
officials. While the prospect of pursuing prosecutorial accountability 
seems to be, at least for the moment, an extremely challenging 
exercise for a number of practical and procedural reasons, there is a 
need for an immediate reconsideration of European cooperation with 
Libya. This is in addition to repairing the damage caused by the 
alleged complicity of Italy and the EU – over and above other 
accountability measures that can be implemented within existing 




Time and again, migration experts have advised the EU to shift its 
focus from a preoccupation with stemming the arrival of refugees to 
addressing the root causes of forced displacement. The former is not 
difficult to achieve, but its dividend is short lived because it is 
propelled by the need to see quick results. By their nature, hurried 
and short-sighted policy considerations do not lead to a lasting 
solution. The other option, addressing the root causes of forced 
displacement, requires a holistic approach, which is not beyond the 
reach of the EU. It may require extra hard work and improvisation at 
several levels of political negotiations, but surely its dividend is more 
permanent and sustainable. The EU is not investing sufficiently in 
this option and needs to re-focus its attention accordingly.  
 
There is also a need to focus on long-term migration-related 
solutions. Of the many recommendations that have been proposed at 
different times and in different contexts, we emphasise the following 
two: 1) improving access to the free movement of people, and 2) in 
situations, like that of Libya, where horrendous violations of human 
rights are rampant, introducing expedited resettlement procedures 
with higher levels of geographic distribution and increased quotas 
(McAdam, 2015). 
 
With regard to a long-term and sustainable solution, the following 
observations are relevant by way of concluding this chapter. Dark 
roots that relish the nightmares of outlandish governance behaviour 
are hovering over Europe, in what seems to be a gradual, but assured, 
process. Exacerbated by the rise of populist political parties, who do 
not shy away from using overtly offensive (and irresponsible) 
language in reference to refugees and other societal groups, the 
problem is taking a disturbing shape. There is an urgent need to 
nurture the proactive involvement of responsible and sensible 
European citizens and actors, in particular grassroots and civil society 
actors, in the migration debate. With proper planning, diligence and 
perseverance, progressive forces can still win the struggle for a fair 
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Playing Cat and Mouse: How Europe Evades 
Responsibility for its Role in Human Rights Abuses 
against Migrants and Refugees 
 
Annick Pijnenburg & Conny Rijken 
 
Introduction 
On 28 June 2018, amid heightened tensions on the issue of migration, 
the leaders of the European Union (EU) made a number of 
agreements on migration at a 
meeting of the European 
Council. The conclusions of 
this meeting reconfirm that 
“a precondition for a 
functioning EU policy relies 
on a comprehensive 
approach to migration which 
combines more effective 
control of the EU’s external 
borders, increased external 
action and the internal 
aspects, in line with our 
principles and values” 
(European Council, 2018, p. 
1). Although the conclusions 
do not address the details of 
the envisaged measures, 
various key elements are 
directly relevant for mixed 
migration flows in Africa. 
These include increased 
support for the Sahel region, the Libyan Coast Guard, coastal and 
southern communities, as well as humane reception conditions, 
The EU tries to stem migration flows 
before they reach its borders. Its policy of 
externalising its borders and cooperative 
migration controls puts people on the 
move – regardless of whether they are 
refugees or migrants – at risk of 
sometimes severe abuse. The dire 
situation of migrants rescued in the 
Mediterranean Sea and returned to 
Libya, where they face arbitrary 
detention, torture and slavery, is but one 
example of the many ways in which such 
policies can negatively affect the rights of 
refugees. But who is responsible for the 
human rights abuses against refugees and 
migrants? The EU cannot claim that it 
has no responsibility, as it controls, at 
least in part, the conditions under which 
these human rights abuses take place. 
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voluntary humanitarian return, cooperation with countries of origin 
and transit, and voluntary resettlement. It also involves exploring the 
concept of regional disembarkation platforms, in close cooperation 
with relevant third countries as well as the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), and increased funding for the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, “a partnership with Africa aiming 
at a substantial socio-economic transformation of the African 
continent”. Furthermore, it involves strengthening the supportive 
role of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, 
including in cooperation with third countries (European Council, 
2018, pp. 1–3). 
 
Although vaguely formulated, these conclusions fit within the 
broader trend of the increasing externalisation of the EU’s external 
borders and migration control. In fact, two years earlier, the 
European Commission announced the new Migration Partnership 
Framework, which provides for reinforced cooperation with third 
countries to better manage migration (European Commission, 
2016a). Indeed, as will be discussed in this chapter, the EU and its 
member states are increasingly seeking to stem migration flows before 
they reach the EU’s borders, and they are doing so, among other 
things, by increasing cooperation with countries of origin and transit. 
In fact, this trend of externalisation and cooperation goes beyond the 
European Union, as other countries, such as Israel, Australia and the 
USA, have adopted similar policies (Gammeltoft-Hansen & 
Hathaway, 2015).  
 
Indeed, since the 1980s, destination states have implemented policies 
“that seek to keep most refugees from accessing their jurisdiction, and 
thus being in a position to assert their entitlement to the benefits of 
refugee law” (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, 2015, p. 241). The 
nature of such policies has changed, moving from ‘traditional’ 
measures to prevent refugees from reaching destination states, such 
as visa controls, carrier sanctions, and high seas interdiction, to 
cooperation-based measures, such as the offering of financial 
incentives and the provision of equipment, machinery, or training to 
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states of origin and transit (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, 2015, 
p. 243). These developments in migration control policies can be 
explained by changes in migratory patterns and technology, policy 
transfers (whereby ‘new’ policies implemented by one destination 
state are ‘copied’ by others), and developments in international 
refugee and human rights law (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Tan, 2017, p. 
33). At the same time, and regardless of restrictive migration policies 
worldwide, we have seen an increase in the number of people on the 
move, increased mobility and mobility options, and a growth in the 
smuggling networks facilitating such mobility.  
 
The externalisation of, and cooperation in, migration control are 
problematic trends, because they risk exposing people on the move 
to harm. There is a real risk that asylum seekers who are in need of 
international protection are either prevented from leaving or returned 
to countries where they face persecution or other human rights 
violations. Moreover, there is a risk that people on the move, 
regardless of whether they are asylum seekers or not, suffer 
sometimes severe abuse as a result of the externalisation of migration 
and cooperative migration control policies. The dire situation of 
migrants rescued in the Mediterranean Sea and returned to Libya, 
where they face arbitrary detention, torture and slavery, is but one 
example of the many ways in which such policies can negatively affect 
the rights of migrants, including asylum seekers. 
 
Although various legal challenges (sometimes successful) have been 
brought against unilateral migration control policies, externalisation 
and cooperation trends in migration control raise new legal 
challenges. It has, thus, been argued that “precisely when they try the 
hardest to protect rights beyond territorial borders, courts acquire the 
most significant role in providing the conditions for the rights’ further 
violation” (Mann, 2013, p. 369). States and courts can be said to play 
a cat-and-mouse game, in which “states continuously adapt and 
mutate their policies in an attempt to ensure their viability vis-à-vis 
legal developments” (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2014, p. 575). As will be 
seen in this chapter, the development of Italian policies to constrain 
migration from North Africa illustrates this point. Indeed, this 
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chapter will show that, from a legal perspective, attributing 
responsibility for the human rights abuses suffered by migrants and 
refugees to the actors involved is not an easy task. It raises many 
thorny legal issues and the applicable international legal framework 
contains gaps and grey areas. Gaps are situations in which actors 
(states, non-state actors, the EU and EU agencies) can escape 
responsibility for their conduct, while grey areas are situations in 
which the law does not provide a clear answer as to who is 
responsible. 
 
This chapter seeks to identify legal boundaries and define 
responsibilities in the area of migration control, in Africa and on the 
shores of the EU. The aim is to point to relevant legal concepts and 
discuss the limitations of the legal framework in relation to current 
practices. Although the UNHCR and IOM, as international 
organisations, play an important role in migration governance, their 
responsibility is not discussed in this chapter. The main research 
question is: To what extent can the EU and its agencies, as well as state and 
non-state actors, be held responsible for the human rights violations suffered by 
refugees and migrants? 
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first 
section gives several examples of current migration control practices: 
Italian and European cooperation with Libya; returns from Libya to 
countries of origin, including the plight of Eritreans on the move; and 
agreements between Israel, Rwanda and Uganda. The second section 
examines the responsibility of states, while the third discusses the 
responsibility of the European Union and relevant EU agencies. The 
last section offers some concluding remarks. 
 
This chapter is primarily based on legal analysis of an area that is 
undergoing change, both in terms of practice and legal standards. The 
description of current practices in the first section is based on desk 
research. It is not exhaustive, but rather highlights a few examples 
that reveal the complexity of the issues at hand. The legal analysis in 
the latter sections relies primarily on case law and scholarly literature.  
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Examples of migration control policies 
Italian and European support for Libya 
Since the year 2000, Italy has signed various agreements with Libya, 
including the 2008 Treaty of Friendship, under which the two 
countries agreed to cooperate to curb migration flows. Under this 
agreement, in 2009, Italy intercepted migrant vessels and returned 
their passengers to Libya (Mussi & Tan, 2017). However, in 2012, the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled, in the case of 
Hirsi Jamaa, that this practice breached Italy’s obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (European Court of Human 
Rights, 2012). It held that there was a risk that the intercepted asylum 
seekers would be ill-treated in Libya without access to an asylum 
procedure and be returned to their countries of origin (mainly, 
Somalia and Eritrea), where they were at risk of persecution. In the 
context of the Arab Spring in 2011, Italy suspended its cooperation 
with Libya, but after the European migration crisis of 2015–2016 and 
the continuing steady influx of migrants from Libya, Italy renewed its 
formal cooperation with Libya through a memorandum of 
understanding signed on 2 February 2017, which was endorsed a day 
later by the EU in the Malta Declaration (Hirsch & Dastyari, 
forthcoming, 2019). 
 
However, the situation in the Central Mediterranean has changed in 
the past few years. Smuggling practices have changed, with smugglers 
using less seaworthy vessels, resulting in more boats in distress that 
need rescuing and such rescues taking place closer to the Libyan coast 
(IOM, 2017, p. 8). The Italian policy to limit the number of arrivals is 
two-fold. On the one hand, Italy tries to restrict the activities of NGO 
vessels carrying out rescues in the Mediterranean Sea. On the other 
hand, it has established a Libyan Coast Guard that can intercept 
migrant boats in distress and return those rescued to Libya (Heller & 
Pezzani, 2018). Italy, thus, provides funds and equipment to the 
Libyan Coast Guard, and coordinates rescue operations. The 
European Union supports this approach by training and funding the 
Libyan Coast Guard (Amnesty International, 2017). Unlike in 2009, 
the interceptions on the Mediterranean Sea are no longer carried out 
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by Italian vessels, but by Libyan vessels, operating with Italian and 
European support. As will be seen below, this difference has 
important consequences in terms of responsibility under international 
law. Indeed, it has been argued that the European Court of Human 
Rights’ decision in Hirsi Jamaa:  
 
[…] contributed to understandings of how to evade judicial review in future cases. 
By saying that a state must not turn back asylum seekers with boats under their de 
jure or de facto control a court is also inviting such policies, as long as they can be 
conducted with no such control. (Mann, 2013, p. 369) 
 
The result of these policies is that migrants are returned to Libya, 
where they are at risk of being detained in inhumane and degrading 
conditions, tortured, raped, sold into slavery and even killed 
(Amnesty International, 2017). As discussed below, they are also at 
risk of being returned to their country of origin, for instance, with the 
help of the IOM, even when this would put their lives at risk. In such 
cases, the principle of non-refoulement, a binding norm in 
international law, is violated.  
Returns from Libya to countries of origin 
The horrific conditions in which migrants in Libya are held in 
detention centres are widely documented (UNSMIL & OHCHR, 
2016; Amnesty International, 2017), with the ultimate crisis reflected 
in CNN’s documentary on the auction of migrants (CNN, 2017). 
Detained in these centres, people are tortured, deprived of food and 
clean drinking water, and live in inhumane conditions without 
adequate living space, medical treatment or basic supplies (OHCHR, 
2017; Amnesty International, 2017; Refugees International, 2017). 
While some of these centres are run by Libya’s Ministry of the 
Interior’s Department for Combatting Illegal Migration, others are 
run by Libyan militias, which are reportedly involved in the smuggling 
and trafficking business themselves (Flynn, 2017). The lack of a 
strong central government in Libya has left a power vacuum, creating 
an environment for organised crime, including trafficking and 
smuggling, to flourish (Shaw & Mangan, 2014; Williams, 1999). As in 
other risky migration routes, migrants are subjected to rape, torture, 
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demands for the payment of ransom, and exploitation, not only while 
they are en route, but also in the Libyan detention centres (Shaw & 
Mangan, 2014; Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015). This inevitably comes 
with practices of human trafficking (Philips & Missbach, 2017).  
 
Given these circumstances, described by some as “hell on earth” 
(Refugees International, 2017), the African Union, the EU and Libya 
joined forces to release these migrants and help them return to their 
countries of origin. IOM assists migrants to return to their country of 
origin through its Voluntary Humanitarian Return programme. IOM 
claims that, with the support of the EU, the African Union and the 
Libyan government, some 23,302 migrants have been returned to 
their countries of origin between January 2017 and March 2018 
(IOM, 2018a). This operation takes place within the larger EU-IOM 
joint initiative to protect and assist migrants in need in 26 states along 
the Central Mediterranean route. The EU-IOM joint initiative, which 
was agreed upon in December 2016, is funded through the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (European Commission, 2016b).  
 
IOM not only assists with returns, but also with reintegration in the 
country of origin. The latter is extremely complicated, because many 
of the migrants are traumatised during the migration. To make 
reintegration work, IOM takes an integrated approach that combines 
support for returning migrants and their home communities, with the 
involvement of local communities in the reintegration process. They 
seek to address migration in an integrated fashion, in which migration 
governance, including all relevant actors, can take place (Betts, 2013; 
Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009). The question is whether this will 
prevent returned migrants from trying to leave their country again in 
search of a better place. We know from scholarly work that people 
embark on risky migration journeys even when the risks en route 
exceed the risks at home (Massey & Coluccello, 2015; see also 
Chapter 12, Desperate Journeys: The Need for Trauma Support for Refugees, 
by Selam Kidane & Mia Stokmans). Moreover, migrants who have 
returned to Nigeria, for instance, say they will try to reach Europe 
again (Aljazeera, 2018). Under the EU-IOM-Nigeria project 
‘Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the 
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sustainable reintegration of returning migrants to Nigeria’, some 
8,803 migrants have been returned from Libya to Nigeria (IOM, 
2018b). In contrast to the high number of victims of trafficking in the 
detention centres in Libya and among Nigerian migrants in general, 
IOM reported only 311 victims of human trafficking (IOM, 2018b). 
This is worrisome, because if returnees are not identified as victims 
of trafficking they are deprived of the support and assistance available 
to such victims (Paasche, Skilbrei & Plambech, 2018). Moreover, 
migrants in need of international protection might be among the 
people who have been returned. As such they are denied access to 
international protection.  
 
The situation of Eritrean migrants stranded in North African 
countries is of particular concern, because many are subjected to 
torture, rape, kidnapping and trafficking for ransom (Van Reisen & 
Rijken, 2015). Although the number of Eritrean arrivals in Europe 
was on the rise in 2015, their number dropped sharply in 2016; 
however, estimates suggest that the number of people leaving Eritrea 
remains high, prompting the question why the number of arrivals has 
decreased (Frouws & RMMS, 2017). Although during 2016, the 
interception and deportation of Eritreans by Sudan and Egypt was 
scaled up, there is no proof that Eritreans have been returned to 
Eritrea on a large scale. Yet, if Eritrean migrants who fled their 
country did not arrive in the EU and were not returned to Eritrea, 
where are they? Some stay in refugee camps in Ethiopia and Sudan, 
others settle in urban centres (sometimes as undocumented migrants) 
within and beyond the region. Some “disappear and do not survive 
the dangerous journey through the desert or across the 
Mediterranean” (Frouws & RMMS, 2017). Given the practice of 
trafficking for ransom in the recent past, there is reason to be 
concerned about the plight of Eritreans. 
Israel’s agreements with Rwanda and Uganda 
In the mid-2000s, the number of asylum seekers from Sudan and 
Eritrea who reached Israel through Egypt’s Sinai peninsula increased 
substantially, reaching over 60,000 in 2012 (Sabar & Tsurkov, 2015). 
In reaction, Israel built a 242-kilometre long electronic fence along its 
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border with Egypt, which was completed in 2014. This effectively 
stopped the arrival of new asylum seekers from Sudan and Eritrea 
(Lidman, 2018). The vast majority of Eritreans and Sudanese 
currently living in Israel are not recognised as refugees (Lidman, 
2018). Following various legislative changes regarding the detention 
of asylum seekers, since 2016: 
  
[…] newly arriving individuals, including asylum-seekers, are detained in an 
immigration detention facility for a three-month period upon arrival […] Single 
Eritrean and Sudanese men under the age of 60 are then automatically transferred 
to the semi-open Holot facility, for a period of up to 12 months mandatory residence. 
(UNHCR, 2016, p. 1) 
 
Moreover, since 2013, Israel has implemented a voluntary departure 
programme, under which asylum seekers are given the ‘choice’ of 
accepting resettlement in Uganda or Rwanda, remaining in prolonged 
detention in Israel, or returning to their country of origin (Sabar & 
Tsurkov, 2015, p. 14; see also Chapter 8, Israel’s ‘Voluntary’ Return 
Policy to Expel Refugees: The Illusion of Choice, by Yael Agur Orgal, Gilad 
Liberman & Sigal Kook Avivi). Between the start of the programme 
in December 2013 and June 2017, some 4,000 Eritrean and Sudanese 
asylum seekers have been relocated to Rwanda and Uganda 
(UNHCR, 2017). It has been reported that Eritrean asylum seekers 
who accept resettlement from Israel to Rwanda bypass immigration 
at Kigali airport and are pressured to agree to being smuggled into 
Uganda. The same applies to Sudanese asylum seekers flown from 
Israel to Uganda, who are smuggled to South Sudan or Sudan. Some 
of those returned are reported to have later died in the Mediterranean 
Sea as they tried to reach Europe (Green, 2017). In a similar vein to 
Italy’s current policy of providing support to the Libyan Coast Guard, 
which seems designed to prevent migrant arrivals without incurring 
responsibility for human rights violations, “[t]he process appears 
designed not just to discard unwanted refugees, but to shield the 
Israeli, Rwandan, and Ugandan governments from any political or 
legal accountability” (Green, 2017). In early 2018, a mass deportation 
plan for asylum seekers to leave Israel for unnamed destinations in 
Africa or face indefinite detention was delayed following legal 
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challenges and mounting pressure (ECRE, 2018). At the same time, 
Israel withdrew from an agreement with the UNHCR to implement 
solutions for some 39,000 asylum seekers in Israel (UNHCR, 2018a, 
2018b). 
 
These are only some examples of how the human rights of migrants 
and refugees are violated in the externalisation of migration control. 
The states and institutions that implement such policies, for instance, 
Italy and Israel, seem to think that they can successfully manage 
migration while avoiding being held responsible for such violations. 
Accordingly, based on a legal analysis, the next two sections discuss 
to what extent the practices described here enable states, non-state 
actors, and the EU and its agencies to be held responsible for their 
involvement in migration control activities outside the EU.  
Responsibility of states 
This section focuses on the responsibility of states for violating the 
human rights of migrants and asylum seekers, while the next section 
focuses on the responsibility of the EU and its agencies. The aim is 
not to provide an exhaustive list of human rights violations, nor to 
determine which actors are responsible for what, but rather to point 
out areas where it is difficult to make such a determination. Under 
international law, there are three ways in which states can incur 
responsibility: direct responsibility for the conduct of state actors, 
failing to protect people from harm, and complicity. Each of these is 
discussed in turn. 
State actors 
Under international law, states have an obligation not to commit 
human rights violations and, if they do, they can be held responsible 
in accordance with the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) (International Law 
Commission, 2001). According to Article 2 of ARSIWA, such 
responsibility arises if two requirements are fulfilled, namely, if the 
conduct is attributable to the state and if it constitutes a breach of the 
international obligations of the state. The violation of human rights 
obligations fulfils the latter requirement. As regards the requirement 
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of attribution, as discussed in the previous section, some of the abuses 
suffered by migrants, including asylum seekers, are inflicted by state 
agents. This is the case if, for instance, asylum seekers are deprived of 
their liberty in Israel or are detained by the Department for 
Combatting Illegal Migration in Libya (OHCHR, 2017). Because state 
agents – such as border control authorities and coast guards, the 
police, and the army – act on behalf of the state, if they commit a 
human rights violation, the state is responsible.  
 
If an individual is on the territory of the state when state agents 
commit a human rights violation against him or her, it is relatively 
easy to establish that the state in question is responsible. Thus, Israel 
and Libya are responsible for detaining asylum seekers on their 
territory. However, sometimes states also act beyond their borders. 
This was the case in Hirsi Jamaa, as discussed in the previous section, 
where Italian border forces intercepted migrants on the high seas, i.e., 
beyond Italy’s territorial waters. This raises the question of whether 
states are also responsible when they act extraterritorially. Under 
human rights law, states have to respect the human rights of all 
individuals within their jurisdiction. A state is responsible for human 
rights abuses if they are committed by a state agent within its 
jurisdiction. But when does an individual come within the jurisdiction 
of a state (Den Heijer & Lawson, 2013, p. 165)?  
 
Broadly speaking, there are two situations when a state exercises 
jurisdiction outside its territory. First, when a state exercises effective 
control over territory abroad, as in the case of military occupation 
(Milanovic, 2011). Second, and more importantly in the context of 
migration, a state also exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction when it 
exercises control and authority over a person outside its territory 
(Milanovic, 2011). Thus, the question is: when does a state exercise 
sufficient control over a person outside its territory?  
 
It is clear that a state exercises jurisdiction over persons when it 
exercises “physical power and control” over them, for instance, when 
they are detained by state agents abroad or on an intercepted ship, as 
held in Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom (European Court of 
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Human Rights, 2011, para. 137). Thus, in the Hirsi Jamaa case, Italy 
exercised jurisdiction because Italian military ships had taken the 
intercepted asylum seekers on board (European Court of Human 
Rights, 2012, para. 81). However, it is unclear to what extent lesser 
forms of control over persons abroad also trigger jurisdiction. As 
mentioned above, Italy now only supports the Libyan Coast Guard 
through funding, equipping, training and coordinating rescues. It is 
doubtful that this reaches the required level of control for establishing 
jurisdiction. If it does, both Italy and Libya could be responsible for 
returning migrants, including asylum seekers, to a place where there 
is a risk that they will be ill-treated. However, if it does not, only Libya 
would be responsible for any violation of the human rights of 
intercepted migrants. Likewise, in the case of Israel returning 
migrants to Uganda and Rwanda, the absence of Israeli agents on the 
ground in those countries means that it is difficult to establish that 
Israel exercises jurisdiction over the people returned to Rwanda and 
Uganda, despite the fact that the asylum seekers are returned on the 
basis of an agreement with Israel. Nevertheless, we will see below that 
in both situations the states of Italy and Israel might be held indirectly 
responsible for their cooperation with African states. 
Non-state actors 
What about harm inflicted by non-state actors? As noted above, not 
all human rights violations are committed by states. An example of 
the harm committed by non-state actors is the torture of Eritrean 
asylum seekers by human traffickers. Another example is the arbitrary 
detention of migrants in Libya in detention centres, which are run by 
militias rather than the Ministry of the Interior’s Department for 
Combatting Illegal Migration. In such situations, state actors are not 
directly involved in inflicting harm. However, in addition to having 
the obligation not to commit any human rights violations themselves, 
states are also obliged under human rights law to protect individuals 
within their jurisdiction from harm committed by others (Shelton & 
Gould, 2013). Thus, a state must protect people from a risk it knows, 
or should have known, about. This does not mean that a state is 
responsible for the ill-treatment itself, but rather for not having done 
everything that it could reasonably be expected to do to prevent it: 
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the applicable standard is one of due diligence (Shelton & Gould, 
2013). If, despite this, the person suffers harm, the state still complied 
with its obligations and cannot be held responsible. However, if the 
state fails to take all reasonable measures, or even colludes with the 
private actors committing the harm, it can be held responsible for 
failing to protect the person and prevent the harm. Thus, if there are 
credible reports that human traffickers torture migrants in order to 
receive a ransom, and the state does nothing to prevent this from 
happening, or even facilitates it, the state can be held responsible 
under international law. 
 
Moreover, in some cases, if the state exercises a high level of control 
over the non-state actor in question, the conduct of the non-state 
actor can be attributed to the state. It is then as if the state itself 
committed the human rights violation in question. Here also, it is 
unclear how much control the state must exercise over the non-state 
actor for the latter’s conduct to be attributed to the state. Under 
international law the threshold is high, requiring either complete 
dependence or strict control, or direction or control of specific 
conduct (Jackson, 2015, pp. 177–178). In the case of the migrant 
detention centres in Libya, which are run by militias, if it can be 
shown that the militias are acting on behalf of the Libyan state, Libya 
could be held directly responsible for the human rights violations 
committed there.  
 
Last, as for the conduct of state actors, a state can only be held 
responsible if it exercises jurisdiction over the individuals in question. 
Thus, in order to argue that European states are responsible for the 
ill-treatment of migrants, including asylum seekers, in Libya because 
they did not take all reasonable measures to prevent it, it must first be 
established that they exercised jurisdiction over them. However, this 
is unlikely to be the case because they do not exercise physical power 
and control over them.  
 
Moreover, the extent to which states have positive obligations to 
prevent and protect when acting extraterritorially remains unclear. 
Indeed, even in situations where a state exercises jurisdiction over 
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individuals outside its territory, the question remains to what extent 
that state has to protect them from harm. If state A exercises 
jurisdiction over a person who is located on the territory of state B, 
when examining the obligations of state A, one also has to take into 
account the fact that state B exercises territorial jurisdiction and has 
the obligation to protect individuals on its territory from human 
rights violations (Battjes, 2017, p. 281). Moreover, it seems that the 
extent of state obligations is proportional to the level of control 
exercised over the individual in question: more control means more 
obligations (Battjes, 2017, p. 283). 
Derived responsibility 
So far the discussion has focused on situations in which states are 
directly responsible for human rights violations. However, states can 
also be indirectly responsible for human rights violations, namely, 
when they are complicit in human rights violations committed by 
other states. One provision is particularly important in this regard: 
Article 16 of ARSIWA. Although it is not embodied in a treaty, this 
provision is part of customary or unwritten law (Aust, 2011, p. 191). 
It provides that: 
 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:  
a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act; and  
b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. 
 
Thus, if the requirements of Article 16 are met, a state is responsible 
for aiding or assisting another state in committing human rights 
violations, even if it does not exercise jurisdiction. The exact contours 
of the rule embodied in Article 16 remain unclear (Aust, 2011, pp. 
99–100). In the context of migration, one particularly thorny issue is 
the question of causality: the aid or assistance is generally provided in 
order to stop migration flows and/or improve the situation of 
migrants in transit countries and would-be migrants in countries of 
origin, not to commit human rights violations (see, for example, 
European Council, 2018). Nevertheless, it has been argued that Italy 
and other European states are responsible because of the support 
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they provide to the Libyan Coast Guard (Moreno-Lax & Giuffré, 
forthcoming, 2019; Hirsch & Dastyari, forthcoming, 2019).  
 
Likewise, in the Israeli example, if Israel knew of the violations taking 
place and continued the expulsions, or if it actually agreed with the 
authorities in Rwanda and Uganda to smuggle asylum seekers out of 
the country, Israel could be held responsible under Article 16 of 
ARSIWA. Moreover, Israel could be held directly responsible for 
violating the principle of non-refoulement if it knew or should have 
known of these practices. 
Responsibility of the EU and its agencies 
As illustrated in the examples given in the first part of this chapter, it 
is not only states that are involved in migration control in Africa. The 
EU is heavily involved in many of the agreements that underpin 
migration governance outside the EU’s borders, through either the 
facilitation of such activities, the financing thereof, or the secondment 
of personnel, for instance, via the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO). EU institutions are the architectures of these agreements 
and EU agencies such as Frontex and EASO play a role in their 
implementation (Mitsilegas, 2015). The case of NF v European Council 
(Court of Justice of the European Union, 2017) shows that it is 
difficult to establish the responsibility of EU institutions for their 
involvement in agreements, even when these are implemented 
(partly) on EU territory. In this case, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union ruled that the EU-Turkey Statement was not 
concluded by the European Council, but instead by the heads of state 
or governments of EU member states and Turkey, and, therefore, the 
Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction. This decision has been 
interpreted as a choice by the Court of Justice not to intervene in 
migration control policies (Spijkerboer, 2018). Establishing 
responsibility is even more difficult if the implementation of the 
agreements concluded between the EU and third countries takes 




The question here is which rules and regulations are in place to find 
international bodies responsible and under what conditions can these 
rules be triggered. The same question arises as regards the 
responsibility of the agencies Frontex and EASO for their 
involvement in the implementation of agreements, either within EU 
territory or beyond. Both questions are addressed in turn below. But 
before this, the next sub-section addresses the responsibility of the 
EU as an international organisation. 
The European Union 
In 2011, the International Law Commission adopted the Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations (ARIO) 
(International Law Commission, 2011), which mirror ARSIWA. They 
can be seen as the little brother of, or lex specialis to, the ARSIWA as 
they have not yet reached the same level of maturity. It is generally 
agreed that ARSIWA has now developed into customary law, 
whereas, due to a lack of practice, this cannot be said about the ARIO 
(Boon, 2011, p. 9). Article 4 of ARIO is the equivalent of Article 2 of 
ARSIWA and contains the same requirements for the responsibility 
of international organisations, namely, a breach of an international 
obligation that is attributable to the international organisation. Article 
10 ARIO states that:  
  
[t]here is a breach of an international obligation by an international organization 
when an act of that international organization is not in conformity with what is 
required of it by that obligation, regardless of the origin or character of the obligation 
concerned. (International Law Commission, 2011) 
  
The EU is an international organisation. Moreover, following Article 
6 of the Treaty on the EU, it is bound by the rights in the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the fundamental rights as they result from the 
constitutional traditions of the EU member states. Violation of these 
obligations by the institutions of the EU, including its agencies, is the 
responsibility of the EU, if the act is attributable to it (Hoffmeister, 
2010, pp. 745–746; Boon, 2011, pp. 3–9). In the case of migration 
governance outside the EU’s territory, and especially in those cases 
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where the EU institutions or agencies are not directly involved in 
implementation, this might be problematic. For instance, the EU 
supports and finances the interception of migrants and their return to 
the Libyan coast by the Libyan Coast Guard, but has no direct control 
over the coast guard’s activities and operations, which remain within 
the sovereign power of Libya.  
 
In the same vein as Article 16 of ARSIWA, Article 14 of ARIO is a 
provision on aiding and assisting. Thus, if the EU aids or assists 
another state or another international organisation in violating human 
rights it can be held responsible under the condition that it knew of 
the circumstances and that the conduct would have been an 
internationally wrongful act if committed by the EU itself. Similar to 
what was discussed above in regard to Article 16 of ARSIWA, it is 
unclear how and when Article 14 of ARIO applies. This remains a 
grey area of the law.  
 
The many efforts of the EU to manage migration in its external 
dimensions have been documented elsewhere in this book and 
discussed by others (Graziani, 2017; Collet & Ahad, 2017). Molenaar 
and El Kamouni-Janssen document how the agreements which the 
EU has concluded with third states in Sub-Saharan Africa fail to take 
into account local realities and, therefore, are ineffective and 
inefficient at best, and counterproductive at worst (2017, pp. 2, 64–
67). The interceptions by the Libyan Coast Guard, which lead to the 
detention of migrants in inhumane conditions, is a sad example of 
such practices.  
 
The question is, then, whether the EU can be held responsible in 
these situations where the violation of the rights of migrants 
(imprisonment) is a direct consequence of the EU’s involvement. At 
first glance this situation does not seem to fulfil the requirements for 
responsibility, as there is no direct involvement and the intent of the 
EU’s action was not the violation of these rights. However, if the EU 
knew that the violations are a direct consequence of its actions one 
could argue that the EU is responsible for aiding and assisting in the 
violation of human rights. As such, reports, for example, by 
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humanitarian organisations, on the human rights situation on the 
ground are indispensable for holding the EU responsible for human 
rights violations conducted by states and non-state actors.  
Frontex 
This and the following section discuss the responsibility of agencies 
tasked with the implementation of EU migration control policies. In 
general, the rules on the responsibility of EU agencies are found in 
the agreement establishing the particular agency. In addition, and 
based on the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the annulment 
procedure can be initiated against acts of EU agencies (Article 263). 
In such a procedure, the Court of Justice of the European Union can 
review the legality of the acts of agencies having legal effect. As such, 
it is possible to also hold agencies (such as Frontex and EASO) 
accountable. Unfortunately, a procedure for infringing the treaties, 
which would be more suitable here, can only be directed against EU 
member states (European Ombudsman, 2013; Parliamentary 
Assembly, 2013). 
 
As we will see, Frontex is already mandated to act in the territorial 
waters and on the territory of third states, based on agreements with 
these states. Both Frontex and EASO play an important role in the 
implementation of policies in hotspots in Greece and Italy and might 
play a similar role in the future, if and when EU reception centres are 
established on the territory of third states, as was recently proposed 
by EU leaders (European Council, 2018).  
 
Motivated by migration control and migration management 
considerations, Frontex as a European agency assists member states 
in securing their borders and the borders of the EU as a whole and in 
preventing ships on the high seas from entering the territorial waters 
of EU member states without permission. Its main task is to 
coordinate operations and to assist member states in the management 
of the EU’s external borders. Frontex also assists member states in 
implementing operational aspects of external border management, 
including actions in third states (Regulation 2016/1624, consideration 
3) and the return of third country nationals who are illegally present 
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in a member state (consideration 11) (European Parliament & 
European Council, 2016). In the past, Frontex has been heavily 
criticised for violating international human rights law (Weinzierl & 
Lisson, 2007; Kasparek, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2011). Criticism 
continued when Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) were 
established for the first time in October 2010 when Greece faced a 
huge influx of migrants entering through Turkey. Human Rights 
Watch’s reports on these practices indicated that Frontex violated 
fundamental rights with its operations on Greek territory, especially 
by sending intercepted migrants to Greek detention centres where 
conditions were dire (Human Rights Watch, 2011; Marin, 2011). 
Frontex then claimed it could not be held directly liable for any 
human rights violations taking place. It argued that it only 
coordinated tasks at the request of states whose actions were 
exercised by national professionals who were not employed by 
Frontex, but acted under the jurisdiction of the host state (which 
made the request for assistance) and remained under their national 
jurisdictions in relation to criminal liability and the carrying of 
weapons. It is debatable whether this statement can be upheld 
(Mitsilegas, 2015; Kasparek, 2010) and to what extent Frontex’s new 
founding regulation (Regulation 2016/1624), has changed this 
situation.  
 
Frontex is currently involved in various operations, including in and 
with third states. In the Mediterranean (Scherer, 2018), Frontex is 
involved in Operation Triton, which was replaced by Operation 
Themis in February 2018. Frontex vessels carry out search and rescue 
operations and bring migrants to a safe port in the EU. The European 
Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) Operation 
Sophia, in which Frontex also participates, was specifically established 
to disrupt criminal smuggling and trafficking networks (European 
Union External Action, n.d.). The training of personnel of the Libyan 
Coast Guard is part of this mission. In the Aegean Sea, Frontex is 
involved in operation Poseidon, whose focus has changed from 




Over the years we have seen the expansion of Frontex’s operational 
tasks. Indeed, in 2016 the mandate of Frontex, and especially its 
operational tasks, were extended further in Regulation 2016/1624: 
 
[…] to provide increased technical and operational assistance to Member States 
through joint operations and rapid border interventions; to ensure the practical 
execution of measures in a situation requiring urgent action at the external borders; 
to provide technical and operational assistance in the support of search and rescue 
operations for persons in distress at sea. (European Parliament & European 
Council, 2016, consideration 11) 
 
However, the responsibility of Frontex did not see a similar 
expansion. Civil and criminal liability is dealt with at the national level, 
albeit in accordance with the law of the host state, and not the home 
state anymore (Regulation 2016/1624, Articles 42 and 43, 
respectively). The criminal liability of Frontex officials is now to be 
treated similarly to that of officials of the host member state. 
However, a provision acknowledging the liability of the agency has 
been adopted in Article 60, but is subject to the agreement underlying 
Frontex’s activities in a specific case. Article 60 states that “[t]he 
contractual liability of the Agency shall be governed by the law 
applicable to the contract in question” (European Parliament & 
European Council, 2016). 
 
Given the current responsibility gap regarding Frontex’s activities, the 
question that remains is to what extent both Frontex as an agency and 
the EU member states involved in Frontex are responsible for human 
rights violations during its operations (Pollak & Slominski, 2009). The 
NGOs and other organisations that have reported on these practices 
argue that Frontex cannot escape responsibility. As we will discuss in 
the next section, similar questions arise regarding the involvement of 
other agencies and cooperation structures designed at the EU level, 
notably EASO (Mitsilegas, 2015). 
EASO 
The European Asylum Support Office, established in 2011 by 
Regulation 439/2010 (European Parliament & European Council, 
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2010), provides operational support to member states with specific 
needs and to member states whose asylum and reception systems are 
under particular pressure. As such, the EASO assists Greece and Italy 
in the processing of asylum claims in EU hotspots. The EU hotspots 
approach is defined as an:  
 
[a]pproach where the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) , Europol and Eurojust work on the 
ground with the authorities of frontline EU Member States which are facing 
disproportionate migratory pressures at the EU’s external borders to help to fulfil 
their obligations under EU law and swiftly identify, register and fingerprint 
incoming migrants. (European Commission, 2015)  
 
In principle, operational support by EASO is limited to the 
registration, identification, fingerprinting and debriefing of asylum 
seekers and return operations. In addition, EASO helps to process 
asylum applications as quickly as possible. EASO issues admissibility 
opinions on individual asylum applications lodged in Greece, which 
are then presented to the Greek Asylum Service for the final 
admissibility decision. This form of joint processing appears to go 
beyond EASO’s mandate under its current regulation 439/2010, 
which in recital 14 provides that “the Support Office should have no 
direct or indirect powers in relation to the taking of decisions by 
Member States’ asylum authorities on individual applications for 
international protection” (European Parliament & European Council, 
2010).  
 
Similarly, as for Frontex, these operational tasks give rise to the 
question to what extent EASO bears responsibility if the human 
rights of migrants in hotspots are violated. As is well documented, the 
situations in hotspots and on the Greek Islands are deplorable and 
inhumane (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Ćerimović, 2017; Danish 
Refugee Council, 2017). It is clear that EASO cannot be held 
responsible for the living conditions and facilities (or lack thereof) on 
the Greek Islands, as this is simply beyond its mandate. However, 
what if rights are violated while giving an opinion on the admissibility 
of an individual asylum application? The official standpoint of EASO 
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and Greece is that EASO does not formally decide on asylum 
applications and that this remains the sole responsibility of Greece.  
 
Nevertheless, EASO’s involvement led the European Centre for 
Constitutional and Human Rights to file a complaint with the 
European Ombudsman. The complaint claims that EASO is 
overstepping its mandate in conducting admissibility interviews in 
hotspots and that EASO’s opinions amount to de facto admissibility 
decisions. The Ombudsman recognised that “there are genuine 
concerns about the quality of the admissibility interviews as well as 
about the procedural fairness of how they are conducted”, but found 
that “ultimate legal responsibility for decisions on individual asylum 
applications rests with the Greek authorities”. It also noted that 
EASO’s founding regulation would likely be amended in the future 
to provide explicitly for such activity, and held that further inquiries 
into the complaint were not justified (European Ombudsman, 2018). 
In order to strengthen the mandate of EASO, in 2016, the European 
Commission launched a proposal to expand the operational tasks of 
EASO and to transform it into an EU Agency for Asylum (European 
Commission, 2016c). Pending adoption, the proposal was amended 
in September 2018, again expanding the operational tasks for the new 
EU Agency for Asylum (European Commission, 2018). 
 
Thus, whereas states like Italy adapt their policies in reaction to legal 
developments, in the case of EASO, legal documents are amended in 
reaction to new policy developments. The cat-and-mouse game can, 
therefore, also be seen to work the other way around. In any event it 
is evident that not only states, but also the EU, make efforts to 
develop migration control policies which at first sight are legal, either 
because they exploit loopholes in the existing framework or because 
they adapt the legal framework itself. However, such policies, 
nevertheless, can lead to human rights violations and it remains 
unclear which actor is responsible for these violations. As regards 
EASO, the EU’s envisioned strengthened mandate for the new EU 
Agency for Asylum suggests that questions of responsibility will 




This chapter investigates the question: To what extent can the EU and its 
agencies, as well as state and non-state actors, be held responsible for the human 
rights violations suffered by refugees and migrants? First, several examples of 
migration control policies were considered. It was then discussed to 
what extent the states involved in these policies, as well as the EU 
and its agencies, may or may not be held responsible for the human 
rights violations suffered by migrants. As regards states, the chapter 
shows that they can be held responsible, both for the conduct of state 
officials and for the conduct of non-state actors. However, states 
need to exercise sufficient control in order to exercise jurisdiction. If 
that is not the case, they can only incur responsibility for aiding or 
assisting another state. Both as regards jurisdiction and aiding or 
assisting, it is unclear where the boundaries lie. As regards the EU and 
its agencies, the situation is similar. If they act directly, EU institutions 
can be held responsible on the basis of the obligations embodied in 
the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. However, EU institutions hardly act 
directly in a third country in the field of migration control. The 
situation is, however, different for EU agencies such as Frontex, and 
in the future possibly also EASO, whose mandates include 
operational tasks. This chapter shows that it is difficult to establish 
the responsibility of these agencies and that this is an area very much 
under development. With the EU planning to further externalise 
migration control, it is important to clarify the legal grey areas and to 
fill in the gaps in the legal framework, in order for the migrants whose 
rights are being violated not to be left in a legal black hole.  
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